
by

Clarence Chongo

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in the

Department of Historical and Heritage Studies at the

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

Supervisor: Professor Alois S. Mlambo
Co-supervisor: Professor Ian R. Phimister

June 2015

© University of Pretoria
“War is a continuation of politics by other means”—Mao Tse Tung, 1938

“The naked truth of decolonisation evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it.”—Frantz Fanon, 1965

“One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”
Abstract

This thesis attempts to reconstruct the history of Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle from 1964 to the latter part of 1979. In doing so, it examines key aspects of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation struggle by analysing the broad range of assistance accorded to the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the two liberation movements which waged armed struggle against the Rhodesian government. The study argues that the Zambian authorities employed a two-pronged approach—war and diplomacy—in supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. However, for mainly economic reasons, they were more inclined to pursue diplomatic approaches rather than exclusively relying on armed struggle in resolving the Rhodesian crisis. They backed the armed struggle only to an extent that it was a necessary instrument to coerce the Rhodesian government to the negotiating table, but this strategy had limited success and created numerous tensions and contradictions. Some sections of Zimbabwe nationalists accused Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, of undermining the liberation struggle and supporting a particular nationalist leader. Thus, Zambia’s role in support of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was shaped by the ideological, strategic and economic interests of Zambia’s ruling elites which, in turn, shaped the attitudes, perceptions and relationships among the nationalist leaders competing for power within the liberation movements. Despite the numerous tensions and contradictions, and the enormous economic risks associated with Zambia’s commitment to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, the study concludes that it played a major role and contributed significantly to the liberation war.
Key Terms:

Armed struggle, Zambia’s role, Kenneth Kaunda, Rhodesia’s UDI, ZAPU, ZANU, Ian Smith, liberation movements, Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, southern Africa, Lusaka Manifesto, Robert Mugabe, Pan-Africanism, Joshua Nkomo, black majority rule, détente,
Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my late father Felix Gibson Chongo, who never lived long enough to witness my achievement, to my mother Unia Mweemba, who carried the burden of raising me up and to Mubanga, Kanisha, Munshya and Mwiche, the constant sources of joy.
Acknowledgements

I owe many thanks to many people indeed. I owe tremendous amount of gratitude to my supervisors Professor Alois Mlambo and Professor Ian Phimister for their proficiency in providing guidance and support. They read every chapter I wrote and gave me their comments which significantly helped to shape this thesis. I am greatly indebted to them for their patience and skillful mentorship. To their persistence, they added the most generous offer of help. I also wish to thank them for securing financial support for me from the Oppenheimer Memorial Trust (OMT) which enabled me to undertake doctoral studies at the University of Pretoria (UP). In particular, I sincerely thank Prof. Mlambo for being my advocate within the complex university bureaucracy.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Oppenheimer Memorial Trust. They generously funded my PhD studies. Without their financial support, I could not have undertaken this project. In particular, I thank Clare Digby of the Oppenheimer Memorial Trust. She always kept in touch, constantly inquired about my progress and often facilitated payment of my tuition fees, and ensured my research and subsistence expenses both in Zambia and South Africa, were promptly and sufficiently met. In addition, I thank the University of Pretoria management for granting me a bursary in the final year of my studies.

It would have been much more difficult to write this thesis without the help of members of staff at the University of Zambia library, the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) Political Archives in Lusaka. They granted me access to the materials. I wish to particularly mention Andrew Nyambe and Petwell
Munshya who were not only friendly but also facilitated my research at UNIP Archives. They located and provided the files.

I would also like to thank all the members of staff in the Department of History at the University of Zambia. My interaction with them was a constant source of encouragement, inspiration and comfort. These included Dr. C. M Chabatama (late), Prof Bizeck J Phiri, Prof Mwelwa C Musambachime, Prof. Francis B Musonda, Dr. Walima T Kalusa, Mr. Friday E Mulenga, Dr. Euston K Chiputa, Dr. Webby S Kalikiti, Dr. Kamini Krishna, Dr. Simeon Maravanyika, Ms Dorothy Mwansa, Mr. Alfred Tembo, Ms. Mailes Mbewe, Mr. Mbozi Santebe (SDF), Ms. Martha Kayuni (SDF), and Ms. Jane Chansa. To those who constructively criticised earlier drafts of this work, I am profoundly grateful. They shaped my thinking.

I wish also to extend tremendous amount of gratitude to my wife, Mubanga and my children, Kanisha, Munshya and Mwiche who endured long hours of my absence during the difficult period of writing the thesis. I am deeply indebted for their patience, understanding, support and encouragement. Lastly, I pay tribute to my brothers—Musenge and Katoma and sisters—Mphande and Lupondo—for their unfailing support. My constant interaction with Mr. Kennedy Zimba of the Department of Crop Science at UNZA, was always refreshing and a source of perpetual encouragement to go an extra mile in pursuit of knowledge. To those who supported me in diverse ways but whose names I have not mentioned, I equally say thank you.
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACUM</td>
<td>All African Convention and Unity Movement of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAPC</td>
<td>All Africa People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AASO</td>
<td>Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALC</td>
<td>African Liberation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress of Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCO</td>
<td>British Colonial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>Copperbelt University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECAS</td>
<td>Conference of East and Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>The United States Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAS</td>
<td>Conference of Independent African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREMO</td>
<td>Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consumer Price Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLCS</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of French Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNDP</td>
<td>First National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLNA</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Algeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FLS  Front Line States  
FRELIMO  Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique  
FROLIZI  Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe  
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
GNP  Gross National Product  
GRAE  Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile  
ICJ  International Court of Justice  
IDF  Israeli Defence Forces  
INDECO  Industrial Development Corporation  
LME  London Metal Exchange  
LONRHO  London and Rhodesia Holding Company  
MANU  Mocambique Africana Nacional Uniao  
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MHA  Ministry of Home Affairs  
MINDECO  Mining Development Corporation  
MPs  Members of Parliament  
MPLA  Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola  
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement  
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NCB  National Coal Board  
NCSC  National Coal Supply Commission  
NDP  National Democratic Party  
NLF  National Liberation Front (North Vietnam)  
NORTEC  Northern Technical College  
NP  National Party (Rhodesia)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRANC</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRDC</td>
<td>Natural Resources Development College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUZS</td>
<td>National Union of Zambian Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPO</td>
<td>Ovamboland People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partido Communista de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>People’s Caretaker Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDU</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLUA</td>
<td>Partido da Luta dos Africanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Ressemblement Democratique Africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RST</td>
<td>Roan Select Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANNC</td>
<td>South African Native National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Rhodesian Special Air Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNDP</td>
<td>Second National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Rhodesian Special Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRANC</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesian African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>South West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWANU</td>
<td>South West African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAZAMA</td>
<td>Tanzania-Zambia Mafuta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAZARA</td>
<td>Tanzania-Zambia Railways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDENAMO</td>
<td>Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mocambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>Uniao Nacional Africana de Mocambique Independente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIA</td>
<td>Universal Negro Improvement Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNZA</td>
<td>University of Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNZASU</td>
<td>University of Zambia Student Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uniao das Populacoes de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>United Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZA</td>
<td>Zambia Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAC</td>
<td>Zambian Air Cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAF</td>
<td>Zambia Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANC</td>
<td>Zambia African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZBS</td>
<td>Zambia Broadcasting Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDDC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Detainees Defence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZLC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Liberation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNDF</td>
<td>Zambia National Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNS</td>
<td>Zambia National Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZTRS</td>
<td>Zambia-Tanzania Road Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUPO</td>
<td>Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................. iii  
Dedication  .................................................................................................................. v  
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... vi  
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................. viii  
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... xiii  

Chapter 1: Introduction and Historical Background ................................................... 1  
  Statement of the Problem ......................................................................................... 17  
  Objectives ............................................................................................................... 18  
  Significance of the Study ........................................................................................ 18  
  Focus and Period of Study ....................................................................................... 18  
  Conceptual Definition ............................................................................................. 20  
  Historiography ....................................................................................................... 21  
  Research Methodology ............................................................................................ 39  

  Origins of Armed Struggles in Southern Africa ....................................................... 44  
  Zambia’s Foreign Policy and Southern Africa ......................................................... 66  
  Contexts of Zambia’s Support for Armed Struggles in Southern Africa ................. 68  
  Local Forms of Support for the Liberation Movements ........................................... 79  
  Diplomatic Support ................................................................................................ 98  
    Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa ..................................................................... 99  
  Dialogue with South Africa and African Unity ........................................................ 107  
    From Lusaka Manifesto to Mogadishu Declaration ............................................ 109  
    Angolan Crisis and Zambia’s Ambiguous Position .............................................. 111  
    End Portuguese Rule and Shift in Zambia’s Attitude .......................................... 116  

Chapter 3: Zambia’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle ....................................... 120  
  Quest for ZAPU / ZANU Unity ............................................................................... 123  
  ZAPU and ZANU Attitudes ..................................................................................... 128  
  Domestic Debates on Rhodesia .............................................................................. 132  
  Preparations for Armed Struggle .......................................................................... 135  
    Mobilisation and Training of Combatants ......................................................... 140  
  Hosting Zimbabwe Nationalists ............................................................................. 143  
  Broadcasting Facilities ........................................................................................... 146  
  Diplomatic Backing for Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle ....................................... 148  
    Zambia and the Front Line States ....................................................................... 162  
    Victoria Falls Conference .................................................................................... 167  
  Intensification of Armed Struggle .......................................................................... 171  
    Kissinger Strategy ............................................................................................... 175  
    Geneva Conference .............................................................................................. 178  
    Anglo-American Proposals ................................................................................. 181  
    Malta .................................................................................................................... 184  
    Internal Settlement .............................................................................................. 186  
  Guerrilla Buildup and Escalation of War ............................................................... 187  

© University of Pretoria
Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka ................................................................. 191
From Lusaka to London’s Lancaster House .................................................. 194

Chapter 4: Contesting Zambia’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle ........ 199

Zambia, UDI and Decolonisation .................................................................. 200
Students’ Attitude ......................................................................................... 204
1976 Student Protests .................................................................................. 212
Concerns of Members of Parliament (MPs) .................................................. 220
State of Emergency and MPs ................................................................. 225
Views of the Business Community ............................................................. 228

Chapter 5: An Uneasy Relationship: Reconstructing the Zimbabwean Nationalists’ Attitudes towards Zambia’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle ........................................ 234

OAU’s Early Efforts at Unity and Nationalist Attitudes ................................ 235
Zimbabwean Nationalists and the Lusaka Manifesto .................................. 241
ZAPU Crisis and Zambia’s Response .......................................................... 243
Concerns, Ordeal and Plight of the March 11 Movement .............................. 253
ZANU, Zambia and Détente ......................................................................... 264
ZANU Crisis and the Zambian Government ............................................... 268
Nhari Rebellion and Chitepo’s Assassination .............................................. 269
Arrests, Detention and Torture of ZANU Nationalists ................................. 275
Critique of Détente ...................................................................................... 276
Theories of Chitepo’s Murder ..................................................................... 281
Secret Diplomacy: Conspiracy to Install Nkomo as Zimbabwe’s Leader .... 289
The Rise and Fall of ZIPA .......................................................................... 293
Kaunda and Smith Secret Encounter ......................................................... 298

Chapter 6: The Cost of Zambia’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle .......... 305

Background to Zambia’s Economic Reliance on Rhodesia ...................... 307
International Sanctions on Rhodesia .......................................................... 309
Zambia’s Attitude to “Voluntary” Sanctions on Rhodesia ............................. 311
Contingency Operations ......................................................................... 314
1973 Border Closure .................................................................................. 324
Disaster, Death and Destruction: Rhodesian Armed Attacks on Zambia .... 330
Air Strikes on ZAPU Guerrilla Camps ....................................................... 331
Attack on Kavalamanja .............................................................................. 332
‘Freedom Camp’ and Mkushi Raids ............................................................. 335
Rhodesian Military Strikes on Zambian Bridges ....................................... 342

Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion ........................................................ 349

Appendix I: Contributions from Member States 1965/1966 Received up to 31 May 1968 .......... 359
Appendix II: Contributions from Member States 1966/1967 Received up to 31 May 1968 .......... 360
Appendix III: Contributions from Member States 1967/1968 Received up to 31 May 1968 .......... 361
Appendix IV: Contributions from Member States 1968/1969 Received up to 30 November 1968 .......... 363
Appendix V: Arrears of Contribution from Member States for the Years 1964/65 to 1968/69 .......... 364
Bibliography ................................................................................................. 366

© University of Pretoria
### List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1:2</td>
<td>Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the allocation of land in Zimbabwe…56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2:2</td>
<td>Foreign nationalist parties recognised in Zambia……………………….81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3:6</td>
<td>Zambia’s expenditure on UDI in 1966………………………………………320</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4:6</td>
<td>Estimated cost of the Border closure in 1973……………………………327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5:6</td>
<td>Estimated cost of restoration of the bridges……………………………345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Introduction and Historical Background

The period after Zambia’s independence in 1964 was a critical time in the history of the country because the newly elected United National Independence Party (UNIP) government directed most of its efforts towards supporting liberation struggles in southern Africa. It backed various nationalist movements which adopted armed struggle as the legitimate strategy of fighting white minority governments in the region. They included Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) of Angola, Frente de Libertação de Mocambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique, South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia (then, South West Africa), African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa, and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Zimbabwe (then, Rhodesia).

Although Zambia backed liberation struggles more generally in southern Africa, it was in Zimbabwe\(^1\) where the struggle was most complex and difficult. This was due to a number of reasons. First, the nature of the ‘enemy’ African nationalists confronted in Rhodesia was different from other dependent territories. Unlike other colonial territories in Africa where metropolitan powers directly governed subjects through colonial administrators and representatives, in Rhodesia the case was different. A minority group of white settlers led by Ian Smith, unilaterally declared Rhodesia’s independence from Britain on 11 November 1965, effectively halting progress towards black majority rule.\(^2\) Rather than

---

\(^1\) From the early 1890s following the imposition of colonial rule until 1964, the territory was known as Southern Rhodesia. Between 1964 and the early part of 1979, it was referred to as Rhodesia. During the interim government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the name Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was used and upon independence in 1980, this was changed to Zimbabwe. In this thesis, the names Rhodesia and Zimbabwe are loosely used interchangeably rather than strictly apply them corresponding to specific periods.

seeing Rhodesia as a British colony with prospects of black majority rule emerging in the near future, the white settlers regarded the territory as their own home, an independent country whose destiny was closely tied to their future. Thus, African nationalists in Rhodesia faced a difficult task of waging armed struggle not against a British colonial government but against a minority group of white settlers in control of a powerful army bolstered by the South African apartheid government, the seat of white supremacy in southern Africa.

Second, Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was difficult and prolonged partly because of what Timothy Shaw and Douglas Anglin described as “a long history of factionalism and feuding” in the nationalist movement, often along ethnic lines. The two liberation movements—ZAPU and ZANU—often competed for dominance and recruitment of members and in their claims to be revolutionary and committed to liberate the African people in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s independence would have arguably been attained a little earlier than 1980 had the liberation movements prosecuted the war as a united front. However, they remained largely disunited and prosecuted the war separately despite persistent attempts to reconcile them by Zambian leaders, the Front Line States (FLS) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), more generally. Zimbabwe achieved independence after protracted negotiations between representatives of the Rhodesian government and nationalist leaders, but the independence conference at Lancaster House in London was a direct product of violent escalation of the armed struggle.

---

This thesis investigates the history of Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle from the early days of independence in 1964 to the latter part of 1979. It examines the nature of assistance offered by the Zambian government to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. It demonstrates that, for national security interests, Zambian authorities used twin tactics in supporting the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe; they backed diplomacy when Rhodesian authorities expressed willingness to negotiate, and readily supported armed struggle when Ian Smith remained intransigent. The central argument is that Zambia’s role in the liberation struggle was shaped by the Zambian ruling elites’ ideological, strategic and economic interests, which, in turn, shaped the attitudes and perceptions of and relationships among Zimbabwe nationalist leaders competing for power within the liberation movements. This introductory chapter provides the background to the study. It highlights the statement of the problem and reports on the literature review and research methodology.

Formerly known as Northern Rhodesia from 1911 to 1964, Zambia is a landlocked country in south-central Africa encompassing an area of approximately 752,614 square kilometres. It shares borders with eight countries, namely, Angola to the west, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the northwest, Tanzania to the northeast, Malawi to the east, Mozambique to the southeast, Zimbabwe to the south, and Botswana and Namibia to the southwest. Northern Rhodesia became a British colony during European Scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century. While pursuing British commercial and political interests in central Africa, Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa Company

---

(BSAC)\textsuperscript{7} obtained mineral concessions from local chiefs. In 1888, the territory was proclaimed a British sphere of influence.

