TOWARDS A CULTURAL DIPLOMACY FOR SOUTH AFRICA – BUILDING BLOCKS AND BEST PRACTICES

by

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ach</td>
<td>Arts, Culture and Heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTAG</td>
<td>Arts and Culture Task Group</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>APPs</td>
<td>Annual Performance Plans</td>
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<td>ARCH</td>
<td>Africa Re-imagined Creative Hub</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUS</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>AWHF</td>
<td>African World Heritage Fund</td>
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<td>BASA</td>
<td>Business and Arts South Africa</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BCM</td>
<td>Black Consciousness Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<td>CCIFSA</td>
<td>Cultural and Creative Industries Federation of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations (United States of America)</td>
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<td>CFIR</td>
<td>Consultative Forum on International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Department of Arts and Culture</td>
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<td>DACST</td>
<td>Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<td>DST</td>
<td>Department of Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAPE</td>
<td>Foundation for Art Preservation in Embassies (United States of America)</td>
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<td>FESTAC</td>
<td>Festival of Black Arts and Culture (Nigeria)</td>
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<td>ICAIC</td>
<td>Cuban Institute of Cinematic Arts</td>
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<td>ICCR</td>
<td>India Cultural Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (Germany)</td>
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<td>ICTS</td>
<td>International Cooperation, Trade and Security (cluster)</td>
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<td>IGOs</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisations</td>
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<td>INCP</td>
<td>International Network for Cultural Policies</td>
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<td>IPAP 2</td>
<td>Industrial Policy Action Plan</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>MGE</td>
<td>Mzansi Golden Economy</td>
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<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Arts Council</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NFVF</td>
<td>National Film and Video Foundation</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Growth Path</td>
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<td>National Heritage Council</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Cooperation Development</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OCSLA</td>
<td>Office of the Chief State Law Advisor</td>
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<td>POCs</td>
<td>Programmes of Cooperation</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<td>RSA DAC</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa, Department of Arts and Culture</td>
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<td>Republic of South Africa, Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<td>RSA NPC</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa, National Planning Commission</td>
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<td>RSA the dti</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>SA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACA</td>
<td>South African Congress Alliance</td>
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<td>SPCHD</td>
<td>Social Protection, Community and Human Development (cluster)</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America (alternatively US – United States)</td>
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<td>USA CRS</td>
<td>United States of America, Congress Research Service</td>
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<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC CPS</td>
<td>University of South Carolina, Center on Public Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Socialist Soviet Republics</td>
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<td>VOKS</td>
<td>All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (former USSR)</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organisation</td>
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<td>WPF</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Cultural diplomacy, a little studied tool of diplomacy, is generally regarded as just one of the components of public diplomacy. When better understood, however, it has the potential to become a much more powerful tool for improving a country’s image and its relations with other countries. It may also contribute to domestic nation-building” (Simon Mark 2009: abstract)

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH THEME

Cultural diplomacy is an ambiguous and contested concept. Apart from sometimes subsumed under or even equated with public diplomacy, it is not clearly distinguished from propaganda, cultural imperialism or cultural exchanges. Occasionally, it is even deemed synonymous with ‘nation-branding’. Nonetheless, Cummings (2003: 1) provides a useful definition that firstly, encapsulates the essence of cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding”; and that secondly, identifies it as a sub-field of the study of diplomacy. The scholarly emphasis is based on the realisation that culture can unite societies but can also tear them apart, e.g. as in Flanders and Belgium; Scotland and the United Kingdom (UK); and the Basque region and Spain. Furthermore, culture underpins diverse but widely discussed diplomatic-relevant notions ranging from the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis proposed by Samuel P. Huntington (1996) to the ‘dialogue among civilizations’ counter-narrative proposed by the former Iranian President, Mohammad Khatami (UNESCO 2000). Hence the belief, advocated even by the earliest diplomatic writers, that an understanding of the culture(s) of other nations is essential for establishing and extending international relations. In practice this requires the pursuit of a corresponding and coherent cultural diplomacy policy, particularly one that presupposes a common understanding of, or approach to related issues such as (national) culture, identity and multiculturalism. This also considering that culture itself is an elusive, intangible and complex concept, difficult to grasp and even more difficult to explain.

While cultural diplomacy is not a new concept, and is reflected in the ancient and earliest manifestations of diplomacy, it (re)gained prominence in modern times. This was the case in the West during the Cold War, particularly in the United States of America (USA), when amongst others it was used as an instrument of subversion and propaganda in the face of strained political relations with the Soviet Union. Since 11 September 2001 (9/11) and to a
large extent due to the so-called ‘war on terror’, there has been a renewed and growing interest among academics, practitioners and the public alike in public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and other ‘tools of state’ that impact on public perceptions.

In addition, globalisation and the information age have eradicated borders and distances, transporting (cultural) goods and images all over the globe in an instant. Cultural goods and services, such as music and films, have also become important commercial commodities, with the concomitant challenge to states (and communities and individuals) to protect their indigenous cultural identities and products against external cultural influences and hegemons (Feigenbaum 2001: 8-12). This debate on the free exchange of goods and services versus the cultural exceptions to free trade is waged in different multilateral fora ranging from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), through the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

While an academic interest in cultural diplomacy is more established in the US and Europe, scholarly emphasis on it has become prominent in other parts of the world and in South Africa, mainly due to policy development on and the increased use of cultural diplomacy. The aim of this study is therefore two-fold: firstly, by reviewing recent literature, to add to the conceptual clarification and understanding of cultural diplomacy, with specific reference to the elements thereof, how it is organised, what its aims are and how it impacts on the conduct of diplomatic relations; and secondly, to determine the need for and to analyse and evaluate the development of a South African cultural diplomacy policy. The latter includes determining which building blocks thereof are already in place – amongst others bilateral and multilateral cultural agreements, the White Papers on Culture and Foreign Policy respectively, a dedicated institutional structure and budget – and where gaps (in policy and strategy) exist. For the purposes of this study, the adapted model that Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) propose for optimum cultural diplomacy effectiveness and durability, based on the twin propositions of distance and interactivity, is used as a framework for analysis to describe, explain and evaluate leading global practices and the South African case study.

2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW

As implied above, scholars and practitioners of cultural diplomacy are confronted by a dual challenge: a definitional problem, since there is no unambiguous and agreed upon
definition and understanding of the term; and a practical problem, since cultural diplomacy is often linked to but needs to be distinguished from related practices such as public diplomacy, cultural exchange, propaganda and nation-branding. Hence the need to provide an overview of literature on cultural diplomacy and related themes, to indicate that embedded knowledge on the research theme exists. At a theoretical level, a distinction is respectively made between literature on the definition and development, the core themes, and the analytical modelling of cultural diplomacy. At a practical level, and contextualised by international examples, literature and data sources on South African cultural diplomacy are considered.

At a theoretical level and by using the Cummings’ (2003) definition of cultural diplomacy as a point of departure, it is firstly evident that the relationship between politics, diplomacy and culture is significant. In this respect Bozeman (1994: 5) emphasised the inseparable link between political systems and culture, also arguing that international relations are in fact intercultural relations. Green (2010: 2-4) elaborated on this by positing that cultural diplomacy is conducted within the broader framework of foreign policy, with the concomitant emergence of new actors in the arena and the progressive development of a multilateral approach since 1945. Accordingly, Freeman’s (1997a: 112) conclusion that an inextricable link exists between culture and diplomacy is noted, also considering that the diplomatic skills of professional diplomats require a good knowledge of their own history and culture and also a sound understanding of and empathy for the culture of the receiving state. Based on the assumption that culture is not static, Feigenbaum (2001: 19-25 & 29-31) examined twenty first century globalisation and the world-wide but uneven growth and distribution of culture goods, and the resultant erosion of local, regional or national cultures. In this respect he identified and emphasised factors that have significant implications for cultural diplomacy.

Although cultural diplomacy is a relatively recent term, it has ancient origins, especially if understood from the perspective of ‘diplomacy between cultures’ (ICD [s.a.]a). The literature also discusses its modern origins in fifteenth century Italy, where formal diplomatic systems of communications were established between different cultures (Klavins 2011). The evolution of cultural diplomacy in the USA since 1914 in particular, is covered by Arndt ([s.a.]). In this respect he cited the height of US cultural diplomacy as the “channelling of debts and reparations incurred by war into exchanges between the antagonists, of scholars and students” – a model pursued for forty years. However, he identified and lamented the subsequent impoverishment of US cultural diplomacy and the
transformation thereof during the Cold War into public diplomacy, or what he called a US euphemism for propaganda.

Secondly, since its post-Cold War re-emergence, substantial literature on or directly related to cultural diplomacy have appeared. From a thematic point of view, note is taken of the following;

(a) Cultural diplomacy as soft power: Joseph S. Nye, in *Soft Power: The means to succeed in world politics* (2004: 30-32), identified culture, political ideas and policies, so-called soft power, as tools available to nations to attract and persuade in pursuit of their objectives, as opposed to the use of more traditional (and coercive) economic and military power, or hard power. This notion of soft power and culture was subsequently pursued and analysed by other scholars of diplomacy, notably Jan Melissen in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (2005: 147-163), and *Diplomatie raderwerk van de international politiek* (1999: 167-184). In these works he explored the definitions, aims and structures of cultural diplomacy, as well as underlying concepts such as culture, cultural identity, cultural community, cultural policy and cultural goods and services. He considered the increasing impact of an expanding range of approaches to communicating with foreign publics on ideas and values, be it through public diplomacy, nation branding, cultural diplomacy, or collaborative dialogue-based diplomacy.

At an official level, soft power also gained attention as a foreign policy tool as evidenced by a national summit hosted by Australia (AUS 2008: 266-277) identifying strategies to project its soft power internationally. Equally, the American Congress Research Service (USA CRS 2008: 22-33) report; *Comparing Global Influence: China’s and U.S Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade and Investment in the Developing World*, related the projections of global influence by China and the US respectively through soft power, including trade, (cultural) diplomacy and aid practices.

Note is taken of an approach by Smith (2012: 68-83) who argued that for mid-size powers in the global arena such as Canada, Norway and specifically South Africa, soft power – including cultural diplomacy – i.e., the power of ideals rather than material power, is the essence of foreign policy. Foreign policy *per se* is not the remit of this study and therefore this notion is not explored further, but it is noted that included in such an overall soft power approach would be, being seen as a good global citizen; supporting multilateral solutions
to global challenges; leading attractive causes such as economic aid or peace-keeping; public and cultural diplomacy; moving and influencing through cultural diplomacy; maintaining a positive image and reputation or so-called charm offensive; and even using hard power resources (political, economic and military) to attract and co-opt rather than to coerce and enforce, eg. for humanitarian assistance, foreign direct investment, political solidarity and acting as champion of human rights globally. It is argued that hard and soft power has a symbiotic relationship and it is therefore how a state’s resources – both hard and soft – are used that determines its international profile and influence.

(b) Cultural diplomacy as a public diplomacy tool: In American diplomatic thinking and writing, leading the global discourse, cultural diplomacy is inextricably linked to public diplomacy. To disregard all studies that use the concept in this way, would negate a major contribution and ignore useful academic work on the subject; it is therefore included. For example, Schneider (2003: 2) proposed that cultural diplomacy may be the best tool (for the US) to communicate values such as freedom, justice, diversity and tolerance in vying for the ‘intellectual soul’ of a nation or continent. Implicitly this recognised the fact that many nations consider public opinion as a basis of foreign policy (Roberts 2011: 12) in the process relying on information sharing and propaganda – antecedents of what would later be called cultural diplomacy – as exemplified by the news and cultural services established in the foreign ministry of France as early as the 1920s (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 127). Outside the US-EU (United States-European Union) axis, the use of culture to encourage mutual understanding and to create a positive brand for New Zealand abroad is explored by MacDonald (2011: 25-38 and 40-53). Mark (2008: ii), in a comparative study of the cultural diplomacies of Canada, New Zealand and India (multicultural countries with English as official language), considered how “cultural diplomacy presents a national image abroad; its role in the protection of cultural sovereignty; and how it advances domestic objectives”. Based on his findings, Mark (2009: 37-39) also argued for a more important and recognised role for cultural diplomacy in improving the image and relations of a country, and increasing its effectiveness in influencing foreign governments and public.

That states and regional bodies are showing a renewed interest in cultural diplomacy as foreign policy tool is further evidenced by the number of studies undertaken and commissioned in this regard. In 2009 the EU commissioned a study with the purpose, amongst others, to “brand Europe (globally) as the place to create in the world” and to
encourage increased cultural collaboration among its member states (EU European Commission, 2009: 9). Similarly, the John Brademas Center for the Study of Congress at the New York University (2009: 4) presented a report to Congress which recommended that “international arts and cultural exchanges be integrated into the planning strategies of US policymakers as a key element of public diplomacy, given the positive association of international opinion of American values and culture rather than government policies”. Countries also periodically reviewed their cultural diplomacy activities, as part of long-term planning and revision of their international relations strategies. For example, in 2011 the Norwegian Agency for Cooperation Development (NORAD) undertook a study; *Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Sport Co-operation with Countries in the South. Case Country Palestinian Area*, as part of the mid-term evaluation of their 2006-2015 strategy (NORAD 2011). As referred to above, Australia considered its soft power and cultural diplomacy in 2008, as part of a study; *Australia 2020 Summit Final Report – Towards a creative Australia – the future of the arts, film and design* (AUS 2008).

*(c) Cultural diplomacy, bilateral relations and foreign policy:* Scholarly and public studies on the manifestations of cultural diplomacy of the US and European states are prolific, for example those by Nisbett (2011), Feigenbaum (2001) and Arndt (2005). The focus ranges from the cultural diplomacy of the 1920s and 1930s to the extensive US attention to public diplomacy (including cultural diplomacy) during the Cold War *vis-à-vis* the former Soviet Union and Eastern European satellite states. A revived interest in the topic is prevalent in the post-9/11 era, exemplified by an approach that recognises the power and opportunities to address (and influence) foreign audiences and to convey ideas and values through cultural diplomacy. Academic interest is also focused anew for comparison purposes on the more traditional, structured and institutionalised approach of the European founding nations (Westphalian states) to cultural diplomacy, for example by Feaux de la Croix (2007) and Bound *et al.* (2007). This renewed interest was further evidenced by a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) documentary (2011) that analysed cultural diplomacy and examined the role of the British Council and the BBC in promoting the UK overseas – an initiative through so-called ‘anglobalisation’ (BBC 2011).

At a scholarly level, the impact of cultural diplomacy on the (heightened) quality of bilateral relations was explored by Aguilar (1996: 245-271), while Ogoura (2008: 2-6) identified five particular phases in the cultural diplomacy of Japan since 1945, rebuilding its international relations in the aftermath of WWII. Higham ([s.a.]: 134-135) explored the lack of a
consistent Canadian cultural diplomacy, although prioritised in Canadian foreign policy planning, due to limited resources and staffing. In his study, Katzenstein (2002: 10-12; 23-30; 49) considered the impact of globalisation and technology on international relations (and cultural diplomacy) in Europe and Asia. These scholars all argued that cultural diplomacy is increasingly recognised as a core tool of both foreign policy and bilateral relations.

(d) Cultural Diplomacy in multilateralism: The value of cultural diplomacy was recognised by the UN since its establishment in 1945, with the creation of UNESCO as a specialised agency of the UN with a mandate for culture. Laves (1959: 386) identified the then newly established UNESCO as the ‘center of cultural diplomacy’ and recognised the significance of cultural relations as a dimension in (contemporary) multilateral diplomacy. The UNESCO Convention on the Promotion and Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted in 2005, is the first global policy instrument of its kind to recognise the right of the state to promote and protect the cultures and cultural diversity of its citizens, in the face of the hegemonic tendencies of especially, but not only, American pop culture (UNESCO: 2005), and support key elements of cultural diplomacy. Jora (2013: 47) identified the 2006 establishment of the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) as a new multilateral trend in cultural diplomacy that will trigger “new strategies of action”.

International diplomatic institutions, such as Clingendael in the Netherlands and the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (ICD) in Berlin, attach particular significance to cultural diplomacy and track the academic theorising and practical development thereof. The ICD monitors and commissions research on cultural diplomacy by public, private (business) and civil society, and published a Cultural Diplomacy Outlook Report which includes a country list of cultural diplomacy projects in the top ten countries per region in Europe, Asia and the Americas, for purposes of oversight, comparison and identifying best or leading practices world-wide. In the 2011 report, nation-branding and art, and other cross-cutting themes of cultural diplomacy were specifically explored (ICD 2011). In this respect the Cultural Diplomacy Outlook 2011 contained a compilation of over 40 essays and case studies based on themes, geographical areas and different artistic sectors and actors, whether state or public. The report ranks both countries and (European) companies in terms of their ‘commitment’ to cultural diplomacy and considers specific regional approaches. The report also considered the public, private and civil society sectors respectively, and included a selection for comparison purposes of projects and programmes from around the world. It also looked at cultural diplomacy in the multilateral
fora of the United Nations (UN), the EU and the African Union (AU). As such it provided a global overview and comparative analysis of cultural diplomacy that is useful to scholars and practitioners alike.

Thirdly, creating an analytical framework for cultural diplomacy, Jessica CE Gienow-Hecht and Mark C Donfried (2010) made a comprehensive analysis of cultural diplomacy from both a theoretical and practical perspective in their study, *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*. In an effort to provide an analytical model for case study purposes, this work relied on and integrated previous studies. In a series of essays, the authors explored the history, meaning, and strategies behind cultural diplomacy, considered contemporary ideas on the subject, and provided and compared a number of case studies of cultural diplomacy policies in different regions of the world, dating back to the 1920s. Accordingly, they identified three different schools of thought on cultural diplomacy, namely;

- the use of culture as an instrument of state policy linked to propaganda-like activities with limited participation and input of the private sector or civil society (e.g. former Soviet Union practices);
- cultural diplomacy as an alternative to difficult political relations (e.g. French relations with Syria and Lebanon from 1920 to 1945); and,
- cultural diplomacy practiced outside the realm of the state (e.g. country promotional activities by Japanese NGOs and individuals, 1862–1933).

Based on these observations of international practices, they proposed an analytical framework (henceforth the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model) and identified two propositions (on distance and interactivity), against which the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy and the resultant strengthening of relations could be assessed. They argued, firstly, that a greater degree of separation or ‘distance’ between cultural diplomacy and the political and economic agenda of the state enhances the chances of success of a cultural diplomacy programme; and secondly, that the more ‘interactivity’ exists between the agent and recipient of a cultural diplomacy program, the more likely cultural diplomacy is to be successful and sustainable.

Prior to this seminal work, several other contributions provided theoretical components for understanding and analysing cultural diplomacy, although not in the structured and coherent manner as Gienow-Hecht and Donfried. For example, Féaux de la Croix (2007: 2), at a discussion forum of the ICD, reasoned that “the standing of a nation in the
international society is importantly determined by its international cultural profile”. He argued that there is no benchmark or standard model for cultural diplomacy based on dependence, autonomy or nature of institutional arrangements, due to a lack of research, but that it is clearly underrated as an instrument of diplomacy. Diodato ([s.a.]) in turn categorised four models of cultural relations and public diplomacy, based on the level of state control and civil society involvement, financing and involvement of primary and secondary actors, namely the French, British, German and Italian models. It is concluded that whereas there have been several attempts at developing analytical frameworks, including some in the related field of public diplomacy, the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model (2010) arguably provides the most appropriate framework for analysing cultural diplomacy beyond the American and European experiences, and is therefore used in this study.

At a practical level, regarding the South African case study, the country’s experience, practice and policy context of cultural diplomacy forms the historical background that informs the study. This includes the (once-off and experimental) placement of cultural attachés abroad in the 1980s to 1990s by the then Department of Education, policy directives in definitive landmark documents and statements over the past half a century, as well as contemporary views of cultural experts on cultural diplomacy. A particular watershed moment in this regard occurred when the Minister of Arts and Culture, in his budget speech in 2011, announced that South Africa would be developing a cultural diplomacy policy and subsequently stated that South Africa would consider (again) placing cultural attachés abroad (RSA DAC 2011c). The parameters of current South African government thinking on cultural diplomacy is based on Presidential and Ministerial speeches, the Strategic Plans and Annual Reports of the Departments of Arts and Culture and International Relations and Cooperation respectively, including the White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage of 1996 – which acknowledges the role of the international community in setting norms and standards (RSA DAC 1996: chapter 1). The 1996 White Paper, in particular, devotes a chapter to the notion of fostering international cultural cooperation, and developing cultural links and exchanges (RSA DAC 1996: chapter 6). The 1996 White Paper was revised in 2013, with the latter indicating a substantial shift in policy orientation towards the goals of a developmental state, that are considered for their impact on cultural diplomacy. From a diplomatic perspective note is taken of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation issued White Paper on South African Foreign Policy – Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu (RSA 2011).
The above overview points to a substantive body of divergent literature on cultural diplomacy. Theory on the concept is however still underdeveloped and it is often equated with or subsumed under other tools of so-called soft power, particularly public diplomacy. This suggests a need for greater definitional clarity and a clearer understanding of the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of cultural diplomacy, which this study will attempt to provide.

Although much has been said and written internationally on cultural diplomacy per se, and Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) have proposed an analytical framework that allows for comparative case studies, similar comparison and research has not been done in respect of South Africa. Therefore, this study on the nature and scope of South African culture, also to the extent it may inform and provide building blocks for a cultural diplomacy approach and policy, is deemed justifiable. In addition, it is evident that it fills an omission regarding the South African cultural diplomacy knowledge base.

3. IDENTIFICATION AND DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The underlying research problem that informs this study is that notwithstanding the growing importance attached globally to cultural diplomacy and its link to foreign policy, international relations and diplomacy, there is still a gap in conceptual clarity, analysis and theory, and in particular how this would inform consideration of a South African cultural diplomacy policy. This is reflected in the following primary research question: Given current thinking on cultural diplomacy and drawing on best practices globally as identified in recent academic writings, what are the critical components (success factors) and key elements in developing / designing a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa?

In order to answer this question, the following secondary research questions are addressed:
(a) What is the current understanding of global trends in cultural diplomacy?
(b) How is cultural diplomacy distinct and differentiated from, or linked to public diplomacy and soft power tools of foreign policy?
(c) What is the recent historical and post-1994 South African context and thinking that informs the development of a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa?
(d) What role is there for non-state actors in shaping cultural diplomacy in South Africa?
(e) How do the current elements or building blocks of South African cultural diplomacy conform to the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model and its two theses on ‘distance’ and ‘interactivity’?
The primary research assumption or explanatory proposition is that current thinking on cultural diplomacy and global practices impact substantially on how diplomacy is considered and conducted, and on the manner in which cultural diplomacy is structured, organised and institutionalised. Therefore, by identifying the elements already in place, including its multicultural identity and its rich and unique natural and cultural heritage, and by drawing on the strengths of a vibrant private sector and civil society, a comprehensive South African cultural diplomacy policy should be designed, developed and pursued in an effective and sustainable manner. In respect of the secondary questions, the following assumptions or explanatory propositions are offered: Firstly, there are significant disadvantages for any state that does not pursue a well-structured and vigorous cultural diplomacy. Secondly, while it can be argued that cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are forms of soft power, their aims and objectives, scope and impact are significantly different. Hence the contention that cultural diplomacy is a significant resource that adds value to foreign policy priorities and practices and that countries need to strengthen their cultural diplomacy policies and practices within the framework of public-private diplomacy. Thirdly, while not detracting from its aesthetic value, the economic and developmental value of culture is increasingly recognised in South Africa and deemed to be a vehicle to promote South Africa abroad. Finally, that South Africa already has significant building blocks and existing albeit rudimentary initiatives upon which to base a viable and robust cultural diplomacy.

Accordingly, the objectives of the research are to:

- identify the current thinking and ideas on cultural diplomacy and to describe and critique the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model of cultural diplomacy;
- distinguish between but also indicate the links and relationship between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy and other relevant concepts;
- consider international practices;
- apply the adapted Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model to South Africa; and
- propose options for the development of a comprehensive and coherent cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa.

Considering its scope and timeframe, the study is demarcated, firstly, by the conceptual and applied nature and content of cultural diplomacy, distinct from but interrelated with public diplomacy and other concepts; and secondly, by the and post-1994 manifestations and development thereof in the South African context (up to 2015). Where applicable and to indicate the legacies of the past, pre-1994 historical-cultural influences were also considered.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This study takes the form of a literature and document based analysis. A critical literature study of the most important and recent primary and secondary sources, as illustrated in the literature survey, was undertaken to define and demarcate the core elements of cultural diplomacy. This includes the structures and principle objectives of cultural diplomacy, as well as international trends evidenced by a scanning of different regions and representative countries in those regions. Based on this conceptual clarification, in the process also distinguishing cultural diplomacy from but linking it to public diplomacy, the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model of cultural diplomacy (2010) is described, critiqued, adapted and eventually used to structure the study and to analyse the South African case study. As far as the latter is concerned, the analysis and evaluation of existing building blocks and current initiatives that constitute the rudimentary elements of a cultural diplomacy for South Africa at present, is based on published policy documents and statements available in the public domain, supplemented by secondary literature-based sources on South African foreign policy, diplomacy and transnational cultural relations.

The approach to the study is descriptive-analytical, using the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model as a theoretical framework. As far as research methods are concerned, the study is of a qualitative inductive nature, involving a non-comparative single case study (i.e. South Africa). As far as data sources are concerned, the conceptual and theoretical dimensions are literature based. The South African case study relies on policy documents and statements in the public domain, and on additional secondary publications on South African foreign policy, diplomacy and culture.

5. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

This study is structured as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction. Chapter 1 sets the context of the study by clarifying the aim and scope and suggesting a working definition of cultural diplomacy, based on a literature survey. It also introduces the research theme, identifies the research problem and indicates the nature of the research design and methodology.
Chapter 2: Cultural diplomacy: conceptual clarification and theoretical framework.
Chapter 2 examines the definitions, and conceptual and theoretical framework for the study of cultural diplomacy, within the context of international relations and diplomatic theory. It discusses the preferred analytical framework provided by Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) and offers an adaption to the model. The relationship between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy and other related concepts are also considered. Against the background of contemporary academic ideas on the subject, and a number of case studies, the analytical framework structured around the notions of distance and interactiveness as amended provides a model against which (South African) cultural diplomacy, across time and space, can be assessed for effectiveness and the long term sustainable strengthening of international relations.

Chapter 3: Origins and development of cultural diplomacy. Chapter 3 considers the global historical development and origins of cultural diplomacy and selected and representative contemporary manifestations thereof against the proposed adapted model. This includes the way cultural diplomacy is structured and implemented in a number of countries, both developed and developing, as well as Western and non-Western perceptions, examples and lessons concerning cultural diplomacy from the different regions of the world, and contemporary developments.

Chapter 4: The cultural diplomacy of South Africa: emergence and manifestations. Chapter 4 applies the 5-element adapted model including the theses related to “distance” and “interactiveness” as identified in the theoretical framework of Gienow-Hecht & Donfried to the South African case study. As a point of departure, this requires a description and analysis of the concept of cultural diplomacy in the South African context, historical and contemporary, including its content and motivations. This includes a consideration of the existing structures and extent of organisational and institutional arrangements, the primary actors as well as the programmatic aspects thereof. Accordingly, this chapter reflects on determining factors, and how these impact on South African cultural policy and (cultural) diplomacy abroad. The existing instruments and vehicles through which cultural policy is applied to the international relations of South Africa are examined. The dynamics and mutuality of cultural interaction are also considered.

Chapter 5: Evaluation and recommendations. Chapter 5 provides a conclusive summary, and key findings, including those related to the case study, based on the five
elements including the two theses of the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model. Accordingly, the elements of a South African cultural diplomacy that are already in place and the gaps that exist, are identified, and recommendations are made with regard to the lessons South African can learn from international best or leading practices. Where applicable, relevant aspects not provided for in the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model are identified in order to strengthen this framework and finally, areas for further study are identified.

6. CONCLUSION

Given the announcement by the Minister of Arts and Culture on the pursuance of a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa, this study is timely. DAC is the leading government department responsible for culture while DIRCO is overall responsible for South Africa’s international relations. Developing a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa would necessitate cooperation between the two departments. A cultural diplomacy policy would be of significant benefit to both. The recent expansion of the international relations programme of DAC to include longer-term cultural seasons programmes with selected strategic partners, and the new focus on a month-long Africa festival in 2015 and ‘cultural seasons’ with the BRICS partners announced by Minister Nathi Mthethwa in his address during the 2014 DAC budget vote in Parliament (RSA DAC 2014a), makes such a study more relevant. Cultural diplomacy has become a new focus of global interaction, pursued in a more formalised manner, not least by South Africa’s strategic partners. While 2014 presented the South African Year in China and 2015 witnessed the China Year in South Africa as a new and significant two-part cultural diplomacy initiative with China, this research is considered to be relevant to support a policy discussion. For DIRCO such a policy would add a useful tool to its existing foreign policy resources, and complement the establishment on 16 July 2015 of the South African Council on International Relations, and the South African Association of former Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Chief Representatives adding an element of diplomatic maturity as South Africa enters the third decade of its democracy (RSA DIRCO 2015f).