Initial attempts to secure the territory were made in Barotseland (now western province) through the Barotse Concession to the BSAC, ostensibly, a representative of the queen. The Barotse Concession, also known as the Lockner Concession, was signed in June 1890 between King Lewanika of the Lozi people of Barotseland and Rhodes’ personal representative, Frank Elliot Lockner. Believing that he was dealing directly with the British government, Lewanika signed the Concession to seek British protection from internal and external threats to his rule. By the terms of the Concession, Lewanika gave the British exclusive mineral and land rights in his Kingdom, promised never to make any treaties with other Europeans and agreed to allow a British representative resident at Lealui. In turn, Lewanika was promised mineral royalties, an annual salary of £2000 and protection against Ndebele attacks. The Company also pledged to build schools for Lozi children and promote trade and industry in Bulozi. Thus, through a series of dubious treaties by its representatives, the Company gained the rest of Northern Rhodesia by the end of 1891.\textsuperscript{8} The BSAC ruled Northern Rhodesia from the 1890s until 1924 when, for economic reasons, it handed over its administrative role to the British Colonial Office (BCO). The territory became a protectorate

\textsuperscript{7} Born on 5 July 1853 in England, Cecil John Rhodes immigrated to South Africa in 1870 and established himself as a successful businessman, laying the foundations for the fortune he would eventually amass by investing in the gold and diamond industries. In the 1880s, he dominated the De Beers Diamond Mining Company and the Gold Consolidated Mines. Through negotiations with Lobengula, King of the Matebele people of Southern Rhodesia, Rhodes was able to gain access to the lands north of the Limpopo and formed the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1889 under a Royal Charter (approval of British Queen Victoria) with the object of acquiring and exercising commercial and administrative rights in south-central Africa. The charter gave the BSAC rights to maintain or distribute vast territory, to make treaties, to establish a police force, and to set up banking firms. By 1900, the BSAC was administering both Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia) and by various means had acquired substantial land and mineral rights. He was not only responsible for British colonisation of vast territories in south-central Africa, but also played a vital role in spreading British imperialism in the sub-region.

instead of a self-governing colony like Southern Rhodesia. Although Britain allowed local European settlers a progressively larger say in the government, it retained ultimate control of the territory until independence in 1964.9

During the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, early signs of growing political awareness among Africans in Northern Rhodesia emerged and found expression in protest movements such as native welfare societies and local religious sects. Expression of political discontent against various forms of colonial exploitation and oppression was to become a common feature of African life especially in the mining areas of the Copperbelt and other railway towns.10 Until 1945, the impact of the anti-colonial movement in Northern Rhodesia remained largely limited partly because of ineffective leadership and the absence of a strong national organisation. However, following the establishment of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC) in 1946, the anti-colonial struggle gathered pace mainly as a direct counter response to the settlers drive for political power.

Against opposition from the Africans, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland comprising the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, the British crown colony of Northern Rhodesia, and the British protectorate of Nyasaland was established by the British Conservative Party government in April 1953. In central Africa and Britain, supporters of the federal scheme argued that it would make these territories more viable.11 However, due

---

11 The federal scheme was a subject of intense negotiations between Southern Rhodesian settlers and the
to protracted political agitation by Africans in the three federal territories (Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland), the federation was dismantled ten years later.

In Northern Rhodesia, the anti-federation campaign was initially led by Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), followed by UNIP, a militant organisation established in 1959 to succeed ZANC. As Bizeck J Phiri has shown, the nationalist struggle in colonial Zambia was closely linked to the politics of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, first to prevent its creation and later to secure its dissolution.\(^{12}\) In 1964, Northern Rhodesia became Zambia after attaining independence and Nyasaland became known as Malawi, while Southern Rhodesia was renamed Rhodesia. Whereas black leadership assumed political power in Zambia under the leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda, a minority clique of Rhodesian white settlers led by Prime Minister Ian Smith announced in November 1965, what became known as Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, a move that was not only designed to secure and preserve white dominance but also to prevent progress towards black majority rule in Rhodesia.\(^{13}\) As will be discussed in the following chapter, UDI provoked Africans to launch armed struggle against the Rhodesian government and encouraged neighbouring states such as Zambia and more generally the OAU to support their efforts.

At independence, Zambia was surrounded by a majority of neighbouring countries still ruled by either European colonialists or minority white settlers. While Rhodesia (later


Zimbabwe) had a white minority government backed by South Africa which also controlled South West Africa (later Namibia), Angola and Mozambique on the western and eastern frontiers, respectively, were still colonies of Portugal. Unstable and military-ruled Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) shared a long border with Zambia on the northern frontier. Tanzania, Malawi and Botswana, which obtained independence from Britain in 1961, 1964 and 1966, respectively, were the only stable neighbouring states under black governments. Further south, Lesotho and the Kingdom of Swaziland became independent in 1966 and 1968, respectively.

Emerging as an independent state, the Zambian government articulated a foreign policy aimed at dismantling white minority rule in the colonies and settler states in southern Africa. Several reasons prompted the Zambian government to support armed struggles in the region. It was partly influenced by the ideology of Pan Africanism. Pan Africanism was an ideology and movement that encouraged the solidarity of Africans worldwide. Based on the belief that unity is essential to economic, social and political progress, Pan Africanism sought to unify and uplift people of African descent. The idea of Pan Africanism first arose as a manifestation of fraternal solidarity among Africans and peoples of African descent in the eighteenth century, but it was in the nineteenth century that it developed as a distinct political movement. Pan-Africanism was originally conceived by a West Indian lawyer.

---


15 Zambia shared an international boundary stretching approximately 5,730 kilometres with eight neighbouring countries; Zaire—2,200 km, Tanzania—320 km, Malawi—750 km, Mozambique—430 km, Zimbabwe—740 km, Namibia—200 km, Angola—1,090 km. It also shared a narrow border with Botswana; see UNIP16/3/27 Press Releases/Speeches, 1974-1975 address by His Excellency the President Dr. K.D Kaunda at the opening of the 5th Participatory Democracy Seminar of the Zambia Defence Forces, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, Tuesday 2 December 1975.

16 At the time of Zambia’s independence, armed resistance movements in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa had already emerged. By the mid-1960s, armed struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia had also commenced.
Henry Sylvester-Williams of Trinidad who practiced at the English Bar at the end of the nineteenth century. Following Sylvester-Williams death, the Pan-African concept remained dormant until it was revived by Dr. William E. Burghardt DuBois after World War 2. DuBois animated Sylvester-Williams’ original ideal of Pan-Africanism and broadened its perspective. Between 1919 and 1945, DuBois was largely responsible for organising five international congresses and for formulating their programmes and strategy along the path of non-violent positive action.\textsuperscript{17}

Apart from DuBois, Marcus Garvey also contributed to the development of Pan Africanism when he founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in Jamaica in August 1914. In its manifesto, the organisation warned against the universal disunity existing among the people of the Negro or African race and also called upon all people of African descent to join in a great crusade to rehabilitate the race. The UNIA not only pledged to work for the general uplift of the Negro peoples of the world but also worked out a concrete plan of action for Negro betterment in Jamaica as a first step towards its world-wide objective. In an effort to gain wider support for the UNIA programme, Garvey went to the United States in 1916 where he organised conventions aimed at “uniting all people of African descent as well as Africans for their own industrial, political, social, and religious emancipation.”\textsuperscript{18} Garvey’s UNIA was concerned with achieving political freedom on the continent of Africa, “the land of our fathers.” While DuBois conceived the Pan African movement as an “aid to the promotion of national self-determination among

Africans under African leadership, for the benefit of Africans themselves,“19 Garvey, on the other hand, looked upon Africa as a place for settling Black people in the diaspora (people of African heritage living outside of the continent). His Back to Africa Movement and the idea of a united Africa became a key feature of Pan Africanism.20

DuBois and Garvey’s pioneering roles in the development of Pan-Africanism and their ardent desire to help advance the emancipation of Africa reverberated inside the continent and, after 1945, certainly influenced African nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Jomo Kenyatta. They were later joined by such prominent African leaders as Ben Bella, Julius Nyerere, Patrice Lumumba, Ahmed Boumedienne and Kenneth Kaunda, among others. Nkrumah and Toure, in particular, became the unrivalled champions of Pan Africanism in the African political arena because, as A. Ajala noted, they not only demonstrated “dauntless courage and unflagging determination” to “archive Pan African ideals” but they also “infused it with new vigour, purpose and determination and made it a positive policy, accepted as a factor in the national politics of all African states.”21

By the end of World War 2, it had become evident that Pan Africanism was developing from a protest movement by people of African descent in the West Indies and United States into an instrument of African nationalist movements fighting colonial rule.

To appreciate how it influenced Zambia’s regional policy, Pan Africanism must be understood within the context of the OAU’s wider goals and principles set out at its creation in 1963. Among others objectives, the aims of the OAU, as enunciated in its Charter and outlined in Article 2, were to promote unity and solidarity of African States and the

19 Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, p.128
21 Ajala, Pan-Africanism, p.106.
elimination of every form of colonialism from Africa. In pursuing these goals, Article 3 set forth, among other fundamental principles to be observed, the unqualified pledge to work for the total emancipation of African territories that were still dependent.\textsuperscript{22} In the context of the Pan Africanist goal of eradicating colonialism from Africa, Zambian leaders interpreted their own independence as incomplete as long as white minority rule survived in the neighbouring territories. In this regard, as part of the wider effort to fight colonialism in the region, the Zambian government supported liberation movements.

Zambian authorities were also guided by the United Nations (UN) Charter which endorsed the principle of the right of all people to self-determination and independence, and the 1960 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Decolonisation. Furthermore, in view of the country’s geopolitical position as a Front Line State (FLS) surrounded by hostile countries, Zambian leaders firmly believed that as long as neighbouring territories remained under minority, oppressive and racist rule, peace along the borders and, ultimately, the country’s national security would never be guaranteed.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, Zambia’s decision to support liberation wars in southern Africa should be interpreted not only in terms of an attempt to secure its own security interests, but in the broader context of the OAU and UN efforts designed to eradicate colonialism and all forms of oppression and racial discrimination on the African continent. Consequently, as part of its wider support for black majority rule in southern Africa as a whole, Zambia allowed various liberation movements to establish bases in the country. Prominent among these included ZAPU and ZANU of Zimbabwe, ANC and PAC of South Africa, SWAPO of Namibia,\textsuperscript{22,23}

\textsuperscript{22} Gianluigi Rossi, “The OAU: Results of a Decade” in \textit{International Journal of Politics} Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter, 1974-75), pp.15-34.
MPLA of Angola and FRELIMO of Mozambique. As will be discussed in detail in chapter 2, these nationalist movements adopted guerrilla warfare as a legitimate strategy for liberation from white minority rule in their respective territories.

The use of violence as an instrument of liberation was not exclusive only to southern African liberation movements. It was a feature that also characterised various revolutionary movements throughout the world during the second half of the twentieth century. During the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Tse Tung used armed struggle against the nationalist Kuomintang who they overthrew after twenty years of guerrilla warfare. In South East Asia, largely inspired by successful execution of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, a group of communist revolutionaries, the Vietminhs, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, waged protracted guerrilla warfare against French colonialists who they subsequently defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and proclaimed an independent Republic of Vietnam in the north of the country. Backed by the Vietminhs in the north and internationally, by China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Viet Cong, the military wing of the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam, forced the withdrawal of American troops in 1975 after a prolonged armed struggle. In Latin America, Fidel Castro also overthrew the Fulgencio Batista government in 1959 through armed struggle after ruling Cuba since 1952.

---

Zambian support for the liberation movements in southern Africa operated at two levels; at domestic and international levels. Locally, Zambia provided residential accommodation, training facilities for various administrative and military skills, guerrilla bases and transit facilities for the freedom fighters. In 1965, Zambian authorities opened an African Liberation Centre (ALC) in Lusaka where representatives of various liberation movements were allocated offices. The Liberation Centre was initially headed by Mukuka Nkoloso as Director and President Kaunda’s personal representative. Nkoloso was not only responsible for giving official recognition, hospitality and distributing aid to various liberation movements. He also worked in conjunction with the Executive Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania, to ensure that those who went for military training abroad and came back to join the struggle at the battle front were genuine freedom fighters.\(^{29}\) Zambia also provided financial support to the liberation movements on a bilateral basis but mainly channeled financial assistance through the Liberation Committee Special Fund.\(^{30}\)

On the diplomatic front, Zambian leaders mobilised international support for the nationalist movements. At various international fora such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Afro Asian Solidarity Organisation, Zambian representatives persistently appealed to leaders of other countries to support policies aimed at promoting black majority rule in southern Africa. They consistently denounced white minority governments and their western sponsors

---

\(^{29}\) Interview with Bautis Frank Kapulu, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia 4 July 2007.

for promoting oppressive policies and denying majority Africans the right to self-determination. They also vigorously supported economic sanctions designed to isolate white minority regimes in the sub region.

In particular, Kaunda played a key role in formulating collective statements aimed at highlighting the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa. In April 1969, he hosted a Conference of East, Central and Southern African states in Lusaka which issued the Lusaka Manifesto on southern Africa. The Manifesto gave priority to negotiations as opposed to violence as the basis for achieving change in white minority territories in the region.\(^{31}\) Although the Manifesto was a collective statement of all the fourteen African leaders who attended the conference, Douglas Anglin argued that it was mainly authored by Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania.\(^{32}\) Until the adoption of the Mogadishu Declaration in 1971 which affirmed the necessity of intensifying armed struggle,\(^{33}\) the OAU used the Lusaka Manifesto as the basis of confronting the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa.

Moreover, in September 1970, Kaunda hosted and presided over the Third Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka which was attended by representatives of more than fifty countries. The conference produced important resolutions on southern Africa which, among other issues; i) criticised white minority governments in southern Africa for promoting racism and appealed for strengthening of economic sanctions against them; ii) expressed solidarity with oppressed Africans in dependent territories; and iii) renewed commitment to

\(^{31}\) See the full text of the Manifesto at UNIP6/7/24 Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, Manifesto on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14-16April, 1969.


providing material and moral support to the liberation movements. Furthermore, at a Commonwealth Conference held in Singapore in 1971 to discuss British arms sales to South Africa, the leaders adopted the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles based on the draft introduced and presented by Kaunda. Among other declarations, Commonwealth leaders denounced racial discrimination, colonial domination and racial oppression, and pledged to support the principles of human dignity, equality and self-determination.

By the time African leaders adopted the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration in April 1975 at a Conference in Tanzania, they recognised that new prospects for negotiated settlement of the armed struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia emerged after the Portuguese were defeated in Angola and Mozambique. Among other things, the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration identified Zimbabwe and Namibia as priorities of concentrating the struggle and recognised the strategic significance of South Africa to the complete decolonisation of southern Africa, in view of its extension of military, political and economic support to Rhodesia and illegal occupation of Namibia. Acknowledging the need for negotiations, African leaders consequently mandated the Front Line States—Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique—to negotiate with the South African government in order to secure black majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Thus, the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration was essentially based on the Lusaka Manifesto because it also recognised the importance of

---

34 UNIP7/23/16 Heads of State Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Lusaka September 1970 NAC/CONF, see Resolutions 2, 3, 4 and 6.
pursuing diplomacy rather than exclusive military efforts to securing majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Undeniably, Zambia played a leading role in the struggle for black majority rule generally in southern Africa and Zimbabwe in particular. The support rendered to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe had far reaching economic, political and security implications. This study examines the complex historical realities that derived particularly from Zambia’s commitment to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. In particular, the study investigates the internal political intricacies associated with supporting Zimbabwe nationalist movements whose guerrilla fighters operated from Zambian soil.

In spite of many written works on liberation struggles in southern Africa, very little is known about the intricate problems of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation war in Zimbabwe. This is partly because most scholars who analysed Zambia’s foreign policy towards southern Africa were mainly preoccupied with evaluating determinants rather than the substance or essence of the country’s regional policy. As a result, they often glossed over or simply oversimplified complex issues concerning Zambia’s role in the liberation struggles. Although they admittedly highlighted some aspects of Zambia’s contribution in the armed conflicts, not much is said about how, for instance, ordinary Zambians and nationalist leaders perceived Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, as this study has done. It can be argued, therefore, that a proper appreciation and understanding of


© University of Pretoria
Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle requires an integrated, multifaceted approach which captures various actors and their role in the conflict.