As a point of departure and to contextualise the study, it is necessary to consider a conceptual clarification of relevant terms, including culture, diplomacy, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and to identify a theoretical framework. In the next chapter consideration will therefore be given to a selection of theoretical aspects in the study of cultural diplomacy and how it finds application in practice.
CHAPTER 2

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. INTRODUCTION

Cultural diplomacy as a field of study, due to the intrinsic elusive nature and scope of culture and the imprecise nexus with diplomacy would benefit from an interdisciplinary approach. This assumption, however, is not without controversy and is less accepted by so-called traditional theorists of International Relations. While diplomacy is a well understood and defined concept, this is not the case with culture and therefore also cultural diplomacy, which is contested and which remains under-discovered and under-explained. Accordingly, this chapter serves a threefold purpose. The first is to contextualise cultural diplomacy with reference to its position and significance in the study and practice of international relations. The second is to clarify the conceptual meaning and understanding of culture, diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. The third is to explain and assess the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model on cultural diplomacy, also considering its propositions on distance and interactivity as success factors.

2. THE CONTEXT OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Cultural diplomacy as a field of study straddles the international relations and diplomacy domain on one hand and the social or cultural domain on the other. These two areas, collectively in the realm of the Social Sciences and individually the subject matter of different disciplines, have only periodically been the topic of joint consideration in International Relations (IR) and its subfields of foreign policy and diplomacy. Hence, the interdisciplinary nature of cultural diplomacy puts scholars in the unenviable position of vacillation between digression or over-simplification and creates confusion for non-scholars, with inevitable relegation of the topic to the margins or periphery of IR.

2.1 Culture in International Relations

In the post-Cold war era, IR theorists have taken a renewed interest in culture, a trend evident across the various divisions of the discipline including foreign policy and diplomacy, as well as across mainstream and alternative IR theories. The mainstream
theorists (classical realists and liberals) adapted reluctantly to this trend, deeming culture to be peripheral, whereas the alternative and critical theorists (reflectivist and constructivist) gained strength from it and greater acceptance for their long held orientations (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996: 3-4). It is argued that this scholarly openness among IR theorists to consider alternative explanations for world affairs with the inclusion of an emphasis of culture is a result of the failure to predict the end of the Cold War, and the resultant transformation of global politics. Changing realities in the global arena, and the challenge of critical theories to orthodox thinking in IR, have created space for a reconsideration of the role of culture. Unfortunately the post-Cold War environment and the preponderance of studies on cultural diplomacy originating in the USA in particular was coloured by a historical orientation towards culture and cultural diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument of containment and subversion dating back to the Cold War (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 3).

In considering the relevance of culture (and identity) in International Relations, Lapid and Kratochwil (1996: 7) argued that “the perception of multiplicity and the pervasive theme of construction are the two central motifs dominating the current rethinking of culture and identity in social theory”. Confronted with an increasingly mobile, diverse and multi-ethnic world, it is proposed that IR will benefit from the new approach to culture. Hence it is postulated that at its core International Relations (and international relations as its subject matter) may in fact constitute contact among cultures within an international society, and therefore that international relations are social or cultural relations (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996: 83-85).

This recognition of the importance of cultural (and educational) affairs in IR and in its subfield of foreign policy is, however, not new. As early as 1964, at the height of the Cold War US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Coombs penned a seminal work, “The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs” for the Council on Foreign Relations (Coombs 1964), that contained lessons for today. In the foreword Senator JW Fulbright (in Coombs 1964: ix-x) bemoaned the fact that although (USA) political, economic and military dimensions of foreign policy had since World War II been significantly enhanced by the end of American isolation, the human component of foreign policy, i.e. “the basic human factors from which a peaceful world must ultimately be built”, had similarly not been emphasised (Fulbright in Coombs 1964: ix). The neglect of the human side of foreign policy excludes the fundamental strengths of a society, its creativity and innovation. It was argued the aspirations of humanity will ultimately be decided
(through knowledge and understanding of each other) in the minds of people, and not on the battlefields or in a conference room. This view echoed the sentiments expressed much earlier by US President Woodrow Wilson in the dying moments of World War I and it was later contained in the preamble of the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) with a global mandate for culture and education: “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed” (UNESCO 1945).

Since the 1990s, in a return to these views, perceived gaps in dominant IR theory were probed, including amongst others how the behaviour of a state is affected by culture, identity and social constructions. In this respect it is proposed that the fundamentals, foundation, or grounding of International Relations as a field of study is similar to that of the Social Sciences, namely that of human decision-making, individually or collectively, and not (only) that of the state (Hudson 2007). As a result humans and their ideas (i.e. ideational factors rooted in culture and identity) are as important determinants of international affairs and state behaviour as are material factors. Hudson (2007) further explored the role and effects of culture and national identity on foreign policy. This analysis has significantly relevance for the field of cultural diplomacy. Culture is linked to the message but also to the cultural orientation of the messenger, and it is argued that the motivations and decisions of individual (political) leaders in the global arena are shaped as much by domestic factors (culture and socialisation) as by international ones (the issues and the nation’s place in the world). Culture, identity and socialisation therefore form “much of the basic architecture of the political belief systems” of leaders (Hudson 2007: 103). Cultural factors play a role in individual, national but also regional (political) context – an analysis of Asian regional politics would be incomplete without consideration of the deep bitterness felt by Asian neighbours against Japan. Culture and (national) identity therefore has a significant impact at individual level and in national, regional and global politics.

It is also noted that in the ascending scale of instruments that exert pressure and influence in foreign policy, Brighi and Hill (cited by van Wyk 2012: 280) made two distinctive proposals regarding the relationship between culture and foreign policy. Firstly the cultural/ideological domain constitutes one of the four main categories or pillars of foreign policy, together with the political, military and economic. Secondly the restriction of cultural contacts – together with boycotts, embargoes and sanctions – as an aspect of negative sanctions, ranks below military action and political intervention as instruments of
pressure and influence, but above positive sanctions and diplomacy. This was supported by the findings of Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (see 4. below) that culture and cultural diplomacy is a key foreign policy instrument and may be used in support of or independently from other instruments, and sometimes in place of (traditional) diplomacy.

The cultural roots of conflict have been thoroughly explored, also by Samuel Huntington (1996) who was of the view that a “clash of civilisations” will replace the Cold War. He argued that a “Confucian-Islamic axis will oppose the West and its allies …. and that most conflicts in the world have cultural roots”. However, it is not only in time of war or conflict that culture and identity impact, or even determine the position or actions that a nation-state takes in the international arena. The fundamental question of “what [should] ‘we’ do” in any circumstance or with regard to any international issue, is determined by answers to the questions “who are ‘we’, [and] who are ‘they’” (Hudson 2007: 104). During times of significant change the conceptualisations of self and others, individually and collectively, are severely challenged and may create great doubt. Nations during times of change fall back on their “heroic history” as driving force for decision-making rather than “strategy and rational choice” (Breuning cited in Hudson 2007: 105).

It is claimed that ideology and technology divide the world today, rather than an anarchical struggle for power. Both are rooted in culture, or more specifically what Mazrui (1990) called “the culture of power and the power of culture, the hidden agenda of world politics”. Accordingly, he not only recognised the underlying cultural foundation of major global political developments since the Middle Ages, illustrated in a wide and at times provocative tour de force, but also proposed a viable cultural based explanation of world politics and international relations. The sentiments of Mazrui were further extended by Lapid and Kratochwil (1996) who not so much proposed the recognition of the ‘constitutive role’ of culture and identity in world affairs and world politics, it not being a new phenomenon, but a ‘return’ of culture and identity to a position of prominence in IR theory.

The recent trends in interdisciplinary convergence or cross-disciplinary venturing, including borrowing on the role and relevance of culture in explaining world politics, are by no means without serious theoretical challenges, or without hindrances in making an impact on mainstream international relations analysis (Walker cited by Kratochwil 1996: 209). The meaning and interpretation of culture in other social sciences, including anthropology and sociology are similarly rapidly evolving from viewing culture as patterns of behaviour.
to “pattern of meanings embodied in symbols” (Geertz 1973: 89), and to a “symbolic and historically transmitted system of shared meanings” (Schweder & Le Vine cited by Kratochwil 1996: 209). It is the latter which is of particular significance to the role that culture plays in international relations and in cultural diplomacy in particular.

The above occurs in a globalised world, where cultural influences spread more quickly than ever before. For example, the dominant American popular culture has spread around the world; English is the global language, particularly as it is the common language of the internet and therefore of social media; people are more mobile than ever before; and news and information is available 24 hours a day, with immediate updates as events happen. Attempts at censorship and state control of culture, where it still exists (e.g. China and North Korea), are arguably destined to be at most a temporary measure against the tide. Recognising therefore the relevance and persistent presence of culture in International Relations, the role and place of cultural in international relations and of cultural diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy, merit further consideration.

2.2 Culture in international relations

Cultural diplomacy, like other forms of diplomacy, is a political concept most often associated with state action, notwithstanding the cultural activities of a myriad of non-state actors. Culture in contrast, is a social concept, most often associated with individuals, groups, communities or nations. Bealey (1999: 219) provides a political science definition for the term nation, as “[a] body of people who possess the consciousness of a common identity, giving them distinctiveness from other peoples”. Freeman (1997b: 177) in turn provides a diplomatic definition for the term as “[a] people unified by a common history, language, culture, religion or ideology, or territory, considering themselves distinct from other peoples, and recognized by others as possessing distinctive traits as a people”. A national culture is therefore the common culture or cultures of the people making up a nation. A state in contrast is defined diplomatically (Freeman 1997b: 273) as “[a] polity controlling fixed territory with defined borders”. When considering the term within the realm of political science Bealey (1999: 308) attempts no short definition but notes that the term is a complex concept that is interrelated, philosophically, legally or politically, that it denotes in turn the relations between human beings and authority; sovereignty and international recognition; and the “bureaucratic apparatus of control”. A state culture then refers to the culture or specific characteristics of a particular body politic and/or its
institutions. In this study the focus is on culture of the nation(s) or national culture that serves as a basis for and/or finds expression in the cultural diplomacy practiced by the state through its government and government institutions. In addition, culture is a source of (national) power in its own right, similar to material political or economic power. For example, India is considered as a cultural superpower, irrespective of whether it is equally considered a global political or economic force (Ians 2010). Thus, culture manifests in and impacts on international relations in a number of different ways.

Considering the high level of agreement on international relations as “a state’s dealings and contacts with other states, and with international organisations”, and as “the general sphere of bilateral and multilateral interstate activity” (Berridge & James 2003: 147), the centrality of foreign policy and diplomacy in international relations is undeniable but also unquestioned. To the extent that foreign policy, albeit sometimes used interchangeably with international relations and diplomacy, is “the political and security policies adopted by a state in relation to the outside world” and “all of the policies (including economic [and cultural] policies) adopted by a state in relation to the outside world” (Berridge & James 2003: 107), culture as a variable inevitably filters down to and contextualises and permeates these fields. This influence can range from cultural issues, through culture as a source and determinant of power, to the use of culture – through diplomacy – as a foreign policy instrument. In respect of the latter, while culture or cultural diplomacy is most often cited as being instrumental and supporting political and economic diplomacy, a visible economic and political presence in a country inevitably stimulates and requires further interest in other aspects of that country, particularly its arts and culture. In this respect cultural diplomacy is not only reactive and instrumental. Cultural connectivity is a foreign policy objective in its own right (The Hindu [s.a.]).

Having contextualised culture in international relations, aligning it with foreign policy and instrumentally positioning it in cultural diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy, a challenge remains regarding the centrality and significance of culture. Drawing on the example of the relationship between strategy and culture (Lantis & Howlett 2013), and by applying this to the relationship between diplomacy and culture, it is contended that three approaches to the study of culture and diplomacy can be discerned. The first views culture as a ‘value-added explanation’ of diplomatic behaviour, to explain deficiencies in, or add to prevalent theories. Culture may have an impact on (diplomatic) behaviour but is a secondary consideration. The second views culture as a theoretical vehicle, or independent variable
that may provide clarity on aspects of *diplomatic* behaviour. The third method argues that human conduct (*diplomatic* behaviour) “can be understood only by becoming immersed … [in] culture” (Lantis & Howlett 2013: 77-78). Without pre-empting a definitive response, it is evident that cultural diplomacy – as a subfield of study in diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations – arguably testifies to the third approach.

3. CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

To clarify the nature and scope of cultural diplomacy, attention is given to its definitional problem, its manifestations and elements, and its association with soft power.

3.1 Conceptual clarification

As indicated, the most widely used definition of cultural diplomacy is that of Cummings (2003:1) namely the exchange of aspects of culture to foster mutual understanding between international actors. However, since the root words of this construct are respectively culture and diplomacy, it is necessary to clarify these concepts as a prerequisite for an accurate understanding and stipulative definition of cultural diplomacy.

(a) The concept of culture: The word culture can be traced to its Latin root, *colere*, meaning tilling of the soil, amongst others as still used today in agriculture, aquaculture and viticulture. In terms of its general usage, the word has obtained two figurative meanings. Firstly in the sense of material manifestations, it denotes “civilization, including aspects of education, manners, arts and crafts and their products”; and secondly in an anthropological sense, it refers to “how people think, feel and act” (Hofstede [s.a.]). Departing from this and in a broader scholarly sense the challenge of defining culture – to eventually situate it in and link it with diplomacy – is not a shortage but an abundance of definitions. A survey of definitions of culture for the period 1871 to 1987 (Vijver & Hutschemaeker cited by Kratochwil 1996: 205) yielded 128 different definitions. In turn, Kroebel and Kluckhohn (cited by Ryniejska-Kieldanowicz [s.a.]: 2) identified 168 definitions of culture and categorised them into six distinctive types; (nominal) descriptive-listing, historical, normative, psychological, structural and genetic. Considering the extent of this, even leading scholars struggle to gain clarity of thought and word, and ultimately and deliberately focus on one aspect or the other of culture, matching “suitable definitions … to declared intentions and theoretical frameworks” (Lapid & Kratochwil 1996: 7).
For example and on the one hand, theorists in the feminist tradition such as Jarbi and O’Gorman (1999: 10), added another dimension when they considered culture against the “ways in which assumptions of sameness and difference remain in the world view of international relations … particularly in the understandings of what … (is referred) … to as the generalized other set against the western norm of self.” On the other hand, practitioners like Holden (2010: 3) followed a pragmatic approach and suggested that traditionally the term culture was thought of and used in a distinct dualistic sense and that this has always led to confusion, as these two meanings were often an antithesis of each other. The first relates to the arts – in particular high art such as opera, ballet, literature, music, paintings, sculpture, drama and poetry – that were traditionally only accessible to and enjoyed by the minority elite of society. The second, in contrast, relates to the anthropological meaning of culture, namely that we as human beings understand and express ourselves through language, traditions, behaviours, values and beliefs, in other words (popular) culture. Since these definitional approaches are mutually exclusive, they have led to confusion, contortions and contradictions in understanding and applying the term.

IR scholars attempted to bridge this dichotomy, for example Chey (2010: 2) who described culture as being “intangible and composed of beliefs, habits and preferences, communicated and preserved in language, but it is not the same as language. It is constantly evolving, adjusting to societal and technological change. It is preserved or represented in cultural and religious institutions that often struggle to keep up with the changing nature of culture.” By returning to normative predispositions, Mazrui (1990: 30) defined culture as “a system of interrelated values, active enough to condition perception, judgement, communication and behaviour in a given society”. Thus culture determines each individual’s view of the world, is personal and ideological but also shaped by thousands of years of different civilisations. He added seven functions of culture in society to further elucidate the concept: culture provides lenses of perception and cognition; motives for human behaviour; criteria for evaluation; a basis of identity; a mode of communication; a basis of stratification; and a system of production and consumption. It is concluded that culture is the underlying foundation of the disparity in power relations in the world whether technological (industry, production, economics, information) or ideological (communism versus capitalism). Hence power in world politics is deemed a cultural reality rather than a political, economic and military phenomenon.
In considering culture and national identity in foreign policy analysis, an assessment and categorisation is attempted by identifying representative definitions to indicate converging themes in literature on culture. Collectively these definitions bring together key aspects of culture; firstly it being a body of rules, patterned ways of thinking, a learned system of meaning, or a set of human-made elements. Secondly these aspects are concerned with the way in which individuals in a population, a human group, participants in an ecological niche, sharing language, time and place, in turn communicate, think, share, behave, react, acquire and transmit, adapt and structure interpersonal and inter-object activities. Thirdly this often takes place through symbols including their embodiment in artefacts, ideas, attached values, knowledge and attitudes towards life, having representational, directive and affective functions, capable of creating entities and particular sense of reality (Hudson 2007: 103-107). It is contended that all human activity, including what nations do in the international arena, becomes both a product and a component of culture. This notion is concisely reflected by Ryniejska-Kieldanowicz’s ([s.a.]: 3) summarisation, namely that culture constitutes the learned and shared behaviour within a particular society, and the material and manifested achievements of such a society, collectively and individually. The significance of this is advanced by Hofstede ([s.a.]) who defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or category from another”. Of importance here is the notion of the ‘category’ related to culture, that amongst others can refer to nations, states, regions within or across nations and states, ethnicities, religions, organisations, or even gender categories. This provides the link to state and diplomacy as in cultural diplomacy.

In conclusion, the two meanings of culture indicated at the outset – respectively in the sense of civilization as a material manifestation and of how people think, feel and act as an anthropological phenomenon – are important when considering the place and role of culture in diplomacy, more specifically in cultural diplomacy. As will be indicated below, diplomacy, more specifically cultural diplomacy conveys culture as the message, but also uses culture to convey any other (political) message. Culture is thus both substance or subject matter (the what) and instrumental (the how). This is particularly relevant when considering the building blocks of cultural diplomacy, including of a South African cultural diplomacy, since culture and cultural diplomacy contain both the elements in the message itself, i.e., the material manifestations and anthropological meaning, but also that of the ‘culture’ of the messenger (see Chapter 4). If humans are individually and collectively
cultural beings then the messages that humans carry (also in the context of diplomacy) are inevitably coloured by the inherent cultural essence or orientation of human identity.

(b) Diplomacy: The concept of diplomacy, although lacking a singular and unambiguous definition, is generally well defined and understood since the term was devised by Edmund Burke in 1796. Pigman (2010: 4) points out that Sir Harold Nicolson in his 1939 seminal text *Diplomacy* endorsed the *Oxford English Dictionary* definition of diplomacy as "the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist". This generic meaning of diplomacy has since been significantly refined and expanded. A more representative and recent definition is that of Berridge and James (2003: 69-70) who define diplomacy as “the conduct of relations between sovereign states, through the medium of officials based at home or abroad, the latter being either members of their state’s diplomatic service or temporary diplomats”. Other elements of the definition of diplomacy would include tact in dealing with people, i.e. diplomacy as a skill, promotion of international negotiations in situations of conflict, and foreign policy, in which case the term is misused, without a distinction between policy and the execution thereof. While the above definition of Berridge and James does not explicitly refer to the peaceful nature of the conduct of diplomatic relations, this is an essential component of diplomacy which stands as the antithesis to war, but may be practiced in the midst of war. Despite a myriad variations and permutations of diplomacy, the core elements of diplomacy have remained remarkably consistent over centuries.

The term diplomacy traces its etymological roots to the Greek term *diploum* meaning ‘to double or to fold’. The derived term *diploma* came to denote the authorised documents carried by official envoys, or ‘diplomats’. Further evolvement resulted in the development of the concept *corps diplomatique*, referring to the (government) officials, envoys and representatives engaged in the arena of international relations and implementing the foreign policy of their state or government through the “profession and practice of diplomacy” (Du Plessis 2006: 123). This notion also distinguished at a primary level between international relations, foreign policy, and diplomacy. Diplomacy is alternatively considered the principal institution and a peaceful means of conducting international relations, the key instrument in the attainment of foreign policy objectives, and a set of behaviours according to pre-determined and agreed (international) rules, that ensure efficient and effective conduct between states and between their representatives. Du
Plessis (2006: 124) thus categorised the significant spectrum of definitions of diplomacy as it prioritises the relationship of diplomacy to respectively the management or conduct of international relations, as a technique or art or tool of foreign policy, and as a process or dialogue of official (state) interaction. A wide-ranging and inclusive meaning of diplomacy is also recognised; as a continuous and changing international political process of engagement in the making and implementing of foreign policy, primarily among states, in pursuit of goals, and through the functions of representing and communicating, which also includes negotiations and reporting while guarding the interests of nationals and the state abroad.

Diplomacy may be better understood through its functions. The primary functions of (diplomacy and) a diplomatic mission are classified in article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, as representation, negotiations, information gathering and reporting, promoting friendly relations, protecting the interests of the sending state and its nationals, and developing economic, ‘cultural’ and scientific relations. This list has been extensively expanded over the past century with non-core functions serving the requirements of a specific state at a particular time, to include amongst others political messaging, managing development aid, commercial activities, public and cultural diplomacy and propaganda, and a host of overt and covert activities related to conflict, war, terrorism, and human and man-made disasters (Berridge 2010: 109-123). These supplementary or ‘non-political’ functions often introduced ‘non-state’ actors, technocrats and even members of civil society to the field of diplomacy. It is the last century that has also seen the transition from the ‘old’ or traditional form of diplomacy to the ‘new’ or contemporary diplomacy. World War I, World War II and the Cold War respectively precipitated this transition driven by a democratisation of large parts of the world, the introduction of a plethora of new states and international actors, a revolution in information and communications and the resultant interdependence of states, actors and issues. This necessitating a parallel evolution in diplomatic theory and practice (Du Plessis 2006: 139). It is (partly) the adaptability and versatility of the ‘new’ diplomacy to the changing environment that ensured that diplomacy and the diplomatic mission remained key instruments of foreign policy, and not only survived, but thrived in the modern era. Diplomacy has also retained its relevance for and its relationship to other policy instruments including economic, cultural (psychological) and military instruments of diplomacy in the contemporary international environment. It is to analysing the concept of cultural diplomacy that one should next turn.
(c) The concept of cultural diplomacy: Thomas Jefferson, at the time US diplomatic representative to France, and later the third President of the United States (1801-1809) in a dispatch to his close friend and subsequently the fourth President of the United States James Madison on 20 September 1785 from Paris (cited in Schneider 2003: 1), captured the essence of cultural diplomacy: “You see I am an enthusiast on the subject of the arts. But it is an enthusiasm of which I am not ashamed, as its object is to improve the taste of my countrymen, to increase their reputation, to reconcile to them the respect of the world and procure them its praise”.

This basic indication of the meaning and aim of cultural diplomacy, also considering the ambiguous nature of culture itself and its role in international relations, raises the question whether or not cultural diplomacy is diplomacy at all. The response of Aguilar (1996: 10-11) is pertinent, namely that as long as cultural diplomacy is “a policy designed to encourage public opinion to influence a foreign government and its attitudes towards the sender country, it belongs in the framework of diplomacy”. The same is true to the extent that cultural diplomacy is seen as promoting moderation and tolerance amongst diverse (international) groups (or actors). Hence the argument that as cultural diplomacy refers to the action by a nation-state to use its culture to promote foreign policy goals, it therefore has all the hallmarks of other traditional forms of diplomacy (e.g. economic and military diplomacy).

This singular approach is echoed by Berridge and James (2003: 62) who described cultural diplomacy as the “promotion abroad of a state’s cultural achievements”, and added the use of cultural attaches, and the (occasional) employment of “dedicated organisations closely associated with the diplomatic service, like the British Council”. They identified the inclusion of a broad range of activities, amongst others science and technology, arts, humanities and social sciences, and placed special emphasis on the promotion of links between institutions including academic institutions. As an example, Schneider, a former US Ambassador to the Netherlands noted that between 1950 and 1975 the US government sent abroad more than one hundred different individuals and group of artists, musicians, writers, dancers and actors to over 89 countries. From a selection of these examples of US embassy activities and programmes, she identified a set of (generic) aims of cultural diplomacy (Schneider 2003: 2-3). These include communicating the intangible values of a society, such as freedom, diversity and tolerance to the outside world; demonstrating in practice the worth of certain (democratic and sometimes self-critical) principles such as free speech and freedom of artistic expression; and translating abstract
ideals such as the importance of quality of life into concrete demonstrations. It is also argued that cultural diplomacy counters inequalities when it reaches the ‘common’ people and that longer term programmes foster knowledge, understanding and often long term friendships. Cultural diplomacy also encompasses the elusiveness and intuitiveness of culture and in particular the dual components of culture. These are culture as art and culture as the manifestation of identity.

Being representative of the essence of the concept cultural diplomacy, the definition of Cummings (2003: 1) is widely accepted and used, namely that it is “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding”. To the extent that this definition provides a stipulative meaning to the concept, it is necessary to operationalise it in more concrete terms by identifying the features and expressions of cultural diplomacy.

3.2 Manifestations and elements of cultural diplomacy

As a point of departure, the elements of cultural diplomacy embedded in the manifestations thereof, distinguishes it from other forms of diplomacy. In this respect the analysis of Schneider (2003: 3) is useful to isolate the characteristics of cultural diplomacy (programmes), that with some exceptions are not typical of other forms of diplomacy, and which also constitute ‘best practice’ in cultural diplomacy. Accordingly, cultural diplomacy is distinguished by the fact that it should:

- be aligned to the interests of the host country, i.e., ballet and literature in Cuba, film and traditional music in India, and be suited to the audience, focussing on local needs and priorities;
- convey aspects of the sending country’s values, whether freedom of expression, thought and creativity, civil liberties, protection and celebration of diversity, compassion for fellow men (e.g. Ubuntu);
- facilitate and support other forms of (diplomatic) engagement;
- be flexible, creative and adaptable to opportunity;
- provide an alternative to official (embassy) engagements in a country, in particular fostering people-to-people bonds;
• engage in information and knowledge exchange in a spirit of mutual co-operation and respect;
• seek out shared history, heritage and bonds, such as common ancient trade routes;
• cultivate long-term relationship and bonds of common interest; and,
• share some of the salient aspects of other forms of diplomacy; i.e. understanding the (domestic and international) environment is a pre-requisite for all forms of diplomacy.

The attempt at categorisation is not new, and five decades ago Coombs (1964: 6) already tried to make sense of what he called a ‘motley assortment’ of activities by grouping them into “exchanges of people – students, professors, technical experts and scientists, businessmen, athletes, government and civic leaders, ballet and theatre companies, individual artists, performers and writers, and trainees in agriculture, industry and the military arts. They also include exchanges of things, such as books and journals, films and TV programs, art and trade exhibits”. In addition, some states also include “financial aid and technical assistance … teaching of foreign language and research on foreign areas”. Based on more recent examples, Tovell (cited in Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 20) identified what he called the elements of cultural diplomacy, namely “artistic exchanges, visual arts, an emphasis on radio, television and film, exchange of persons, scholarships, cultural centres, exhibitions, sports, etc.”; to which Passin (quoted in Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 20) added “festivals, musical tournaments and expositions”. These elements may then be summarised in the form of a definition of cultural diplomacy, namely “the science of cultural diplomacy describes the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions and beliefs in all aspects of our society – such as arts, sport, science, literature, and music – with the intention of fostering mutual understanding” (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 21).

It is noted that states do not necessarily focus on all elements of cultural diplomacy, but may decide to concentrate resources on specific areas or elements aligned to their broader foreign policy objectives, their areas of recognised expertise or particular cultural strengths, or the requirements of the time and place and circumstances. For example, since the inception of their respective cultural diplomacy programmes, the French and Germans have placed greater emphasis on promotion of language, the British on education, and the Canadians on cultural diversity (see Chapter 3 Section 3). In contrast, the American cultural diplomacy programmes after World War II prioritised educational, scientific and cultural exchange programmes of specialists, scholars and teachers. This
was based on the belief that they carried American values and ideals of freedom, democracy and meritocracy, to especially Europe. This was further exemplified by the contention of Fulbright (in Coombs 1964: xi) who deemed the USA focus on education in the post-1945 programs to fill an “intellectual hunger ... and a craving and need for knowledge and understanding ... as intense as the desire for a better material life, and, indeed the two aspirations are closely related”. To this were added American artists exchanges, exhibitions and musical touring groups. For example, jazz groups featured prominently in the USA programme in the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Coombs 1964).

Soviet-style cultural diplomacy of the time, in turn contained elements not normally found elsewhere, and which could be considered a perversion or even antithesis of cultural diplomacy, as it was not concerned with mutual understanding but with an exclusive and aggressive portrayal and promotion of Soviet values and socialist ideology, and a deliberate negation of everything else (Barghoorn 1960: v-vi). Cold War cultural diplomacy added a strong sense of propaganda on both sides (Soviet and USA), and influenced thinking to the extent that in this context, Barghoorn (1960: 10) defined cultural diplomacy as the “manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for propaganda purposes” and, “(c)ultural diplomacy is, then, a branch of intergovernmental propaganda” (Barghoorn 1960: 11). This viewpoint points to the ambivalent distinction and relationship between (positive) propaganda and cultural diplomacy.

To deepen an understanding of cultural diplomacy, consideration is subsequently given in chapter 3 to what constitutes the cultural diplomacy programmes of various states (and nations) at various times, including the activities linked to cultural diplomacy and what this elucidates regarding the objectives, structures, actors and agencies and programmes of cultural diplomacy.

3.3 Cultural diplomacy and other forms of soft power

As indicated, Joseph Nye (2004: 5) coined the now familiar term soft power, as the ability of governments to persuade through culture, values and ideas, as opposed to so-called hard power, or the capacity to coerce or (en)force through political, economic or military means. In international relations, apart from its independent use, cultural diplomacy as soft power often plays a role in support of the more traditional or ‘hard’ forms of political and economic diplomacy. In this regard it increases curiosity and deepens understanding of a nation and its culture, heritage and arts, or conversely, it may provide (the only)
access where these traditional forms of diplomacy may either not be present or be ineffective (The Hindu [s.a.]). In addition, in times of war in particular, soft power (often through the media) may be used to “cast cultural differences and political struggle in the language of military conflict and war” (Chouliaraki 2007: 8). Therefore, soft power has the capacity to not only contextualise but “help constitute the contemporary landscape of power and global order” (Chouliaraki 2007: 8).

This realisation, in principle, is not new. During the 1960s Coombs (1964: 7) identified two groups of sceptics on the significance of cultural and educational relations in international relations and foreign policy. Firstly, those who believe states should only concern themselves with ‘hard’ and material power in their international relations, and that these cultural exchanges (i.e. soft power) has no effect and place in the tough choices facing the world. Secondly, those who are actually engaged in these types of international relations, and who fear that any association with government (and its foreign policy) – i.e. the exercise of hard power – will taint their integrity and freedom of expression. This provides ‘space’ for cultural diplomacy as an exercise of soft power. However, when studying cultural diplomacy it is essential first to consider other forms of soft power. Although each form of soft power is analytically distinct, collectively they are “bound by certain interdependencies – a fact that evidently has to do with their common function as instruments of soft power” (Chouliaraki 2007: 3). It is thus pertinent to consider these other forms of soft power in as far as it has implications for cultural diplomacy.

(a) Public diplomacy: The concept public diplomacy merits further consideration as many politicians, practitioners and scholars particularly in the dominant US discourse consider cultural diplomacy to fall within the ambit of public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is often associated with and defined as a key element, a subset or subdivision of the wider notion of public diplomacy (Holden: 2010). The reason is that public diplomacy – especially as used in the USA where it is closely associated with the US Information Agency (USIA) and its response during the Cold War era to Soviet propaganda – has always included culture related activities although in terms of its use obtaining a derogatory meaning. In this respect, Chey (2010: 5) points out that public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy “have always existed alongside each other” in a symbiotic relationship.

Similar to cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy also aims to convey a message to the general public and to influence the public opinion (of the ‘other’ or alter-state), but it is not
without controversy. This is due to the manipulation of images (often) through the media, in order to influence the ‘others’ outside the host country (Chey 2010: 5). Cultural diplomacy, in turn, refers to cultural exchanges and to diplomacy conducted “with a willingness to exchange ideas, art, value systems and other aspects of culture” (Chey 2010: 5). Since the tools and activities of public diplomacy amongst others include educational and cultural exchange programmes, visitor programmes, language courses, cultural events, radio and television broadcasting and other forms of electronic and social media – similar to cultural diplomacy – the perceived overlap between the two forms is not only self-evident but also understandable.

The overlap between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy is also found in examples of the latter. Although the objective is not to discuss public diplomacy in depth, note can be taken of the following: Firstly, during and after the Cold War an active public diplomacy was and still remains high on the priority list of US policy makers, and is deemed essential to US national security and the promotion of American interest around the world (Lynch 2010). As such public diplomacy is a recognised, well-theorised and established concept in American and instrument of US foreign policy. It is well represented in the social structures of American universities, professional associations and academic journals. The ‘Amerika Haus’ in Germany that provided opportunities for German speakers to learn more about American culture and politics, the equivalent of the German Goethe Institute or British Council (foreign cultural institutions), was considered a public diplomacy programme of the State Department until 2006 where-after it was down-scaled and in effect handed over to the local German authorities (Junker et al. 2010: 405; ICD [s.a.]b).

Secondly, the link between and occasional overlap of public diplomacy and cultural is also evident in China where the government uses well known public cultural figures, including for example the actor Jackie Chan, to make public radio and television commercials to present a positive image of China abroad. This serves as a counter to what the China State Council calls negative foreign media stereotyping, by reflecting in contrast a prosperous, democratic, open, peaceful and harmonious state (Dzodin 2010).

Thirdly, the former US Ambassador to the Netherlands and leading scholar on cultural diplomacy, Cynthia Schneider (cited in Lewytzkyj 2009) in discussing the relationship between public and cultural diplomacy, explained this overlap by observing: “Public diplomacy consists of all a nation does to explain itself to the world, and cultural
diplomacy, the use of creative expressions and exchanges of ideas, information and people to increase mutual understanding, supplies much of its content”.

These examples point to the fact it is difficult to distinguish between public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy in an absolute sense. To the extent that they do overlap, it is evident that public diplomacy is the broader and more inclusive form of diplomacy. As such it does not only include culture-related or culture-based activities, but potentially also cultural diplomacy as a sub-set of diplomatic activities. To the extent that a distinction is maintained, the narrower focus of cultural activity is recognised and also the observation previously made that a symbiotic relationship exists between the two forms.

(b) Propaganda: As with public diplomacy, propaganda and cultural diplomacy is often associated, and therefore the term merits some discussion. In essence, propaganda is the essentially negative and offensive use, mainly at a psychological level, of tools and activities often to be found in both cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy. The targets – the ‘foreign’ public including interest groups and decision-makers, also overlap. Accordingly and as a more moderate position, Feigenbaum (2001) considered propaganda and (educational) exchanges to be two aspects of cultural diplomacy and furthermore uses the latter term interchangeably with foreign cultural relations. Regarding the difference between (cultural and educational) exchanges (and cultural diplomacy) on the one hand and propaganda on the other, preference is shown for emphasising the negative nature of propaganda as opposed to the positive nature of cultural diplomacy.

As legitimate activities promoting the national interest, cultural exchanges as an element of cultural diplomacy can be clearly differentiated from propaganda. While both are considered activities of governments seeking to project their interests abroad, informational diplomacy (propaganda) has an explicit political content and immediate impact, while the methods of cultural diplomacy are indirect and its goals are long-term (Feigenbaum 2001: 30-31). Propaganda uses the techniques of public relations while cultural diplomacy is rooted in exchange and example. Cultural diplomacy relies on cultural activities and leaders to speak for themselves as manifestations of a free society. The goal of cultural diplomacy is still political – projecting a favourable image abroad – but, the methods, i.e. – the free exchange of ideas, events and peoples – are in essence non-political.
In contrast, Berridge and James (2003: 215) adopted a more pragmatic albeit cynical view in their definition of propaganda as “the use of mass communications to reinforce or change public opinion, domestic or foreign”. This meaning is contextualised by their viewpoint that traditionally in International Relations propaganda has always been considered “the antithesis of diplomacy because of its noise, mendacity and its design to appeal to the people over the head of the government, but ... it is not necessarily anti-diplomacy; it all depends on its content” (Berridge and James 2003: 215). Hence public diplomacy may be defined as “a late-twentieth-century term for propaganda conducted by diplomats” (Berridge and James 2003: 218). Propaganda may however be used to support diplomatic efforts and therefore cultural diplomacy. In contrast and as indicated above, cultural diplomacy to be considered the “promotion abroad of a state’s cultural achievements”, together with the use of cultural attaches, and the (occasional) employment of “dedicated organisations closely associated with the diplomatic service, like the British Council” (Berridge and James 2003: 62).

(c) Cultural relations: It is useful to make a distinction between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. The “former grow naturally and organically, without government intervention – the transactions of trade and tourism, student flows, communications, migration, media access, intermarriage – millions of daily cross-cultural encounters. The latter in contrast, involves formal diplomats in the service of national governments who employ these exchanges in support of national interests” (Arndt quoted by Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 13-14). Accordingly, whereas cultural relations are transnational relations between predominantly non-state actors, cultural diplomacy refers to formalised and institutional intergovernmental or transgovernmental relations, or hybrid versions involving some state and government involvement. Considering the conceptualisation, manifestations and relationship of cultural diplomacy with other forms of soft power it is necessary to reflect on a theoretical framework for cultural diplomacy.

4. THE GIENOW-HECHT & DONFRIED MODEL OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

As previously indicated this study applies the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model of cultural diplomacy. Therefore a brief précis of the model is provided, based on an analysis of eight case studies of cultural diplomacy from four regions around the world, in an attempt to provide an assessment beyond the dominant US discourse on theory and practice. The two theses of distance and interactivity being success factors as proposed by the editors of
the study, is explained and critiqued. Finally the application of an adapted model is indicated for the international examples and an overview of South African cultural diplomacy.

(a) Synopsis of the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model of cultural diplomacy: The point of departure of the model that will be used is derived from a series of academic essays on the topic by scholars in the field. As much of the academic research on cultural diplomacy over the past two decades has focussed on the US and its use of this tool of foreign policy, the editors (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 3) note that the term has become associated with Cold War tactics, manipulation and subversion. The purpose was therefore to determine the meaning, origins and strategy of cultural diplomacy beyond the cold war parameters, including the indicators thereof before World War I, its utilisation as a political instrument between the two world wars, the growth thereof during the Cold War and its development globally since the 1990s; and in four distinguishable regions beyond the American-European axis, namely the Soviet Union (albeit a state), Eastern Europe, Middle East and Asia. Each region was considered alternatively before and during the Cold War. The aim was to provide meaning to and analyse the practice of cultural diplomacy in selected case studies, thereby challenging the US dominated and American-centric understanding of the topic (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 4).

Based on these comparative case studies Gienow-Hecht and Donfried identified and used two approaches in their research, namely a conceptual and a structural approach. The conceptual approach refers to the motivations for and intent of cultural diplomacy. The structural approach refers to programmes and agents of cultural diplomacy and how they relate to the state. From this they developed what constitutes a model of cultural diplomacy, based on two premises on distance and interactivity respectively as determinants of effectiveness and success. The assumption is that the more distance there is between cultural diplomacy (the agent thereof) and the political and economic agents and agenda of the state, the greater the chance of success. Similarly the more interactive cultural diplomacy (the programme) is the more the acceptance and participation of the audience ensuring a positive and enduring impact. Based on the comparative research and their findings, Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010: 4) propose that by using a variety of (cultural diplomacy) instruments the state will achieve short- and long term goals, and in the process strengthen relations. From the research conducted and related to the assumptions on distance and interactivity, they extracted the following elements of cultural diplomacy: firstly and indicative of structure, the elements of agencies,
institutions, actors and programmes; and secondly and indicative of concept, motivations, aims and objectives (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 4-9).

Regarding structure, namely agencies and the related elements, these may on the one hand be state controlled (albeit clandestinely), for example the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), established in 1925 in the Soviet Union and seemingly independent but under close supervision of the state and party. On the other hand agents may be fully outside of and beyond state control, while (positively and progressively) influencing (political) relations between states. An example is the relationship between Polish and West-German Catholics who jointly prepared the 1966 Bensberg Memorandum which sought to encourage dialogue in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. Although both state agencies and civil society played a crucial and combined role in campaigns to advance national interest in the cultural diplomacy programmes of the USA and UK in Israel and the Arab Middle East from 1945 to 1958, more distant non-state actors had become equally important. For example, as early as the 1862-1933 period in Japan, Japanese citizens themselves – and without any state role – promoted Japanese culture to foreign audiences, countering views of Japan as a so-called barbaric country.

Regarding concept, namely aims and related elements, and using the same case studies, it was found the motivations range from creating a sympathetic external environment outside the formal political structures of the target state, with the intent to neutralise negative campaigns against the own state and to disseminate a controlled, positive image of it to the outside world. This for example explains the range of so-called independent pro-Soviet cultural institutions supported by VOKS. Alternatively, cultural objectives may also dovetail with and support political, economic and diplomatic objectives, as in the case of the French administration of Syria and Lebanon between 1936 and 1946. In the latter case, the success of the initiative and by implication the extent of French influence, depended on cooperation between a diversity of nongovernmental cultural, educational, cinema and scouts institutions and the active participation of the local population in the variety of their programmes. As an exceptional and unique case, in Hungary between 1956 and 1963, Hungarians used clandestine cultural ties and institutions to circumvent Soviet-style restrictions and maintain desired wide-ranging cultural contacts with European countries. (This was also the case in SA – during apartheid years – by the expatriate artist community, amongst others). Finally the Bensberg Memorandum of the 1960s referred to above, inspired peaceful dialogue between the Poland and West Germany
serving as a (temporary) replacement for formal inter-state relations, eventually contributing to more positive political relations. Similarly, in Japan, the promotion of Japanese culture by private citizens to foreign audiences was aimed at defending Japanese culture as ancient, value-laden and unique.

The above selection of diverse examples of cultural diplomacy programmes illustrate the wide range of (foreign policy) objectives to be supported, or even achieved in the absence of good political and economic relations between the respective states, through these programmes. Cultural diplomacy therefore functions as an important instrument of foreign policy to strengthen (political and economic) relations or on occasion as a substitute to those relations.

(b) Success factors: the theses of distance and interactiveness: Based on the case studies and research, Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010: 23-35) argued that for the future, cultural diplomacy programmes will benefit from being separate from political and economic agendas, and that maximum interactivity with the target audience will foster sustainability and also success. This approach, being unrestricted (as far as possible) by government or sectoral policy and interest, creates space and opportunity for mutually beneficial cultural dialogue and cultural exchanges, and finds favour with recipients. They therefore proposed that, firstly, “the more distance there is between the agent of a cultural diplomacy program and a political or economic agenda, the more likely the program is to succeed” (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 23); and that secondly, “the more … (reciprocally) … interactive the structure of the cultural diplomacy program, the more likely it is to be sustainable and therefore successful” (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010: 23).

(c) Critique: Apart from the elements of cultural diplomacy grouped under concept and structure, Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 8) acknowledge, firstly, that the intentions of the actors involved in cultural diplomacy depend on the “cultural mind-sets, the organisational and structural circumstances”; and secondly, that historical context and regional variants play a significant role in how states would interpret or implement cultural diplomacy (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 9). Furthermore, it is noted that the two propositions for success, i.e. distance and interactiveness, both (narrowly and predominantly) relate to the structural aspect (agents and activities) of cultural diplomacy. While the case studies and model shed light on the complexity and depth of cultural diplomacy, and provide a useful categorisation of the elements thereof, they also indicated that historical and cultural factors play a significant role in the construction, manifestation
and implementation of cultural diplomacy. As previously indicated (see Section 2.2 above) culture is neither an add-on, nor (simply) a conceptual vehicle for cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomatic behaviour can only be understood and explained by becoming immersed … in culture. Therefore, and as an adaptation of the original model, historical and cultural factors are added to the model for consideration as key elements in determining best practices, building blocks and therefore the success factors of cultural diplomacy.

(d) Application of the adapted (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried) model: An adapted model, based on five dimensions, is firstly used as analytical framework to explore cultural diplomacy manifestations and activities globally, with the aim to identify evidence of best or leading practices and building blocks thereof (in Chapter 3). Secondly, the model is applied to South Africa to explore motivations and activities related to its cultural diplomacy, to identify existing building blocks thereof, and to identify lacunas and propose measures to address these gaps in order to progress towards a dedicated cultural diplomacy for South Africa (in Chapter 4). The five dimensions applied in the analysis are therefore the historical-cultural dimension, reflective of the ‘past’ or new power position of a country; the aspirational dimension, or motivations driving the approach; the institutional dimension, or how cultural diplomacy is structured; the programmatic dimension, or content of cultural diplomacy programmes; and, the propositional dimension reflecting the level of distance and interactivity in cultural diplomacy.

5. CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to contextualise cultural diplomacy with reference to its locus and impact in the theory and practice of international relations. It thus clarified the conceptual meaning and understanding of cultural diplomacy and of the components thereof (culture and diplomacy) and explained and assessed the proposed Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model. Interim findings based on evidence indicated a critical variant in cultural diplomacy to be the historical-cultural dimension, and the proposed Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model was therefore adapted.

In the next chapter the origins and subsequent developments as well as representative examples of contemporary manifestations of cultural diplomacy from different regions of the world, and at the multilateral level is considered. Key contributions and leading
practices constituting building blocks and best practices of cultural diplomacy are identified based on the adapted Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model.
CHAPTER 3

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to consider the emergence, phased development and global practices in the field of cultural diplomacy by using illustrative and representative examples. Although primarily descriptive, it also serves an analytical purpose by identifying trends, key contributions, leading practices and benchmarking regarding current cultural diplomacy. A brief overview is presented of the origins and initial development of cultural diplomacy, with particular emphasis of the contemporary manifestations of cultural diplomacy in different regions of the world and at a multilateral level. In this respect, the elements of the adapted model of Gienow-Hecht and Donfried are used to identify best or leading practices and building blocks of cultural diplomacy. The historical examples that follow are not comparable with modern cultural diplomacy practices per se, but denote elements thereof and are based on recognition of the importance of culture in not only international affairs, but in diplomacy as these were evolving at the time. Accordingly the concept cultural diplomacy is applied retrospectively (and not overtly narrowly) to illustrate that the historical examples thereof fit its general nature and understanding.

2. PRE-MODERN ORIGINS OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

While elements of modern cultural diplomacy is discernible in precursors prior to World War I, and again in distinctive patterns that emerged during the interwar period, the Cold War and the post 9/11 era, the origins of cultural diplomacy are re-traceable to antiquity and the origins of diplomacy itself. Roberts (2011: 3-4) argued that the practice of diplomacy existed long before the term was coined to describe it. This can also be said of cultural diplomacy. Strategies to promote a positive image of an individual, a group, a nation or a state, and to initiate and carry on a dialogue with ‘other’ persons or with a people, based amongst others on culture, date back to the earliest interactions between peoples.

Ambassadors sent to the city states of ancient Greece as representatives, came to their postings not only bearing (cultural objects) gifts, but inherent in their duties were attendance of public events, religious festivals and sporting contests, including the Hellenic
Games. They had to see and be seen. They were both participant and attendant, showcasing and appreciating a showcase (Constantinou 1996: xvi). They engaged actively in reciprocal forms of what would later be termed cultural diplomacy. In Plato’s *The Republic*, *theoria* or ‘sacred embassy’ referred to both the journey and the viewing of the shrine, the oracle or the games (Constantinou 1996: 55-56). This practice of showcasing of national cultural events to foreign audiences to gain favour or affect influence was carried through to modern cultural diplomacy. What Constantinou calls ‘gastronomic diplomacy’ (1996: 125), tracing the political uses of food and drink from ancient Greece to Biblical times to modern diplomatic practices, constitutes a practice of cultural diplomacy. Hospitality offered and reciprocated in the name of the ruler or later of the state became strategic tools and determined hierarchies, and relationships.

The Byzantine empire from the 400s until 1453 developed intricate systems of etiquette around feasts and food, hospitality and displays of grandeur (still contemporary tools of diplomacy and cultural diplomacy), to impress visitors, project power in the face of military competent neighbours and nurture ever changing alliances (Neumann 2013: 46-52). Sharing (impressive displays of) food strengthened relations between representatives of states and therefore between the states they represent. Black (2011: 33-34) had noted similar tendencies of ‘majestic court rituals’ as a means to impress foreign envoys and illustrates cultural superiority among other imperial state system, including the Chinese dynasties. The presentation of gifts indicated tribute paid to the Chinese emperor and this practice, on the part of the Chinese, indicated acceptance. The practice of gift-giving is still continued in Chinese diplomacy although the meaning has changed.

Cultural diplomacy practices of the late-Middle Ages, early and later Renaissance in various guises are well documented. As an example Lazzarini (2015: 137) notes different modern interpretations of the cultural diplomacy of the time, amongst others the understanding of (cultural) artefacts as “vectors of … diplomatic messages … as communication channels alternative … to formal diplomacy, but also as themselves agents of diplomatic interaction”. A further manifestation of cultural diplomacy of fifteenth century Italy was the (intentional) role played by artists as occasional or regular diplomatic agents. In 1476 Matteo Mariano Tommassi, an artist from Siena, was a paid musician in the Court of Este, but deployed by Ercole d’Este as diplomat to travel and carry official messages on several occasions (Lazzarini 2015: 137).
From the time of the invasion of Italy by France in 1494, French diplomacy was in ascent. Influences of the French diplomatic ‘school’ still prevail and even dominate in diplomacy e.g. in language and diplomatic phrases. Arndt (2005: 1-23) identified the sixteenth century as marking the ‘heydays’ of cultural diplomacy. The Jesuit priests, forming the informal cultural arm of the French court of Louis XIV abroad, travelled to China and elsewhere to share knowledge, ideas and the French language, and to counter xenophobic Asian tendencies at the time. This practice was continued by successive French monarchs who exported French books, letters, and works of art, intellect and ideas through human envoys. This practice was continued by Napoleon Bonaparte after the collapse of the ancien regime, who pursued the expansion of French power – supplementary to military endeavours – through the export to and implementation in Germany and Italy of the French educational and judicial systems.

A particular genre of cultural diplomacy – which endures till this day, was initiated in 1851 in London with the ‘Crystal Palace’ international exposition. The roots of expositions are found in medieval trade fairs. The idea of international participation, and the inclusion of the arts however came with the formation of the Royal Society of Arts in London in 1754, and in 1761 the society hosted a very successful exposition combining arts, manufacturing and commerce (Thackeray & Findling (eds) 2002: 95-98) France had also adopted the concept and between 1761 and 1849 held several industrial expositions showcasing inventions and often miniaturised versions of mechanical devices. The 1851 Crystal Palace international exposition was however the grandest of its kind, a forerunner for modern expositions, and “[equated] industrial development with that of the state and the nation” (Purbrick 2001: 3). The exposition opened in a giant exhibition hall made of glass and iron, with over one hundred thousand individual exhibition pieces from Great Britain and its colonies in Africa and Asia, France, Germany, and the USA. Over six million visitors attended the exposition over a period of six months and it was reportedly very successful, making a healthy profit, part of which was used for educational scholarships that still present grants in arts and science. Following in this tradition, and still combining the arts, culture and scientific innovation and creativity, international expositions continue to be held to this day, every five years and lasting six months, the most recent in Milan from May to October 2015 with 145 countries participating.

The illustrative examples above of early manifestations of cultural diplomacy, although selective and brief, indicate a number of observances that make them relevant to modern
day cultural diplomacy. These include the wide-spread acknowledgement of the value of and practice of early forms of what is now termed cultural diplomacy; the use of cultural diplomacy in the furtherance of both domestic and international objectives; the intricate links between cultural diplomacy and other forms of diplomacy where cultural functions of ambassadors and envoys may either constitute core diplomatic functions or actions in pursuance of cultural diplomacy as such, supplementary to core diplomacy; the variance in actors and agencies but all carrying out actions in the interest of the ruler, emperor or state; and what could be considered the programmes or activities of cultural diplomacy, i.e. cultural showcasing, reciprocal hosting and attending festivals, the presentation of (cultural) gifts and (cultural) hospitality including gastronomy. Traces of many of these practices of early cultural diplomacy can be seen in modern times across different regions of the world.

3. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

By the late-1880s, and based on the aforesaid historical antecedents, a well-established and institutionalised cultural diplomacy practice had emerged among the states of Europe and beyond. These modern (in terms of international relations) developments manifested in the countries of various regions of the world, and also within the framework of multilateral intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). Hence the following overview of selected but representative examples. By providing an overview of the modern-day manifestations of cultural diplomacy per region – i.e. Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa, it is possible to determine the proliferation of this form of diplomacy and important trends. Outside of the tradition European states, a renewed interest in cultural diplomacy during the latter half of the 20th century has seen the development of cultural diplomacy practices, institutions and policies in major Asian powers such as Japan, China and India. Other regions of the world, including emerging powers in Latin America and Africa, have similarly expanded and institutionalised their international cultural relations to the extent that these constitute cultural diplomacy. In respect of these developments, especially concerning elements of what is now known as cultural diplomacy, the following is noted:

3.1 Europe

Historically, Europe is the region from which the contemporary institution of diplomacy that characterises the Westphalian international system emerged. It is also the region where cultural diplomacy was first institutionalised in agencies dedicated to that function.
(a) France: France has a long tradition of cultural diplomacy as a core element of its international relations and foreign policy, and established the Alliance Française as the first global cultural diplomacy institution in 1883 to promote the French language abroad and thus cultivate an affinity for France (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 18). To this day it is closely and jointly managed by the Foreign and Cultural Ministries and fully funded by the state. Another unique feature of French cultural diplomacy is the fact that foreign cultural relations are entrenched in the French Constitution of 1958. Article 87 of the Constitution places an obligation on the state to maintain (good) external relations (solidarity and co-operation) with other French speaking nations. Article 88 provides that the state may conclude agreements with other states that wish to be associated with France for development of their civilisations. This prioritisation of the French language and culture is reflected in the stated diplomatic missions and priorities of the French government. In addition, the Cultural Ministry with its extensive network of cultural institutions abroad plays a leading role in the association of French speaking states, the ‘Francophony’ and the prominence of culture in France’s foreign aid policy (Griffin 2011).

Despite its historical traditions, the practices and institutions of French cultural diplomacy are still evolving. In July 2010, France consolidated its external cultural representation through a new act (Décret n 2010-1695 relatif à l’Institut Français: …) in the Institut Français, an umbrella body to coordinate all of France’s cultural diplomacy in a single institution. The then Minister of Culture, Kouchner, described this institute as providing “an umbrella for a multi-faceted network of international cultural instruments and centres – a new face for France abroad”. According to him, the primary role of the Institut Français is the promotion of the French language, and the dissemination of France’s “ideas, knowledge and scientific culture and (to) ensure that France plays a more active role in the great debates shaping the world”. It also has a training function for those involved in external cultural policy (Griffin 2011).

(b) United Kingdom (UK): The UK also has a long tradition of cultural diplomacy. This was institutionalised in the British Council in 1934, an independent organisation but funded by government. Its mandate is to make the British way of life and ideas better known abroad, encourage the study of the English language and promote British literature, science and fine art (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 18). Despite the acknowledgement, institutionalisation, and political and resource commitment to cultural diplomacy, and similar to other countries, UK cultural diplomacy is not immune to periodic
threats of de-prioritisation and reduction of resources, often in the face of other pressing matters on the public purse. The issue of de-prioritisation of cultural diplomacy and the possible reduction of resources to the British Council was discussed in the UK Parliament in 1987 (Hansard Millbank Systems 1987). During this parliamentary debate on cultural diplomacy, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Tim Egger, reiterated the importance of cultural diplomacy as a valuable part of the continuing promotion of British interests and values world-wide. While the Under-Secretary did not confirm or deny the budget cuts at the time, the British Council like government departments have face periodic assessment and budget challenges. British cultural diplomacy institutions and programmes have however endured for almost 80 years, and have remained globally well recognised and generally greatly appreciated.

(c) The Soviet Union / Russian Federation: In 1925, after the Bolsheviks had won the civil war in 1921 and the Communist Party came to power, the Soviet government established VOKS, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. This was a non-governmental network controlled by the state and party to sponsor and support pro-Soviet (cultural) groups and organisations maintaining relations with the USSR outside of the formal Communist Party channels. This formed the basis of the Soviet Union’s cultural diplomacy. The aim was to create a sympathetic external environment outside of the formal political arena, countering the propaganda campaign against the USSR and to build a positive image of the USSR abroad (Fayet in Gienow-Hecht & Donfried 2010: 5; 33-35). The Soviet government needed to re-establish its diplomatic credibility and rebuild its economy while growing the communist reach, and used an array of hybrid mass organisations crossing cultural, humanitarian, propaganda and political lines. In this context, cultural relations played a major part in all Soviet foreign relations and they supported foreign policy objectives (Fayet 2010: 33-39).

After the isolation years of Stalinism that prevailed until 1955, the Soviet Union in 1958 signed a cultural agreement with the USA, and cultural exchanges significantly increased. This initiative was based on the fact that since the 1920s, Soviet propaganda and cultural diplomacy had been intertwined. However, after World War II, the Soviet government realised that it was not winning the propaganda war and that the USA had made serious inroads in Europe. In response, cultural diplomacy became a major way for the USSR to improve political relations and gain access to audiences in the USA to promote their socialist views (Magnúsdóttir 2010: 50-58).
The uniqueness of the Soviet cultural diplomacy lay in the extremely complex set of links between networks (pro-Soviet cultural groups), state propaganda and the high level of (cultural) contact between the intellectual elite and artists, writers and scholars of the Soviet Union and the USA and Europe. Culture in Soviet understanding was considered to be broadly inclusive beyond mere artistic and cultural endeavours, propaganda did not have a disparaging connotation, and the extensive network of influence stretched across cultural, political and academic spheres.