In addition, hosting Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas posed serious threats to the country’s internal security partly because of their alleged involvement in domestic politics, and partly on account of the deadly internecine battles which characterised the rank-and-file of the nationalist movements while based in Zambia. Internal feuds, which often reflected original ethnic and personality tensions at home, coupled with ideological differences, frequently resulted in sporadic and violent street fights between members of ZAPU and ZANU. Throughout the period under study, the constant theme that governed Zambia’s relationship with the two liberation movements was Kaunda’s consistent attempts to keep them united in the struggle. His repeated failure to heal the breach between the two nationalist organisations remained a constant source of frustration.

While Zambia supported liberation movements and hosted nationalist guerrillas from the entire southern African region, there are several reasons why this study focuses on Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle alone. First, Zambia and Zimbabwe shared a common historical heritage both as colonies of Britain and as members of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is plausible to suggest that given the strong social, economic and political ties forged during the federation, Zambian leaders felt duty-bound to support Zimbabwe attain black majority rule as well. Second, Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw observed that at independence, Zambian leaders realised that the limited resources at their disposal could only be deployed most effectively if concentrated on a single target. Thus,

Zimbabwe was singled out as Zambia’s chief priority in the anti-colonial campaign in the region primarily because it had the “most developed nationalist movement” and therefore appeared to offer the best prospects for early independence.\textsuperscript{42} Third, there was the problem of UDI. UDI forced Zambian leaders to abandon the course of peaceful means in preference to supporting armed struggle as a necessary and legitimate strategy for political transformation in Zimbabwe.

Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle came at a great cost to the country’s social and economic stability. The Rhodesian government launched devastating military operations on Zambia for hosting nationalist guerrillas.\textsuperscript{43} Many Zimbabwean refugees and ordinary Zambians and military personnel were killed and infrastructure such as road and railway bridges destroyed, with far reaching repercussions on the stability of the economy. Thus, Zambia paid a heavy price for supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

**Statement of the Problem**

Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle is a strong theme in the country’s history and national identity. Yet, in spite of the availability of a large amount of written works on the conflicts that generally engulfed the region, there is surprisingly very little research that has been done to investigate the nature of Zambia’s contribution in Zimbabwe’s liberation war. This thesis examines the complex processes and problems of Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle from 1964 to 1979.

\textsuperscript{42} Anglin and Shaw, *Zambia’s Foreign Policy*, p.16.
\textsuperscript{43} Rhodesian Armed Forces began mounting military operations against suspected ZAPU guerrilla bases in Zambia after the mid-1970s when ZANU had already moved their operational headquarters to Mozambique. There, ZANU also suffered devastating armed raids by the Rhodesian Security Forces.
Objectives

The general objective of this thesis is to analyse the role played by Zambia in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle from 1964 to 1979. Specifically, the study;

i) investigates the nature and extent of Zambia’s support for Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle,

ii) examines the domestic concerns regarding Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle,

iii) investigates the perceptions and attitudes of Zimbabwe nationalists towards Zambia’s role in the liberation struggle, and

iv) evaluates the cost of Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

Significance of the Study

This study broadens understanding of the process of decolonisation in southern Africa. It will, thus, make a significant contribution to southern African historiography on decolonisation and, hopefully, stimulate further research interest on the subject.

Focus and Period of Study

This study focuses on Zambia, a neighbouring country that supported revolutionary armed struggle in Zimbabwe at enormous risk to its economy and security. It covers a fifteen year period from Zambia’s independence in 1964 to the latter part of 1979, when UDI, which unleashed armed struggle in Zimbabwe, was dismantled. While acknowledging Zambia’s immense contribution towards the liberation of southern Africa as a whole, the study deliberately singled out Zimbabwe as the principal country of focus for analysis of Zambia’s contribution towards black majority rule in the region. This is because of the following reasons. First, undertaking such a sharply focused study allows for a much deeper
analysis than would be the case if it was to deal with the entire southern African region. That each liberation movement whose operations were confined within a specific geographically defined territory in southern Africa was unique, in terms of the nature of the enemy they confronted, when and how they organised armed resistance, how long the struggle was sustained and the sources and nature of support they received, is undeniable. Thus, each revolutionary armed struggle and the role of external backers requires a separate study. Second, for reasons of limited time demanded to complete the project, the need to focus on Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle alone was imperative.

It is also vital to state what this study is not. It is not an account of the development of armed revolutionary struggle in Zimbabwe. Scholars have long documented the origins and evolution of armed struggle in Zimbabwe. Nor is the study an analysis of African liberation movements or guerrilla warfare. Histories of African liberation movements organising peacefully initially and then resorting to armed struggle in the face of intransigency of white minority governments or analyses of the theory of guerrilla warfare as practiced by various African liberation movements, have similarly received adequate scholarly attention.

---


Building on Carol Thompson’s\textsuperscript{46} earlier account of the role of the Front Line States in the liberation of Zimbabwe and drawing substantial insights from recent works on the role of the Nordic countries in the liberation of southern Africa,\textsuperscript{47} this study is rather an analysis of Zambia’s role in the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe. However, when investigating Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, this study is, in fact, analysing Zambia’s contribution in the wider decolonisation process in southern Africa. Viewed in broader perspective, therefore, one can consider this study an analysis of Zambia’s role in the decolonisation of southern Africa using Zimbabwe as a case study. It is, thus, a contribution to postcolonial southern African historiography on decolonisation.

**Conceptual Definition**

**Liberation**

This thesis adopted P. A. K With’s concept of liberation. According to With, liberation is defined in liberation literature as a process of freeing oneself from some kind of oppression, whether through foreign occupation or class oppression. For With, when the idea of liberation is so often tied to armed struggle, it is probably because the armed struggle in itself involves a break with the political community and the normal social order and is a radical defiance of the ruling political system, denying it any legitimacy. So, for instance, armed national liberation is the process of freeing the society of the colonial oppression.


through armed struggle; while in contrast, the granting of political independence to a national movement in a peaceful process would normally not be called liberation.\(^4^8\)

**Historiography**

Literature on liberation struggles generally can be categorised into three major themes. The first examines the conditions and circumstances that gave rise to liberation movements. The liberation movements were born out of the social, economic and political experiences during colonialism. They emerged as a necessary response to combat exploitation and discrimination of the colonial system. That the liberation movements emerged primarily as a result of popular discontent against prolonged oppressive conditions perpetrated by the colonialists is a subject of consensus among scholars.\(^4^9\)

The second interrelated theme is concerned with the subject of armed struggle as a strategy of liberation. The classical view, an opinion which this study also shares, is that liberation movements only adopted armed struggle as the legitimate strategy of liberation after exhausting all peaceful avenues of political expression. In Africa, for instance, Africans initially aspired to organise peacefully in demanding equal rights, justice and adequate representation in the governance system. When the colonial authorities blocked all avenues for political expression, they were compelled to organise armed resistance not only as an alternative, but as the only way of combating the oppressive conditions perpetrated by the colonialists. This was the case with the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and

---


the Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea Bissau, ANC in South Africa, ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe, SWAPO in Namibia, FRELIMO in Mozambique and MPLA in Angola.50

The third theme is about support accorded to the liberation movements.51 In many parts of the world, liberation movements received various forms of support, locally, regionally or internationally. In southern Africa, for example, liberation movements received both internal and external aid. Internally, they received political and material support from the urban and rural masses, and from “progressive” intellectuals, civil servants and businessmen. Externally, they obtained diplomatic and material assistance mainly from the OAU Liberation Committee, from nonaligned nations and from the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries, as well as from the Scandinavian countries and humanitarian and solidarity groups in the western world.52 In view of the above, this study enters the discussion within the framework of the latter theme in order to identify, analyse and explain how Zambia supported the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe.

Literature on liberation struggles that raged in various parts of the world is vast. Yet, very little has been written on Zambia’s contribution in these wars, especially, the revolutionary armed struggles that ensued generally in southern Africa and particularly in Zimbabwe. This historiographical gap partly reflects shifting interests and perspectives by some historians in reconstructing Zambia’s postcolonial history.53 In South East Asia, major

liberation struggles were fought in China and Vietnam after World War 2. S. Swarup,54 Mao Tse Tung,55 W. G Burchett,56 and D. Pike57 are among the writers that analysed revolutionary armed struggles in these countries. Answering the questions why the Chinese Revolution occurred and why it took the form it did, Swarup explained that the Chinese communist leadership responded appropriately to the two critical situations they confronted in China. First, to win support of the masses, they capitalised on the prevalent mood of bitterness among disillusioned and dissatisfied peasantry concerning their exploitation by the landlords. Second, they took advantage of the growing popular resentment against the privileges of the foreigners by whipping up nationalist sentiments behind appeals for national unity. By exploiting the two situations, the Chinese Communist Party won considerable public support especially among the peasantry in the countryside. The peasantry became a rallying point for armed revolutionary struggle against the Kuomintang until liberation was achieved in 1949.

Similarly, Mao identified two aspects of the revolutionary armed struggle in China. The first was the national revolution which was primary, and which was mainly anti-imperialist. Second, there was the democratic revolution which was anti-feudal. However, both struggles were interrelated. In his strategy of the “peoples’ war,” Mao set out a

programme for the achievement of what he referred to as national democratic revolution, which meant national independence and democracy in China.\textsuperscript{58}

Drawing inspiration from the success of the Chinese revolution, Burchett demonstrated how the Vietminhs fought against French colonialism through guerrilla war. Suffering shattering military defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French were forced to withdraw, not only from Vietnam, but also from their former protectorates of Laos and Cambodia.\textsuperscript{59} Until the unification of North and South Vietnam in 1976 which was preceded by the American defeat and subsequent withdrawal from the country, the National Liberation Front (NLF), supported by China and the Soviet Union, fought a bitter armed struggle against the US backed government in the south in a war which became internationalised. In Pikes’ view, superior techniques adopted by the NLF, effective communication and strong organisational ability to mobilise the “sea of angry villagers” in the countryside, was vital to its victory.\textsuperscript{60} In Latin America, the classical example of revolutionary armed struggle occurred in Cuba. Cuban leader Fidel Castro noted that, upon assuming power in May 1952 through a military coup against an imperialist regime of Grau San Martin, Fulgencio Batista not only persecuted the communists but also became increasingly dictatorial and reactionary to demands for reform by left-wing groups and opposition elements. Lack of morale and will to fight, coupled with an absence of the means, leaders and strategy for the struggle by the opposition elements compelled the

\textsuperscript{58} Tse Tung, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”, pp.73-89.
\textsuperscript{60} Pike, Viet Cong, p.32.
revolutionary forces to launch an armed struggle against the government which, subsequently, was overthrown in 1959.\textsuperscript{61}

While the above works highlight some of the examples of where liberation struggles raged in various parts of the world, this study seeks to analyse Zambia’s role in revolutionary armed struggles of southern Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in particular. As in Southeast Asia and Latin America, Africa was also a theatre for protracted liberation wars against European colonialism and settler white minority governments. Amare Tekle observed that the early models of guerrilla struggle in Africa were organised by the Mau Mau in Kenya, the Union of the Peoples of the Cameroon (UPC) in Cameroon and the Front for the Liberation of Algeria (FLNA) in Algeria.\textsuperscript{62} While the Mau Mau and the UPC were defeated by the colonialists, major victory was achieved in Algeria where the revolutionary armed forces of the National Liberation Front fought against the French between 1954 and 1962. The outbreak of the Algerian war of independence also helped in many ways to liquidate French colonialism in Tunisia and Morocco where nationalist movements had been growing rapidly in the countryside during the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{63}

Collin Legum,\textsuperscript{64} G. Chaliand,\textsuperscript{65} Basil Davidson,\textsuperscript{66} L. Rudebeck,\textsuperscript{67} G. M Houser,\textsuperscript{68} Richard Gibson,\textsuperscript{69} M. Morris\textsuperscript{70} and Kenneth W. Grundy\textsuperscript{71} are among the early scholars who

\textsuperscript{67}L. Rudebeck, Guinea-Bissau: A Study of Political Mobilisation (Uppsala: the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974).
wrote about liberation struggles in Africa. Their works are an important source of information on African liberation movements and the general subject of armed struggles and guerrilla warfare as practiced by various liberation movements. In his analysis of the activities of the liberation movements in southern Africa, Colin Legum noted that the command of superior weaponry by the white minority forces was the main source of frustration in the operations of the nationalist guerrilla fighters who, during the initial stages of the struggles, were poorly armed.  

Focusing on Portuguese Guinea, Chaliand traced the development of armed struggle by first analysing the social, economic and political conditions that prevailed in the country. He noted that many years of ruthless economic exploitation, blatant social inequalities, and denial of fundamental human rights and lack of political space for political expression, were the basis of insurrection against the colonialists by the Africans. To a large extent, the character of armed liberation movements generally in Africa was shaped by similar historical forces and circumstances. They were born out of popular discontent arising from many years of oppressive conditions—economic deprivation, class inequalities and political repression. 

Davidson and Rudebeck, whose works both focused on Guinea Bissau, agreed with Chaliand that armed struggle spearheaded by PIAGC was a product of systematic exploitation of the Guineans by the Portuguese.

---

70 M. Morris, *Armed Conflict in Southern Africa: A Survey of Regional Terrorism from their Beginning to the Present with a Comprehensive Examination of the Portuguese Position* (Cape Town: Jeremy Spence, 1974).
Based largely on his experiences and observations, G. M Houser traced the developments in the struggle for Africa’s independence from colonial domination, through the development of anti-colonial movements, liberation struggles, to the military coup in Portugal as a “final conflict” which gave way for the independence of Portuguese colonies and hastened Zimbabwe’s independence. Similarly, Richard Gibson’s illuminating study examined, country by country, the development of each of the major African liberation movements. He does not only discuss the specific geographic, economic, social and political conditions in which each national liberation struggle evolved, but also surveys the history of African resistance to European encroachment and rule in each territory under consideration and traces the efforts at reformist solutions. Despite highlighting important insights into the problems of liberation movements such as internal rivalries, Gibson’s work was limited in scope; it terminates in 1972. Yet, 1972 marked the year when armed struggle intensified particularly in southern Africa. Clearly, Gibson’s work was produced when liberation struggles in southern Africa were still raging. It is argued here that in the period after 1972, especially subsequent to the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism two years later, the dynamics of armed struggle in southern Africa were significantly altered.

Writing from a colonial perspective, M. Morris provided another detailed account of armed struggle in southern Africa. He traced the history of armed conflict in the Portuguese colonies and the minority regimes in Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia. He not only considered the military capabilities of the parties involved in the conflict, but also highlighted the impact of the wars on the belligerents by providing statistical evidence. Although detailed, Morris’ study presents a biased account of the armed struggle in southern Africa. He brands national liberation movements as “terrorist” organisations. He also
attributes deaths of hundreds of civilian populations in Angola and Mozambique to these “terrorist” groups, notably, the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) and MPLA, and FRELIMO, respectively. He completely ignores, whether by design or sheer ignorance, atrocities committed by Portuguese forces that launched a brutal campaign of chemical warfare in Angola and Mozambique, which resulted in the death of a large number of civilian populations. By presenting an inaccurate account, Morris not only sought to legitimise Portuguese colonialism in Africa, but also attempted to discredit African liberation movements and perhaps alienate them from potential sources of assistance. Despite this distortion, Morris’ work is an important source of information on the general understanding of armed struggle in southern Africa.

Kenneth Grundy examines the history of armed confrontation between various liberation movements and white minority regimes in southern Africa. He also analyses the subject of guerrilla warfare as it was propounded and practiced by southern African liberation movements. His analysis of guerrilla war as a strategy of liberation fits Che Guevara’s theory in which he conceived guerrilla warfare as a “war of the masses,” a “war of the people,” and regarded a “guerrilla band” as “an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people” which draws support from the “mass of the people themselves.”

The recurring theme that runs through all the works reviewed thus far is that African liberation movements emerged primarily in response to the brutality of the colonial system. Also, most of the earlier works were produced when liberation struggles in some parts of

---

Africa were still raging. Probably, this explains the difficulty in documenting the effects of these wars. The few attempts that were undertaken mainly focused on countries that were involved in full scale war. Little research was done on neighbouring countries that supported such liberation struggles. T. J. B. Jokonya, for instance, analysed the impact of the armed conflict on rural society in southern Rhodesia.  

Jokonya was sympathetic to the peasantry who bore the brunt of the brutality of the Rhodesian armed forces for allying themselves with ZAPU and ZANU. He recounts how Rhodesia’s implementation of the scorched earth policy uprooted hundreds of peasants who ultimately became internally displaced persons and refugees in neighbouring countries. By analysing the impact of armed struggle on rural societies in Zimbabwe, Jokonya’s study helps explain the origins of thousands of Zimbabwean refugees who settled in Zambia during the period of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

Beginning with David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, followed by Eliakim M. Sibanda, Fay Chung and Agrippah Mutambara’s more recent accounts, these scholars have highlighted some salient aspects of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. While Mutambara’s memoirs and Martin and Johnson’s study examine the history of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle from the ZANU perspective, Sibanda provides a historical narrative of ZAPU’s history and its contribution towards the liberation of Zimbabwe. He criticised what he viewed as Martin and Johnson’s attempt to project ZANU as the vanguard of the liberation struggle.

---

liberation struggle and Robert Mugabe as a heroic leader of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe. The basis of Sibanda’s criticism is that Martin and Johnson were sponsored by the Zimbabwean government dominated by ZANU-Patriotic Front (PF) “to write the history of the struggle” to an extent that ZANU “was portrayed as the leading and perhaps only bona fide liberation movement.”

Thus, for Sibanda, Martin and Johnson produced a distorted account of the liberation struggle. However, in view of Sibanda’s personal loyalty to ZAPU as a former member of the nationalist movement, and the intense rivalry between the two nationalist organisations during the struggle, it is not difficult to understand Sibanda’s negative posture and attitude towards ZANU. This study is not necessarily an analysis of the history of or rivalry between Zimbabwe nationalist movements, rather, it attempts to locate Zambia’s place in these intra-party feuds. It unravels the complex and intricate issues that surrounded the struggle for Zimbabwe’s independence and Zambia’s role in them.

Apart from relating her experiences as a member of ZANU while in exile, first in Zambia and from 1975 in Mozambique, one prominent issue Fay Chung grappled with in her memoirs was the question of détente. The détente exercise was initiated by the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, pursued by the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster and supported by Kaunda, ostensibly to find a peaceful settlement to armed struggle in Zimbabwe. Chung argues that, contrary to the image portrayed by the Zambian government that it pursued a consistent liberationist agenda for Zimbabwe, the détente

---

81 Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People’s Union*, p.3.
exercise, proved otherwise.\textsuperscript{83} She notes that an attempt by the Zambian government to brutally disarm ZANU and its subsequent expulsion to Mozambique following its refusal to disarm as part of détente was done primarily for economic reasons. For Chung, ZANU members firmly believed that Zambian authorities supported the détente exercise unequivocally for their country’s interests; Zambia was suffering from severe economic crisis as a result of its almost total reliance on copper whose price was fast falling and, thus, complicating diplomatic relations. Zambian authorities attributed the country’s worsening economic crisis to the continuing conflict in Rhodesia and the international sanctions against it. ZANU’s refusal to disarm was seen as a major hindrance to the détente exercise, hence their expulsion to Mozambique.\textsuperscript{84} Chung’s argument reflects the dominant ZANU narrative about Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle; that it was mainly concerned with securing its economic interest even at the expense of interrupting or undermining armed struggle in Zimbabwe.

Building on Chung’s analysis of the manner in which Zambia dealt with ZANU, this study contends that Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was far more complex and much more sophisticated than has hitherto been acknowledged and that reconciling a country’s national interests with the reality of pursuing certain foreign policy goals has always remained a controversial issue in international relations. In short, striking a balance between the country’s national interest and its ideology has always been a major problem in foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{83}Chung, Re-living the Chimurenga War, p.71.
\textsuperscript{84}Chung, Re-living the Chimurenga War, p.94.
D. G Anglin and T. M Shaw, M. Songiso, D. G Anglin, B. V Mtshali, and T. M Shaw, and J. Pettman are among the prominent political scientists who examined Zambia’s foreign policy towards southern Africa. They mainly focused on analysing the determinants of Zambia’s foreign policy in the region. Utilising dependency theory to explain Zambia’s regional policy, these scholars emphasised economic factors as primary motivation for the country’s regional behaviour. They based their argument on Zambia’s colonial legacy and its unenviable geopolitical situation. During the colonial period, Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) was developed as an appendage of white-dominated Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The key sectors of the economy such as electricity, energy, transport and communication were controlled by the Southern Rhodesian government. In fact, Zambia’s trade routes to the nearest coastal ports such as Beira in Mozambique and Lobito in Angola were controlled by the Portuguese authorities. Thus, at the time of independence, Zambia was dependent on Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial government for its very economic survival. Because Zambia was economically dependent on the white south, it participated in the United Nations economic sanctions on white minority regimes and backed a number of armed groups waging war on them in order to “have neighbours who were ideologically acceptable and could therefore be relied upon to provide transport

88 J. Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict (Sussex: Julian Friedman, 1974).
facilities to the sea.” For Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw, the political transformation of southern Africa was the ultimate answer to the country’s dependence on the white minority regimes to the south. The ultimate goal was to promote Zambia’s economic development.

Rather than explain Zambia’s regional behaviour purely in economic or ideological terms, this study concurs with Andrew De Roche’s recent assertion that “a more appropriate lens through which to view the stance of Kaunda and his colleagues is national security theory, which encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external threat.” According to De Roche, “a more satisfying explanation” for Zambia’s regional behaviour must be understood in an “interpretive framework” that incorporates more than simply economic and ideological factors. This study builds on De Roche’s approach which emphasises multiple factors as underlying motives of Zambia’s foreign relations towards Rhodesia, and southern Africa as a whole.

Similarly, M. Songiso’s thesis exposes the theoretical as well as the analytical strengths and weaknesses of both the idiosyncratic approach and political economy school in understanding Zambia’s regional policies, especially when applied to Zambia’s response to UDI, the civil war in Angola and to Zambia’s relations with South Africa. He criticised both the idiosyncratic approach, which focuses on personality and ideology, and the political economy school, which emphasises economic interests and class formation, as Zambia’s

90 Mtshali, ‘Zambia’s Foreign Policy: The Dilemma of a New State,’ p.279.
91 Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, p.235.
94 Songiso, Zambia’s Role in Southern Africa, Chapter 4.
foreign policy determinants. He argued that these two approaches, taken individually, do not adequately explain Zambia’s regional policies since their exponents are selective in their choice of evidence.\(^95\) Implicit in Songiso’s argument is that an analysis of Zambia’s regional behavior requires an integrated approach, drawing on the empirical strengths and analytical insights of both the idiosyncratic approach and political economy school. He concluded that Zambia’s foreign policy in the region consistently and simultaneously reflected elements of ideology and interest, a position also shared by Pettman and Shaw.\(^96\)

In an article, Anglin—like Mtshali who examines the dilemma confronted by the UNIP government with regard to advancing the liberation cause and the reality of exposing its people and economy to internal and external harm\(^97\)—contended that Zambia’s involvement in regional affairs confronted the government with a series of moral and political dilemmas concerning the means by which its commitment to total liberation of Africa should be translated into concrete measure of support.\(^98\) This dilemma, Anglin argued, emerged principally from the conflict between the country’s commitment to the Pan-Africanist ideal of continental liberation and the implications on national security. He concluded that Zambia sought to “reconcile her revolutionary idealism with the realities of her exposed position on the frontline of freedom in Africa.”\(^99\) Anglin and Shaw have also shown in Chapter 6 of their study how Zambia’s support for the liberation movements exposed her to military action by white minority regimes in the south. This study benefits

\(^{95}\)Songiso, Zambia’s Role in Southern Africa, p.11.


\(^{97}\) Mtshali, ‘Zambia’s Foreign Policy, p.277.


from their analysis of Zambia’s engagement with various liberation movements of southern Africa. It builds on their insights.

This study does not seek to reinterpret or renew the debate on Zambia’s foreign policy in southern Africa. Rather, it seeks to analyse the substance, essence and nature of Zambia’s role during the critical period of liberation struggles in southern Africa in general and, particularly, in Zimbabwe and how its commitment to the regional conflicts influenced the country’s economic stability. It deals with the penalty on Zambia for adopting a confrontational stance against the Rhodesian government. It represents a departure from those approaches which mainly focused on analysing Zambia’s foreign policy during the liberation struggles at the expense of investigating the implications of that policy on the country’s political economy.

Richard L. Sklar, Douglas G Anglin, Robert Good and Andrew De Roche’s works analysing UDI are also essential to this study. The underlying theme in these works is Zambia’s policy responses to UDI in view of the enormous stress and burden it imposed on the country’s economy. Rather than discussing UDI as an isolated special development that not only compromised Zambia’s security but also brutally exposed the limitations and vulnerability of the country’s economy as the above works suggest, this study analyses UDI in the broader context of the liberation struggle that ensued in Zimbabwe. It can be argued that it was, in fact, UDI which triggered armed struggle in Zimbabwe. In the context of the liberation war in Zimbabwe and the wider southern African region, the development of UDI was crucial in determining Zambia’s attitude towards the broader question of white minority

rule in the region and, ultimately, its decision to support armed struggle in Zimbabwe. In many ways, UDI immeasurably complicated the decolonisation process in Zimbabwe and the entire southern African region.

Dunstan Kamana’s article\textsuperscript{101} is also critical to this study. He examines the history of Zambia’s involvement in southern African regional affairs, pointing out in particular to its vulnerability at independence in the wake of UDI and its firm determination to support liberation movements’ struggle for independence in the rest of the continent. He acknowledges Zambia’s original preference for a non-violent transition to black majority rule and its gradual, if reluctant, acceptance of the need for violent pressure, given the uncompromising attitude of the remaining white regimes in southern Africa. He is aware of the country’s continuing concern as a Front Line State with unity amongst the liberation movements and the difficulties of trying to advance negotiations among a disparate group of actors. His work provides considerable insights into processes and problems in the region over the final liberation of Zimbabwe and points to the need for multiple tactics, military and non-military. He also recognises the huge economic burden and constraints on Zambia’s action as a Front Line State. Kamana reveals Zambia’s frustration with Britain as well as with Ian Smith, but reasserts Zambia’s continuing commitment to rapid independence for the remaining white-ruled territories. This study builds on Kamana’s insights.

This study also builds on Carol Thompson’s earlier account of the role of the Front Line States in the liberation of Zimbabwe\textsuperscript{102} and draws useful insights from Chris Chirwa’s


recent study on Zambia’s contribution to South Africa’s liberation struggle. Thompson identifies three critical roles played by the Front Line States—a small power alliance consisting of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. She argues that first, the alliance provided rear base logistical support and training for guerrillas, sanctuaries for refugees, weapons, food, clothing and medicine. Second, they provided diplomatic support for Zimbabwean nationalists and initiated the negotiating conferences that eventually led to Lancaster House. Third, the alliance played a key mediatory role between ZAPU and ZANU, helping them to iron out their differences till they forged a common stance during negotiations which led to Zimbabwe’s independence. Unlike Thompson who confines analysis of Zambia’s role within the context of the Front Line States, this study contends that Zambia’s contribution to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle did not begin with the establishment of the Front Line States in 1974. It began much earlier, dating back to the period prior to Zambia’s independence when nationalist leaders in the region collaborated in the fight against white dominance in their respective territories. After independence, opposition to white minority rule intensified. Moreover, an analysis of developments during the first decade of independence proves that circumstances and Zambia’s responses to events in Rhodesia were, in many respects, very different from the period after 1974. Thus, a deeper appreciation of Zambia’s role can be yielded only when the story is told from 1964. Despite Thompson’s narrow focus, this study builds on her insights, particularly Zambia’s crucial contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe as a key member of the FLS.

104 Thompson, Challenge to Imperialism, pp.2-3.
Chirwa states that Zambia mustered diplomatic, moral, logistical and financial support of the international community in promoting the liberation of South Africa. He suggests that Kaunda played a leading role in “animating other leaders globally” to “vocalize their concerns” and “stir them to action.”\(^{106}\) Chirwa’s analysis reveals the nature of Kaunda’s diplomatic role in the struggle against white minority rule in South Africa. Although Chirwa focuses on South Africa, arguably, Kaunda played a similar diplomatic role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle and southern Africa as a whole.

Lastly, this study equally benefited from recent accounts of the role of the Scandinavian countries in the liberation of Southern Africa.\(^{107}\) For instance, T. Sellstrom’s two-volume study discusses Sweden’s role in the liberation of southern Africa. Volume 1 is mainly concerned with the formation of the broad and active political opinion which in 1969 was behind the Swedish parliament’s decision to endorse a policy of direct, official humanitarian assistance to the southern African liberation movements. On the other hand, Volume 2 examines how the support was expressed from around 1970 to 1994.

Similarly, T. L Eriksen’s edited work, a collection of scholarly articles documenting the Norwegians’ role in the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa is also significant to this study. While the first four chapters examine the formulation and implementation of official Norwegian government’s policies vis-à-vis the struggle for national liberation in southern Africa, the last four discuss the role of the non-state actors such as the solidarity

movements, churches and the trade unions in the struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa. Collectively, the works of Sellstrom, Eriksen and Morgenstiene are an important contribution to our understanding of the international assistance rendered to southern African liberation movements. From them, this study draws useful insights into the role of the state and non-state actors in the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa.

Despite the firm ideological stance taken by Zambia against white minority rule in Zimbabwe and the strategic role she played by hosting ZAPU and ZANU nationalist guerrillas, there is a clear absence of an integrated study which examines intricate processes and problems of Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. To date, no study has been undertaken to review and assess the ways in which Zambia’s support for Zimbabwean nationalist movements affected and influenced the country’s economic condition and domestic political processes. This assessment is important because the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe symbolised an unprecedented confrontation between whites and blacks in southern Africa with global implications for peaceful transition from colonial rule to black majority rule. This study is an attempt to provide such a review and assessment.

**Research Methodology**

This thesis utilised qualitative methods to research on and evaluate Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle from 1964 to 1979. This approach enabled the author to analyse the economic, social and political issues that confronted Zambia during the period under review. The author also conducted interviews with key role players who served in the Zambian government at the height of the liberation struggles in southern Africa.

**Data Collection**

The study utilised two major sources of documentary evidence; primary and secondary sources. The bulk of primary sources were obtained from the National Archives.
of Zambia (NAZ) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) Political Archives, and the Special Collection section of the University of Zambia (UNZA) Library in Lusaka. Primary sources which were consulted included documents such as government memoranda, letters, reports, presidential and ministerial speeches, statements and press releases, correspondence related to various Ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Information and Finance. These documents provided crucial information on how the Zambian government dealt with Zimbabwean and other liberation movements and nationalist guerilla fighters based in the country. The major weakness of these documents for this kind of study is that a large amount of them are official in nature. Therefore, they often reflect government policy and exclude the nationalists’ voices. However this gap was partially filled by utilising the liberation movements’ own publications such as the *Zimbabwe News*, *Zimbabwe People’s Voice* and the *Zimbabwe Review*. These documents captured the voices of Zimbabwe nationalists and the organisations’ official position on matters of armed struggle against the Rhodesian government.

The thesis also extensively used reports of the OAU Liberation Committee meetings concerning the liberation struggle and nationalist movements. Most of these reports were essential because they reflected the position of the OAU towards the liberation movements. Other sources essential to the study were various liberation movements memoranda submitted to the Liberation Committee. The value of these documents is that they portray the attitude of liberation movements towards matters of the liberation struggle and the role of the OAU and individual member states. Their major limitation is that sometimes they provide exaggerated accounts of their achievements in the armed struggle.

A study of this nature would have benefitted from using documents from Zambia’s Ministry of Defence especially since it was mainly responsible for coordinating matters
relating to various liberation movements. However, this author was informed that the
government removed ‘sensitive’ records from the National Archives and ‘secured’ them at
the Ministry of Defence Headquarters where they remain inaccessible. Efforts to access
these documents by this author proved futile. As a general observation, primary sources
from the National Archives of Zambia are very thin and scanty on matters of Zambia’s
involvement in southern African liberation struggles especially the period after 1971.
Research undertaken by this author on archival sources covering the period from the early
1970s to 1979 suggests that, for some reason, most of the files had been removed from the
shelves while a few available ones had been depleted. This constitutes one of the major
limitations of the study. However, this gap was filled by archival sources from the UNIP
political archives which cover the entire period under review.

Meanwhile, apart from archival sources, the study also utilised oral sources. The
author interviewed seven former Zambian government and party officials who served in
various capacities as Cabinet Ministers in the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home
Affairs, Ministry of Information, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and as members of the
UNIP central committee. The value of these sources is that they, like official records,
portray official government policy on matters of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle. The
extensive utilisation of official government documents and intensive use of oral sources
from former government officials naturally gave a more prominent voice to the Zambian
government’s perspective.