It the post-1990 Russian Federation (cultural) elements of the Tsarist and Soviet era continue to be used in Russia’s cultural diplomacy. The Russian bear featured prominently in both the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games and the 2014 Sochi Olympics. The ‘blini’ or traditional Russian pancake representing “the Russian soul” (USC CPD 2014: 3-4) was served at both events to high profile guests, and Russian ballet, authors, astronauts and language featured prominently in both ceremonies. Functionally and institutionally despite significant changes, Russian cultural diplomacy remains highly centralised, hierarchical and focused on elites audiences.

Europe as represented by France, the UK and Russia all have a long history of cultural diplomacy, institutionalised and with well-established programmes. They had differed pre-1990s in motivations and target audiences, but represent the oldest of the traditional Westphalian cultural diplomacy practices globally.

3.2 The Americas

In contrast to the ‘traditionalist’ Europe, the Americas represent the first of the ‘new worlds’ in diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. A definitive change and break in the relations with Europe by the Americas was evidenced in the address to Congress by President James Monroe on 2 December 1823. In what became known as the Monroe doctrine, the President articulated the essence of this change or break as – “separate spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe, non-colonization, and non-intervention” (US Department of State [s.a.]). The examples below are illustrative of that new diplomatic approach.

(a) United States of America (USA): In few countries of the world have the changes and phases in alternatively re- and de-prioritisation of cultural diplomacy been more radical or noticeable than in the USA. The USA features disproportionately prominently in IR and
related theorising, including in cultural diplomacy. In the USA scholarly discourse on cultural diplomacy is often subsumed under public diplomacy, and at times it is even equated with propaganda. This is understandable considering the long tradition of the public and cultural diplomacy of the country, and the fact that in response to current events American cultural diplomacy has ebbed and flowed with the tide of international crises.

As an eighteenth century emerging power, the US had almost without interruption pursued and maintained close cultural ties and exchanges with Europe. In the late 1700s Benjamin Franklin, one of the Founding Fathers of the US and accomplished diplomat was the first American to be admitted as member in the Spanish Academy of History, and the American Philosophical Society in return elected several Europeans as corresponding members. These reciprocal honours and exchanges continued through the 1800s and 1900s. Since the mid-1800’s American missionaries and educationalists carried American values and culture to Asia and the Middle-East, and facilitated opportunities for foreign students and travellers to visit the USA (Feigenbaum 2001: 26).

A shift to linking culture and international relations took place in 1938 when the State Department set up its own division of cultural relations, which soon turned its attention to countering Hitler’s Nazi propaganda forays into Latin America during the early stages of World War II. These circumstances gave American cultural diplomacy a distinctive propaganda orientation at the time.

After World War II and between 1945 and 1990, USA cultural diplomacy experienced a noticeable and significant revival due to the Cold War. Both Soviet and USA policymakers were in a cultural race as much as an ideological race to ‘win the minds of men’ through psychological warfare and cultural infiltration, first in Europe and then around the globe (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 15). To amongst others counter the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, Senator J William Fulbright initiated the prestigious Fulbright exchange programmes in social sciences, humanities and later the arts. In 1961 President Kennedy emphasised the human side of foreign policy and appointed for the first time an Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Coombs 1964: 2). Total spending on international cultural programmes, however, was still under one percent of the total military budget (Coombs 1964: xi) and there is no evidence that the situation has significantly changed since then.
The ending of the Cold War (1989-1990) saw a substantive, even structural de-activation period of cultural diplomacy in the late 1990s. This was the result of an anticipated (peaceful) ‘new world order’ and an accompanying but noticeable decline in the priority and funding afforded cultural and public diplomacy during the Cold War. US libraries, cultural offices and information centre abroad were closed. In addition the Unites States Information Agency (USIA), the parent body for these prominent image building enterprises, was formally closed in 1999, while a few scaled-down functions were transferred to and integrated with the US State Department.

The watershed events of 9/11 and the subsequent US-guided ‘war on terror’, accompanied by the serious decline in America’s image globally after the Iraq war under the George W Bush administration, precipitated a significant resurgence in US cultural diplomacy (as well as in public diplomacy). The main objective was to influence foreign public opinion particularly in Arab speaking countries (Hughes 2005). This renewed interest and a sense of urgency was evidenced by a myriad of organisations and institutions across the USA, including the US Congress (John Brademas Center 2009) generating discussion on how Americans are viewed in the world. This included the critical assessment of the role of culture in global interactions and foreign affairs, and the resources that were to be allocated to present a preferred picture of American values, culture and democracy to the world (Feigenbaum 2001).

In the USA cultural diplomacy is often subsumed under public diplomacy. Nevertheless, the value of culture and art in international relations is appreciated, and the State Department supported Foundation for Art and Preservation in Embassies (FAPE), promotes and upholds American culture in American diplomatic missions throughout the world. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, summarised the motivation for this initiative in the following words: “Bypassing written and spoken words, art expresses the human spirit and human creativity, connecting all citizens on a deeper level ... as a powerful means of communication” (cited by Lewytyzkyj 2009). Cultural diplomacy is thus enjoying a legitimacy and attention in the USA not seen since the Cold War.

The cultural diplomacy of the USA exhibits certain characteristics. Firstly a particular feature of American culture is the global dominance of American popular culture, specifically in music, television and film. This dominance has placed the USA in direct opposition to almost all the states of the world when the multilateral convention for the
protection of cultural diversity (and indirectly to counter the American mass popular culture engulfing the world), was adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in October 2005. Secondly, the USA cultural diplomacy programmes tend to be one-sided and unilateral. This is explained by the American public policy anthropologist, Robert Albro (2011), who argues that prevailing American public diplomacy theory (and practice) since well before 9/11 has mostly been about message delivery: “getting them to want what we want”, and “shaping the narrative, combatting extremist voices” and competing in the “war of ideas”. This relative absence of mutuality, reciprocity and dialogue explain the difficulties Americans have with clearly distinguishing in word and deed, the concepts and practice of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and propaganda respectively.

(b) Canada: The cultural diplomacy of Canada has always had a strong focus to the extent that it is closely aligned to the country’s primary foreign policy objective to contain American (cultural) imperialism and promote Canadian independence and its unique character and values (Chey 2010). Already in the late 1990s Canadian academics drew attention to the links between culture, cultural policy, cultural diplomacy and the ability of Canada to maintain an autonomous position in international relations and pursuing an independent foreign policy. Maintaining its independence and safeguarding its national security (in all its manifestations), in an increasingly interdependent world, is a Canadian foreign policy priority (Chey 2010: 7). A unique feature of Canadian cultural diplomacy is its particular multilateral approach; Canada maintains a strong presence in UNESCO and has traditionally worked closely with other states to develop a body of global legal instruments for the protection and promotion of national cultures, cultural heritage and cultural diversity. Canada was also a leading country and founding state of the 20-member International Network for Cultural Policies (INCP). This inter-ministerial forum fostered consensus on global cultural policies and was a driving force for the adoption of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005. Canada continues to be a leading proponent of cultural diplomacy globally, both in its bilateral relations and particularly in the multilateral arena.

(c) Cuba: Armando Hart Dávalos, the Minister of Culture of Cuba from 1976 to 1997, in a series of interviews with Luis Báez, a Cuban journalist, gave an extensive expose of culture in Cuba and of Cuban international cultural relations (Báez 1983). He indicated that artistic freedom of expression is entrenched in the 1976 Constitution of Cuba, one of
the few in the world to do this. This predisposition dates back to 1959 when shortly after the revolution; a National Cultural Council was established as well as a film industry and the Cuban Institute of Cinematic Arts (ICAIC). Print shops were nationalised and a national print industry established, and later a National Publishing House and the Cuban Book Institute as well. In 1967 the Casa de las Americas (House of the Americas) was established with the aim to strengthen cultural relations with Latin American countries. This was followed by the establishment of a Ministry of Culture in 1976 and the appointment of Armando Hart Dávalos as the first Minister of Culture of Cuba. The policy of the Ministry is not to promote specific genres but to “facilitate the development of all viable artistic forms, based on the country’s cultural history and its resources … and stimulate a creative climate in the country” (Báez 1983: 10-11).

This domestic cultural foundation extended into the international arena. According to Minister Dávalos, “having cultural ties with countries all over the world is considered a principle and a necessity” (Báez 1983: 20). In addition, Cuba propagated a universal perspective of culture, and on the question of exiting Western culture or re-joining the West, (as proposed by former US President Reagan) the Minister responded that Cuba will “carry out its political, ideological and cultural debate in the West, within its own traditions, traditions which to a great extend were born of the peoples of Europe” (Báez 1983: 31). This set the tone of the underlying principles that still guides Cuba’s cultural diplomacy.

In response to a question whether culture can bring together countries with political differences, the Minister (Báez 1983: 56) answered with an emphatic yes. He was also of the opinion that Cuba was culturally open to the world, seeking cultural relations, including with the USA, and strengthening shared cultural roots, history and heritage with Europe, Latin America and Africa. Expanding this to Asia was not excluded. He referred to the establishment of an international committee of Latin American intellectuals and artists providing unity in culture, which “foreshadows unity in economic(s) and politics”. The Minister addressed the defence and promotion of national culture, while opening up to the world, the very principles which were in subsequently enshrined in the 2005 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Expression (UNESCO 2005).

Unique to Cuban cultural diplomacy and from personal experience, the author* has first-hand knowledge of the quality of Cuban interventions in UN debates on culture and the

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progressive approach taken by Cuban diplomats on issues of culture and cultural diplomacy, in the UN General Assembly in New York and at UNESCO in Paris. The Cuban diplomats are highly regarded, expertly trained, well versed and often take the lead within the Group of 77 & China, and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) in UN cultural debates. Cuba thus has a disproportionately large impact and influence in multilateral cultural fora.

The Americas represent a break from the traditionalist diplomatic and cultural diplomacy approach of Europe. The US, Canada and Cuba as representative of the region do not share a common approach, history or (current) manifestations of cultural diplomacy, but rather reflect a wide spectrum of (often divergent) dimensions.

3.3 Asia and Australasia

Many of the countries in Asia and Australasia have strong and ancient cultural traditions and since their (re)emergence in the 1980s as regional and global powers in world politics, displayed renewed vigour in expanding their cultural diplomacy influence abroad. The examples below serve as illustrations of that renewed focus on cultural diplomacy.

(a) India: In an interview with a local Indian newspaper in 2008, then Director General of the India Cultural Cooperation Council (ICCR), Virenda Gupta, announced that with 20 existing cultural centres around the world, India was set to open a further 15 over a period of two years, 2009-2010. This would ensure and expand India’s cultural diplomacy influence globally, particularly in its immediate south Asia region (The Hindu [s.a.]). In this regard, Lee (2010) observes that the soft power of cultural diplomacy is often used to spread the influence of a country in regions of interest. It has been suggested that the growth of India’s cultural centres around the world (from 22 in 2008 to 35 in 2010) has as much to do with its growing global influence and increased focus on culture as a tool of influence, as it has to do with the growing global influence of China.

Cultural diplomacy may also be a function of (this) regional expansion as illustrated by neighbouring Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Deputy High Commissioner to India, on 5 February 2012, opened a joint film festival with India and said that it was part of Bangladeshi “cultural diplomacy, and people to people contact is an aspect of that.” The aim of the film festival was to project “the historic war of liberation of Bangladesh to the new generation of Bangladeshi youth and to the world” (ANI 2012). The examples from
India and Bangladesh indicate that cultural diplomacy may also have a specific national and regional focus in addition to the international one.

The Indian ICCR as government funded and managed cultural diplomacy institution has been criticised for its “staid and dull” promotion of Indian cultural and it has been argued (Mark 2009: 34) that positioning the ICCR rather as an independent body similar to the British Council would enable it to fully make use of the myriad of opportunities Indian heritage, popular culture and diversity has to offer.

(b) China (the People’s Republic of China): Sun Jiazheng, the then Chinese Minister of Culture, declared in an interview in the People’s Daily Online (2004) that culture has become the third pillar of Chinese diplomacy after economics and politics. (He did not mention security or defence diplomacy, normally considered the fourth pillar of diplomacy.)

Subsequently, China significantly increased its cultural presence abroad since it opened its first Confucian Institute in Seoul, South Korea in the same year. These institutes, which promote the learning of Chinese language and culture in the world, are modelled on the British Council, French and Italian Institutes. They do, however, differ by always functioning in partnership with local institutions, usually universities. These cultural centres serve as a platform to intensify cultural exchanges, to expand outreach, and also to provide an interface for the local population with arts of the country of origin. By 2006 China had established 80 centres (Lai 2006), by 2010 the number has grown to over 100 institutes, and by 2014 the number had increased to 440 institutes in 120 countries. Among other cultural diplomacy institutions, only the Alliance Française and the British Council are represented in more than 100 countries (Wang 2014).

In 2006 the Eleventh Five Year plan of the Chinese Communist Party’s called for the popularisation of Chinese culture worldwide, as well as emphasizing the growth and export of Chinese arts and artistic products. In 2010 Premier Wen Jiaboa, in a ‘Government Work Report’ to the National People’s Congress, indicated China’s commitment to attach more importance to cultural development in order to enhance the international influence of Chinese culture, thereby recognising the power of culture and the arts in the international arena (Dzodin 2010). China’s public pronouncements on cultural diplomacy placed a new focus on the export of cultural goods, or what is known as the creative economies,
indicating a direct link between the foreign policy objectives of cultural diplomacy and domestic policy priorities in China.

**(c) Japan:** Japan opened the Japan Foundation in 1972, with nine offices in Asia Pacific, and re-constituted it as an independent body in 2003, with the express aim of fostering friendly foreign relation, promoting understanding, friendship and goodwill, contributing to a better international environment, contributing to the world in culture and other fields through international cultural exchange activities (Chey 2010: 8). The power of the initiative is demonstrated in the fact that this example of Japanese initiatives in cultural diplomacy was shortly after followed by similar initiatives by China, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia (Powney cited in Chey 2010: 8).

In a speech delivered in 2008, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taro Aso, expanded on the “new cultural diplomacy that Japan is pursuing” (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) 2008). This included a specific multilateral approach, for example, supporting a UNESCO project to produce a map of the languages of the world which are in danger of dying out. The Minister argued that cultural content, including popular Japanese *manga* and *anime* – and so-called *J-pop, J-fashion and J-anime* that rivals Disney products in Asia (especially amongst the youth of China) was creating a positive image of Japan globally. The fact was also recognised that the cultural products were produced by the artists, practitioners and the industry, and not by government. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister committed the support of the Japanese government to build partnerships with the cultural sector to further develop that industry (Japan MoFA 2008). In addition, Japanese pop-culture and popularly sought-after toy robots created a climate for developing robotic technology making Japan a world leader in the field of industrial robots. As such, culture, and popular culture, and cultural diplomacy directly supported economic development and economic diplomacy. Furthermore, a positive image abroad of Japanese culture (tea ceremonies, flower arranging, origami, cherry blossoms in bloom, sumo or Japanese food), supported foreign relations by creating positive images of and associations with Japan. The role of the Foreign Ministry in this was to support and ‘market’ Japanese culture abroad, taking advantage of pop culture to drive an active cultural diplomacy (Japan MoFA 2008).

A particular feature of Japanese cultural diplomacy is the balance it seeks in the role of government on the one hand and the role of the content drivers founded in civil society on the other. A further distinguishing feature is the close linkage between cultural diplomacy
and economic diplomacy and economic development, again as illustrated with China, strengthening the links between international and domestic policy priorities.

(d) **Australia**: Australian diplomats, at least since the 1940s, have advocated for a stronger role for culture in diplomacy (Chey 2010). In this regard they demonstrated and understanding of the importance of a positive image of a country abroad among the public and decision-makers, and of the role culture plays in promoting such an image. However, as with many other countries, the commitment of resources and the political will to prioritise cultural diplomacy did not necessarily follow (Chey 2010: 1).

In 1960 the Australian Department of External Affairs started discussions on foreign cultural relations and in 1969 an Interdepartmental Committee proposed a formal cultural relations program. However, this was not adopted partly because of a difference of opinion between the Australian government who wanted to pursue a cultural diplomacy policy linked to foreign policy objectives and the Australian Council, the organised arts sector body, who wanted art for art sake, even in international programmes (Manton cited in Chey 2010: 9). From the 1970s Australia posted cultural attachés to some of its diplomatic missions and, by following the example of Canada and Germany amongst others, experts from outside the civil service. Financial constraints have reduced these post in number to the current five, namely in Beijing, Tokyo, Jakarta, Washington and New Delhi. Australian Studies Centres (NGOs), self-financing and often part of joint co-operation councils but receiving government support for visitor programmes, book donations and travel costs, fill the gaps in cultural diplomacy. An International Cultural Council was established by government to consolidate cultural diplomacy programmes in 1998, but due to subsequent budget cuts its cultural diplomacy role did not – as envisaged – develop into something similar to that of the British Council (Chey 2010: 10). Australian cultural diplomacy had thus gone through a number of crises of recognition and funding, and for government, finding the right balance between creating function specific institutions and supporting civil society in their cultural relations programmes remained a challenge.

China, Japan, India and Australia as representative of the Asia region, have all with the exception of Australia that is vacillating, shown strong development in cultural diplomacy programmes and significantly expanded their number of overseas cultural diplomacy institutions since the 1970s, i.e., Japan and China, with India following that route in the last
twenty years. For China and Japan in particular a unique focus has also been on the export or ‘economics’ of cultural goods.

3.4 Africa

Africa is newest of the regions to turn to cultural diplomacy in the furtherance of foreign policy goals and strengthening foreign relations. In this regard the African Union plays a prominent role in promoting cultural diplomacy across the Continent, and although mainly policy oriented, it has popularise the concept and raised awareness of its role and potential in supporting (other) foreign policy objectives. As individual examples, Ethiopia and Nigeria have both made pronouncements on their cultural diplomacy approaches and instituted programmes to give effect to it.

(a) African Union (AU): An Extraordinary Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) held in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999 decided on the establishment of the African Union to follow on and expand on the mandate of the Organisation of African Unity established in 1963. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was subsequently adopted during the Lomé Summit of the OAU on 11 July 2000. The following (Lusaka) Summit in 2001 drafted the road map for the implementation of the AU and the Summit hosted in Durban, South Africa in 2002 launched the AU and convened the 1st Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union (AU [s.a.]a). Since its inception, and as the pre-eminent Pan-African body, the African Union (AU) has been active in pursuing common African cultural policies and promoting cultural diplomacy practices. The following prominent and illustrative initiatives in this regard are noted:

(i) The African World Heritage Fund (AWHF and the Fund) was initiated by the African Member States of UNESCO, endorsed by the African Union and launched in 2006 with the aim to protect, promote and develop the world heritage on the African continent in line with the provisions of the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (AWHF [s.a.]). In October 2009 AWHF became a Category II Centre under the auspices of UNESCO, associated with and mandated to carry out the strategic objectives of the premier global intergovernmental cultural and cultural diplomacy institution (UNESCO WHC [s.a.]). The AWHF supports Africa world heritage sites through training in conservation and management, identifying new sites and supporting the inscription process, rehabilitating sites in danger, and capacity building for technical expert
and site managers. World heritage sites are drivers of employment opportunities, sustainable development, tourism and local community involvement. The AWHF is hosted by South Africa and the AWHF Annual Report for 2014 reported that President Zuma had committed a further US$1 million to the operational costs and endowment fund of the AWHF (AWHF 2014). The AWHF is by all accounts one of the most successful cultural diplomacy initiatives of the AU, having also established long-term partnerships with heritage institutions and experts from Norway, Canada and Japan, who serve respectively on the Board of the AWHF and as patrons. The five African regions are represented on the Board, as is the Director-General of UNESCO and the South African chairperson together with number of technical experts from the Continent. The AWHF enjoys wide support on the Continent and internationally and has had a notable number of successes, for example lending technical support to the nomination of the Okavango Delta in Botswana resulting in it being inscribed as the 1000th site on the world heritage list. The Fund is functionally autonomous, reports to an intercontinental Board, and an assessment of the Annual Report 2014 indicates a high level of interactivity of the programmes, supporting the two thesis of success of the adapted model. The ten-year anniversary in 2016 will present an opportunity to further assess achievements and challenges and further strengthen the Fund.

(ii) **Africa Agenda 2063 and the 4th Pan-African Cultural Congress** – in the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration on the establishment of the OAU and AU, the Heads of State and Government of the Africa Union (AU) agreed in Addis Ababa in May 2013, on a vision and eight aspirations to serve as pillars for the Continent’s enhanced development for the next fifty years (AU [s.a.]). Known as the Africa Agenda 2063, it is significant that ‘Aspiration 5’ is focussed on “An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics” (AU 2015a). The objectives of Aspiration 5 are to entrench Pan-African ideals in all school curricula and the enhancement of Pan-African cultural assets including heritage, folklore, languages, film, music, theatre, literature, festivals, religions and spirituality. The African creative arts and industries and African languages are to become contributors to “self-awareness, well-being, peace and prosperity, and to world culture and heritage” (AU 2015a). While cultural diplomacy is not directly mentioned in the Africa Agenda 2063, the cultural aspiration is to be promoted on the Continent and among the Diaspora, making it an international cultural diplomacy programme.
In the preparatory and consultative phase of Agenda 2063, the (African) cultural sector in a meeting in Addis Ababa in May 2014 on ‘Africa Reimagined Creative Hub (ARCH), asked for the “[scaling] up [of] cultural diplomacy”, and had further proposed a meeting of the cultural and creative sector from across the continent to contribute to the development of the Africa Agenda 2063 (Wadaw 2014). This resulted in the hosting by South Africa as part of Africa Month 2015, of the 4th Pan-African Cultural Congress. The Congress adopted a series of critical recommendation for the implementation of the Africa Agenda 2063, including a recommendation for the “Promotion of Cultural Diplomacy” (AU 2015b). The recommendations of the congress will be fed into the AU consultative processes and contribute to the development of the first ten year implementation plan of the Africa Agenda 2063, placing cultural diplomacy firmly on the development agenda of the African Union.

(b) Ethiopia: An article on the webpage of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) after the December 2014 meeting between Presidents Museveni of Uganda and Teshome of Ethiopia reported that Ethiopia had institutionalised its cultural diplomacy, within the framework of public diplomacy, firstly aimed at improving the image of the country, and secondly to influence the world and especially the Continent to address Africa’s challenges and let the voice of Africa be heard in these challenges. The article reported on an Ethiopian cultural diplomacy programme in neighboring Uganda, with the intent of “[drawing] the soul of Uganda near to Ethiopia” through musical performances (Yassin 2015). The programme was for the “residents of the Kibale district” and came at the invitation of President Museveni who had seen them perform during a visit in December 2014 to Ethiopia. The cultural programme in Uganda intended to convey a message of Ethiopia’s ... “vision; its development agenda; and special contributions to the African Renaissance” (Yassin 2015). It was acknowledged that the effect of the long-term political and economic aims of the programme on the “hearts and minds of the people of Uganda” would be difficult to measure, but it was felt that the messages of “multilateralism, dialogue, shared progress and mutual benefit” was successfully conveyed. Cultural diplomacy it is argued is therefore very closely tied to foreign policy objectives, creating a “bridge” between the peoples of the region. It was further suggested that this programme be extended to the rest of Africa, drawing on similarities and (researched) common “traditions, cultures, customs and values” (Yassin 2015). This would create trust and mutual understanding and support economic development in the region and further in Africa. In this regard Ethiopia would draw on its rich cultural, heritage, history and traditions as instruments to be used to “win the hearts and minds of foreign nationals to
help support Ethiopia’s policies …. and national interests”. As culture is “intertwined” with identity, this would impact positively on African identity and Renaissance. While the Ethiopian example assessed is based on just one particular event, the report on the event refers most of the essential elements of cultural diplomacy and therefore provides a useful insight into the cultural diplomacy approach and practice of Ethiopia.

**c) Nigeria:** A unique perspective on cultural diplomacy is offered by a Nigerian diplomat and scholar that argued that cultural diplomacy is the principal instrument globally to promote a culture of peace and reduce the culture of war, and the preferred alternative to other forms of diplomacy, vis political, economic and security, as it promotes dialogue and value-sharing (Hagher 2011). This approach was based on a definition of cultural diplomacy that considers culture as the sum total of a way of life, encompassing a philosophical (ideas and beliefs) and creative component (the arts), but also a material (technology and manufactured goods) and nonmaterial (institutions) component. It is posited that culture and cultural diplomacy had been a key foreign policy strategy of Nigeria for over fifty years, as the soft power option of attraction and persuasion contrasting with the hard power approach of coercion. Nigeria’s foreign policy has been premised on friendly relations, active participation in multilateral fora and upholding the principles of those fora, with an absence of extra-territorial ambitions, working with other (African) states, and supporting the independence of all (African) countries. Prime Minister, Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa declared this to be the foreign policy (objectives) of Nigeria in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1960. It meant that Nigeria had chosen soft power or cultural diplomacy as the objective of its foreign policy, and has maintained it for over 50 years. This was evidenced in the economic and training assistance provided to dismantle apartheid; technical aid assistance provided to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; providing electricity to the neighbouring countries of Benin and Niger; playing a leading role in NEPAD, helping to create the first regional peace keeping force, ECOMOG, in the world; and in promoting and protecting black culture, amongst others through the international Festival of Black Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977.

It was proposed that Nigeria should increase its cultural diplomacy budget as a part of its foreign policy budget, and appoint prominent artists as ambassadors, as had been done by India, Cuba, Mexico and Columbia, to counter the negative image of Nigeria portrayed in some international films. This would also need an assessment and renewal of cultural institutions in Nigeria, and further support to the export of cultural goods, including music.
and textiles as examples of Nigeria’s cultural diplomacy programmes. As Nigerian Ambassador to Mexico and later Canada, Hagher (2011) countered what he called cultural ignorance by initiating and supporting a cross cultural programme of music and dance, representing favourite cultural practices in both countries, over a period of more than a year with exchange of choreographers and dancers (Mexico), and in Canada launched a now successful ‘Nollywood’ Festival in Toronto to counter the Western films (District 9, a Canadian film on Scam 419 and a CNN film on How to rob a bank) portraying Nigeria in a negative light. Embassies and Missions should therefore be in the forefront of cultural diplomacy initiatives. In Cameroon, the Nigerian High Commission arranged a trade and cultural week, which did much to restore the strained relations between the two countries due to the protracted conflict over the Bakassi Peninsula (Ngwane 2009). The trade and cultural week aimed at sharing experiences in management of resources, promoting tourism, and cooperation between business entrepreneurs in the private sector. This was supplemented by joint cultural performances from artists of both sides.

It was argued that while the culturally homogenous history and traditions in fashion, literature, film, music and belief system facilitated the interaction between Cameroon and Nigeria, it was important that there be an equitable distribution of own cultural goods and services, and the advancing of unique home-grown products and genres, so that it constituted a mutually beneficial partnership guarding against dominance of one culture over the other, or cultural imperialism.

While formalised cultural diplomacy in Africa may be a relatively recent phenomenon, the pro-active and leading role of the Africa Union is unique. The above selected but representative examples of modern-day national cultural diplomacy practices from Europe, the Americas, Asia and Australasia and Africa provide an instructive overview of the proliferation of, and contemporary trends prevalent in the cultural diplomacy institutions, policies and programmes of some of the major global powers. It also serves as illustration of the extent to which cultural diplomacy has become an established instrument of foreign policy and part of conventional diplomacy.

3.5 Multilateral cultural diplomacy

While multilateral diplomacy in different forms became more prominent after World War II, it has its roots in antiquity, and in particular in the eight peace conferences held between
the Greek states and Persia between 392 and 367 BC. This was followed by occasional major global conferences in the 18th and 19 century (Vienna and Berlin) and by the Versailles conference in the 20th century and then with further increasing frequency since World War II (Roberts 2011: 17-18). Modern (post WWII) multilateral cultural diplomacy is practiced in a myriad of international and regional organisations, both intergovernmental and non-governmental, but most importantly for the study of cultural diplomacy, in the UN and in the European Union (EU).

(a) United Nations: During the establishment of the UN – also to the extent that it emerged from the remains of the League of Nations established after World War I and re-conceptualised towards the end of World War II – the importance of culture(s) and by implication cultural diplomacy was recognised. This provided the basis for and led to the establishment in 1945 of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), a Specialised Agency of the UN with headquarters in Paris. The UNESCO Constitution was signed in London on 16 November 1945 by 37 countries and came into force on 4 November 1946 after the 20th ratification. UNESCO was tasked with the UN mandate for education, science and culture, later also communications. It is considered to be an ‘upstream’ think-tank of the UN, rather than a ‘down-stream’ implementing agency like the United Nations Children’s fund (UNICEF - that for example builds schools) the United Nations World Food Program (WFP - that for example feeds millions), or the World Health Organisation (WHO - that for example builds hospitals). Next to the UN with 196 member states (almost universal membership), UNESCO as of 1 September 2015 had the second highest number of member states at 195 member states and 9 associate members (UNESCO [s.a.]b).