This study would have certainly benefitted from oral data from former guerrilla leaders and surviving
members of both ZAPU and ZANU. Using such oral sources would have highlighted aspects of the nationalist
perception towards Zambia’s role in the liberation struggle. But due to limited time demanded to complete the
project, the author failed to secure interviews with these people. This constitutes one of the limitations of this
study. However, this limitation was partly overcome by utilising, as already noted, ZAPU and ZANU
publications. These captured the perception and ‘voice’ of the liberation movements.
Apart from archival and oral sources, the study also utilised published works such as government reports, parliamentary debates, books, autobiographies and journal articles. These proved very useful. In particular, parliamentary debates related to Zambia and liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, tabled and discussed in the National Assembly by Cabinet Ministers and MPs, and printed in the Parliamentary Hansard during the sessions between 1965 and 1972,\textsuperscript{109} constituted an important resource material for this study. They yielded vital information concerning intense debates that raged between Opposition and Independent MPs, on one hand, and the arguments from members of the ruling party regarding Zambia’s decision to support Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, on the other. The strengths of parliamentary debates are that they reflect the views of ordinary Zambians, as expressed through their elected representatives, concerning government’s foreign policy including the question of supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

The study also hugely benefitted from the \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}. This periodical, a collection of monthly reports by European journalists and correspondents, was widely utilised because of its detailed and extensive coverage of African affairs, including liberation struggle issues. Although some reports are presented from a European perspective, the major strength of \textit{Africa Research Bulletin} is that most of the reports captured events as they occurred. Other publications used in this study included \textit{Africa Confidential} and \textit{Africa Contemporary Record}. They were important for their analysis of African issues in general and, particularly, of developments in the African liberation struggle. Apart from reporting

\textsuperscript{109} This period—referred to as the First Republic—was characterised by plural politics during which some Opposition and Independent MPs in the National Assembly were very vocal in criticising government’s policies. By the time government introduced a new constitution which allowed the existence of only one party, the ruling UNIP in 1972, all Opposition political parties—the African National Congress (ANC), the United Progressive Party (UPP) and the United Party (UP) had been proscribed. After 1973, the National Assembly became a rubber stamp of government’s policies as UNIP MPs debated issues within the context of ‘One Party Participatory Democracy.’ The value of parliamentary debates on contentious issues of Zambia’s role in regional armed struggles virtually ceased to exist.
on many African issues, generally, these publications cover vital information on Zambia’s diplomatic role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

In addition, this thesis extensively made use of Zambian newspapers such as the *Times of Zambia* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*. As state-owned and government-controlled daily newspapers, the *Times of Zambia* and *Zambia Daily Mail* often reported on government activities in relation to southern African liberation struggles in general and Zimbabwe, in particular. They extensively reported on Rhodesian military raids in Zambia. These newspaper reports were vital primary sources of information for the study. In addition, this thesis also used unpublished works such as Masters Dissertations and PhD Theses. Other secondary sources included research papers presented at conferences, seminars and workshops. Finally, the study also immensely benefitted from the myriad of internet sources.

**Interview Process**

This study adopted an open-ended interview method in which key former Zambian government officials who served during the period of the liberation struggles in the region were allowed to comment freely on Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. The interviews were conducted at the homes of the interviewees without distraction. Handwritten notes and a tape recorder were used to capture responses. Written consent for participation in the study and permission to record the interviews were obtained from the informants beforehand. The recordings were transcribed and used as primary data.

---

110 From 1964, the *Times of Zambia* was owned by Tiny Rowland’s, London and Rhodesia Holding (LONRHO), a company which had extensive business interests in central and Southern Africa. Its editorial reports reflected foreign interests which often infuriated Zimbabwe nationalist movements especially ZANU. It was not until after the Zambian government took over the running of the newspaper in the early 1970s that official government policy was reflected in its editorial policy.
Chapter 2
Zambia and the Liberation of Southern Africa

Introduction

This chapter documents key aspects of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation struggles in southern Africa from 1964 to 1979. The chapter begins by tracing the origins of the armed struggle in each white minority ruled territory in southern Africa—Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The next section analyses the contexts in which Zambian authorities accepted the legitimacy of supporting liberation struggles in the region while the third part investigates the nature of support accorded to various liberation movements. By briefly tracing the roots of armed struggles, setting the contexts of Zambia’s commitment to regional armed conflicts, and analysing the nature of support for the nationalist movements, this chapter maintains that Zambia played a major role in the struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa.

Origins of Armed Struggles in Southern Africa

Generally in Africa, the struggle for independence was a long process which began during the inter-war period, but agitation against the imposition of European colonial rule started much earlier in the 1880s. Up until the end of World War 1 in 1918, the scale of opposition to the introduction of colonial rule was so widespread in many parts of Africa that African historians have correctly characterised the period as the epoch of primary resistance. However, it was during the inter-war period that African nationalism emerged, heralding an era of increasing political agitation. As O. B. Oloruntimehim observed, this period of nationalist struggle in Africa was led and dominated by “new western-educated

elites.” After the end of World War 2 in 1945, the era of mass nationalism gathered momentum. A number of factors played a role in accelerating this process. First, the war weakened Britain and France, the two Allied powers which had the largest colonial empires in Africa. The global conflict helped to destroy the myth of invincibility of these European powers. Britain in particular emerged from the war impoverished and exhausted and lost its will to maintain its large colonial empire in Africa and the Far East. In 1947, it was forced to relinquish India which Ali Mazrui described as “the brightest jewel in the British Crown.”

Second, African nationalists’ agitation for self-rule was also aided by developments on the international scene. The founding of the United Nations in 1945 helped in many ways in accelerating the process of decolonisation globally and Africa in particular. This is because the establishment of the Trusteeship Council provided a platform for UN member countries to demand for independence for dependent territories globally. For Mazrui, “the Trusteeship Council of the world body became a major lobby against colonialism at large.”

Inspired by India’s independence in 1947 and Mahatma Gandhi’s strategy of non-violent political mobilisation, Kwame Nkrumah led a successful anti-colonial campaign of passive resistance against British colonialism. Describing him as a champion of “populist nationalism,” John Hargreaves noted that Nkrumah “appealed to thousands of Africans, beyond those reached by traditional elite politics, to respond to clear and simple demands for political freedom for their continent.” Africans in the Gold Coast responded to Nkrumah’s appeal. In March 1957, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African state to attain

---

114 Mazrui, “Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom,” pp.105-126.
independence from British colonial rule. Thereafter, the “winds of change” blew so rapidly across Africa that by 1960, several African states became independent.\textsuperscript{116}

However, by the mid-1960s, the “winds of change” which had been blowing across the continent suddenly stopped at the banks of the Zambezi River in southern Africa. While new black ruled states in the sub-region—Congo (later Zaire), Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland—emerged from colonialism, white rule remained deeply entrenched in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.\textsuperscript{117} It became clear that independence in these territories could only be achieved by what John Hargreaves dubbed as “forced decolonisation”\textsuperscript{118} or armed struggle.

Thus, prior to the 1960s, the struggle in Africa was largely of a constitutional nature with nationalist parties demanding African rule. Except for Algeria and to some extent Kenya during the Mau Mau, the struggle for independence in Africa was peaceful. In sharp contrast to the struggle in independent Africa, the struggle in southern Africa was bitter, bloody and protracted. The intensity of struggle in these areas was determined by the presence of many white settlers and the deep economic, political and military involvement of the colonialist and imperialist powers—Britain, the United States, Portugal, France and Japan. Because the dynamics of the situation in southern Africa were different from the situation in independent Africa, new strategies and tactics were required. After trying tactics that had been used in already independent Africa without success, nationalist movements in southern Africa resorted to guerrilla warfare. When and how guerrilla warfare was introduced in various states still controlled by white settlers differed from country to country.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Hargreaves} Hargreaves, \textit{Decolonisation in Africa}, p.212.
\end{thebibliography}
country. Much depended on the extent to which revolutionary forces in each country appreciated the concrete historical situation in their society. Some movements started much earlier than others.\textsuperscript{119}

The origins of armed struggles in southern Africa differed in time and space, but the pattern and processes which spurred armed resistance movements were similar. During the colonial period, Africans were systematically exploited and denied fundamental human rights. They served as tools of exploitation furthering the economic interests of the ruling elite within the colonial system.\textsuperscript{120} The colonial political system also excluded Africans from participating peacefully in the political processes. Africans were often denied opportunity either to promote their political interests or seek changes in the political system by constitutional means.\textsuperscript{121} What hardened their attitudes even further was the fact that, whilst their counterparts elsewhere in Africa were being decolonised by metropolitan powers, in southern Africa, white minority governments sought to reverse this process by tightening the grip on political power. For instance, in South Africa, an Afrikaner nationalist government committed to apartheid was elected into office in May 1948. Led by Dr. D. F. Malan, the National Party (NP) government introduced apartheid, a system which not only promoted social exclusion of races—Africans, Indians and Coloureds—but also disenfranchised them.\textsuperscript{122} Articulated first by Malan’s apartheid system in South Africa, white supremacy was further promoted by a minority group of white settlers in Rhodesia when they unilaterally secured the country’s independence from Britain in November 1965, effectively rolling back

\textsuperscript{119}Zimbabwe News Vol. 8, No. 3 (1974), p.4.
\textsuperscript{122} Sam C. Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), p.98.
any progress towards independence under black majority rule. Elsewhere, the Portuguese authoritarian government led first by Antonio Salazar and succeeded by Marcello Caetano tightened the grip over its African empire; in 1951 it incorporated Angola and Mozambique into Portugal as overseas provinces.\(^{123}\) Thus, the intransigence of white minority governments, coupled with many years of deep social inequalities, ruthless economic exploitation and intense political repression, fueled resentment among Africans. They organised armed resistance movements in order to overthrow the oppressive colonial and white minority governments.

Armed struggle originally developed in the Portuguese colony of Angola early in 1961 among peasant communities in the northern part of the country. In this region, known to the Portuguese as the Baixa de Cassange, and extending over a wide plain along the Kwango River near the Congolese border, the colonial authorities developed a profitable cotton economy, but cotton growing was largely depended on forced labour. Moreover, the Portuguese colonial administration introduced a system of compulsory cultivation of cotton much to the resentment of the local people. As John Marcum observed, “the practice of creating involuntary migrants out of African villagers was part of the system of abuses that made violent resistance inevitable.”\(^{124}\) Resentment against forced cotton growing developed into a violent uprising against the colonial authorities; the peasants burnt cotton seeds, attacked and destroyed European stores, killed large numbers of cattle and barricaded roads.\(^{125}\) This uprising was quickly suppressed by the government resulting in the massacre

---


of 5000 unarmed peasants in Baixa de Cassange around the districts of Malange. The rest of
the militants took refuge in the forests of the northwestern region.126

Although the initial insurrection was crashed, another nationalist movement, MPLA,
developed in Luanda, the capital city of Angola. Founded in December 1956 by young
Marxists of the former Partido Communista de Angola (PCA) and leaders of the Partido da
Luta dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA), MPLA was dedicated to “overthrowing Portuguese
rule and the establishment of an independent Angolan state governed by a democratic
coalition of all the forces that fought Portuguese colonialism.”127 In the wake of the violent
uprising among cotton peasants, in February 1961, MPLA stormed the central prison in
Luanda and released hundreds of political prisoners incarcerated there. The Portuguese
retaliation was brutal. Three thousand people were killed in Luanda.128 In March, a much
more serious revolt erupted in northern Angola led by Holden Roberto’s Uniao das
Populações de Angola (UPA), an organisation that was formed in 1958. The UPA mainly
operated from Zaire (then the Congo) where it enjoyed the support of the Bakongo people
who lived on both sides of the Angola-Congo frontier. In 1962, the UPA declared itself as
the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) with Jonas Savimbi as Foreign
Minister. GRAE later become Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA). Savimbi
later broke away and formed Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA).129

The UPA-led uprising was extremely serious for the Portuguese. Roland Oliver and
Anthony Atmore revealed that “over 6000 ‘loyal’ Africans were killed by the nationalist

126 A. K Essack, “Armed Struggle in Southern Africa” in Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 5 No. 34
129Zimbabwe Review August 1976 Special Number see article by Enos Malandu, “Angola: Facts and
Perspectives.”
guerrilla forces and some 2000 whites—the largest single number of European civilians killed in any African territory during the anti-colonial struggles.”

Although by the end of 1961 Portuguese authorities succeeded in suppressing the revolt after they killed about 50,000 local Africans, armed resistance had already developed and spread to several parts of Angola, including Cabinda, Moxico and Cuando Cubango regions by 1966. By 1968, the struggle spread to Lunda district in north-eastern Angola.

As in Angola, armed resistance in Mozambique had rural, peasant roots. In northern Mozambique, the Portuguese government ruthlessly exploited the colonial populations and violently suppressed anything that was construed as dissent. For instance in 1959 and 1960, the Portuguese colonial authorities crushed a cooperative movement amongst peasants in the Cabo Delgado and arrested its leaders. In particular, in June 1960, the Portuguese forces fired on a peaceful protest against increased rural taxation in the same province, killing hundreds of protesters. Some peasants fled into exile into Tanganyika (later called Tanzania after Zanzibar was incorporated in 1964) where they formed FRELIMO. FRELIMO was founded by exiles from three political organisations—the Mocambique Africana Nacional Uniao (MANU), Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mocambique (UDENAMO) and Uniao Nacional Africana de Mocambique Independente (UNAMI), who came together in Dar es Salaam in June 1962 under the patronage of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. They chose Dr. Eduardo Mondlane as president of FRELIMO. FRELIMO began to seriously plan to launch an armed struggle. In 1963, it sent 250 cadres for military

training in Algeria.\textsuperscript{134} In September 1964 FRELIMO launched its first military action against the Portuguese in the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa after infiltrating guerrillas across the northern border of Mozambique from Tanzania.\textsuperscript{135} This was followed by similar military activities in northern areas of Zambesia and Tete provinces. Armed struggle in Mozambique had begun.

In Namibia, armed struggle developed as a result of many years of economic exploitation and persistent political repression perpetrated against Africans by successive colonial governments which ruled the territory since the 1880s. Namibia, then designated South West Africa, became a Germany colony in 1884. Three principle features characterised German colonial rule in Namibia; first land was taken away from the Namibian people and made available to German settlers; second, traditional structures were destroyed in an attempt to make Namibians subservient colonial subjects; and third, Namibians, like Angolans and Mozambicans, were used as forced labourers on white-owned land and the new mines and industries.\textsuperscript{136}

Germany ruled Namibia until the end of World War 1. After Germany was defeated in 1918, the territory became a responsibility of the newly created League of Nations. However, during the war, the territory was invaded and occupied by the South African forces acting at the request of the British government. Following Germany’s defeat, the League of Nations mandated the territory to South Africa in 1920 in which South Africa was expected to “promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of

\textsuperscript{134} NAZMFA1/1/261 Loc. 532 OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, 1968, See OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Report of the Executive Secretary to the 13\textsuperscript{th} Session of the OAU Liberation Committee, Algiers, 15 July 1968.

\textsuperscript{135} NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969, Memorandum Submitted by FRELIMO, Dakar, Senegal 15 July 1969.

the inhabitants of the territory.” But the major concern and intention of the South African government was to incorporate Namibia fully into the Union of South Africa rather than promote the interests and material well-being of the people in the territory. Consequently, it continued and extended the land expropriation of the Germans and encouraged more white settlers, especially the Afrikaners to settle in Namibia.  

South Africa’s goal of colonising Namibia was revealed in 1945 following the dissolution of the League of Nations and the creation of the United Nations. South Africa refused to transfer the League mandate to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, and demanded instead the right of annexation. However, in 1946, the UN General Assembly rejected South Africa’s request to incorporate Namibia into its Union. Consequently, as A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune explained, “the South African government declared it would administer the territory without UN jurisdiction and shortly afterwards began introducing its apartheid system there.” South Africa’s determination to continue administering Namibia “without UN jurisdiction” therefore became illegal, setting in motion a protracted campaign to enforce the UN authority over the territory.