The preamble of the UNESCO Constitution (1945) is often cited for its inspirational text, embodying the ideals of the UN and its founding nations:

… since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed; … that ignorance of each other’s ways and lives have been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war …
This idealistic approach is reinforced by the modern-day Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (ICD) based in Berlin who proclaims that the ultimate goal of cultural diplomacy is peace and stability (Norrman 2013).

The UNESCO cultural diplomacy programmes are both concrete – by providing measures and support for the protection of world arts, culture and heritage during peace time and war, by promoting and protecting global cultural and linguistic diversity, and by promoting arts education and fostering creativity; and ideational with less tangible outcomes or results like the ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’ Intercultural Dialogue programmes (UNESCO [s.a.]c). UNESCO also works with other multilateral diplomatic fora, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), to address the shrinking global cultural diversity and to provide guidance and support to member states to strengthen their cultural policy environment in order to protect their own cultural diversity and cultural goods. The global dominance of American cultural goods and services unfortunately strengthens a narrow view of some American citizens of culture as tradable goods, or the profit making entertainment industry, no different from other economic goods, and therefore to be pushed aggressively, without concern for the more vulnerable cultures of other nations. This had created tensions vis-à-vis American culture in multilateral diplomatic fora including in UNESCO since the start of the organisation, and led to counter-campaigns by culturally diverse countries such as Canada, France [and South Africa] and the nations of Africa and Asia (Graham 2006: 231). This has conversely added vigour to the efforts by UNESCO and nations across the globe to take measures to protect domestic cultures, and to intervene in domestic markets to support local cultural industries.

(b) European Union (EU): As a regional IGO, the EU has emphasised the importance of culture in regional (and international) relations and of cultural diplomacy. In 2010 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on “the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external actions”, underlining “the importance of cultural diplomacy in advancing the EU’s interests and values in the world, underlining the need for the EU to act as a global player” (EU European Parliament 2010). The resolution further resolved to ensure that there is a dedicated person in all EU foreign representation, to coordinate cultural diplomacy, and a comprehensive (cultural diplomacy) strategy to give effect to the role of culture in furthering the EU’s values of “democratisation, human rights, conflict prevention and peace building” (EU European Parliament 2010). The resolution also strongly advocated for the strengthening of the United Nations multilateral cultural diplomacy framework.
Multilateral cultural diplomacy has made significant progress in strengthening the international legal and regulatory framework for the protection and promotion of heritage and cultural diversity. UNESCO in 2001, 2003 and 2005 adopted new global normative instruments for the protection of respectively underwater cultural heritage, intangible cultural heritage and cultural diversity. The EU (and other regions) has supported clauses in the standard-setting instruments promoting international technical and financial cooperation, thus strengthening the global (cultural diplomacy) network.

4. INTERNATIONAL BUILDING BLOCKS AND BEST PRACTICES

Building blocks and best practices in cultural diplomacy can be inferred from both historical (as far as applicable) and more recent examples. The selected examples of cultural diplomacy (above in Section 3.2 [pre-modern origins] and Section 3.3 [contemporary developments]) are illustrative of international practice, although they are not the primary focus of this study and are therefore not exhaustively discussed. From these examples internationally common elements and normative standards may be concluded. Based on the adapted Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model, and to summarise the international ‘building blocks and best practices’ the following ‘lessons’ may be learned from these examples:

(a) The historical-cultural dimension: The historical-cultural dimension is often an unspoken but prevalent reflection of the ‘trials and tribulations’ of a country’s past, or a mirror image of a (often new-found) global or regional power position, as in the case of for example China, India or Australia. French culture, or the ‘French exception’ is as much a part of the national character of France as is the ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ won during the French revolution. The Russian Federation in turn, maintains a connection to the Soviet Union through its continued reflection of traditional Russian culture forms including ballet and literature, and Canada’s preference for multilateral cultural diplomacy seeks to set a distinct agenda and build global alliances in the face of the (cultural) dominance of the USA. Cuba’s open and global approach to cultural diplomacy, particularly in the Latin American region mirrors its attempts over decades to circumvent the US embargo. Both Ethiopia and Nigeria reflect a cultural diplomacy approach closely aligned to their regional and continental (political and economic) aspirations.

(b) The aspirational dimension: The aspirational or motivational element refers to what states wish to achieve with their cultural diplomacy. In the cases above while there are
variances, and overlaps and objectives are not always clearly defined, most states wish to promote and foster appreciation for their cultural heritage and showcase unique and excellent examples thereof, whether ballet, music or film. They wish to create goodwill and foster mutual understanding. In almost all cases cultural diplomacy supports foreign policy objectives whether political or economic. In the case of the US it is argued that it also supports security objectives. Cultural diplomacy often promotes nation branding, and the creation of a positive image of the country as in the case of Nigeria. Cultural diplomacy may have an economic objective in the creation of markets for cultural goods and opportunities for artists, as in the case of China, thereby supporting the domestic agenda of the state.

(c) The institutional dimension: Countries vary widely in how their cultural diplomacy is managed or administered; in the UK the British Council is functionally autonomous and sets its own agenda, although it is funded by the state. In France, China and India although external agencies or institutions have been created for the promotion of cultural diplomacy those are closely monitored and managed by the state, through the foreign ministry. In Canada management of cultural diplomacy by the cultural ministry allows some degree of separation from the political and economic agenda of the state. In Ethiopia and Nigeria although it is not always clear which agency or department directs cultural diplomacy, it is seen as an integral part of foreign policy and therefore controlled by the state, even when initiatives are aimed at the private sector and the people. The Africa World Heritage Fund of the AU functions autonomously but depends on funding from member states for its operations, and hosting and support of the institution by one member state.

(d) The programmatic dimension: Programmes for cultural diplomacy may be as diverse as the institutional dimension, with France and China concentrating on language training, and the UK on educational and youth programmes. Japan had found a niche market for its unique brand of anime, manga and (toy) robotics, while Indian and Russian cultural diplomacy retains a focus on traditional art forms and cultural practices. The AWHF concentrates only on world heritage in Africa, but covers all aspects of protecting, promoting, sustainable managing and developing of world heritage sites on the Continent. Nigeria and Cameroon, and Nigeria and Mexico found common interests in shared national passions for dance and music, which facilitated the cultural interaction, and the creating of bonds of friendship and understanding.
(e) The propositional dimension: The propositional dimension refers to the two theses of ‘distance’ and ‘interactivity’ as determinants of success of cultural diplomacy initiatives. The argument is that the greater the distance between the cultural and political/economic agendas of the state the greater the chances of success and equally the greater the interaction with the receiving audience the greater the chances of the success. The high regard for the British Council and its cultural diplomacy programmes over decades would suggest that the distance thesis of separating culture from politics and economics in the case of Britain has been particularly successful. The often poor reception of cultural diplomacy initiatives by the US State Department especially recently and in areas of conflict may serve to confirm the thesis. Russian cultural diplomacy is still reminiscent of Soviet Union (propaganda) practices and the (still) close involvement of the state, again seemingly confirming the thesis that distance is an advantage in (successful) cultural diplomacy. The contradictory French experience may be explained by the fact that there is little or no separation between culture and politics in France. In the French experience, culture is not something you do but who you are, and this may be reflected in the African experiences in Nigeria and Ethiopia.

Regarding the interactivity thesis, the cultural diplomacy of both UK and France is particularly successful with a strong focus on mutuality, reciprocity, collaboration and cooperation with the receiving target audience. This is also confirmed by the experiences of Nigeria where there is a strong focus on the participation of the target audience. As had been indicated, US initiatives tend to be more one-sided and unilateral, and therefore less likely to be enthusiastically received, although this may also be due to the nature of the situation, when tested in a situation of conflict and tension. The cultural diplomacy programmes of China and other emerging countries have been institutionalised too recently, or lack research to make an accurate assessment of the workings of the two theses.

5. CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to consider the emergence, development and global practices in the field of cultural diplomacy. Although selective and not discussed in depth, illustrative and representative examples from the regions of the world were considered for their illustrative value. The examples also served an analytical purpose by identifying trends, key contributions, leading practices and benchmarking regarding current cultural diplomacy, as measured against the adapted five element Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model.
CHAPTER 4

THE CULTURAL DIPLOMACY OF SOUTH AFRICA: EMERGENCE AND MANIFESTATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

Although South Africa was relatively late in announcing the development of a formal cultural diplomacy policy, the country has been pursuing an active albeit informal international cultural programme in support of foreign policy objectives for some time. Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to focus on South Africa as a case study to identify the principles and elements constituting the building blocks of cultural diplomacy in place and the gaps that may exist in its pursuit. In this regard the adapted five element model of Gienow-Hecht & Donfried is applied in a single chapter (rather than fragmenting and spreading these elements over more chapters). Therefore, the chapter respectively and in sequence considers the historical-cultural dimension which informs the national cultural character of South Africa; the aspirational (or policy) dimension; the institutional dimension; the programmatic aspects in place; and finally the propositional elements of distance and interactivity to determine the potential successes.

2. THE HISTORICAL-CULTURAL DIMENSION

Cultural diplomacy in South Africa is informed by the national cultural character of the country and its inhabitants/citizens. While not exclusive, the foundations of the national cultural character (and therefore an important determinant of the philosophy underpinning cultural diplomacy) of post-1994 South Africa, are to be found in the principles espoused, amongst others, in a range of historical texts. Three examples of these texts are selected as representative of these writings: the Freedom Charter of 1955, the writings of Steve Biko of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in the early 1970s and finally the ANC’s Draft National Cultural Policy of 1994. While the Freedom Charter laid the foundation for a rights-based Constitution in South Africa post-1994, the writing of Steve Biko influenced the thinking on blackness, consciousness and identity that remains relevant to national (cultural) identity to this day, and the ANC policy document informed the approach of the new government after the elections. Accordingly these document and views are analysed to determine their cultural components and their contributions to cultural diplomacy.
2.1 Historical overview

The 1994 democratisation process in South Africa found expression in a new constitution, a change of government and the demise of a political system of oppression and marginalisation which had lasted for over three hundred years. The impact on South Africa was cosmic. While the political changes were instant, radical and irreversible, the socio-economic consequences were to be felt for decades, and are felt still. The mind-set of the population and nation remains irrevocably informed by their experiences of the pre-1994 era. Freeman (1997b: 219) posited that “‘togetherness’ and ‘separateness’ are important parts of national consciousness … [and that this] consciousness will [in part] be based on common historical experiences”. This elucidates the prevalent racial, cultural and ethnic sensitivities, and the determination to transform the South African society which includes the cultural character thereof.

(a) The Freedom Charter, 1955: The Freedom Charter was an ideological, cultural and human rights beacon in the emergence of the South African nation, and was adopted at the Congress of the People, in Kliptown, Johannesburg on 26 June 1955, as a “statement of core principles” of the South African Congress Alliance (SACA). The Congress consisted of the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People’s Congress (ANC [s.a.]a). It represented a collection of the “freedom demands from the people of South Africa” (ANC [s.a.]a) and later became one of the base documents of the 1996 South African Constitution. In 1980 the popularity of the Freedom Charter was revived by the United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella body for the antiapartheid groupings, and its principles became a core part of the later liberation struggle (Johnson & Jacobs 2012: 121).

For its contribution to the national culture the declarations contained in the Freedom Charter (ANC [s.a.]b) on [education and] culture, addressed in a section The Doors of Learning and Culture shall be opened!, are considered. The Freedom Charter provided for the following:

The government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life;
All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free exchange of books, ideas and contact with other lands;
The colour ban in cultural life, in sport and in education shall be abolished (ANC [s.a.]b).

Another contribution of the *Freedom Charter* was claiming equal rights for all “national groups”. It stipulated that “all people shall have equal right to use their own languages and to develop their own (folk) culture and customs” (ANC [s.a.]b). In the Constitution of 1996 protection of languages was subsequently given prominence. Language rights were recognised in the preamble of the Constitution and eleven official languages were recognised and protected, while also recognising other languages used in South Africa.

While culture and rights featured prominently, cultural diplomacy or international cultural relations were not specifically addressed in the *Freedom Charter*. However references to international peace and friendship and “upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status for all” (ANC [s.a.]b) speak to the objectives and the fundamental characteristics of cultural diplomacy. The philosophy espoused in the *Freedom Charter* subsequently found expression amongst others in the entrenchment of economic, social and cultural rights in the South African Constitution of 1996, and a principle of South Africa’s multilateral cultural diplomacy to this day.

**b) The black consciousness writings of Steve Biko:** The foundations of the national cultural character of South Africa and therefore of its cultural diplomacy are also to be found in the philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) of the early 1970s and particularly in the writings of Steve Biko. The BCM amongst others brought a new culturally based dimension to anti-apartheid resistance, or what Mangcu (2012: 278) calls the “cultural nationalist stage” of resistance and liberation. Although the period of prominence of the Movement was short, it left an indelible imprint on the way of thinking about blackness and black freedom in South Africa (Chipkin 2007). The activist Steve Biko was central to the BCM and his political ideas and writings aimed at “empowering blacks by restoring African consciousness and pride” (Johnson & Jacobs 2012: 33) encapsulated what the Movement essentially represented. To fully appreciate the contribution of the writings of Steve Biko to South African consciousness and national culture today and for its relevance to cultural diplomacy, it is necessary to consider his views on blackness, the black man and African culture.

Biko lamented that the black man had failed to throw off the yoke of oppression and ascribed it to the fact that white domination had created a “defeated [black] man … man only in form
…. the black man has become a shell, a shadow of a man completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity” (Biko cited in Chipkin 2007: 112). The black man under oppression was therefore a person without an own culture. Biko’s quest for black freedom or black consciousness is often juxtaposed against that of Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire. Freedom did not mean integration into white society as the route to liberation, but Césaire’s idea of a “return to self”, or his own view of “restoring an alienated soul” (Chipkin 2007: 116). In this regard African culture had not been obliterated by the “belligerent cultures it collided with”, but “the fundamental aspects of the pure African culture” had survived (Biko quoted in Chipkin 2007: 116-117). Restoring African consciousness (and culture) therefore relied on two stages in the BCM philosophy; “physical liberation and psychological liberation” (Johnson & Jacobs 2012: 35).

Two distinctive features of this pure African (black) culture are found in the importance attached to the concept ‘man’ and “giving the world a more human face” or what is also referred to as ‘Ubuntu’ (Mangcu 2012: 274). The concept of ‘Ubuntu’ has remained prominent in South African domestic and international politics, and was taken up although not clearly defined in the 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy Building a Better World: the Diplomacy of Ubuntu (RSA 2011). The unique characteristics of African culture, vis-à-vis that of Western culture was further explored by Biko when he said that that “God [made] … us a community of brothers and sisters jointly involved in the quest for a composite answer to the varied problems of life …. hence all our action is usually joint community orientated action rather than the individualism which is the hallmark of the capitalist approach …. [Africans] are not individualistic … they have a ‘situational-experiencing’ approach to life instead of the Westerners ‘problem-solving one …. [they] allow both the rational and non-rational elements to make an impact upon them ….” (Biko cited in Chipkin 2007: 117). These unique characteristics (still) exert strong influence on the South Africa national culture and character and on the approach South Africa takes to cultural diplomacy.

Biko also asserted that the ‘black man’ must take co-responsibility for allowing himself to be placed in a subverted situation; that he needs to rewrite his own history, a positive history, lift out the ‘heroes’ who form the core of it; and, that he needs to be proud of that history and strongly identity with it (Biko cited in Chipkin 2007: 118). The latter assertion for the need to (re)write your own history, “construct … [your] own identity and take full responsibility for … [your] own liberation” (More 2014: 180), finds strong resonance in the
modern day transformative strategies of the South African government. Included in this would be the transformation of the cultural and heritage landscape which is one of the priorities of the Department of Arts and Culture of South Africa and also informs its approach to international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy (RSA DAC 2013a: 10).

The relevance of Biko’s writings and black consciousness for modern-day South Africa is found in its still-valid proposal of self-starting progress for black South Africans; its provision of a record and reminder of black culture; its contribution to the way South Africans think about race; and, its provision of an analytical instrument in the fight against racism (Mangcu 2014: 168). A criticism of Biko’s ideas, and a problem that is prevalent till today, is that he was anti-minority rights, i.e., he advocated a cultural singularity (based on black consciousness precepts) rather than the multiplicity/diversity which is the reality of the South African society. This constitutes a limitation in his writings that, given his early death, had no opportunity to be further explored or developed.

(c) The African National Congress’s Draft National Cultural Policy, 1994: In 1994 the ANC – after its unbanning on 2 February 1990, the subsequent release of its leaders and in the run up to the national elections – released a series of policy documents to inform its negotiating positions and serve as discussion papers and policy guidelines in the new South Africa. These policy documents, illustrative of the new post-1994 government thinking, and collectively known as Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, amongst others contained the Draft National Cultural Policy of 25 February 1994 (ANC 1994). In its preambular paragraphs the latter defines and describes the nature of culture in South Africa as follows:

   Arts and culture policy deals with custom and tradition, belief, religion, language, identity, popular history, crafts, as well as all the art forms, including music, theatre, dance, creative writing, the fine arts, the plastic arts, photography, film, and, in general is the sum of the results of human endeavour. (ANC 1994: section I)

This definition recognised both the tangible aspects (the art forms) as well as the intangible aspects (custom and tradition, etc.). It particularly recognises the aspect of identity and relates arts and culture to human endeavour, therefore taking a wide ranging and holistic approach. As indicated, national identity is one of the key dimensions and a building block of South African cultural diplomacy.
The preamble further specifically links culture to the highest national priorities of development and nation-building, and recognises that colonialism and apartheid ignored, misrepresented and stifled the culture of the majority of South Africans. In response the culture of the majority of South African became one of “resistance to colonialism and apartheid, which became a major instrument in the achievement of political democracy…” (ANC 1994: section 1). Culture therefore had both a developmental and political dimension and this close association continued beyond the 1994 democratic elections, and informs cultural policy and cultural diplomacy in South Africa to this day.

For the majority of the population in South Africa, culture was always highly politicised (as was almost every other aspect of their human endeavour and existence) before and during the apartheid years. In the discourse on the neglect, distortion and marginalisation of the (cultural) rights of the majority of the South African population, the 300 years of colonialism is often viewed together with the almost 50 years of apartheid to cover the whole existence of modern South Africa. Addressing the legacy of the past explains both the entrenchment of cultural rights in the Constitution and also its close association with politics.

The Draft National Cultural Policy of 1994, in addition to setting out the policy objectives, the role of the state, suggestions for a Ministry of Culture, the funding proposals and the legislative and institutional requirements, specifically considers international cooperation (ANC 1994: section IV, subsection 14). It indicates that “there is a need for South Africa to return to the international fold, across all disciplines and arts forms”, and to ensure that South Africa subscribes to international cultural conventions related to the protection of artists and arts practitioners. The aim of international co-operation is “to ensure that South African cultural expressions are promoted abroad, in a manner which will facilitate it to become universal, eclectic and open” thus supporting domestic policy priorities (ANC 1994: section IV, subsection 14). On the issue of the free flow of cultural goods and service, it is noted that this must benefit South Africans and in particular artists and cultural practitioners. Cultural exchanges are to be encouraged, but (arts and) culture also needed to be protected against commercialisation and commodification which can result without adequate “protection, planning and regulation” (ANC 1994: section IV, subsection 14). This aspect became prominent in 2005 when South Africa played a leading role in the UN adoption of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions by chairing the two-year long international negotiation process (UNESCO [s.a.]a).
The ANC Draft National Cultural Policy of 1994 set the scene for the development of cultural policies after 1994, and key elements of what would make up the building blocks of a future cultural diplomacy policy as reflected in the historical context can be discerned in this early policy document.

While the Freedom Charter of 1955 was idealistic, distinctly non-racial and a democratic, grass-roots representation of the aspirations of a large part of the South African society, the black consciousness writings of Steve Biko of the early 1970s were focused specifically on empowering black South Africans, to the exclusion of others, restoring African or black pride and consciousness so that they (black South Africans) could command their own future. The ANC Draft National Cultural Policy of 1994, written 20 years after Biko and 40 years after the Freedom Charter, was an attempt at policy formulation for a multicultural, new, post-1994 South Africa. It took a wide ranging and holistic approach, placed culture within the framework of development, nation-building and addressing the legacies of past discrimination. The three approaches, although sometimes seemingly contradictory should be seen as each illustrating a different aspect or development of the historical context and collectively serve as antecedents of contemporary culture policy and cultural diplomacy in South Africa.

2.2. The centrality of culture and national identity

South African culture (and cultural diplomacy by extension) firstly as the externalisation or internationalisation of domestic culture and policy, and secondly as the cultural dimension of foreign policy, is informed by historical, social, political and anthropological factors. These factors range from its ancient history and heritage as cradle of humankind, through the legacy of its often violent and traumatic colonial and apartheid history, the diversity of its people, the persistent economic and social inequalities, to the instability of its social transformation while attempting to build a new nation and state. These influencing factors have implications for how the nation-state sees itself, its national character or more specifically its national culture, and its national identity. The South African state’s (national) culture, to the extent that it does exist as the foundation of its cultural diplomacy, is also constantly evolving and developing albeit in a gradual and evolutionary manner.
Considering the role of culture in foreign policy and in cultural diplomacy, this has particular relevance for South Africa, as for other societies, when considering not only the origins, manifestations and unique characteristics of its cultural diplomacy, but also the rationale thereof as an instrument of foreign policy. It is also relevant when identifying and considering the so-called building blocks of a South African cultural diplomacy. If people are individually and collectively cultural beings, then the messages that they carry are inevitably coloured by their own inherent cultural essence or orientation, i.e., by their identity, as well as by the institutional identity and culture they represent.

It is widely agreed that identity plays a key role in ‘national character and national culture’ and this is also true in the case of South Africa (Hudson 2007). At its most fundamental the question can be asked if South Africans as a nation exist. What makes South Africans a nation; what makes South Africans refer to themselves as a ‘we’, or ‘this nation’? Chipkin (2007: 44) argued that the emergence of the nation and nationalism in South Africa since the mid-1950s whether cultural or political is heavily influenced by the struggle against colonialism. South Africa as a ‘people’ came to be defined and formed, in and through the “politics and culture of nationalist struggle” (Chipkin 2007: 2). As an extension beyond South Africa it is noted that in African nationalism too, the origins of the identity of an individual is to be found in a ‘people’ which is seen to be the “bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity” (Greenfeld cited in Chipkin 2007: 2-3).

The South African national identity is also closely linked to that of the African continent, through a joint sense of place, shared history of colonial oppression and a common understanding of the full meaning of liberation and freedom. This is illustrated in the famous speech by former President Thabo Mbeki, “I am an African” at the adoption of the South African Constitution in Cape Town in May 1996 (Mbeki 1996). In the speech Mbeki does not focus on apartheid per se (he does not mention the words apartheid or colonialism) but elucidates the ‘shared’ history of the Continent, and the struggle against the deep denial of the dignity and humanity of Africans through oppression, and this is shown to be deeply significant for South African culture and cultural diplomacy.

These guiding principles (informing the national culture) as they emerged pre-1994 found formal expression post-1994 firstly, at a domestic level in constitutional, policy and institutional terms; and secondly, at the international level in foreign policy, international agreements and
diplomacy. Accordingly a thematic differentiation is implicitly made between the constitutional framework, the cultural framework and the foreign policy (and diplomacy) framework.

3. THE ASPIRATIONAL DIMENSION

The aspirational (or policy) dimension of cultural diplomacy refers to motivations, i.e., the goal(s) that governments and agents of cultural diplomacy wish to achieve through the demonstration of their culture, targeting foreign audiences. The policy and other documents discussed below indicate values, principles and policy guidelines regarding South African culture and culture policy. They are ideal and normative, but provide the framework and building blocks for cultural diplomacy.

3.1 The constitutional framework

While the 1996 South African Constitution does not expressly address cultural diplomacy, it sets the parameters for culture, international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy and therefore by implication also for cultural diplomacy.

One of the most distinguishing features of the 1994 democratic transformation in South Africa was the adoption of a new Constitution, as a revision of the negotiated settlement-based 1993 Constitution, on 8 May 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) (RSA 2009) (hereinafter the Constitution), a product of extensive negotiations, reflected the agreed principles and values of a new nation. Progressive and aspirational, the Constitution entrenches economic, social and cultural rights (the so-called second generation rights) of its citizens, one of the few constitutions in the world to do so (Mudacumura & Morçöl 2014: 63). This places an obligation on the state (and government) to ensure cultural freedoms and provide cultural services to its citizens which by implication would have effect on how the state conducts its international relations and cultural diplomacy.

The Preamble of the Constitution emphasises the building of a society based on fundamental human rights, quality of life and the potential of each person. The founding provisions in Chapter 1, section 6 extensively provides for the promotion and protection of languages, including the establishment of a Pan South African Language Board to “promote, and create conditions for, the development and use” of languages (RSA 2009: 1-
4). Chapter 2 of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, section 15 and 16 makes provision for freedom of religion, belief and opinion, freedom of expression including freedom of artistic creativity (RSA 2009: 8-9). Section 30 addresses language and culture and provides that “(e)veryone has the right to use the language and participate in the cultural life of their choice”. Section 31 allows “(p)ersons belonging to a cultural religious or linguistic community …. to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language” and to form associations to maintain those. Section 32 guarantees everyone the right of access to information (RSA 2009: 16). The entrenchment of cultural rights in the Constitution should be seen against the backdrop of South Africa’s past and the previous marginalisation and negation of the cultural traditions, practices and heritage of the majority of its people. The cultural marginalisation did not take place in isolation and was inextricably linked to the political, economic and social marginalisation.

In the Constitution, international relations is dealt with in two specific chapters: Chapter 5, dealing with the President and National Executive; and Chapter 14, dealing with General Provisions, including Section 231 on international agreements. The Constitution (RSA 2009: 54) Chapter 5, section 84, allocates the powers and functions of the President of the Republic, and includes “receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives”. Chapter 14, Section 231, of the Constitution provides for the “negotiating and signing of all international agreements”, by the national executive. International agreements signed before 1996 binds the Republic and “customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament”. All international agreements have to be ratified or tabled in Parliament, as appropriate (RSA 2009: 139).

South Africa’s Constitution is thus (human) rights-based which includes (economic, social and) cultural rights and which is also reflected in the principles of its foreign policy, and informs the positions the country take in negotiations or discourses in international fora, and how it conducts its multilateral cultural diplomacy. This is reflected in the fact that South Africa continues to be a leading player in the Human Rights Council in Geneva (Shetty 2014: 4-5) and as indicated, chaired the two-year long international negotiations for the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted by the UN (UNESCO [s.a.]). Significantly South Africa on 12 January 2015 ratified the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights which expands the cultural rights in the Constitution and will bring about new domestic and
international responsibilities. The related international reporting obligations in turn strengthen the relationship South Africa has with global cultural bodies (RSA DIRCO 2015b).

3.2 The national and foreign policy framework

The national and foreign policy frameworks determine the overall policy direction the country is pursuing in its domestic and international priorities respectively. As a recent and representative example of the national policy framework, The National Development Plan was adopted by Cabinet in 2012 as the long-term policy plan for eliminating poverty and reducing inequality in SA by 2030. The White Paper on Foreign Policy in turn as illustrative sample of the foreign policy framework was approved by Cabinet in 2011, and serves as a blueprint for guiding as well as aligning foreign policy to domestic imperatives.

(a) National Development Plan - Vision for 2030: The National Development Plan (NDP) – Vision for 2030 is a development blueprint and long-term vision for South Africa. A draft was released to the public by Minister Trevor Manuel of the National Planning Commission appointed by the President, on 11 November 2011 (RSA The Presidency: 2011). Subsequently adopted by Cabinet, it addressed arts and culture in Chapter 15 briefly under the heading “Transforming Society and Uniting the Country”, as follows:

Arts and culture opens powerful spaces for engagement about where a society finds itself and where it is going. Promoted effectively, the creative and cultural industries can contribute substantially to small business development, job creation, urban development and renewal.

Two elements relevant for cultural diplomacy are thus identified – the issue of identity (indirectly; where we are and where we are going), and more definitively the (economic) value and potential power and contribution of the creative industries.

The focus on international relations in the National Development Plan is more pronounced. In addressing South Africa’s international relations in Chapter 7, Positioning South Africa in the World, the NDP notes the interplay between various aspects of international relations, and places emphasis on the relations of South Africa with its immediate neighbours, the region, the African continent and the global South. Soft and ‘smart’ power global shifts from West to East are noted, and DIRCO is urged to effect organisational transformation,
to strengthen its research capabilities and work closer with civil society, academia and the business community, who “ultimately do business across borders” (RSA NPC 2011: 235). While culture or by implication cultural diplomacy is not specifically mentioned in this context, the linkages between domestic and foreign policy and the complex and diverse international environment, beyond the traditional political, economic and security sphere is acknowledged. Significantly it is recognised that “democratic South Africa has enjoyed permutations of power and influence in international relations that have not always been associated with diplomatic or consular representation” (RSA NPC 2011: 237).

Culture is dealt with more pronouncedly under a sub-heading ‘Proposals to Reposition South Africa in the Region and in the World’ (RSA NCP 2011: 241) together with a basket of soft power issues, and it is stated that:

In areas such as science, culture, higher education, sport and environmental protection, there is a need to showcase South Africa and promote its presence and leadership on strategic issues as part of its ‘soft power’ in international relations, without losing sight of the increased value of mental power – the ability of countries to show restraint on emotional impulses and maintain a relatively stable mind-set in getting along with each other during international negotiations and in general.

It is identified as a fundamental necessity that South Africa develops a more sophisticated public diplomacy strategy, incorporating new media and social networking, as well as “people-to-people” initiatives, although this is not directly linked to cultural exchanges or cultural diplomacy (RSA NCP 2011: 255). There is an important albeit indirect identification of the need for a better fit between domestic needs, regional and continental obligations and international cooperation, specifically by engaging the domestic constituents, including the cultural (and sporting bodies and business community), “which ultimately constitute the relations between countries” (RSA NCP 2011: 256).

The National Development Plan therefore provides a number of indicators important for an understanding of the foundations or building blocks of the cultural diplomacy of South Africa; i.e., national identity, the economics of culture, working with civil society, the importance of soft power, the link between domestic and international priorities and the importance of people to people contacts in international relations and diplomacy.
(b) The White Paper on South African Foreign Policy – Building a Better World: the Diplomacy of Ubuntu: As representative of the foreign policy framework, the 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy – Building a Better World: the Diplomacy of Ubuntu (hereafter the Foreign Policy White Paper) (RSA 2011) did not refer to cultural diplomacy per se. This is a shortcoming, considering that the manifestations of cultural diplomacy have become a part of South Africa’s foreign policy practices as implemented – if not similarly defined or applied – by both DIRCO and DAC. However several references in the document to the concepts of identity, culture, cultural cooperation and diversity, provided guidance on what is considered elements of cultural diplomacy. These distinctive references appeared across the Foreign Policy White Paper, in the sections on national interest, foreign policy objectives and the philosophy that underpins it, the South African values, the approach of DIRCO as primary actor in foreign policy, the trends evident in the international environment and finally in South Africa’s approach to the various regions, blocs and institutions or organisations. It is argued in the Foreign Policy White Paper that foreign policy objectives must support national priorities and contribute to strengthening national identity, address the inequalities of the past, foster social cohesion and support development, and this includes consultations with domestic constituents. The philosophy of ‘Ubuntu’, a cultural concept, which underpins South Africa’s foreign policy is premised on respect for all (international) nations and cultures, affirming our ‘own’ humanity and that of others, recognising the diversity of ‘our’ nations and in the process infusing ‘Ubuntu’ into the South African identity. As primary actor DIRCO takes the role as overall coordinator of South Africa’s foreign policy, and the implementation thereof though its diplomatic practices – which therefore includes social, political and economic relations. This gives DIRCO a direct interest in South Africa’s cultural diplomacy as instrument of foreign policy. It is however only in the section dealing with relations with Europe that cooperation beyond the traditional relations are explicitly supplemented with a focus on arts and culture, science and technology, as well as sharing values on human rights and democracy – again illustrating a limitation in scope.

These values underpinning South Africa’s foreign policy is rooted in its ‘struggle’ past, and includes a people-centred approach based on the principles of democracy, equality and human rights as encapsulated in the Freedom Charter of 1955. This also found expression in the ANC pre-1994 documents – Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa – i.e. foreign policy belongs to the people of South Africa. This notion was subsequently translated into a progressive constitution, which provides
direction to a foreign policy which, while based on national interests, includes a focus on development, social aspects and partnerships. When considering the global environment, it is posited in the *Foreign Policy White Paper* that in addition to the political and economic trends and drivers, cultural forces are at play in the international arena, and have an impact across national boundaries. Finally, and importantly the *Foreign Policy White Paper* advocated a cross-sectoral approach to South Africa’s foreign policy, involving both state and non-state actors, to ensure a coordinated approach in a complex and multidimensional world. DIRCO as primary actor undertakes to strengthen its informational and coordinating function, and to broaden its outreach and public diplomacy efforts to ensure such a coordinated approach. It is noted that DIRCO includes the cultural component – see 4.4.1(b) in its public diplomacy mandate. This public diplomacy outreach of DIRCO since 2009 however primarily targeted the domestic constituency as an attempt at engagement of civil society in consultations on amongst others developing the *Foreign Policy White Paper* (Masters 2012: 29). Conversely a weakness in public diplomacy was also identified in the Fifteen Year Review, as “foreign policy goals” not fully achieved (Landsberg 2012: 9).

While there is a clear lack of reference to cultural diplomacy *per se* in the *White Paper*, the inclusion of the concepts and application of culture, cultural cooperation, national identity, diversity and the philosophy of ‘Ubuntu’, in shaping and strengthening South Africa’s foreign policy, provide direction and an indication of the building blocks of cultural diplomacy which will enable the development of a coherent and comprehensive cultural diplomacy policy and strategy for the country.

### 3.3 The cultural policy framework.

The cultural policy framework indicates values, principles and policy guidelines regarding culture and culture policy, and informs cultural diplomacy. Two major cultural policy documents, i.e., the *White Paper on Arts Culture and Heritage* of 1996 and the draft *Revised White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage* of 2013, as well as other values (Africanisation) set the tone and informed the adoption of cultural legislation, and the reconstitution and establishment of cultural institutions, since 1994. Recent policy statements are considered to establish trends in continuity or change.
(a) **White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage, 1996**: Shortly after the 1994 elections the newly elected democratic government created a Ministry and Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST). The new Minister appointed an Arts and Culture Task Group (ACTAG), in November 1994, to consult widely amongst the arts and culture sector, including practitioners, educators and administrators, to obtain their views on an arts and cultural dispensation consistent with non-racist, non-sexist and democratic ideals for the new South Africa (RSA 1996). The ACTAG also drew on the expertise of advisors from UNESCO, Germany, the USA, the Netherlands, and Sweden (RSA 1996: preamble).

The report of the ACTAG was presented to the Minister in July 1995, and the *Arts and Culture White Paper* (hereafter the *ACH White Paper*), was developed from its recommendations, the inputs of international advisors from New Zealand and the Netherlands, further investigations and costing exercises. The stated aim of the *ACH White Paper* was “to promote the arts, culture, heritage and literature in their own right, as significant and valuable areas of social and human endeavour in themselves” (RSA 1996).

As an extension of this aim, the stated purpose of the *ACH White Paper* was to provide “government policy on the optimum funding arrangements and institutional frameworks for the creation, promotion and protection of South African arts, culture, heritage and the associated practitioners” (RSA 1996). The *ACH White Paper* was informed by global leading practices of societies where arts, culture and heritage are valued and are recognised for their influence on quality of life. A specific focus of the policy was to locate the activities of the Ministry within the Government framework of reconstruction and development through its goals of meeting basic needs, building the economy and human resource development, and realising the intentions of the Growth and Development Strategy (RSA 1996).

The *ACH White Paper* argued that arts and culture was one of “the most emotive matters to face the new government. Cultural expression and identity stand along language rights and access to land as one of the most pressing issues of our times” (RSA 1996). It furthermore stated that “arts and culture play a healing role through promoting reconciliation”, and that the *ACH White Paper* is based on international standards, in which culture is “understood as an important component of national life which enhances all of our freedoms” (RSA 1996: paragraph 13).
The *ACH White Paper* approach was one of reconciliation, and even idealism and argued that the dynamic interactions of the past had “resulted in an extraordinary fertile and unique South African culture which binds our nation in linguistic, cultural, culinary and religious diversity in so many forms”. The resilience of culture and artists to survive suppression was commended, and the commitment of the artists who contributed to the cultural boycott acknowledged. The *ACH White Paper* argued although apartheid led to “stifling of expression and, indeed, to distortion … cultural expression found a way to survive … and oratory, praise poetry, story-telling, dance and rituals lived on in the collective memory” (RSA 1996: chapter 2, paragraph 2). In addition South African [anti-apartheid] artists played an important role in the “quest for democracy … are world class and have the power further to enrich our experience” (RSA 1996: chapter 2, paragraph 3).

Chapter 6 of the *ACH White Paper* titled *International Cultural Cooperation* foresaw the role of the Ministry as facilitating cultural exchange and access of artists to the international arena setting the foundations for cultural diplomacy. The African, European and Asian heritage of South Africa provided the links to the world, and government should “maximise opportunities” for interaction for South African arts, culture and heritage. A particular role was envisaged for the National Arts Council and National Heritage Councils to liaise with counterparts abroad for promotion, preservation and development. There was a strong focus on developing cultural relations with Africa and re-integrating South African culture with that of the Continent. Relations with southern Africa were to be strengthened for the creation of regional networks in indigenous customs and beliefs, as well as for the development of audiences and markets. Relations with European countries were to be maintained “within a framework of multiculturalism” (RSA 1996: chapter 6). South Africa was to make its contribution to the global debate on culture, and world cultural affairs by strengthening multilateral cultural relations.

While cultural diplomacy as concept is not mentioned in the 1996 *ACH White Paper*, and this is considered a limitation, there is a particular focus on international cultural exchanges on the basis of mutual respect. The objective of the international programmes is facilitation of opportunities for artists, practitioners and institutions, sharing training, knowledge and facilities, particularly within southern Africa, the Continent and the wider world. Development of audiences and markets reflects an economic imperative linked to domestic priorities, and aspirations of integration with the Continent resonate strongly with South Africa’s international and foreign policy objectives.
(b) The draft *Revised White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage, 2013*: The *Revised White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage* (hereafter the *Revised White Paper*) was presented to the public by the then Minister of Arts and Culture, Mr Paul Mashatile, at a sector-wide workshop on 1 July 2013. It has not yet been adopted by Cabinet and thus remains a draft. However, as it is the most recent policy document from the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC), and is a significant departure from before, it needs to be considered for its relevance to cultural diplomacy (RSA DAC 2013a). The *Revised White Paper* for the first time included the concept of cultural diplomacy in a national government policy document, (taken from a 2009 DAC discussion document on South African Living Heritage), provided a definition for cultural diplomacy and identified cultural diplomacy as a strategic level for advancing arts, culture and heritage and the cultural and creative industries. Significantly cultural diplomacy is placed in the service of the domestic (national) priority of development, with the aim of ensuring that the sector and participants derive benefit therefrom. As a first step the *Revised White Paper* explained the policy departure from the 1996 *White Paper* and consequently the need for the revision.

The *Revised White Paper* argued that revision of the 1996 *White Paper* became necessary as the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) separated into two fully independent departments, Arts and Culture (DAC) and Science and Technology (DST), and significant legislative changes had taken place in the interim period. As a result the focus of the *Revised White Paper* shifted significantly to place an emphasis not only on arts and culture, but also on heritage and cultural and creative industries, with the aim to strengthen the socio-economic development role of the sectors to “increase its contribution to addressing the country’s triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality” (RSA DAC 2013a). As a reflection of the policy position of the government on arts, culture and heritage, the *Revised White Paper* objectives are aligned to the national development priorities, and as far as they are relevant to cultural diplomacy, include: strategically re-positioning the role of the DAC in delivering arts, culture and heritage (ach) to all – within the context and ambit of a developmental state and in partnership with other role-players; transforming the approach, institutional structures and processes for equitably delivery of ach; maximizing the developmental socio-economic opportunities that exist within ach; ensuring that as many South Africans as possible have access to, and enjoy the ach; and facilitating and supporting the involvement of South Africa’s cultural and creative industries in the global arena, including across the African continent. The *White Paper* therefore
acknowledged the important role of other stakeholders in delivering arts, culture and heritage, which can implicitly be extended to the international arena, and confirmed that not only should ach have an economic value-addition element to the lives of South Africans, but that DAC has the responsibility to provide access to international opportunities to “as many South Africans as possible” (RSA DAC 2013a).

As a point of departure the *Revised White Paper* adopts the definition for cultural diplomacy by Cummings: “[Cultural diplomacy is the] exchange of ideas, information, art, lifestyles, value systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture [across nation states,] with the intention of developing and sustaining mutual understanding’ (RSA DAC 2013a). Subsequently the *Revised White Paper* provided a useful definitional clarification of foundational concepts of cultural diplomacy while it acknowledged the difficulties and overlaps. It provides a list of what is deemed to be included in each category and gives definitional ‘shortcuts’ by stating; “Arts is…’expressing ourselves’; Culture is…’who we are’; Heritage is …’our shared inheritance; and, Cultural and Creative Industries is … the socio-economy of ach’” (RSA DAC 2013a). This elucidation of basic concepts allows all participants to have a uniform understanding and therefore common approach. Regarding the role of government as agent, the *Revised White Paper* clearly indicates that this role as previously articulated in the 1996 *White Paper*, namely the distribution of public funds and creating an environment conducive to culture creativity, is not in line with current thinking on the role of a developmental state. It therefore made provision for the government to directly support and get involved in actual delivery where “this may either be lacking; not happening at all; happening but needs to be reinforced and strengthened; and is happening but at too slow a pace. The role of government thus goes beyond just creating the conditions in which socio-economic development and nation building can thrive, to actively participating in ensuring the attainment of these objectives (RSA DAC 2013a). The transformative role of government and DAC and the role and contribution of the ach and the culture and creative Industries to socio-economic growth and development is therefore emphasised. The latter guided by the *National Development Plan (NDP)*, the *Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP 2)* and the *New Growth Path (NGP)*. This articulation links the ach portfolio in government to the national economic and developmental priorities, and underscores the economic potential of the sector. This emphasis is also carried through to the international arena where access and opportunities for South African artists and cultural practitioners become the stated objective of DAC.
The Revised White Paper furthermore includes a list of aCH terminology from Arterial Network’s 2011 document, *Adapting the Wheel: Cultural Policies for Africa*. Arterial Network is a civil-society network of artists and cultural practitioners, NGOs and institutions, and donors working in Africa’s creative and cultural sectors. It was established in March 2007, and is a non-profit organisation with national chapters in 40 African countries, and contributed actively to the *Revised White Paper* consultations. The acceptance of the aCH terminology is a significant development, as indicated for the first time the term cultural diplomacy is included in a government policy document. A further expansion on cultural diplomacy is contained in chapter 5 of the document titled, ‘*Strategic Approach to advancing ACH and the Cultural and Creative Industries*’, which then recognised its mutuality and links it to national interests, and economic and political goals … “this is an important aspect of international relations, and thus is led by government”. The important role of other sectors of society is noted as they create culture, while government “manages the international environment by utilising and creating awareness of its cultural sources and achievements, to win support that will ultimately have a positive impact on national policies and programmes” (RSA DAC 2013a). Cultural diplomacy “has the potential to demonstrate national power, create an environment conducive to support and assist in the collection and interpretation of information. This, in turn, aids in the interpretation of intelligence, enhances the prestige of a nation and aids in garnering support for policies abroad. All of these factors affects a nation’s security, thus, cultural diplomacy has an effect on, and a role to play, in regards, to national security” (RSA DAC 2013a). This elucidation thus links cultural diplomacy directly to the other foreign policy objectives of government namely political, economic and security.

The *Revised White Paper* acknowledges that South Africa has made significant progress since 1994 to advance its aCH, but notes that “it has not been done in a sustainable and coherent manner”. It is argued in chapter 5 that cultural diplomacy has not yet been integrated into the foreign policy objectives of South Africa and international relations structures. It commits DAC to work closely with the Department of International Relations and Coordination (DIRCO) to ensure that cultural diplomacy is “embedded in South Africa’s international relations policies, programmes and institution”... including through the placement abroad of cultural attachés at missions. It is also stated that DAC will also work closely with other relevant departments and bodies to develop and implement cultural
diplomacy programmes. The creation of additional capacity in the DAC is envisaged to carry out the cultural diplomacy mandate (RSA DAC 2013a).

In his budget vote address to Parliament on 17 July 2014, Minister Nathi Mthethwa indicated that the Revised White Paper review process was still ongoing and that he was consulting with the twenty eight DAC associated institutions (museums, play houses, monuments and funding institutions) to look at their business models to improve their efficiency (RSA DAC 2014a). Ministers Mthethwa did not expand on developments in the cultural diplomacy area, but he did indicate that the envisaged ‘Seasons’ programme and the Africa month programme would be key focus points in the DAC’s cultural diplomacy programme.

The Revised White Paper therefore became the first national government policy document to use the concept cultural diplomacy, and identified it as a strategic tool for advancing arts, culture and heritage and the cultural and creative industries domestically. Cultural diplomacy therefore also has a distinct domestic objective, i.e., to support the development of the sector and provide access to international platforms for the benefit of the sector, while profiling the richness of South Africa’s arts, culture and heritage.

(c) Other cultural policy determinants: Supplementing the formal and representative policy documents (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3 above) which determine the overall policy direction in domestic and international cultural priorities respectively, there are other important principles and pointers that inform (foreign) policy and that should be noted for their relevance to cultural diplomacy. The first of these is the principle of Africanisation and the ideas of African Renaissance. Africa remains central to the foreign policy objectives of South Africa. This was reiterated during South Africa’s second tenure in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the term 2011-2012, where the theme of South Africa’s two-year term was “Promoting the African Agenda” (RSA DIRCO 2012b). It was also further evidenced in the support by DIRCO and the South African government for the Africa Union’s vision for the continent, Africa Agenda 2063 (RSA DIRCO 2014b; RSA 2014), the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) and establishment of the new South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) (RSA DIRCO 2015g). In the cultural diplomacy domain, in October 2014 South Africa became the eighth African country to ratify the Charter on African Cultural Renaissance (RSA 2014) and in May 2015 DAC hosted a month-long celebration of Africa (RSA 2015b). Africanisation
and African Renaissance remain one of the fundamental principles underpinning South Africa’s foreign policy, its (international) cultural policy and cultural diplomacy.

The second policy indicator is to be found in recent policy statements as articulated for example in the ANC NGC 2015 Discussion Documents (hereafter Discussion Documents) (ANC 2015). Although not government policy but the position of a major political party (ANC – alliance partner) the views articulated are relevant and may be indicative of new policy direction relevant to cultural diplomacy. Regarding national identity and value systems the Discussion Documents (chapter 1) notes significant trends, i.e., on the positive side, more than half of South Africans identify themselves as South African first, and this is particularly prevalent among the youth. On the negative side, South Africans face a serious challenge regarding values, with personal “greed, crass materialism and conspicuous consumption” contrasting glaringly with the overwhelming positive support for the National Development Plan’s objectives of eliminating poverty and inequality in a spirit of Ubuntu. Cultural diplomacy is specifically mentioned in Discussion Documents under chapter 2 on Arts and Culture, and places the focus on ‘Africa Month’, and the ‘cultural seasons’ programme with BRICS countries, confirming the policy direction set by the Minister of Arts and Culture in his budget vote speech earlier in the year. Paradoxically in chapter 7, which deals with international relations, no mention is made of cultural diplomacy, a similar omission as in the 2011 White Paper on Foreign Policy. In contrast to DAC’s initiative in 2015 to celebrate an Africa month, only the celebration of Africa Day is mentioned in the review of international relations. Finally while pillar five of the Africa Agenda 2063’s seven inspirational pillars provides for “An Africa with strong cultural values and ethics”, the pillars are listed, but this noticeable cultural diplomacy element is not discussed at all. The evidence in the Discussion Documents on cultural diplomacy shows progressive development and implementation of cultural diplomacy programmes, but does not indicate a departure from the respective positions as reflected in the strategic plans and policy documents of DIRCO and DAC respectively. It therefore reflects the same absence of coordination between the departments and a further absence of acknowledgement of the concept of cultural diplomacy as a pillar of foreign policy reflected in the policies of South Africa’s primary coordinating agent for foreign policy namely DIRCO.

In summary, there are clear indications of an progressive appreciation of the role of culture in foreign relations and foreign policy in the cultural policy framework, from the 1996 White Paper, more strongly conceptualised in the Revised White Paper, and further articulated in
the principles and pointers evidenced in the Africanisation approach and the ANC NCG 2015 Discussion Documents. There is also an increased expansion and implementation of cultural diplomacy programmes. However, coordination and an integrated approach between DAC and DIRCO is not evidenced, resulting in cultural diplomacy as an important component of South Africa’s ‘soft power’ not yet being elevated to a strategic position in understanding and shaping foreign policy (Smith 2012: 81).

4. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

The institutional dimension of cultural diplomacy refers to the agencies, institutions and actors who operate in the international arena on behalf of South Africa and who are responsible for international relations, foreign policy, international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. They are the President by virtue of the powers bestowed upon him in the Constitution, the Cabinet and relevant government departments, according to their mandates. Non-state actors would include civil society, business and the arts and culture sector. This section therefore considers how the institutional dimension is represented in the cultural diplomacy of South Africa.

4.1 State-agencies and actors

State agencies operating in the field of cultural diplomacy are primarily the President, the Cabinet especially the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and her department, the Minister and Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) and the DAC associated institutions.

(a) The President and Cabinet: The Constitution (RSA 2009: 54) Chapter 5, section 84, allocates the powers and functions of the President of the Republic, which includes receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives. Chapter 14, Section 231 provides that the national executive negotiate and sign all international agreements. The President appoints the Cabinet and the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation who by virtue of this office’s portfolio coordinates the implementation of South Africa’s international relations. In practice the minister liaises with other ministers of technical departments on all South Africa’s foreign policy positions.
Despite the specific and limited powers conferred by the Constitution upon the President vis-à-vis international relations, a central role has been assumed by the President as primary agent and key role-player in foreign policy decision making (Masters 2012: 20-21). In this regard, President Jacob Zuma expressed his views on culture and implicitly on cultural diplomacy, in celebrating 20 years of freedom and democracy in South Africa, when on 11 December 2014 he addressed an event in honour of the contribution of arts and culture and its veterans to the struggle for liberation and the building of a new society in South Africa. He honoured the role of artists in mobilising the international community on the side of the liberation struggle in particular the testimony of Miriam Makeba as representative in the United Nations General Assembly in 1963, contributing to the UN declaring apartheid a crime against humanity (RSA The Presidency: 2014b). He commended the artists including the Amandla Cultural Ensemble, led by Jonas Gwangwa, who had mobilised the international community against apartheid, and recalled that the former president of the ANC, OR Tambo, famously stated that “Amandla could do more in two hours of performance than he could do in twenty years” of advocating against apartheid (RSA The Presidency: 2014b). President Zuma recognised the international ‘Artists against Apartheid’ campaign, as well as the artists in the country who joined the campaign against apartheid.

He further noted that in moving the National Development Plan (NDP) forward, the ach sector would be pivotal in nation building and social cohesion. He therefore appealed to the sector to contribute to radical consciousness and economic transformation, and stated that according to recent research, music, craft, visual arts, books and film, contributes more than 15 billion rands to the economy. He therefore expressed support for the vision of government to foster entrepreneurship across the value chain of the ach industry and welcomed the creation of the Cultural and Creative Industries Federation of South Africa (CCIFSA) and the South African Music Industry Council; organisations in ach to speak on behalf of the sector. He lamented that issues of intellectual property rights, piracy and social security remain of concern to artists in South Africa. Several elements of cultural diplomacy were alluded to in the statement by the President; the economic and transformative power of the creative industries, the impact and message of showcasing the diversity of culture and heritage abroad, the impact of the ‘Artists against Apartheid’, and the acknowledgement of the influence and impact of arts and culture in the NDP.
The President strengthened his statements on cultural diplomacy when on 5 December 2014 during a visit to China he formally closed the SA State Year in China, and highlighted the impact of international cultural showcasing. He specifically referred to the people-to-people relations that had been established, the profiling of South Africa, the creation of understanding between the peoples, and the opportunities brought about for sharing of innovation and best practices in the arts and culture (RSA The Presidency: 2014a).

(b) Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO): As indicated, the Minister and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) coordinate all South Africa’s international relations and foreign policy. The department is structured along geographic lines into branches, with the multilateral branch in turn structured according to common (global) themes and institutions. From interaction with the relevant sections in the department, the author is aware that there is a so-called ‘desk’ for UNESCO at the level of Deputy Director in DIRCO. This ‘desk’ is however responsible for all areas of expertise of UNESCO including education, culture, communications and the sciences. There is no dedicated person for culture (or cultural diplomacy) in DIRCO. However, several statements and events by DIRCO between 2010 and 2015 provide clarity on the approach by DIRCO to cultural diplomacy.

The most significant statement by DIRCO on cultural diplomacy, although somewhat dated, came during the DIRCO annual conference on 19 November 2010, which focussed on the recently completed FIFA World Cup Soccer tournament held in South Africa. Deputy Minister Marius Fransman spoke on the topic “Cultural Diplomacy and Sports as Tools for Nation Building and Development” (RSA DIRCO 2010), and made several observations important to understanding the South African international relations perspective on cultural diplomacy. He indicated that as coordinator of the implementation of South Africa’s foreign policy, DIRCO understood and appreciated that foreign policy was no longer the preserve of governments or diplomats. The involvement of non-state actors like NGO’s, business, academia, religious bodies, labour formations and civil society in the “in the practice of our foreign policy”, was therefore welcomed (RSA DIRCO 2010). He noted that cultural diplomacy was not simply about “culture” in the narrow sense, but “about a country projecting its power in the domain of ideas – to influence the ideas and outlook of states, international organisations, and non-state actors in order to pursue its national interests and enhance its geopolitical standing” (RSA DIRCO 2010). He acknowledged that “(a)ll governments across the world are investing enormous diplomatic
and political resources in winning the hearts of minds of other nations and the people of the world. The link between cultural diplomacy and foreign policy was confirmed when he specified that South Africa would promote its cultural diplomacy for development and nation building, addressing the developmental needs of the South and of Africa – the priorities of South Africa’s foreign policy. A new domestic dimension of cultural diplomacy was added when he noted that events such as the Fifa World Cup Tournament of 2010, promoted the national aspirations of the Constitution, i.e., healing the divisions of the past, laying the foundations of an open and democratic society, improving the quality of life of all citizens and building a united and democratic South Africa. The World Cup had buoyed Brand SA both domestically and internationally, and resulted in increased patriotism, self-belief, self-respect and optimism (RSA DIRCO 2010).

Cultural diplomacy was addressed again in September 2012, when DIRCO hosted the annual diplomatic fair with the stated aim “to promote and celebrate cultural diplomacy in South Africa” (RSA DIRCO 2012a). The fair attracted wide participation from the diplomatic community stationed in Pretoria with over 60 foreign diplomatic missions sharing with the public information about their histories, cultures and traditions. Despite the positive comments on cultural diplomacy in 2010 and 2012, DIRCO otherwise has remained non-committal on the matter. Minister Mashatile had on 16 May 2013 during his budget vote to Parliament, said that he would have discussions with his DIRCO counterpart, regarding the placement of cultural attachés in missions abroad. Commenting on that statement, Clayson Monyela, spokesperson of DIRCO, indicated that South Africa at the time had no dedicated cultural attachés, but staff who are “doing cultural diplomacy” (SAPA 2013). Monyela declined to say whether Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane would be agreeable to the proposal of creating new positions in missions focused specifically on culture, and there is no record of this meeting between the two Ministers having taken place.

A prominent and public acknowledgement of cultural diplomacy by DIRCO was the launching by that department of the inaugural Ubuntu Diplomacy Awards on 14 February 2015. The awards were presented “in order to recognise South African industry leaders and eminent persons for their contribution to promoting South Africa’s national interests and values across the world” as announced by DIRCO (RSA DIRCO 2015a). Awards were presented to organisations and individuals who had distinguished themselves through excellence, innovation, creativity, social responsibility and patriotism. Seven categories were recognised which included economic diplomacy, arts and cultural diplomacy, social
responsibility, youth diplomacy, sports diplomacy, a diplomacy award and a lifetime achievement award. The arts and cultural diplomacy award was given to Mr Sipho ‘Hotstix’ Mabuse and Ms Yvonne Chakachaka as “individual(s) or organisation that has promoted South Africa’s arts and culture and/or the exchange of cultural programmes between South Africa and international communities” (RSA DIRCO 2015a). Significantly, President Zuma on the occasion again acknowledged that government cannot build international relations alone, but needed “all other sectors of our society to work with government to build relations and promote friendships and partnerships across our shores” (RSA 2015a).

It is evident however that DIRCO does not give prominence to cultural diplomacy. Most recently, during her budget vote address in Parliament on 21 May 2015, while providing an overview of the foreign policy priorities for the year, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane did not mention culture or cultural diplomacy, although she mentioned the political, economic and ‘social’ relations established with all countries of the globe. In her reference to the public diplomacy unit (the unit most likely to carry out cultural diplomacy programmes in DIRCO apart from the UNESCO ‘desk’) she indicated that they would focus specifically on image-building, branding and marketing (RSA DIRCO 2015e).