Meanwhile, the system employed by South African authorities of recruiting contract workers for diamond and copper mines was deeply resented by local Africans especially the black workers from northern Namibia who felt exploited. In order to address the grievances of these workers, Namibian nationalist leaders, particularly Sam Nujoma and Jacob Kuhangua launched the Ovamboland People’s Organisation (OPO) in April 1959 in

---

140 Singham and Hune, *Namibian Independence*, p.4.
Windhoek. OPO began campaigning for the abolition of the contract labour system. In order to present a united front, the organisation formed an alliance with South West African National Union (SWANU), an organisation which was established in May 1959. In April 1960, OPO leaders transformed the organisation into a broader movement and formally reconstituted it as the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) with Sam Nujoma as president. Among other objectives, SWAPO’s central goal was to “work for the achievement of a complete independence for South West Africa and the removal of all forms of oppression such as apartheid laws, contract system, Bantu education …”

SWAPO’s struggle against South Africa’s rule was not only confined within Namibia, but was also pursued at the international level. In the early 1960s, Namibian nationalists extensively petitioned the UN to assume greater responsibility for decolonising the country. But as Peter Katjavivi has shown, between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s, there was a “general crisis of confidence in the UN” which, in his view, “was a factor in SWAPO’s decision to launch an armed liberation struggle.” For Katjavivi, Namibians were disillusioned with the failure of UN Committees on Namibia to deal effectively with the question of independence. They were also disenchanted with the 1966 court judgment handed out by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the case brought before it by Liberia and Ethiopia against South Africa. At the UN General Assembly meeting in 1960 and during discussions on Namibia, Liberian representatives announced that the Liberian and Ethiopian governments had instituted proceedings against South Africa before the ICJ to finally settle Namibia’s legal status and South Africa’s obligations to the UN and the people

---

141 SWAPO of Namibia, To Be Born A Nation, p.174.  
142 Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia, p.45.  
143 Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia, p.55.
of Namibia. In July 1966, the ICJ ruled that it could not judge the substance of the case because Liberia and Ethiopia had no special interest in bringing the case. While the South African government hailed the judgment as a victory, SWAPO interpreted the decision as a miscarriage of justice. The ICJ’s failure to deliver a judgment “removed the last pretext for holding back the launching of the armed struggle.” Meanwhile, by 1961 at a national congress in Windhoek, SWAPO had already resolved to prepare for launching an armed struggle. In subsequent years, it recruited and sent hundreds of cadres for guerrilla training in Tanzania and beyond in Socialist countries in the Eastern bloc. In a most recent published work, National Liberation in Post-Colonial Southern Africa: A Historical Ethnography of SWAPO’s Exile Camps, Christian Williams has shown how in 1964, SWAPO established a training camp at Kongwa situated at a site of an abandoned railway station less than two kilometers west of Kongwa village and eighty kilometers east of Dodoma in Tanzania. For Williams, it was there that SWAPO based its new guerrilla army and accommodated its burgeoning membership in Tanzania. Between 1964 and 1965, the first militants returned from military training. In August 1966, SWAPO militants from the Omgulumbashe base camp in Ovamboland engaged South African troops in battle signifying the beginning of armed struggle in Namibia.

In Zimbabwe, armed struggle was launched in the mid-1960s, precisely after white settlers proclaimed UDI in November 1965, but the grievances which spurred Africans to organise armed resistance movements lay deep in the history of Rhodesia. For a very long

---

144 Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia, p.57.
145 SWAPO of Namibia, To Be Born A Nation, p.176.
147 Williams, National Liberation in Post-Colonial Southern Africa, p.65.
148 SWAPO of Namibia, To Be Born A Nation, p.177.
time, Africans in Zimbabwe, like their counterparts in Namibia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, were economically exploited, racially discriminated, deprived of affordable education and excluded from the political process. As early as the 1930s, the Southern Rhodesia colonial government introduced a number of legislations which adversely affected the economic and social well-being of majority Africans. The most notorious was the Land Apportionment Act of 1930.\textsuperscript{149} This piece of legislation divided agricultural land in colonial Zimbabwe along the lines of white production areas for commercial purposes and peasant production areas for purpose of mere communal subsistence.\textsuperscript{150} There were glaring disparities particularly in the distribution and allocation of land between the white settlers and the Africans. Although the white settlers only formed a small population in 1930, they were assigned a large portion of prime land by the colonial administration. For instance, despite the fact that the African population in 1930 was estimated at 1,081,000, while that of the white was less than 50,000, the Land Apportionment Act allocated 51\% of land to the whites and distributed only 29.8\% to the Africans.\textsuperscript{151} Table1:2 attempts to highlight the extent to which the Land Apportionment Act benefited Europeans and disadvantaged Africans.

\textsuperscript{149} Through this legislation, the Rhodesian colonial government decided to expropriate huge tracks of land from the Africans in order to deal with the problem of labour shortages. Prior to the coming of European settlers, Africans had unlimited access to land and could sufficiently sustain themselves. Consequently, for the majority of Africans, there was no need to sell their labour power to the white commercial farmers or industrialists, especially in the early days of colonial rule. Thus, the colonial administration passed the Land Apportionment Act to compel Africans to look for employment in the industries and white farming areas.


### Table 1.2

Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the Allocation of Land in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Land (in hectares)</th>
<th>% of the Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>49,149,174</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Reserves</td>
<td>21,127,040</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td>17,793,300</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Purchase Area</td>
<td>7,464,566</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Area</td>
<td>590,500</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>88,540</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96,213,120</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The significance of the Land Apportionment Act was that it had far reaching ecological effects for the Africans. The reserves became overpopulated, overstocked and overgrazed. Soil fertility deteriorated while the sources of water also dried up. The net effect of the impoverishment in the reserves was a decline in agricultural productivity.152

After the colonial government realised that the Land Apportionment Act was causing an ecological disaster, it came up with “remedial measures” designed to contain the deteriorating economic situation in the country. As Richard Maposa, Daniel Gamira and James Hlongwana noted, the Rhodesian government enacted the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951 in order “to provide good husbandry farming for Africans, to encourage Africans to protect natural resources in their communities, to provide the security of tenure to the effective peasant farmer, and to limit the number of animal stocks in reserves within their carrying capacities.” But because the Native Land Husbandry Act failed to provide practical solutions to the problems created by the Land Apportionment Act, Maposa, Gamira and Hlongwana dismissed it as a cosmetic arrangement and a desperate measure intended to

---

conceal the failures of the previous Act so as to stifle African opposition in the communal areas.\textsuperscript{153}

The failure by the colonial government to provide adequate land fuelled resentment among African populations in the communal areas. For the majority of Africans, the distribution of land was unfair and robbed them of their very livelihood.\textsuperscript{154} Capitalising on the prevailing mood of bitterness among Africans, and inspired partly by the example of nationalists in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as well as the rising tide of independence throughout Africa, African nationalists formed the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) in 1957.\textsuperscript{155} SRANC emerged as the leading nationalist movement which articulated African grievances.

Meanwhile, in April 1953 the British Conservative Party government created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, comprising the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, the British crown colony of Northern Rhodesia, and the British protectorate of Nyasaland. As noted in Chapter 1, supporters of the federal scheme in both central Africa and Britain advanced the theory that it would make the economies of these territories more viable.\textsuperscript{156} Southern Rhodesia turned out to be the nerve centre of the Federation. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became markets for Southern Rhodesian manufactured products and sources of cheap labour for its agriculture and mining.

Although the membership of Southern Rhodesia in the Federation accrued immense economic benefit to the colony, the settlers were determined to secure as much


\textsuperscript{154} Sibanda, \textit{The Zimbabwe African People’s Union}, p.42.

\textsuperscript{155} Sibanda, \textit{The Zimbabwe African People’s Union}, p.34.

\textsuperscript{156} See Chapter 1.
independence as the framework of the federation would permit. Sir Godfrey Martin Huggins, the first Federal Prime Minister, spoke of “racial partnership” which meant, in the settlers’ view, “a device for throwing off the detested Colonial Office yoke in order to enable the settlers to rule central Africa for the foreseeable future.” In the context of the federation, the policy of racial partnership implied that any constitutional arrangement would include proper safeguards for the social, economic and political rights and interests of both Europeans and Africans. In the political sphere, it meant that Africans would be able to advance until ultimately they reached the same numbers as Europeans in both the Legislative and Executive Councils. In the economic sphere, every individual was allowed to “rise to the level that his energy, ability, qualifications and character would permit.”

The doctrine of partnership also denounced racial discrimination.

Huggins’ policy of partnership antagonised certain sections of the settler community as much as African nationalists of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Benedict Mtshali argued that the right wing white settlers saw partnership as “a step in a dangerous direction.” Foreseeing African majority rule over their children, they formed the Dominion Party—the forerunner to the Rhodesian Front, a party which eventually proclaimed UDI—to strive for the implementation in central Africa of Malan’s apartheid policy. Southern Rhodesian Africans generally had mixed feelings about the federation because they thought that the declared policy of multi-racial partnership would possibly ameliorate settler colonialism and racism in their own country. Similarly, African nationalists in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia opposed the federation and the policy of partnership. They interpreted it as a

---

157 Mtshali, Rhodesia, p.100.
159 Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict, p.100.
cunning scheme designed to formalise Southern Rhodesian dominance of the other two federal partners and therefore “rob them of their protectorate status and independence.”161 The political dominance of the Europeans of Southern Rhodesia in the federal government could not be reconciled with the growing African nationalism. With independence sweeping down from the north, Africans wanted the same status, not permanent junior partnership in the white-dominated federation.162

Political agitation intensified. Early in 1959, SRANC mobilised Africans to demonstrate against the federation. The countrywide wave of protests which simultaneously took place in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia prompted the Federal government to declare a state of emergency throughout the Federation. In February 1959, the Federal government banned SRANC and arrested and detained the leaders, including 500 of its supporters.163 Similar action was taken against African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The proscription of SRANC did not silence African nationalists. They formed the National Democratic Party (NDP) a year later and intensified the struggle for independence. Waves of riots and demonstrations against the government continued unabated until the nationalist movement was banned on 9 December 1961. Barely a week later, NDP was reconstituted as ZAPU. However, ZAPU was also banned the following year in September because of its campaign of political violence.164 The period after ZAPU was banned was characterised by what Eshmael Mlambo described as a “lull” in political activity within the nationalist movement.165 This was primarily because the leaders were “banned from addressing rallies

162 Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict, p.100.  
163 Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, p.51.  
164 Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, p.88.  
165 Mlambo, Rhodesia, p.194.
or holding any kind of political meetings.”166 The supporters of ZAPU responded to the ban by a further countrywide wave of violence; they burned government buildings and schools and destroyed forests owned by the infamous British South Africa Company.167 According to Mlambo, “this marked the beginning of African nationalist militancy and determination to take the country by an armed struggle, as all attempts at independence through peaceful, constitutional action had failed.”168 African nationalists began recruiting men for military training in socialist countries such as USSR, China and North Korea,169 as well as Cuba, Algeria, Egypt and Ghana. Although from 1963 to 1965, about 140 ZAPU militants were trained, they could not be deployed for internal assignment in Rhodesia due to lack of arms and other relevant materials.170

The dissolution of the Federation in 1963 coincided with the split in the leadership of ZAPU, culminating in the formation of another nationalist movement, ZANU under the leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole. While Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland emerged as independent states in 1964, the white settlers in Rhodesia moved to consolidate their political dominance. They banned the two nationalist movements, ZANU and ZAPU171 and incarcerated the leaders. The following year in November, Rhodesian authorities declared independence from Britain, effectively blocking any possibility for Africans to change the political system by peaceful and constitutional means.172 African nationalists resorted to

---

166 Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, p.89.
167 Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, p.89.
168 Mlambo, Rhodesia, p.194.
169 Mlambo, Rhodesia, p.214.
170 NAZMFA/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) 15th Regular Session Dakar, Senegal 15 July 1969, see Memorandum submitted by the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Z.A.P.U), Dakar, Senegal 15 July 1969.
171 After ZAPU was banned, the nationalist movement was reconstituted as the Peoples Caretaker Council (PCC) inside Rhodesia while those who escaped into exile continued to use ZAPU.
guerrilla warfare in order to secure independence from white settlers. This signified the beginning of armed struggle in Zimbabwe.

However, within the nationalist narratives, there has been controversy concerning which of the two liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU initiated the armed struggle in Zimbabwe. For some time ZANU nationalists and some writers of the party’s history such as David Martin and Phyllis Johnson claimed that ZANU guerrillas “fired the first shot” when they engaged Rhodesian forces at the “battle of Chinhoyi/Sinoia” on 28 April 1966. But this has since been challenged by former members of ZAPU such as Dumiso Dabengwa and more recently, Eliakim Sibanda. Dabengwa maintained that contrary to claims that ZANU started the armed struggle in 1966 in Sinoia, the fact is that ZAPU’s armed struggle started in 1965 when small ZAPU units were sent into the country. Similarly, Sibanda dismissed the idea that the Sinoia ZANLA attack was the first one involving guerrillas after UDI. He insisted that in March of that year, ZAPU sent commandos who engaged the Smith regime in fierce fighting at the Nkayi Reserve in western Rhodesia. Smith retaliated to this attack by destroying peasants’ livestock and property. Nonetheless, regardless of the controversy about who fired the first shot, it is generally accepted that the armed struggle in Zimbabwe started in the mid-1960s and was mainly precipitated by UDI.

The origins of armed struggle in South Africa can be traced back to the late 1940s when the National Party, led by Dr. Malan formed government after winning elections in

---

175 The acronym means Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army. ZANLA was the armed wing of ZANU.
176 Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People’s Union*, © University of Pretoria
May 1948 and began to transform South African politics.\textsuperscript{177} Since 1910 when the Union of South Africa was accomplished, the Africans, Indians and, to a lesser extent, Coloureds were systematically marginalised, socially, economically and politically, by the South African government. The discovery of minerals, first of diamonds in Griqualand in 1867 and Kimberly in 1870, and then of gold in Transvaal in 1886, created a huge demand for labour. It was partly to ensure the supply of labour and partly to safeguard the positions of the whites that a series of legislations were passed, especially in the 1910s and 1920s, to compel Africans to leave their farms for the mining and other industrial centres. These Acts included the Natives Land Act of 1913, the Mines and Works Act of 1911 and its amendment in 1926, the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. Like the Land Apportionment Act passed by the Southern Rhodesian government in 1930, as discussed earlier in the chapter, the most notorious was the Natives Land Act, under which 88\% of the land in South Africa was reserved for the exclusive use of whites, who constituted only 20\% of its population. The Act caused the immediate displacement of thousands of independent African pastoral and agricultural farmers from their traditional homes and lands.\textsuperscript{178}

M. H. Y Kaniki further noted that the Mines and Works Act of 1911 and its amendment of 1926 and the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 also excluded Africans from many skilled occupations and laid down different scales of pay for skilled (largely white) labour and unskilled (largely African, Indian and Coloured) labour. In 1935, the white miner was receiving on the average eleven times what an African was receiving. The Natives (Urban


Areas) Act of 1923, the Native Administration Act of 1927 and the Native Service Contract Act of 1932 all also jointly regulated the movement, residence and employment of Africans in the interest of white workers. The total effect of all these measures was to drive Africans from their homes and farms into the new mining and industrial centres and keep them on European farms as wage-earners.\(^\text{179}\)

It was partly as a result of the need to fight for their rights that Africans founded the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in January 1912 in Bloemfontein. In 1923, the organisation was renamed African National Congress (ANC). Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Africans continued to be oppressed. However, it was not until after 1948 that the new nationalist Afrikaner government introduced more repressive measures and intensified its marginalisation of the Africans. As Sam C. Nolutshungu has shown,

apartheid or separate development was progressively implemented through a series of Acts designed to insulate the various races from each other, politically and physically, to abolish forever the representation of blacks in the national parliament at Cape Town and thus to ensure in perpetuity white political supremacy.\(^\text{180}\)

For Stephen Ellis, “the radical nature of the National Party's policy of apartheid more generally, caused some opponents of the government to wonder whether organised violence may not emerge as a real option within the foreseeable future.”\(^\text{181}\)

Moreover, the period between 1948 and 1960 was characterised by an intensification of repressive laws and further erosion of political rights by the South African government. The most notorious were:

\(^{180}\)Nolutshungu, \textit{South Africa in Africa}, p.98.
i) the Group Areas Act of 1950 which required the classification of all South Africans by race;

ii) the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 which categorised any person or organisation that criticised apartheid or advocated non-racialism and civil liberties as a communist;

iii) the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 which legally abolished the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining for African workers;

iv) the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953 which made it an offence to protest or support any campaign against any law;

v) the Mines and Works Act of 1956 which prohibited Africans from doing skilled work in the mines and

vi) the Bantu Self-government Act of 1959 which divided Africans into black homelands corresponding to the traditional ethnic groups of the Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa, Tswana, Tonga and Venda in which they were to develop separately under some measure of self-government.\(^{182}\)

While the apartheid regime intensified the enactment of oppressive laws, the ANC leadership began to differ over the correct and most effective means of confronting white violence and repression. As a result of the relatively peaceful approach adopted by the ANC prior to 1959, a group of disillusioned ANC members led by Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe broke away and formed the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in April 1959 in Soweto, Johannesburg. The PAC was committed to the overthrow of white domination in South

---

Africa. It organised a series of nationwide demonstrations against the hated “pass laws” instituted under the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953. The response of the apartheid regime was brutal; in March 1960, the police shot at a group of demonstrators against pass laws in front of the police station in the township of Sharpeville, killing 69 people and provoked global condemnation. The government responded by declaring a state of emergency and banning several organisations including the ANC. According to Ellis, some of those detained during the state of emergency that lasted from March to August 1960 are said to have discussed the prospect of armed struggle even while they were behind bars.