From the above references since 2010, it is clear that although DIRCO has a comprehensive understanding of the meaning and value of cultural diplomacy, as expressed by Deputy Minister Fransman already in 2010, the concept has not found permanent expression in foreign policy priorities, and has not been embedded in the core business of the department. Smith (2012: 81) takes an even broader approach and argued that soft power – as a central component of South Africa’s foreign policy, and which includes cultural diplomacy – “[should be] elevated to a more strategic position in DIRCO”. A clear absence of reference to cultural diplomacy in texts and statements would further indicate that a sustainable and cooperative relationship between DAC and DIRCO on cultural diplomacy has not been institutionalised.

(c) Department of Arts and Culture (DAC): The Minister, Deputy Minister and Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) are responsible for policy formulation and implementation in the fields of arts, culture and heritage, including cultural diplomacy. On an annual basis the Minister of Arts and Culture identifies the priority areas for the Ministry and department, including the international priorities for the coming year in his budget vote address to Parliament. When these addresses are compared over several years, it gives an indication of changes and new focus areas. The Minister of Arts and Culture’s budget
vote speeches are taken from 2011 for comparative purposes, as 2011 was the first time that cultural diplomacy was mentioned in the budget vote address. Other relevant speeches during this time by the Minister(s) and by the President are also briefly looked at for policy direction on cultural diplomacy. A chronological survey indicates noticeable and progressive development in and application of the use of the term cultural diplomacy.

On 11 June 2011 then Arts and Culture Minister Paul Mashatile, in his annual budget speech to Parliament, reported on the finding of the National Consultative Conference held in April 2011, “on the significant contribution of the arts, culture and heritage sector to the economy”. This was linked to the department's international programme when he announced that the DAC will “encourage and support initiatives to promote South African artists on the world stage” (RSA DAC 2011c). In this regard it was indicated that DAC would work with DIRCO to develop a policy on cultural diplomacy, which would also include the deployment of cultural attachés abroad. The following year in the 2012 /2013 DAC budget vote address, on 3 May 2012 Minister Mashatile did not mention cultural diplomacy as such but again listed the key international (or cultural diplomacy) initiatives for the department for the year (RSA DAC 2012c). He again indicated that DAC would work with DIRCO, in this case to host the Africa Day celebrations on 25 May. He also informed Parliament that Cabinet was considering the ratification by South Africa of the Charter on African Cultural Renaissance (the primary continental cultural policy document with implications for cultural diplomacy), and that South Africa would be hosting the first leg of the South Africa France ‘cultural seasons’ in 2012. The cultural seasons were a significant new addition to the cultural diplomacy programmes of DAC, and were aimed at “showcasing our cultures and strengthening cultural cooperation between our two countries” (RSA DAC 2012c).

Minister Mashatile addressed the African Union Ministers of Culture on 1 November 2012 (RSA DAC 2012b) and reported on the SA-held conference on world heritage on 26-28 September 2012. The conference was aimed at contributing to the development of the second periodic report of Africa on the state of world heritage in Africa. This continental initiative of DAC constituted an important element in the cultural diplomacy programmes of the department. This continental focus of the department’s cultural diplomacy became more apparent when on 16 May 2013 in his next budget vote address Minister Mashatile announced progress with the implementation of the liberation heritage route, linking sites of significance for South Africa’s struggle for liberation, throughout the Continent (RSA DAC 2013a).
He announced that sites had been identified in Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Ethiopia, in consultation with those countries. He reported on the success of the pilot project “cultural seasons” hosting French artists in South Africa in 2012, and the return phase in 2013 of sending over 800 South African artists to France to participate in events in over 100 cities and towns. He announced that based on the success of the SA FR seasons, planning was taking place to expand the programme to key strategic partners, including the UK, China, Russia, Angola and Nigeria. He again announced that discussions would take place with DIRCO to place cultural attachés in South African missions abroad. As indicated under 4.1(b) above there is however no record that such a meeting eventually took place.

When Mashatile subsequently opened the SA pavilion and announced the permanent return by SA to Venice Biennale on 31 May 2013 he gave a commitment to give exposure to SA artists, and to open up opportunities for new (international) markets. The aim at the Biennale was to showcase SA artistic talent on the world stage, strengthen trade in artistic goods, build sustainability, and enhance contribution to create jobs and grow the economy (RSA DAC 2013d). This provided a prominent link between domestic and international cultural priorities and highlighted the economic dimension of cultural diplomacy. A further important development – in the multilateral cultural diplomacy relations of South Africa – took place when Minister Mashatile was invited to address the high level thematic debate on culture and development in the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) on 12 June 2013. In addition to making a strong appeal for the placement of culture at the centre of the global sustainable development debates, particularly in the in elaboration of the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), he also advocated for the promotion of cultural diplomacy “as a tool to strengthen people to people contact and a means to open further avenues for interaction between peoples” (RSA DAC 2013e).

After the national elections on 7 May 2014 (RSA SANEWS 2014a), and during the 2014 DAC budget vote address of the new Minister, Nathi Mthethwa, to Parliament on 17 July 2014 (RSA DAC 2014a), he highlighted two international priorities for the department, a month-long Africa festival in May 2015 in celebration of the African Union’s Africa day on 25 May every year, and continued support for the African World Heritage Fund (AWHF) established and hosted by South Africa on behalf of the continent in 2006, and which had since become a leading training and management institution on heritage in Africa. This
continued the focus on and indicated a further strengthening of the international cultural relations of the department and South Africa with the Continent.

The renewed focus of DAC on Africa manifested in the launch of the Africa Month cultural programme at Freedom Park on 1 April 2015. A linkage was established between the objectives of the Africa Month, i.e., stimulating competitive markets for intra-Africa trade, and the DAC’s priorities of increased economic opportunities for artists, a developmental approach to artist, product and audience development, social cohesion among communities and the continent as well as cultural diplomacy. The Minister indicated that it will also serve to strengthen the creative industries and their value-add towards socio-economic development. The Month would “promote African identity, entrench African values and ethics as well as strengthen existing collaborations in the continent” (RSA DAC 2015a). It was envisaged that the programme would contribute to the attainment of the African Union’s Vision 2063 which “strives for an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena,” (RSA DAC 2015a).

In the most recent DAC budget vote address on 19 May 2015, Minister Mthethwa (RSA DAC 2015b), indicated that the cultural seasons programme had been integrated into the Africa programme and that preparations for cultural seasons with Nigeria and Ghana were advanced. The work done on the cultural seasons would feed into the BRICS Summit of July 2015. The BRICS Ministers of Culture subsequently signed a cultural cooperation agreement on the fringe of the summit (Sputnik 2015). Minister Mthethwa assessed the successes of the Africa Month celebrated in May 2015. These were the profiling of African arts and culture to the South African and global audiences; using the African Cultural Renaissance Charter to promote the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063; integrating social, political, cultural and economic goals through the theme “We Are Africa: Opening the doors of learning and culture for peace and friendship from Cape to Cairo”; connecting and uniting South Africans with the rest of the continent; celebrating the role played by the OAU in decolonizing the continent since May 1963; sharing Africa's intellectual richness through discussions, and, using dance, music, drama and poetry in celebrating “Africanness”.

The most recent statements by Minister Mthethwa during the budget votes of 2014 and 2015, as well as his statement at the launch of the Africa Month, indicated a strong alignment between the objectives of DAC international cultural programmes or cultural diplomacy and South Africa’s foreign policy objectives, i.e., amongst others a specific and primary focus on Africa, and active engagement with the BRICS countries. Cultural diplomacy was a specific
subheading in the text of the Minister’s speech and enjoys more prominence as a concept and as an instrument in support of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives.

DAC policy statements since 2011 have therefore shown a consistent and progressive use of the concept cultural diplomacy and an increased application thereof in terms of its international programmes. The department has developed a clear set of objectives, and has aligned those in the broad to South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. At a government-wide interdepartmental coordination level, DAC participates as an associate (not core) member on the International Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) cluster, while being a core member and reporting to the Social Protection, Community and Human Development (SPCHD) cluster. DAC also participates in the annual Consultative Forum on International Relations (CFIR) chaired by DIRCO that brings together the three tiers of government to coordinate their international relations work.

It is evident that a consultative process to create the necessary policy, institution and programmatic linkages between DAC and DIRCO – the primary agent responsible for South Africa’s foreign policy – needs attention in order that cultural diplomacy be elevated to the strategic level.

(d) Other institutions and initiatives: In addition to the Minister and the department of Arts and Culture acting as primary agencies for cultural diplomacy, DAC has over twenty associated institutions, functionally independent but fully funded by DAC and reporting to the Department and to Parliament for oversight. These include the National Arts Council (NAC), the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF), the National Heritage Council (NHC). The latter institutions are particularly relevant as they have a specific international mandate in their constitutive acts. For example the NAC was established in April, 1997 through an Act of Parliament (No. 56 of 1997: National Arts Council Act. 1997). The vision of the NAC is to promote South Africa’s cultures, freely expressed through the arts. The agency is mandated to develop South Africa’s creative industry. In the Act under functions of the Council, article 6, it stipulates that the Council may firstly “make bursaries available to students for local and overseas studies” and secondly, “nationally and internationally facilitate and promote liaison between individuals and institutions” (RSA DAC 1997: 6). Article 7 specifically allows the following performance of functions outside the Republic: sub article 7 (1) “The Council may, in order to achieve its objects, render such support as may be prescribed to any person who is a South African citizen in any territory outside the Republic.; and (2) This Act shall as far as it can be applied with the necessary changes,
apply in connection with the performance by the Council of its functions under subsection (1) as if the territory in which it so performs its functions were part of the Republic” (RSA DAC 1997: 8). The NAC and the other institutions mentioned here are therefore mandated through an act of Parliament to conduct their cultural affairs internationally, in effect acting as agents of cultural diplomacy. An analysis of the strategic plans and annual reports of these institutions for their contribution to cultural diplomacy is beyond the remit of this study but would add valuable insights.

A notable once-off phenomenon and an antecedent to cultural diplomacy today, was the appointment by the then Department of National Education of cultural attachés at South African Missions abroad pre-1994, specifically from 1981-1991. They were appointed in two sessions from 1981 to 1985 and then again from 1985 to 1991. Thereafter the programme was ceased and not repeated. Documentary evidence on the appointments and work of the attachés is not publically accessible. As the only source of information, discussions were held with a senior official in the relevant department at that time (Oberholzer 2015). Cultural attachés were placed in South African missions in countries were the governing party at the time (pre-1994) had particularly strong cultural and historical links, predominantly Western Europe. The placements were in the South African missions in Bonn (and also accredited to Denmark, Sweden and Norway); London (and also accredited and occasionally working in the USA); Brussels (also accredited to Netherlands, France and Spain); Vienna (also accredited to the former ‘east bloc’ countries and later to Italy and Portugal; and originally to Buenos Aires and Rome, but these latter postings were closed earlier than the others. Significantly the appointees were almost without exception senior academics that were considered art and cultural experts in particular fields, including languages. From witness accounts they were highly skilled individuals, and particularly successful in building cultural relations and practicing cultural diplomacy. The programme was discontinued in 1991, reportedly due to drastic cost cutting measures being instituted.

4.2 Non-state agencies

Non-state agencies refer to civil society, NGOs, business and other informal groupings active in the cultural and cultural diplomacy space. South Africa has an active arts and culture civil society who had prior to 1994 been at the forefront of cultural activism and of the liberation struggle. President Zuma paid tribute to the ‘Artists against Apartheid’ in December 2014 as part of the celebrations of the twenty years of democracy (see Section
4.1(a)), and DIRCO Minister Maite Nkoana Mashabane presented an Ubuntu diplomatic award to Yvonne Chakachaka and Sipho ‘Hotstix’ Mabuse in February 2015, for their promotion of South African arts and culture / or exchange of cultural programme abroad (see Section 4.1(b)). Since 1994 there have been significant developments in the South African arts and culture sector, as in all other spheres of South African life. The anti-apartheid and anti-government activities sustained by sympathetic foreign donors, have made way for a different kind of interaction with the international community. Emphasis has shifted to developing the sector, showcasing South Africa’s rich arts and culture heritage and issues of sustainable livelihoods. An extensive infrastructure of arts, music and cultural festivals at national, provincial and local level have developed since 1994 or several who existed before have changed focus since 1994 to reflect the new South Africa.

As the sector has however not been well organised (SAPA 2014), and consistent data collection and analysis is not freely available, accurate assessments of the nature, scope and of the role of the non-state actors in the South African cultural environment and in particular as this relates to international engagements are difficult to make. Another challenge is that often events arranged by civil society or the sector would benefit from different levels of government support and both the costs and benefits would be difficult to determine with any accuracy. For example, Minister Mthethwa announced in his budget vote (RSA DAC 2015b) that DAC would be supporting twenty two national and regional flagship events, including the National Arts Festival and the Cape Town International Jazz Festival. Some indication of key role players, the size of events, and the extent of their international engagements can be gleaned from the media. A prominent example of these is the National Arts Festival (NAF) – considered the world’s second-largest arts festival – held annually in Grahamstown and which celebrated its 40th anniversary in 2014. In an interview with the artistic director, Ismail Mahomed, the Yiga (2014) reported the transition from pre- to post-1994. The festival was able to continue to harness the “immense power [of the festival] to engage the hearts and minds of South Africans” (Yiga: 2014). The international component of the festival is both of an incoming and outgoing one, with international artists participating in the NAF and South African acts being selected by visiting producers and organisers to perform abroad, “[contributing] hugely to South Africa’s … cultural diplomacy campaigns abroad”.

Apart from civil society, business pays a noticeable role in supporting the arts in South Africa. An example is the unique partnership between DAC and Business and Arts South Africa (BASA). BASA was founded in 1997 as a section 21 company and registered as a
Public Benefit Organisation (PBO) by the DAC and the corporate sector, as a joint initiative, to ensure greater involvement in the arts from South African businesses. South African businesses operating both in South Africa and internationally were included in the partnership and the business membership is currently 117. BASA serves as a bridge between the business and arts sectors and government, to ensure optimal benefits are derived for each partner from the partnerships. BASA offers grants and educational programmes for artists, and research and access to the arts community for business. Annual awards are presented to best practice initiatives (BASA 2015).

Non-state actors, including business, civil society and arts and cultural practitioners make up a sizable, but largely indeterminable part of the agencies functioning in the international domain including in the international cultural domain. While the political and security aspects of foreign policy are primarily carried out by state actors, economic and cultural diplomacy does not face such containment. Actions by these non-state actors often pass unseen and unrecorded, but the (long-term) impact may be just as significant.

5. THE PROGRAMMATIC DIMENSION: AGENTS, ACTIVITIES AND TARGETS

The programmatic dimension refers to the content of international (cultural) programmes, the delivery vehicles and the target audiences. Government programmes are contained and reflected in the strategic plans, annual performance plans, annual reports and relevant strategy documents of departments. Due to the diversity, dispersion and lack of accurate collated data regarding programmes implemented by non-state actors (see Section 4.2), an assessment of these programmes are at best inference, does not provide an accurate overall representation and is therefore acknowledged but not included here. It is anticipated that the new Cultural Observatory established by the DAC at the Metropolitan Nelson Mandela University and working in partnership with Rhodes University and Fort Hare to collect cultural statistics and analyse trends, will eventually fill the gap in data collection and assessment (RSA 2015c).

(a) DAC Strategic Plans (Strat Plans) and Annual Performance Plans (APPs) (2011–2015): An overview and assessment of the DAC Strategic and Annual Performance Plans over the past five years (2011–2015) reveal a number of strategic changes and new developments in the programmatic direction of the department impacting directly on its international cultural programmes or cultural diplomacy programmes (RSA DAC 2011a; RSA DAC 2012a; RSA DAC 2012d; RSA DAC 2013b; RSA DAC 2014b; RSA DAC 2015c;
RSA DAC 2015d). These changes are also reflected in the previously discussed policy documents including in the *Revised White Paper*, and are therefore summarised here. Firstly there is a shift to a stronger strategic focus on the socio-economic and economic aspects, and not just on the aesthetics (or art for art’s sake) of arts and culture, and this is reflected in the strategic objectives. Secondly, in terms of international cultural projects, the objective is to (also) create opportunities and access markets for South African artists, and the introduction of longer-term cultural exchange programmes (cultural seasons) with strategic partners, the first with France in 2012, and with the UK and China in 2014/2015. The Minister in his budget vote address in 2014 also announced cultural seasons with Russia and other BRICS members (RSA DAC 2014a). Thirdly, a renewed focus on African cultural relations, including the signing and ratification of the *Charter for African Cultural Renaissance*, an annual Africa day celebration (since 2015 an Africa Month celebration), and support for and hosting of Pan-African festivals and Africa Seasons. This cultural objective is aligned to the foreign policy objective placing Africa at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy. Fourthly, the accelerated building and or declaring of heritage monuments and museums (so-called legacy projects), transforming the heritage landscape. Some of these are trans-frontier projects, including the Matola Raid museum and interpretive centre as expanded on by Minister Mthethwa, in his budget vote address (RSA DAC 2014a). These shifts in strategic direction indicate a strengthening and focus of the international or cultural diplomacy programmes of the department. There is also a stronger alignment with both the domestic national priorities and the foreign policy priorities. The targets or audiences for these programmes are unfortunately not clearly identified, while the budgets available and allocated are captured in broad in the annual APPS.

Another indicator of programmatic activity for DAC is the number of bilateral and multilateral cultural agreements the country is state party to, accessible through the Treaty Section of the Office of the State Law Advisor (OCSLA) of DIRCO (RSA DIRCO 2015c). This list (accessed on 20 May 2014) indicated 117 cultural treaties, both bilateral and multilateral dating back to 1910. The list has grown in the interim. The DAC APP for 2014/2015 (RSA DAC 2014b: 45) indicates as a programmatic target for 2014/2015 “15 bilateral agreements [and or] programmes of cooperation (POCs) [signed], and programmes/ projects to implement and service agreements and POCs” (RSA DAC 2014b). The APP only lists one multilateral treaty namely the “Convention on Cultural Diversity implementation strategy developed”. Unfortunately the specific targets and activities are not indicated for either the bilateral or multilateral treaties in the APP.
A key new programmatic focus for DAC is on ‘cultural seasons’. Cultural Seasons are partnerships that South Africa, through the Department of Arts and Culture, forge with other countries, which provide a platform for: “profiling and strengthening relations between SA and the other country; fostering people to people contact and encouraging institutional collaboration; showcasing and promoting SA arts, culture and heritage; fostering skills transfer and development; developing arts education and residency programmes; promoting market access and create demand for cultural goods; translating heritage and culture into economic gains, and, promoting the sustainability of the sector … ” (RSA DAC 2014b: 13). It is contended that cultural seasons bring engagement and partnerships at governments, institutions and artists levels. For example, open calls for proposals for the SA/UK Seasons makes at least part of the programme accessible to artists and cultural practitioners, and it has a strong focus on co-operation and collaboration between artists and institutions of the two countries. The decision making body is comprised of both government and civil society. This Seasons programme thus illustrated features of both the ‘distance’ and ‘interactivity’ propositions.

(b) The DAC Mzansi Golden Economy (MGE) strategy: The Mzansi Golden Economy (MGE) strategy, presented at a national consultative conference on the economics of arts and culture in 2011, is the most significant policy document to come out of DAC apart from the Minister’s speeches and the annual strategic plans, in five years (since then there has also been a Social Cohesion and Nation-Building strategy developed but currently with limited international applicability, and will therefore not be considered in detail). The MGE strategy was specifically designed to align arts and culture to the Government Programme of Action and the development goals of Government, including job creation (RSA DAC 2011b). The MGE strategy envisions large-scale intervention to reinforce the arts, culture and heritage (ach) sector as a substantive growth sector in the economy, and to introduce programmes that contribute to large-scale employment, skills development, market and audience development, fostering of entrepreneurs and new business opportunities in arts and culture. The large-scale projects or work streams developed as part of Mzansi Golden Economy (MGE), as a strategic response include: Cultural events, Touring Ventures, Legacy projects, Cultural precincts, Public Art, Art Bank, Sourcing enterprise/information centres, National Academy for Cultural & Creative Industries of SA (NaCISA), Artists in Schools, and a Cultural Observatory.
Several of these, including the Touring Ventures and Cultural Events, have cultural diplomacy components that provide opportunities for artists to participate in either international tours or international events, or to get support for their own initiatives in these areas through open calls for proposals (RSA DAC 2011b).

The MGE budget of R267 million is allocated to Cultural Observatory; Art bank; Sourcing Enterprise; Cultural Events and Touring Ventures. There is however not a distinction made between the funds allocated to domestic or international events and programmes. It is also noted from the 2014/2015 APP, MGE contributed to the Cultural Seasons with R40 million. This is in addition to the budget of approximately R41 million allocated to the International Co-operation unit in DAC, but which includes compensation of employees and payment of membership fees to international organisations (RSA DAC 2014b: 47). A further breakdown of the budget was unfortunately not provided which made it difficult to ascertain exactly how much of the budget was allocated to programming.

(c) The DIRCO Strategic Plan 2015-2020, Annual Performance Plan 2015-2016 and Annual Report 2013-2014: A perusal of the DIRCO Strategic Plan 2015-2020 (RSA DIRCO 2015c), the Annual Performance Plan 2015-2016 (RSA DIRCO 2015d) and the Annual Report 2013-2014 (RSA DIRCO 2014a) shows no reference to culture or cultural diplomacy. The key focus is on international (political and economic) relations, strengthening bilateral relations and cooperation as well as continental and multilateral relations. The social dimension is only occasionally mentioned and culture not at all. Outside of these policy directives, there is however a number of cultural diplomacy activities that DIRCO engages in, sometimes under the banner of public diplomacy or the co-ordination of South Africa’s international relations. The following two are examples of these: Firstly, DIRCO has for several years hosted the annual Diplomatic Fair – a predominantly cultural event for the foreign missions stationed in South Africa with the aim “to showcase and promote cultural diplomacy through arts, music …” (RSA DIRCO 2012a). The Fair is targeted at the public, with countries accredited to South Africa providing information and showcasing their culture (including food and drinks) and “[affording] government, business, the diplomatic corps and other sectors of society the opportunity to learn and network” (RSA DIRCO 2012a). Secondly, as indicated, DIRCO hosted the inaugural Ubuntu Diplomatic awards on 14 February 2015, “[in] order to recognise South African industry leaders and eminent persons for their contribution to promoting South Africa’s national interests and values across the world” (RSA DIRCO 2015b). One of the
seven awards made was the *Ubuntu Arts and Cultural Diplomacy Award*, for promotion of South Africa’s “arts and culture and/or the exchange of cultural programmes between South Africa and international communities”. It is evident the DIRCO initiatives on cultural diplomacy are considered (cultural diplomacy) projects under the rubric of public diplomacy.

South Africa’s diplomatic missions abroad also engage in international cultural programmes. Strategic and annual performance plans and annual reports for South Africa’s diplomatic missions abroad are not available and it is not possible to determine with certainty how much time and resources they allocate to cultural (diplomacy) programmes. The author knows from personal experience that continuous budget cuts over years have left missions with very little resources to promote culture outside of annual events around the major national days, in particular Freedom Day on 27 April. Some missions partner with ‘Team South Africa’ ie SATOUR, and Brand South Africa, and on occasion with SA firms represented in that particular country, to leverage off each other’s events and functions, but this is ad hoc and not a consistent programme.

It is further noted the resident ambassador (and other foreign representatives) do not as in early historical examples of cultural diplomacy, play the specific role of cultural ‘ambassador’, although culture is part of the portfolio of the mission and is implicitly or explicitly included in the strategic plans of the mission and of DIRCO. In the Cabinet approved *Measures and Guidelines for the Enhanced Co-ordination of South Africa’s International Engagements* (RSA DIRCO [s.a.]) the role of the Head of Mission is generically stated as being the representative of the President, and acting on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Mission represents South Africa “in the full scope of its international relations and serves as a mouthpiece of the Head of State or the Government”. He coordinates and implements South Africa’s policy and takes on “the leadership and chief executive role in the sphere of government policy and interstate (government-to-government) relations” (RSA DIRCO [s.a.]). Culture is thus neither explicitly included nor excluded from the portfolio of responsibilities of South African Ambassadors.

**6. THE PROPOSITIONAL DIMENSION**

The propositional dimension refers to the two theses of ‘distance’ and ‘interactivity’, (suggested by Gienow-Hecht and Donfried) as the factors most relevant to the success of cultural diplomacy.
6.1 The distance thesis

The distance thesis relates to the distance between the political and economic agenda of a state on one hand and the cultural diplomacy programmes and projects on the other, based on the proposition that distance and effectiveness are directly proportional (i.e. the greater the distance the greater the success and vice versa). This could also be extended to the agents or agencies of cultural diplomacy.

(a) Policy: Policy pronouncements or speeches by the President and the Minister of International Relations and Co-operation do not include any references to maintaining ‘distance’ between the agendas of the political, economic or cultural imperatives of the state, and neither does the 2011 White Paper on Foreign Policy. In the Minister of Arts and Culture’s introductory message in the 1996 Arts and Culture White Paper (see Section 3.3(a)), he referred to the ‘arms-length’ approach. Although this approach was specifically related to state funding for arts, he did not make a distinction between domestic or international funding. He noted that in some countries, no state support was provided to the arts while in others the State played a critical role. For South Africa he envisaged a unique arms-length relationship which would be essential to freedom of expression: “Promotion without undue promulgation would be our ideal” (RSA 1996: preamble). Chapter 6 of the White Paper made provision for facilitation of international exchange and maximizing of opportunities, encouraging participation of artists abroad, and envisaging a specific international role for the NAC and NHC. The latter provisions distinctly supported a ‘distanced’ role for the primary agents and organs of the state. More recently, this approach was significantly reviewed in the Revised White Paper of 2013, which while not yet adopted and still in a draft form, foresees a much more interventionist and transformative role for the state (RSA DAC 2013a). While this developmental role of the state is mainly aimed at the domestic market and sector, it can be envisaged that there will similarly be a closer engagement with the international cultural diplomacy programmes.

(b) Institutions and agents: South Africa does not have an agency such as the British Council or Alliance Française tasked with carrying out its cultural diplomacy function abroad. The international cultural relations programmes of South Africa as far as they are cultural diplomacy programmes are carried out by DAC and its institutions and to a lesser extent by DIRCO – under the rubric of public diplomacy – or indirectly by other Government departments like the Department of Trade and Industry (the dti). The DAC associated institutions established after the democratic elections of 1994, served to
distance or remove the funding and implementation of cultural programmes and projects from the national department to agencies (RSA 1996). While functionally autonomous these institutions were, and continue to be, fully funded by the DAC and report annually to the Minister of Arts and Culture. Their international cultural programmes and projects are however conceptualised and carried out independently from DAC, lending an element of distance from the political and economic agenda of the state.

With regard to the cultural work of the South Africa diplomatic missions abroad, the author knows from personal experience that while these missions do offer some cultural activities, these are as indicated mostly *ad hoc* or built around national days and in particular Freedom Day celebrated on 27 April each year. Cultural functions in missions are more often assigned to junior staff members who also have a plethora of other responsibilities. These officials are career diplomats and are rarely trained or skilled in ach. Unfortunately the strategic plans or annual reports of the diplomatic missions abroad are not published or publically available to enable a detailed assessment of the exact nature and scope of their cultural diplomacy programmes.

The dti had identified the creative industries as a potential growth sector and contributor to the GDP and their development programmes for the sector is focussed on accessing international markets and platforms, it is a distinctly commercial or trade approach, and cannot therefore be said to be cultural diplomacy (RSA the dti 2015). DAC rather than DIRCO is therefore the primary South African agent for the implementation of cultural diplomacy programmes. This brings about an element of distance from the ‘diplomatic agent’ i.e., DIRCO carrying the main political and economic agenda of South Africa abroad. The DAC associated institutions created shortly after the democratic elections of 1994 also served to distance or remove the funding and implementation of cultural programmes and projects, and of cultural diplomacy programmes and projects from the national department to agencies, although this would appear to not have been implemented to the full extent possible.

(c) Programmes: After 1994 DAC established associated institutions to implement ach programme and projects, including international cultural programmes or cultural diplomacy and also mandated several of them to act internationally. Since 2011 however, DAC has reinstituted an own funding imperative through the Mzansi Golden Economy strategy (MGE) (see Section 5(b)). MGE is a direct funding intervention from the DAC to develop the sector, and “to reinforce the Arts, Culture and Heritage (ach) Sector as a substantive
growth sector in the economy” (RSA DAC 2011b). This also includes the ‘Touring Ventures’ and ‘Cultural Events’ have international components that provide opportunities for artists to participate in either international tours or international events, or to get support for their own international initiatives through open calls. The latter initiative indicates a reversal from the principle of ‘distance’ prevalent in the 1996 White Paper.