The massacre at Sharpeville near Johannesburg marked a turning point in the struggle for black majority rule in South Africa. It ushered in a period when Africans reassessed their strategy in the struggle against the white minority regime of South Africa. They adopted guerrilla warfare as a strategy of overthrowing the white supremacist apartheid government. As Ellis rightly observed, despite the killing of Africans by police, the defiance campaign against pass laws intensified, prompting Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd to declare a statement of emergency, giving security forces power to arrest and detain people without trial. Consequently, hundreds of South Africans, including the leaders of PAC and ANC, were arrested. The government also banned the two organisations. Although most ANC leaders were arrested, some went underground and began organising secret armed resistance groups. For instance, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and other ANC leaders formed an underground movement called Umkonto we Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation) centred at Rivonia near Johannesburg which was raided in 1963

---

183 Under these laws, blacks were excluded, among other things from living or working in white areas unless they had a pass.
and, after the famous Rivonia Trial, the leaders were imprisoned for life on Robben Island.\textsuperscript{185} Others escaped and went into exile. In his most recent, fascinating and elaborate study, \textit{The Lusaka Years: The ANC in Exile in Zambia, 1963-1994}, Hugh Macmillan has documented the history of the ANC while in exile in Zambia.\textsuperscript{186} The PAC also organised another underground movement called Poqo and it too was soon targeted by the state. Thus, because of the ban on nationalist organisations, the ANC and PAC were forced underground and adopted new tactics. Most significantly, the liberation movements launched a campaign of armed struggle. The era of armed resistance in South Africa had begun.

Thus, more generally, by the mid-1960s, southern Africa was on fire. The brutal and repressive nature of white minority regimes compelled nationalist movements to seek asylum in independent black governments in the sub-region for purposes of further organising the armed struggle. Apart from Tanzania, Zaire, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, in the region, and OAU member countries further afield, including Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, among others, liberation forces also found strong support in Zambia’s domestic and foreign policies.

\textbf{Zambia’s Foreign Policy and Southern Africa}

Zambia’s foreign policy in general and particularly towards southern Africa was articulated by Kaunda during the formative stages of the country’s independence. On the occasion of the opening of parliament in January 1965, Kaunda pledged to support liberation struggles in southern Africa. He stated that:

\begin{quote}
… our [foreign] policy is one of non-alignment … but non-alignment does not mean expediency…. We must do all in our power to see that our less
\end{quote}

fortunate neighbours in [southern] Africa come to enjoy these privileges of freedom and unity which we have won for ourselves.\textsuperscript{187}

The following year, President Kaunda re-affirmed Zambia’s commitment to back armed struggles in the region. He stated that:

The basic aim of Zambia’s foreign policy is to secure peace, freedom and prosperity through justice at home and to maximize our contribution to world peace and the welfare of mankind …. Under our policy … we cannot hold our heads high before the rest of the world unless we take our full part in helping those of our brothers and sisters [in southern Africa] currently struggling to free themselves from racial oppression and minority exploitation. We shall continue to give them all the support we can.\textsuperscript{188}

Kaunda set the tone, defined the basic attitudes and spelt out the guiding principles which were to govern Zambia’s approach to international issues. Kaunda’s position was clear; he affirmed Zambia’s commitment to support liberation movements which adopted armed struggle as the legitimate strategy of fighting white minority rule in southern Africa. In this regard, he allowed a number of nationalist movements to establish operational bases in Zambia. Among these liberation movements included ZAPU and ZANU of Zimbabwe, ANC, PAC and All African Convention and Unity Movement (AAC and UM) of South Africa, MPLA of Angola, SWAPO of Namibia and FRELIMO and Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique (COREMO) of Mozambique.\textsuperscript{189} However, Zambia’s commitment to back nationalist movements in the region did not take place in a vacuum. It was influenced by a number of local, regional and international factors.

\textsuperscript{189}See NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist parties in Zambia, 1964-1967.
Contexts of Zambia’s Support for Armed Struggles

Pan-Africanism

The commitment by Zambian leaders to support liberation movements in southern Africa had its basic intellectual and psychological roots in the ideology of Pan-Africanism, a historical phenomenon that emboldened the spirit behind the creation of the OAU.\(^{190}\) W. Mangwende described Pan Africanism as “an intellectual and political outlook among African and Afro-Americans who regarded Africans and people of African descent as homogenous.” “This outlook,” according to Mangwende, “led to a feeling of racial solidarity and a new self-awareness and caused Afro-Americans to look upon Africa as their real “homeland,” without necessarily thinking of a physical return to Africa.”\(^{191}\) He further described it as a political movement which advocated the political unity of Africa or a set of ideas which stressed the cultural unity and political independence of Africa. The key concepts were the “redemption of Africa” and “Africa for the Africans.”\(^{192}\)

Pan Africanism had a long history dating back to 1900 when Henry Sylvester Williams organised the First Pan-African congress in London. Attended by about thirty delegates, mainly from England and the West Indies and a few Black Americans, the conference served as “a forum of protest against the aggression of white colonisers and, at the same time to make an appeal to the missionary and abolitionist traditions of the British people to protect the Africans from the depredations of the Empire builders.”\(^{193}\)

---


\(^{193}\) Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism*, p.118.
conference drafted a letter to the Queen of England and other European rulers appealing to them to fight racism and to grant independence to their colonies. George Padmore pointed out that this meeting attracted attention and put the word “Pan-Africanism” in the dictionaries for the first time. The conference was “welcomed by the Lord Bishop of London and a promise was obtained from Queen Victoria not to overlook the interests and welfare of the native races.”

It was not until 1919 during the Versailles Peace Conference in Paris, when the African American scholar and writer, Dr. William Burghardt Du Bois, organised the 2nd Pan-African congress which “drafted various proposals” though, according to Adekunle Ajala, “nothing much came out of them.” Du Bois organised three more congresses before the world was plunged into another war in 1939. Meanwhile, towards the end of World War I, Marcus Garvey emerged as a major protagonist of the Pan-Africanist radical tradition and founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) which attracted millions of Afro-Americans with such slogans as “Africa for the Africans,” “back to Africa” and the renaissance of the black race. However, Du Bois rejected Garvey’s populism, his “back to Africa” approach, and applied himself to the removal of racial discrimination in the New World and agitated for the right of peoples of Africa to national independence.

As noted, between 1919 and 1945, Du Bois convened several Pan-African congresses earning the title of “farther of Pan Africanism.” The most significant was the 5th Pan-African congress held in Manchester in October 1945. For the first time, it was attended by prominent African

---

194 Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, p.118.
195 Ajala, Pan-Africanism, p.7.
nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta who served as secretary and assistant secretary, respectively. Ajala argued that:

By the end of the congress, it had become clear that Pan-Africanism was growing from a protest movement by people of African descent in the West Indies and United States into an instrument of African nationalist movements fighting colonial rule. The congress provided the outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. Pan-Africanism was becoming a mass movement of Africa for the Africans.\(^\text{198}\)

The shift of emphasis in Pan-Africanism from a protest movement of western hemisphere negroes seeking racial equality, allied with African intellectuals, to a tool of African nationalist movements fighting colonial rule,\(^\text{199}\) coincided with Kwame Nkrumah’s rise as the most energetic, consistent and articulate exponent of Pan Africanism.\(^\text{200}\)

Although the Manchester Congress of 1945 promoted the struggle for the independence and unity of African countries, there were other opposing movements and conferences, the most prominent being the Bamako Conference of 1946. Attended mainly by leaders of French West Africa, and convened under the aegis of the Ressemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA), it condemned any struggle for independence as an act of betrayal of the peoples of Africa and called for the creation of a Community federally linked with the colonial power.

Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana were the most prominent leaders who promoted the spirit of Manchester. Egypt did not only play a pioneering role by creating The African Association which, in the 1950s and early 1960s, extended much needed diplomatic, material and, in some cases, military assistance to many

\(^\text{198}\) Ajala, *Pan-Africanism*, p.11.
\(^\text{199}\) Wallerstein *Africa*, p.104.
liberation movements from the entire African continent, but also organised several international conferences in solidarity with the liberation struggle in Africa. Cairo became the Mecca of many nationalist leaders who were given access to Radio Cairo with a view to mobilising their peoples in the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle.201

A. Tekle pointed that Nkrumah was also passionate about the struggle for African independence and, thus, provided financial and material assistance to liberation movements. He regularly began sponsoring conferences at both the government and the party organisational levels to expose and denounce colonialism as well as to publicise the plight of Africans and to promote their right to self-determination. The Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) and the All Africa People’s Conference (AAPC), both held in 1958 in Accra, became precursors of several such meetings in other African capitals. Inevitably, the AAPC meetings were more militant and revolutionary, although the CIAS and later similar conferences were to become the vehicles which committed the independent African states to direct involvement in the liberation struggle.202

For Tekle, a distinct pattern of political alignment emerged in independent Africa, dividing the countries into two large blocs, reflecting Manchester and Bamako, conventionally designated as radical and conservative. This was to dominate African conference diplomacy between 1958 and 1963, especially after the creation of the Casablanca (radical) Group and Monrovia (moderate) Group in January and May 1961, respectively. Comprising of Ghana, Morocco, Egypt, Guinea and Mali, the Casablanca group rejected not only colonialism, but also condemned any political, economic or military association with extra-African forces or blocs. The Monrovia group, which was based on the

Bamako group, joined by non-French speaking countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia and Liberia, advocated peaceful rather than violent means, and close association with the metropolitan powers.\textsuperscript{203}

In view of the polarisation of the political positions between the Casablanca group and the Monrovia group, a major difference clearly emerged regarding the nature of liberation struggle. While the radicals advocated armed struggle, the moderates espoused the cause of nonviolence and appeals to reason. Tekle concluded that this was the political climate that formed the background for the First Conference of Independent African Heads of State and Government which met in Addis Ababa in May 1963 to create the OAU, and at the same time, establish the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (herein after referred to as the Liberation Committee). The Addis Ababa synthesis was a compromise which attempted to accommodate both blocs.

Thus, the OAU was established with the following aims and principles enshrined in its Charter:- i) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; ii) to coordinate and intensify collaboration and efforts to improve the living standards of the African peoples; iii) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence; iv) to eliminate every form of colonialism from Africa; v) promote international cooperation in the observance of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. In pursuit of these goals, Article 3 outlined the following fundamental principles to be observed:- a) equality of sovereignty for all the member nations; b) nonalignment and noninterference in the internal affairs of a nation; c) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inalienable right to independence of each nation; d) peaceful solution to

\textsuperscript{203} Tekle, “A Tale of Three Cities,” pp.49-60.
disputes through negotiations, mediations, conciliation, and arbitration; e) unqualified condemnation of political assassination and subversive activity carried on by any nation against another; f) unqualified pledge to work for the total emancipation of African territories that are still dependent; g) a pledge to maintain the policy of nonalignment toward all blocs.  

It is in this context that Zambian leaders committed the country to supporting the liberation struggles in southern Africa. This commitment therefore had an ideological basis rooted in Pan Africanism and reinforced the basic goals of the OAU at its inception. For Zambian leaders, the country’s independence was closely linked with the independence of the rest of Africa. They interpreted Zambia’s independence as incomplete for as long as white minority rule in surrounding territories continued to survive. B. L Mapani, a Zambian diplomat at the UN at the time explained:

We in Zambia have always held the view that our own independence would be meaningless unless the rest of our brothers and sisters … under colonial subjugation exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

Similarly, Zambia’s Prime Minister, Daniel Lisulo recalled that, soon after joining the continental body, the Zambian government pledged to support the OAU’s solemn and unqualified commitment to the “complete eradication of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and total liberation of Africa.” Thus, Zambia’s commitment to the liberation struggle was guided by the OAU Charter which called for an unqualified pledge to

---

204 Rossi, “The OAU: Results of A Decade,” pp. 15-34.
205 UNIP7/23/50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence to and from Zambian Embassies Abroad, 1975, see Statement by Mr. B. L. Mapani to the Third Committee of the 30th Regular Session on the Importance of the Universal Realisation of Human Rights, New York, 10 October, 1975 with a cover letter dated 10 November 1975 addressed to the Hon Minister of Foreign Affairs by D.W Kamana, Zambia’s Permanent Representative to the UN.
work for the total emancipation of African territories that were still dependent via support for national liberation movements. It was also influenced by the 1960 UN’s General Assembly Declaration on Decolonisation which endorsed the principle of the right of all people to self-determination and independence.207

Zambia’s Geopolitical Position

Zambia’s attitude and commitment to armed struggles in southern Africa was also influenced by strategic geopolitical factors. At independence, Zambia was surrounded by a majority of neighbouring countries still ruled either by European colonialists or minority white settlers. On the western and eastern frontiers, there were Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, respectively. To the south, Rhodesia was ruled by minority white settlers bolstered by the South African government, which also controlled South West Africa (later Namibia) to the south west. Unstable and military-ruled Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) shared a long border with Zambia on the northern frontier. Tanzania, Malawi and Botswana, which obtained independence from Britain in 1961, 1964 and 1966, respectively, were the only stable neighbouring countries under black governments.

In view of Zambia’s geopolitical situation of having hostile states on most of its frontiers, concerns for the country’s security become an important consideration in the decision by its leaders to support liberation movements in the region. They believed that, as long as neighbouring territories remained under minority, oppressive, and racist rule, peace along the borders and, ultimately, the country’s national security would never be guaranteed.208 Given the country’s strategic position as a frontline state surrounded by

hostile countries, Zambia’s commitment to the liberation wars in the region should, thus, be interpreted in terms of an attempt to secure its own security interests.

**UDI**

Another related factor which heightened Zambia’s geopolitical concerns and reinforced its willingness to support liberation struggles was the unilateral declaration of independence by white settlers in neighbouring Rhodesia in November 1965. By unilaterally securing independence from Britain, the white settlers precluded the pre-conditions constituting the traditional pattern under which Britain granted independence to its colonies, namely: i) unimpeded progress towards majority rule; ii) guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the constitution; iii) immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; iv) progress towards ending racial discrimination and; v) British government’s satisfaction that any basis proposed for independence should be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.²⁰⁹

The attitudes of white settlers towards UDI conflicted with the perceptions of Rhodesian Africans and the Zambian government. The white settlers conceived UDI as an attempt to “preserve justice, civilisation, and Christianity.”²¹⁰ For Rhodesian Africans, UDI symbolised white supremacy, consolidation of racial discrimination and a tragic attempt to impede constitutional progress towards black majority rule. UDI and all it represented—political repression and imprisonment of political opponents—galvanised their determination to adopt guerrilla war as the only viable option for attaining independence.²¹¹ Similarly in Zambia, UDI represented a geopolitical disaster. Ackson Kanduza argued that Zambian leaders interpreted it as an attempt to roll back the winds of decolonisation and,
thus, a contradictory reality which could not co-exist with the independence of Zambia. Thus, UDI reinforced Zambia’s willingness to support armed struggle as a legitimate strategy of political transformation in Rhodesia and southern Africa as a whole.\footnote{A.M Kanduza, ‘Zambians against UDI in Rhodesia’ Paper Presented to a Conference on UDI Forty Years On: Liberation, Confrontation and Cooperation, University of Cambridge, Centre of International Studies, 21-22 September (2005), p.5.}

**Economic Factors**

Economic factors also played a key role in shaping Zambia’s policy towards southern Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular. At independence, Zambia inherited an economy developed as a crucial component of Southern Rhodesia’s economic system. The dominant economic links which existed between Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) and Southern Rhodesia must be understood within the context of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Northern Rhodesia exported labour to agricultural and mining industries in Southern Rhodesia and provided a huge market for its manufactured products.\footnote{Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 1965* (Lusaka: Ministry of Finance, 1966), p.33.} Northern Rhodesia also depended on its southern neighbour in almost all the key sectors of the economy, including transport and communication, energy and electricity. Thus, it was during the phase of the Federation that Zambia’s economy became deeply integrated and inextricably intertwined with that of Southern Rhodesia. Due to intense political agitation by African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland demanding self-rule, the British government dismantled the Federation in December 1963.