From the evidence, South Africa would have a ‘mixed’ track record and approach to the distance argument, without consistent or coherent application thereof, indicating that it is not a primary factor of consideration. While the 1996 White Paper advocated an “arms-length” approach by the state to the arts, this was reversed with the 2013 draft Revised White Paper advocating a more interventionist, developmental approach for the state. Post-1994, DAC created ‘distanced’ arts and culture funding bodies and yet with the 2011 MGE strategy launched a major own intervention to fund and develop the sector, seemingly creating an overlap and duplication of functions. As DAC is the main agent for the development and implementation of South Africa’s cultural diplomacy at institutional level there remains an element, albeit indirectly, of “distance” from the primary agent of the political and economic agenda of South Africa’s foreign policy, vis à DIRCO.

6.2 The interactivity thesis

The interactivity thesis refers to joint participation or reciprocity inherent in the cultural diplomacy programmes or projects and proposes that interactivity and effectiveness are directly proportional (i.e. the greater the level of interaction, the greater the success and vice versa). It is suggested that involving the target audience in a two-way mutually beneficial communication enhances the success of the cultural diplomacy initiative.

Official pronouncements by South African state or government officials on cultural diplomacy specifically referring to the concept of interactivity are rare and it is therefore difficult to determine with a measure of certainty how deliberately or not such an approach is pursued. Practice however points to examples of this, e.g. the Seasons. Similarly, target audiences are mostly not specifically identified, but are assumed to be both the government and the public of the receiving state. Direction in this regard is provided in the draft Revised White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage in section 16.6 on cultural diplomacy, where the target audience is identified as the “foreign nation”. It is further argued in the Revised White Paper that cultural diplomacy has an advantage over other forms of diplomacy in that it “[reaches] so-called ordinary people outside of the traditional international relations circuit” (RSA DAC 2013a: 62).
(a) **Policy:** Policy pronouncements or speeches by the President and the Minister of International Relations and Co-operation does not include any references to fostering ‘interactivity’ between the cultural exchange or cultural diplomacy programmes and the receiving audiences and neither does the *White Paper on Foreign Policy*. While statements by the Minister of Arts and Culture lacks details on how exactly cultural diplomacy will be approached or implemented, the draft *Revised White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage* in its section 16.6 pertinently acknowledges the need for “a two-way process” (RSA DAC 2013a), and therefore clearly acknowledging the need for an interactive process.

(b) **Institutions and agents:** The draft *Revised White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage* further recognises cultural diplomacy as “aspect of international relations and thus …. led by government” (RSA DAC 2013a). It is however noted that cultural content is created by other sectors of society, and not by government. A distinct role for civil society is therefore acknowledged. It has to be deduced that the “two-way process” (see Section 6.2(a) above) also pertains to institutions and agents of cultural diplomacy.

(c) **Programmes:** The DAC cultural seasons programme established since 2012, with France as the first reciprocal participant, has had a high level of interactivity associated with the programming. The SA-FR Seasons ran over two years, 2012-2013, and the emphasis was on cooperation and collaboration between the governments, institutions and the hundreds of individuals and groups participating in the programme. There was a strong element of reciprocity, partnerships and long term relationship building (France 2013). The subsequent SA-UK Seasons, held in 2014 and 2015, again emphasised collaborations and building lasting partnerships, giving significant effect to the interactivity thesis, with a particular focus on attracting and reaching the youth in both countries (SA-UK Seasons [s.a.]).

The interactivity argument as determinant of success does not feature prominently in statements of the primary agents of cultural diplomacy in South Africa, indicating that it is not a principal consideration. The 2013 *Revised White Paper* however specifically refers to a “two-way” process for cultural diplomacy, and identified the target audiences as the “foreign nations” and the “ordinary people” outside of the traditional international relations circuit. At the programmatic level, the interactivity proposition found a strong and consistent application in the cultural seasons programme of DAC introduced as from 2012 with the first cultural seasons exchange programme being held over a two-year period with France. Since then there have been cultural seasons with China and the UK, and several...
factors indicative of interactivity featured prominently, including reciprocity, establishing long-term relations between institutions and individuals and partnerships.

7. CONCLUSION

The aim of the chapter was to consider the South African case study to identify which principles and elements constituting the building blocks of cultural diplomacy were already in place and which gaps existed in the pursuance thereof. Although South Africa only started (formal) references to cultural diplomacy in government statements in 2011, the country has been actively implementing an international cultural programme in support of foreign policy objectives for some time. The chapter therefore firstly considered the historical-cultural dimension which informs the national cultural character of South Africa. The key factors that emerged from the history of South Africa was a strong sense of ‘Ubuntu’, or compassion with humanity; a drive to transformation in the cultural landscape; a search for a national identity in the face of the dehumanisation of the majority of the people under colonialism and apartheid; a highly politicised cultural environment and a focus post-1994 on development and nation building. The cultural dimension highlighted the prominent position of national identity as a building block of cultural diplomacy. National culture and cultural diplomacy by implication was formed through the struggle against oppression. Secondly the aspirational dimension focused on the current policy framework, starting with the entrenchment of rights, including cultural rights, in the Constitution. The National Development Plan established the elements of identity; the economic value of the arts; working with civil society; the importance of soft power; linkages between the domestic and international environments, and people to people interaction. The White Paper of Foreign Policy again focussed on identity, and added cultural cooperation, diversity, coordination and cross sectoral interaction. The Revised White Paper added definitional clarity to the concepts of culture and cultural diplomacy; and envisaged the strengthening of the role of government. It also proposed a closer coordination between DIRCO and DAC, acknowledged the role of non-state actors and highlighted the two-way interaction between nations, validating the thesis of interactivity.

The third dimension, namely the institutional one considered the key role players, the President and Cabinet and the relevant departments; the recognition given at the highest level to the role of the arts and culture sectors during the liberation struggle; the gradual
but distinct development of the concept and practice of cultural diplomacy especially in the
DAC; the indeterminable but significant role of non-state actors; and the lack of coherence
and coordination between DIRCO and DAC on cultural diplomacy. The programmatic
aspects of cultural diplomacy constituted the fourth dimension, and lifted out the
transformational and economic focus of the DAC programmes, as well as a new emphasis
on Africa and the BRICS countries. What could be considered as DIRCO’s cultural
diplomacy programmes were ad hoc and not included in strategic plans or APPs, but
constituted building relations with the diplomatic corps in Pretoria, or promoting the
diplomacy of Ubuntu through the Ubuntu awards.

Finally, the propositional elements of distance and interactivity as success factors were
considered to determine the potential successes of South Africa’s cultural diplomacy
initiatives, with mixed results. The concentration of international cultural programmes or
cultural diplomacy initiatives resides with DAC, and not with the primary implementer of
political and economic diplomacy, i.e., DIRCO, and therefore indicates a measure of
distance between the cultural and political/ economic agendas. However that more
interventionist role envisaged for government in the arts and culture sector in the Revised
White Paper reversed this position. Although the thesis of interactivity is hardly mentioned
in government statements and policy documents, the Revised White Paper placed cultural
diplomacy in the domain of nation to nation relations, reaching the ‘ordinary people’ outside
of the traditional international milieu. The aspect of interactivity featured in the more recent
approach, implementation and assessment of the legacy of the completed SA FR seasons
and in the stated intentions of the currently ongoing SA UK Seasons. The RSA case
study, despite prominent gaps in information, provided rich material for an application of
the adapted Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model. The evidence indicated that ample building
blocks exist for the development of a cultural diplomacy for South Africa. While the
historical cultural dimension provides a sound if somewhat idealistic philosophy and the
policy framework is well developed, institutional and programmatic shortcomings could be
overcome by a coordinated approach, not least between DIRCO and DAC, and closer and
more coordinated collaboration with civil society. The evidence related to the propositional
dimension is mixed and a more thorough consideration of the influence and impact and
these two factors may serve to enhance South Africa’s cultural diplomacy programmes.
CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

This study was prompted by the renewed interest globally in the role and value of culture in international relations and cultural diplomacy in foreign policy, as well as pronouncements by the Minister(s) of Arts and Culture of South Africa expressing an intent to develop a cultural diplomacy policy for the country. This presents questions of both a theoretical and a practical nature, informing the understanding and application of cultural diplomacy.

The study proposes that a theoretical clarification of the concept, and consideration of the application thereof globally, will provide examples of best practices and identify building blocks towards the development of a cultural diplomacy for South Africa, hence the main research question: Given current thinking on cultural diplomacy and drawing on best practices globally what would be the critical components in designing a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa? Moreover, several secondary questions informed the primary research question, namely: What is the current understanding of global trends in cultural diplomacy? How is cultural diplomacy distinct and differentiated from, or linked to public diplomacy and soft power tools of foreign policy? Applicable to South Africa as a case study further secondary research questions were considered: What is the recent historical and post-1994 South African context and thinking that informs the development of a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa? What role is there for non-state actors in shaping cultural diplomacy in South Africa? How do the current elements or building blocks of South African cultural diplomacy conform to the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model and its two theses/propositions on ‘distance’ and ‘interactivity’?

The questions were considered firstly at a theoretical level to determine the meaning, nature and scope of cultural diplomacy and its components, as well as to distinguish it from other forms of soft power. An empirical analysis determined how cultural diplomacy is managed, structured, organised and institutionalised in different regions and states of the world. A further empirical analysis of South African aspects considered which building blocks of cultural diplomacy is already in place upon which a cultural diplomacy may be developed and implemented.
2. **KEY FINDINGS**

(a) **Cultural diplomacy:** A theoretical analysis of cultural diplomacy indicates that the concept crosses various domains of the Social Sciences, although an interdisciplinary approach to this specific category of diplomacy – and instrument of foreign policy – is not equally well accepted by traditional theorists. A renewed interest in culture and identity among scholars of IR theory is apparent, particularly post 9/11, and this interest is not only restricted to the critical theorists. As key component of cultural diplomacy, the concept of culture remains elusive, and definitions are as diverse as the multiplicity of cultural manifestations it seeks to describe. Definitions of culture point to its dualistic nature both as artistic expression and as identity, encompassing the message and the messenger. Diplomacy as complementary component to culture in cultural diplomacy is well understood and theorised, particularly in the conventional approach. Definitions of diplomacy are indicative of the profession and the practice, and recognise diplomacy as pre-eminent tool of foreign policy and the primary channel of non-confrontational communication between states.

In considering the theory and practice of cultural diplomacy, nine features of cultural diplomacy that distinguished it from other forms of diplomacy are identified in the study, namely: alignment to the interests of the host country; focusing on local needs and priorities; conveying the sending country’s values; support other forms of (diplomatic) engagement; flexibility, creativity and adaptability to opportunity; providing an alternative to official channels of communication; engagement in information and knowledge exchange for mutual co-operation; seeking out shared history and heritage; cultivating long-term relationship and common interest; and sharing some characteristics of other forms of diplomacy; i.e. understanding particular environment.

It is concluded that while cultural diplomacy is often equated with other forms of soft power, particularly public diplomacy, their aims, scope and impact are significantly different. Cultural diplomacy aims can be clustered in three distinctive groupings; to communicate positive values, demonstrating principles such as artistic freedom, and illustrating abstract ideals such as quality of life. Unique to cultural diplomacy is also a powerful public-private partnership. A distortion of cultural diplomacy in the USA towards public diplomacy and propaganda over the past half a century can be ascribed to the bipolar rivalries of the Cold War, and in response to the integration by the Soviet Union of
its cultural diplomacy programmes into its state propaganda campaigns. This bias is not as prevalent in theory or practice in other parts of the world. A unique form of cultural diplomacy is further evidenced in multilateralism, led by UNESCO for the UN, and with Europe leading the trend of regional coordination of cultural diplomacy.

The study was positioned within the theoretical framework proposed by Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried in order to allow consideration of the aspirational, institutional, programmatic and propositional dimensions of cultural diplomacy. The model was therefore adapted to also include a fifth dimension namely the historical-cultural dimension, as evidenced from case studies.

(b) International best practices and benchmarks: Today, cultural diplomacy is practiced in in one form or another across all regions of the world, but it has ancient roots. Examples of cultural diplomacy are found in biblical times, in the pre-modern city states of ancient Greece, the Byzantine empire, the Chinese dynasties, the Middle Ages and Renaissance period. Formalised and sustainable cultural diplomacy practices date back to the sixteenth century when the French court used Jesuit priests to carry French language and culture to the outside world. Since the late 1880s, cultural diplomacy became institutionalised and today it is common practice among almost all states of the world.

An analysis of global trends indicates the importance of the historical-cultural dimension in cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is most powerful and effective when it is aligned to the history or heritage of a country, or its global or regional power position, and is therefore a reflection of the national cultural character of a nation or state. Best practice in the second, ie., aspirational dimension, indicates a strong prevalence of showcasing of cultural excellence; alignment with other foreign policy objectives; creating a positive image of a country, and supporting the domestic agenda represented by creating markets and opportunities for local artists. The institutional or third dimension reflects a diversity in management and organisation of cultural diplomacy around the world, from fully state controlled to state funded but managed by an independent institution. Some degree of separation from the political and economic agenda and agents of the state, and a distinction from public diplomacy and propaganda strengthened cultural diplomacy initiatives. The programmatic or fourth dimension globally was found to be as diverse as the institutional dimension, but reflected a common show-casing of cultural excellence, selected focus on comparative advantage, and finding common interests and shared (national) passions. It was evidenced that countries often select and focus on elements of
cultural diplomacy that reflect their particular strengths, or particular foreign policy approaches, eg. the French and Germans place emphasis on language promotion and modernity, the British on education and the youth, the Chinese on establishing cultural institutions and partnerships and the Japanese have a strong focus on anime, robotics and multilateral cultural diplomacy in the UN context. The fifth or final propositional dimension, measuring distance and interactivity, proved to be somewhat inconclusive regarding distance, illustrated by the contradictory experiences of for example France and the UK, but a stronger correlation regarding the interactivity thesis, where a two-way interaction with the receiving target proved to be a positive influence in almost all cases.

Lessons learned, and the experiences of different countries and how they use structures, messages and delivery mechanisms in cultural diplomacy hold lessons for South Africa in the development of its cultural diplomacy.

(c) South African case study: In applying the five-element adapted model, the empirical analysis of the South African indicated the principles and elements constituting the building blocks of cultural diplomacy in place, and the gaps that exist. The historical-cultural overview showed that the mind-set of the South African people remains conclusively influenced by their pre-1994 experiences, not unusual for a young nation and state. This is reflected in the racial, ethnic and cultural sensitivities, the cultural character of the nation and in the transformation agenda of the state. The Freedom Charter of 1955 laid the foundation for a strong (human) rights-based society, the principles of which are also reflected in the 1996 Constitution. The writings of Steve Biko on black consciousness in the early 1970s, and his advices to the (South African) black man to (re) write his own history, construct his own identity and take responsibility for his own liberation, is indicative in the current transformative strategies of the South African state. The ANC’s Draft National Cultural Policy of 1994 showed a strong developmental, nation-building and political dimension. It also identified cultural showcasing as an objective of international cultural cooperation or cultural diplomacy. Culture and an identification with ‘people’ rather than the individual, is central to the national character of South Africa. This together with the national identity – forged during the liberation struggle – is a key building block of South African cultural diplomacy.

In terms of the aspirational dimension of the model, the South African case study indicated a strong constitutional framework, human rights-based and progressive. Chapter 2 of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, entrenches economic, social and cultural rights, providing a
natural leadership role for South Africa in the multilateral human rights regime and institutions. The *National Development Plan – Vision for 2030*, acknowledged identity and the economic value of culture as key factors in the showcasing of South Africa internationally, promoting its presence and leadership in international relations, working with civil society linking foreign and domestic objectives, and furthering people to people contacts – key cultural diplomacy components. The main contribution of the *White Paper on South African Foreign Policy – Building a Better World: the Diplomacy of Ubuntu*, occurs in profiling the philosophy of Ubuntu, which underpins South Africa’s foreign policy, showing respect for all nations and cultures; affirming South Africa’s own humanity and that of others; and recognising the diversity of nations, and in recognising the role of non-state actors in support of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. The cultural policy framework, in the form of the 1996 and 2013 White Papers complete the aspirational dimension of South Africa’s cultural diplomacy. The White Papers indicates an approach to cultural diplomacy based on mutual respect, with a focus on facilitating international access for the domestic artistic community and recognising the economic power of culture. The *Revised White Paper* for the first time refers to the concept of cultural diplomacy *per se* in official government documents and proposes that cultural diplomacy must be aligned with foreign policy objectives. The *ANC NGC 2015 Discussion Documents* announced new cultural diplomacy programmes prioritizing Africa and BRICS countries showing a progressive development of the conceptual understanding of cultural diplomacy.

The third or institutional dimension of South Africa’s cultural diplomacy shows the President as primary agent. President Zuma has since 2014 made several supportive statements on the economic and transformative role for the creative industries; the impact of showcasing the diversity of culture and heritage abroad; and highlighted the aspect of people-to-people relations. Analysis of the statements of the Minister and Department of International Relations and Co-operation in turn indicated that while they are the main foreign policy agents, references to cultural diplomacy are often peripheral and it is rarely seen as a main pillar of foreign policy, but rather as a (sub) component of public diplomacy, branding and profiling of South Africa, for example the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the annual Diplomatic Fair for the resident diplomatic missions in Pretoria, and the newly introduced Ubuntu awards for promoting South Africa’s national interests and values abroad. The Department of Arts and Culture therefore remains the main agent for cultural diplomacy in South Africa and the concept has been consistently and progressively developed and profiled, and increasingly implemented since it was first mentioned formally.
in 2011. Despite several pronouncements to the effect, the DAC and DIRCO has not come together at executive level to coordinate and cooperate on South Africa’s cultural diplomacy. The evidence further indicates that non-state actors play a vital yet un-calculated role in cultural diplomacy, while their contribution to the content development thereof is well acknowledged.

The fourth or programmatic dimension of cultural diplomacy indicates a focus since 2011 by DAC as primary agent of cultural diplomacy, firstly on a closer alignment with domestic (development) objectives, secondly on longer term cultural exchange programmes or cultural seasons with strategic partners, and thirdly alignment with foreign policy objectives through a renewed focus on Africa. The DAC Mzansi Golden Economy strategy aligns DAC programmes, also its international programmes to the Government Programme of Action, and the government’s development goals including job creation. Open calls provided opportunities for civil society and non-state actors to participate. While funding for (cultural diplomacy) programmes appears substantial, it is not segregated from other programmes, making analysis and findings difficult. DIRCO’s strategic plans over the same time period in turn show no distinctive focus on cultural diplomacy. Ad hoc (international cultural) activities are typically presented as part of public diplomacy.

The fifth or propositional dimension indicates a “mixed” result for South Africa as far as the thesis of distance is concerned at policy and programmatic level. A shift from an arms-length to more interventionist approach in fact indicates a closer involvement of the state. With DAC remaining the primary agent for cultural diplomacy however, an element of distance is maintained at the institutional level. Regarding the thesis of interactivity, official pronouncements shows a paucity of references to this element, but programming in turn shows a high level of interactivity signifying while it is not a primary consideration in strategy and planning, it finds substantive expression in the implementation of programmes.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Policy recommendations: The case study indicates a significant existing policy framework with a progressive and aspirational constitution, recent national and foreign policy frameworks and a draft revised white paper on arts and culture. The DAC Mzansi Golden Economy strategy closes the gap between government’s national (developmental) priorities and arts and culture objectives. The DAC cultural diplomacy priorities are aligned
to foreign policy objectives as illustrated in DAC statements and programming but the lack of attention to cultural diplomacy by the primary foreign policy agent, DIRCO, is an omission. Given leading international best practice, the study thus proposes that a coordinated approach between DIRCO and DAC be formalised in a cultural diplomacy policy. The importance of cultural diplomacy as a pillar of foreign policy should be formally recognised. The point of departure should be South Africa’s foreign policy and the diversity and strength of the country’s arts, culture and heritage landscape. Such a policy will enrich South Africa’s international relations and enhances its diplomatic toolkit. Cultural diplomacy should also be consistently and comprehensively referenced in all relevant national and foreign policy documents to enhance the practice and understanding thereof.

(b) Cluster / coordination recommendations: DAC has progressively since 2011 developed its cultural diplomacy approach and programme. This has not however translated the country’s cultural diplomacy programmes into a significant international relations instrument as recognised and optimally utilised by its strategic partners, whether new partners like China, or traditional partners like the UK and France. This is primarily because it had not been adopted as a government-wide strategy and instrument of foreign policy, but rather as (merely) the international programme of DAC, a department with primarily a domestic – and arguably not a priority – national mandate. DAC currently reports only to the Social cluster and enjoys associated status at the ICTS cluster. The study thus urges enhanced coordination and interaction at cluster level with cultural diplomacy recognised as an instrument of foreign policy and DAC as primary agent being elevated to core issue and participant respectively in the ICTS cluster system of government. This should also permeate through other government coordination institutions including in the CFIR.

(c) Institutional recommendations: DAC has over the past five years as primary agent of South Africa’s cultural diplomacy developed significant institutional and experiential capacity, and this should be retained and expanded. Furthermore, leading international practice does not clearly favour a state controlled institution for the implementation of cultural diplomacy such as those used by China and France over an independent institution such as in the case of the UK. However, leading practice does indicate that countries have for the most part set up a dedicated cultural diplomacy institution for implementation purposes, with the Ministry retaining the policy prerogative, and that is also the proposal of this study. Such a dedicated institution may serve to facilitate and enhance coordination and cooperation between DIRCO and DAC, the primary agents in
this regard, and circumvent the traditional territorial or silo approach prevalent among
government departments (not only in South Africa). As example the *Institut Francais* is
jointly managed and co-financed by the Cultural Ministry and the Foreign Ministry and this
is suggested as a viable option. The proposed Cultural Observatory recently established by
DAC at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, in partnership with Rhodes University
and Fort Hare, for the gathering of information and cultural statistics on the sector in South
Africa, present an opportunity to provide a sustained academic or intellectual input into the
work of the department. It is thus proposed that the mandate of the Cultural Observatory be
expanded to cover the international cultural arena, as a point of comparative analysis, and in
an institutionalised policy advisory capacity to DAC. An absence of cultural attachés or
dedicated and trained cultural officers in South Africa’s missions abroad leaves a serious
gap, and present missed opportunities. Cultural diplomacy practiced by missions is mostly
ad hoc and because missions are managed by and report to DIRCO, also mostly
uncoordinated with DAC. Trained, dedicated officials for cultural diplomacy similar to
dedicated economic officers or attachés for other specialised services will significantly
enhance South Africa’s cultural diplomacy programmes.

**(d) Programme recommendations:** DAC has announced long term and extended cultural
diplomacy programmes with selected strategic partners including the BRICS countries and
Africa. While providing a strong anchor for its cultural diplomacy efforts, it would be short-
sighted to neglect South Africa’s other international (cultural) partners. Almost 120 cultural
agreements necessitate ongoing servicing of those agreements at various levels and
intensity. A variety of programmes and projects in scope and size will ensure that existing
cultural relations are sustained and success is achieved across the spectrum. In support
of other foreign policy objectives, SA Missions should be assisted through a series of
coordinated efforts between DAC and DIRCO to present examples of excellence in South
African arts, culture and heritage. At a practical level, touring ventures with artists,
exhibitions or film weeks can enhance a sustained cultural diplomacy presence abroad.
Fostering institution to institution collaboration through exchange of expertise will have a
multiplier effect. South African books and films should be freely available to Missions and
be accessible in a public corner of the Mission, in the absence of South African cultural
centres abroad. A network of periodic exchanges between missions and occasional
replenishment of these items will enlarge the pool of resources and ensure a continuum in
South African cultural presence abroad. Streamlining and rationalisation of programmes
and agreements to enhance alignment and coordination, will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of South Africa’s cultural diplomacy efforts.

**(e) Research recommendations:** This study would have benefitted from more statistical data and analysis of the cultural sector in South Africa (albeit the data is lacking or insufficient). Areas of cultural excellence and comparative strengths in SA present a useful research agenda. A history of cultural relations and an audit and analysis of cultural agreements would add further insights. The role of the non-state actors in cultural relations and cultural diplomacy will provide a broader understanding. A cultural diplomacy think-tank and network of cultural and cultural diplomacy academics will support policy development. Integrated studies on culture and cultural diplomacy will benefit the further development of the study domain in SA. Research that addresses some of the gaps or challenges mentioned above may provide important and relevant results in the development of a South African cultural diplomacy policy.

4. **CONCLUSION**

International leading practice and existing elements of cultural diplomacy in South Africa inform the main research question: Given current thinking on cultural diplomacy and drawing on best practices globally what would be the critical components in designing a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa? The study concludes that global trends indicate a renewed academic interest in cultural diplomacy and an acknowledgement of the role of culture in international relations theory and practice. Cultural diplomacy is defined by the five-dimension model of historical-cultural, aspirational, institutional, programmatic and propositions elements. These elements determine the nature and scope of cultural diplomacy and also differentiate it from other forms of soft power including public diplomacy. At a practical level states are increasing their focus on and implementation of cultural diplomacy as foreign policy tool. The secondary question on the South African historical and post-1994 context indicates a strong but diverse national cultural character informed by the experiences of the recent democratic transformation. The current elements or building blocks of South African cultural diplomacy supports the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model and in particular the thesis on interactivity, somewhat less so the thesis on distance, which may be explained by the current (more interventionist) transformation approach of the state.
Finally the study confirms the importance of culture and cultural diplomacy in foreign policy and in International Relations, and indicates the continued need for theoretical and practical analysis. As the world continues to be faced with resource scarcity, conflicts, environmental degradation, and challenges to human welfare and prosperity, states will continue to vie for position and influence, and there will be an increased need for the softer side of (cultural) diplomacy to build and strengthen international relations and transcend the turbulent times.


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SUMMARY

TOWARDS A CULTURAL DIPLOMACY FOR SOUTH AFRICA – BUILDING BLOCKS AND BEST PRACTICES

by

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Cultural diplomacy is considered by many to be the fourth pillar of foreign policy, together with political, economic and military diplomacy. It is widely practiced by states today, yet it is ill-defined, under-theorised and often undervalued as an instrument of foreign policy. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States of America there is a renewed interest in the theory and practice of cultural diplomacy as an instrument to build strong international relations, foster effective (diplomatic) channels of communication between nations, and exert influence in the global arena. As a manifestation of this renewed interest, South Africa recently announced its intent to develop a cultural diplomacy policy. The study proposes that global best practices offers lessons for South Africa, and that building blocks for the development of a South African cultural diplomacy policy already exist.

The theoretical limitations and range of application of cultural diplomacy informed the primary research question: Given current thinking on cultural diplomacy and drawing on best practices globally what would be the critical components in designing a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa? Three aspects informed the response; the trend in scholarly writing including the 5-element adapted model of Gienow-Hecht & Donfried recognising cultural diplomacy as a key instrument of foreign policy; Secondly an overview of best practices in cultural diplomacy globally reflecting a diversity of approaches and
institutions; and thirdly, the South African context demonstrating the existing building blocks of a cultural diplomacy policy.

A reflection on the origins and elements of cultural diplomacy as practiced by different states responded to the secondary research question: *What is the current understanding of global trends in cultural diplomacy?* The trends indicate an expansion, greater formalisation and publicising of cultural diplomacy, as an increasingly recognised instrument of foreign policy. Considering the links between cultural diplomacy and other forms of ‘soft power’ responded to a further secondary research question; *How is cultural diplomacy distinct and differentiated from, or linked to public diplomacy and soft power tools of foreign policy?* Evidence revealed cultural diplomacy differs substantively from other ‘soft power’ tools in its aim, audience and content, but they may be used in unison or to support each other. Uniquely cultural diplomacy embraces the national cultural character at the centre thereof, as manifested dualistically through art works, performances, literary works, music, drama, poetry and dance, but also though identity, language, values, beliefs and behaviour.

In the South African case study, two further secondary research questions were considered: *What is the recent historical and post-1994 South African context and thinking that informs the development of a cultural diplomacy policy for South Africa?*; and, *What role is there for non-state actors in shaping cultural diplomacy in South Africa?* Applying the adapted model revealed a cultural diplomacy orientation steeped in the struggle and liberation politics of South Africa’s past, and a concerted post-1994 effort to address the previous marginalisation and neglect of (some) cultures. Increased awareness and progressive development of cultural diplomacy programmes, acknowledging the role of non–state actors, provide further building blocks of a cultural diplomacy policy.

Lastly consideration was given to a final secondary research question: ‘How do the current elements or building blocks of South African cultural diplomacy conform to the Gienow-Hecht & Donfried model and its two theses/propositions on ‘distance’ and ‘interactivity’? The evidence was mixed and recommendations are made for adjustment of the theses for the South African context. Building on global best practices, and with key elements already in place, this study proposes that a comprehensive South African cultural diplomacy policy can be designed, developed and pursued in an effective and sustainable manner.
**Key terms:** Culture, cultural diplomacy, diplomacy, foreign policy, international relations, national identity, propaganda, public diplomacy, soft power, South African cultural diplomacy.