Zambia became independent the following year, but the pattern of economic dependence on Rhodesia continued. The magnitude of its economic reliance was revealed in 1965 when Rhodesian white settlers declared independence, a development which polarised the political positions of the two countries. For instance in 1965, 1,075,647 tonnes of imports and exports, representing practically the entire Zambian trade through the ports of
Beira, Lourenco Marques (later renamed Maputo) and South African ports was transported by Rhodesia Railways. Rhodesia itself supplied 33 per cent of Zambia’s merchandise imports and took 93 per cent of its exports. Nearly all this trade was also transported by Rhodesia Railways.\footnote{Republic of Zambia, Economic Report 1966 (Lusaka: Ministry of Finance, 1967), p.19 and Republic of Zambia, Economic Report 1967(Lusaka: Ministry of Finance, 1968), p.43.} At the time of UDI, Zambia obtained 1 million tonnes of coal annually, representing more than 95 per cent of Zambia’s coal requirements, from Wankie Colliery in Rhodesia. Sixty-eight thousand tonnes of coal was required to produce 58,000 tonnes of copper on a monthly basis.\footnote{Africa Confidential No. 23, 25 November (1966), p.6 and Africa Confidential No.20, 15 October (1965), p.3.} Zambia imported 200,000 tonnes annually or 90 per cent of its oil and petroleum products from the Central African Petroleum Refinery in Umtali, Rhodesia, while the Kariba South Bank hydro-electric power station supplied Zambia with most of its power requirements.\footnote{Mtshali, ‘Zambia’s Foreign Policy,’ p.230.} Apart from the Rhodesia Railways, the Benguela Railway line connecting Zambia with the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean via Zaire (now DRC) was also an important route for Zambian import and export trade.

In view of the polarisation of the political positions of Rhodesia and Zambia, the Zambian government was confronted with what B. V Mtshali referred to as “Zambia’s dilemma” in the wake of the Rhodesian crisis. For Mtshali, the dilemma was that, on one hand, Zambian leaders were determined to implement their long-standing commitment to assisting struggling fellow Africans liberate themselves from white minority rule in Rhodesia, while on the other, stood the government’s equal commitment to protecting its citizens and the economy from external harm.\footnote{Mtshali, ‘Zambia’s Foreign Policy,’ p.277.} Despite this ‘dilemma’ and enormous risks to the country’s economy, the Zambian government went ahead and supported armed
struggle in Zimbabwe and southern Africa as whole. The thinking within the Zambian leadership was that the economy would remain vulnerable as long as unfriendly governments in Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique continued to survive and control supply routes for the country’s import and export trade. Thus, Zambia backed armed liberation struggles in Zimbabwe and, more generally, southern Africa with the view of replacing white minority governments with friendly black ruled states which would potentially secure the country’s economic interests by safeguarding export and import trade routes. Supporting the liberation struggles in the region was, therefore, seen as an attempt to ultimately secure and guarantee the country’s long-term economic independence. Thus, far from popular perception and contrary to claims by some former Zambian leaders such as Bautis Frank Kapulu and Grey Zulu that Zambia backed armed struggles entirely on principle, available evidence suggests there was an economic dimension to the decision. Zambia supported armed struggles in the region in order to secure its economic, political and security interests.

Humanism

At domestic level, the philosophy of humanism played a key role in determining Zambia’s attitude towards white minority rule and support for armed struggle to end them. Introduced early in 1967 by the numerous writings, speeches and programmes of Kaunda and rooted in his strong Christian upbringing and convictions, humanism stressed the inherent worth and importance of individual human beings. It stressed a man-centred

---

219 Wina interview cited and Chona interview cited.
220 Interview with Bautis Frank Kapulu Makeni, Lusaka 10 June 2013.
221 Zulu, Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu, p.357.
222 The debate on whether Zambia was motivated by economic interests or principle in its policy on southern Africa has thoroughly been examined by Mukelabai Songiso, ‘Zambia’s Role in Southern Africa: A Reinterpretation’ M.A Dissertation, University of Zambia, 1989. He concludes that both economic interests and principle was at play in Zambia’s regional behaviour.
223 Chona interview cited.
society.\textsuperscript{224} It emphasised dignity and love for man the world over without distinctions of race, colour or religion and also rejected and condemned all forms of exploitation, discrimination and racism. For Kaunda, the driving force behind Zambia’s foreign policy and decisions on foreign matters including supporting the liberation struggles in southern Africa were based on and guided by the principles of humanism.\textsuperscript{225} Because the basic principles of humanism were incompatible with and irreconcilably opposed to discriminatory and racist policies of white minority governments, the Zambian government had the moral justifications for supporting the liberation struggles in southern Africa.\textsuperscript{226}

**Local Forms of Support for the Liberation Movements**

Zambia’s commitment to the liberation struggles in southern Africa was expressed in diverse forms; it ranged from offering recognition to various liberation movements, providing transit and broadcasting facilities, financial and material aid, to according them diplomatic and moral backing. These forms of support must be analysed within the framework of the OAU and particularly the Liberation Committee to which Zambia became a key member shortly after becoming independent.\textsuperscript{227} The Liberation Committee was established in 1963 by African Heads of State and Government meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to co-ordinate efforts towards the speedy liberation of the African continent. With its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the Liberation Committee was mandated with


\textsuperscript{227} Zambia joined the OAU Liberation Committee late in 1965. Early in 1966, its government was invited for the first time to address the Committee. See NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organisation of the African Unity Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966. Address to the Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, January 1966 by Hon. Mr. R. Sikasula, M.P, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

© University of Pretoria
the following specific objectives; i) to coordinate the material and financial support sent to the liberation movements from independent African states and from abroad; ii) to give recognition and financial assistance to selected revolutionary movements; iii) to reconcile differences among rival insurgent groups so that they may present a united front; iv) to facilitate the formation of revolutionary alliances across national boundaries and v) to publicise the struggle through diplomacy in international circles.\(^{228}\) It is this context of specific goals and objectives of the Liberation Committee that this study analyses in some detail the nature, character and forms of support the Zambian government accorded the liberation movements.

Recognition of liberation movements formed an essential aspect of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation struggles in southern Africa. The approval of liberation movements was mainly informed by the Liberation Committee.\(^{229}\) Zambia often endorsed nationalist movements which had been previously accepted by the OAU Liberation Committee. That it supported liberation movements that had received formal and prior acceptance by the Liberation Committee remained a rule rather than a norm. In practice, Zambia occasionally backed liberation movements that had never been recognised by the Liberation Committee. For instance, COREMO and All African Convention and Unity Movement of South Africa (AAC and UM) were cases in point. The degree of militancy and level of effectiveness on the battle field were two important yardsticks which governed the Liberation Committee’s decision whether or not to support a particular liberation movement. Recognition was an essential qualification for eligibility to receiving other forms of


\(^{229}\) NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, See “confidential” Extract from Cabinet Draft Minutes, Item 9: Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties, 13 January 1965, (CAB (65) 3\(^{rd}\) Meeting, signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet.
assistance from the Liberation Committee. The initial form of support Zambia rendered to the liberation movements was to play host to them and their representatives in Lusaka. The following Table 2:2 highlight a list of all liberation movements and their accredited representatives accepted and supported by the Zambian government in 1965.

### Table 2:2

**Foreign Nationalist Parties Recognised in Zambia and their Accredited Representatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) All-African Convention and Unity Movement of South Africa (AAC and UM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives: (i) Isaac Bangani Tabata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Jane Cool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) A. Essack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) L. Nikani</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2) African National Congress of South Africa (ANC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives: (i) Tennyson Xola Makiwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Thomas Titus Nkobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Memory Milton Miya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Chris Nkosana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Ulysses Modise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Johannes Tautau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(3) Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives: (i) Leslie Ngqondi Masimini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Vusumzi Make</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Thomas Sethlodi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Zacchus Molete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Charlotte Mbele</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(4) South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives: (i) Solomon Mafina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Albert Muyongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Joseph Nawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Lucas Pohamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Edward Katijivena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) M. Muatilifange</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(5) Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives: (i) Alberto Sithole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Titus Nyampambadza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Celestino D’souza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### (6) Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representatives:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Anibal de Melo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Philipp Floribert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Teodoro Carlos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Joaquim Cristovao</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (7) Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representatives:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Robert Chikerema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Edward Silonda Ndlovu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Goerge Stephen Parirenyatwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Goerge Bodzo Nyandoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Jason Ziyapapa Moyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Tasisius George Silundika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (8) Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representatives:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Herbert Chitepo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Henry Hamadziripi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Noel Mukono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Washington Malianga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) S. Parirewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Don Muvuti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (9) Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application made for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Paul Gumane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Amos Sumane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Absolomu Bahule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Masunzo Bobo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The hosting of liberation movements demanded provision of office accommodation for their organisational and administrative operations. In this context, the Zambian government sought to purchase a building on stand no.1667 Bradford Street in Lusaka from Irving and Johnson for approximately £7,000. However, the government could not purchase the property because it was not suitable for the accommodation of all the liberation

---

231 NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967. See confidential (CAB(65) 18th Meeting 20April 1965. Extract from Cabinet Minutes signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Item 4: Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties (CAB(65) 110).
movements. Kaunda, nevertheless, pressed his cabinet to urgently acquire another building to create offices for the liberation movements. He emphasised that:

… I am still of the opinion that it is important to acquire a building in Lusaka in which all the recognized foreign nationalist organizations will be required to have their offices. For this reason I feel that efforts must be continued to find a suitable building despite the disappointment over the Bradford street property.

Consequently, in October 1965 government acquired a new office building at Charter Welfare Hall, Kamwala at plot 4559 in Lusaka and placed it at the disposal of liberation movements for use as their headquarters. The new office building was designated as the African Liberation Centre (ALC). The government further decided to appoint Mukuka F. Nkoloso as director of the Liberation Centre. He was responsible for coordinating various activities of the liberation movements; he ensured that recognised liberation movements were provided with office space to conduct day-to-day operations, including organising publicity campaigns, facilitated distribution of aid to the organisations, and reported directly to Kaunda. Working in close collaboration with the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee based in Tanzania, Nkoloso was also responsible for screening the cadres from

---

232 NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, see memorandum by the President presented to the 18th Cabinet Meeting, 28 April 1965, Extract from Cabinet Minutes signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Item 4: Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties (CAB(65) 110).

233 NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, see memorandum by the President presented to the 18th Cabinet Meeting, 28 April 1965, Extract from Cabinet Minutes signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Item 4: Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties (CAB(65) 110).

234 This is the place along Chilimbulu Road in Kamwala, Lusaka where the Staff College for Defence Forces is currently situated.

235 NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967 See later dated 22 October 1965 and addressed to the Chief Representative for ZAPU, MPLA, SWAPO, FRELIMO, ANC (S.A) COREMO ZANU PAC UPA AAC and UM, UDENAMO by G.K Barr, on behalf of the Permanent Secretary, Office of the President and copied to the permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and the Commissioner of Police.
various liberation movements to ensure that those who went for military training and came back to join the struggle at the battlefront were genuine freedom fighters.\textsuperscript{236}

Because the liberation movements and their cadres were a potential threat to the country’s internal security, the Zambian government maintained strict control over their operations in the country. It formulated a number of rules and regulations designed to govern their activities in the country. They included the following:

i) only liberation movements officially recognised by the Zambian government were allowed to operate in Zambia;

ii) recognised liberation movements were allowed to establish offices only in Lusaka except with special permission from the Office of the President;

iii) office bearers and members of recognised liberation movements were not allowed to operate outside a radius of 10 miles from an authorised office without express permission from the Office of the President.

iv) if permission to travel outside Lusaka by leaders of liberation movements had been granted, they were required to report to Mukuka Nkoloso, His Excellency’s Personal Representative at the Liberation Centre on departure and return.

v) each liberation movement was allowed to maintain a maximum number of only 6 permanent staff at the Liberation Centre in Lusaka.

vi) the number of permanent staff at any other authorised office was limited to a maximum of 4 people only.

\textsuperscript{236} Kapulu interview cited.
vii) liberation movements were not allowed to recruit for military training any foreign national ordinarily resident in Zambia without permission from the Office of the President.

viii) all officials of the liberation movements operating in Zambia were required to disclose and submit full details of their names, dates and places of birth, family, national status and residential addresses to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

ix) liberation movements were not allowed to appoint any individual as an official of a liberation movement in Zambia without permission from the Office of the President.

x) liberation movements were required to submit applications for permission to hold both public and private meetings of more than 10 persons to the Divisional or District Commander of Police of the area in which the meeting would take place. No such meetings were allowed to take place unless permission had been granted.

xi) members of the liberation movements were reminded that they were not exempted from any of the provisions of the laws of Zambia and, as such, those who committed any offence were liable to trial and punishment in the same way as any ordinary citizen of Zambia.237

The significance of these rules was that they helped the government regulate the operations of the liberation movements in the country. During the early years of the struggle, it was relatively easy for the government to enforce these rules. However, as numbers of freedom fighters continued to increase and as the struggle gathered momentum, it became increasingly difficult to enforce the regulations. Due to the security implications involved, matters relating to operations of liberation movements in the country were handled and

237 NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, Letter from D.C Mulaisho, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President dated 28 June 1966 addressed to the Chief Representatives for ZAPU, MPLA, SWAPO, FRELIMO, ANC (S.A) COREMO, ZANU PAC(S.A) and AAC and UM.
coordinated at the highest level. The principal office responsible was the Ministry of Presidential Affairs. It worked very closely with the Office of the President (Special Duties), Ministry of Defence (Defence and Police), Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, District Government and the Director of the Liberation Centre.

The provision of transit facilities, for transportation of cadres and shipment of war materials, constituted another crucial form of support that Zambia gave the liberation movements.238 Throughout the period under review, the Zambian government granted freedom fighters from various liberation movements the right of passage to undergo military training in East Africa and beyond in socialist countries such as China, USSR, and North Korea, among other places.

In the sub-region, major military training camps were located in Tanzania. The earliest camp was Kongwa in central Tanzania established in 1962 to host members of all liberation movements. But as the liberation struggle gained momentum and the number of freedom fighters increased, it became necessary to open more camps. Wami, Nachingwea, Itumbi and Mgagao were duly set up. The latter two hosted ANC and PAC cadres as well as those from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Nachingwea was reserved for the FRELIMO fighters because of its proximity to Mozambique while Tundura and Bagamoyo, and Mtwara were established as education training centres and a rearguard hospital for freedom fighters, respectively.239 The ANC also secured a training camp at Kingolwira and a residential site at

Msanvu, while PAC trained its cadres at Masuguru but later moved to Msungura. Both camps were in the coastal region. In the 1970s, Masuguru became a settlement camp for PAC cadres who migrated in larger numbers into the country in that period. In 1976, more South African refugees flocked to Tanzania following the Soweto uprising in South Africa, so the ANC requested additional settlement and training camps from the government of Tanzania. Through the coordination of the Liberation Committee, the ANC was granted a 100 acre stretch of land at Mazimbu in Morogoro which was later on extended to 250 acres. On this site, the ANC built its first educational institution in 1978 to teach the young cadres who had fled South Africa in the aftermath of the Soweto killings.240

Conducted by Chinese military instructors recruited by the Liberation Committee, military training for freedom fighters lasted between 4 to 6 months. The dominant form of training covered the following broad subjects: elementary knowledge of regular army tactics, modern guerilla warfare tactics and combat operations. Specific modes of training included physical fitness, use of small arms, rocket launchers, light mortars, and plastic explosives. Other forms of training were field engineering, sabotage, ambushes and patrols, defence and attack up to platoon level, principles of guerilla formations, situation of guerilla actions and general tactics and objects.241

Similarly, after completing training, cadres were granted safe passage for deployment for military action at the battlefront. Both governments of Zambia and Tanzania worked very closely with the Liberation Committee in matters of transiting and training of

240 http://www.swapoparty.org/the_role_of_the_oau_liberation_committee.html accessed on 18/05/2015 see “The Role of the OAU liberation Committee in the Southern African Liberation Struggles” by Paul T. Shipale
cadres. Rules and procedures were established to govern transiting of cadres through Zambia to Tanzania and back. In a letter addressed to Vernon Mwaanga, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, G. S Magombe, the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee stated:

I have informed all leaders of liberation movements that with immediate effect all their requests for allowing their cadres to come to Tanzania for military training should be routed to the Minister for Presidential Affairs [in Zambia] who will give them a “Recruitment Form” to sign and that it is only after completing this form that their trainees would be allowed to come to Tanzania.242

By signing the “Recruitment Forms,” the cadres agreed to undergo voluntary military training and pledged, upon completion of training, to return to their home country and take active part in the struggle against the colonialists. In the initial stages, the composition of trained cadres earmarked for deployment to the battlefront was allowed to transit Zambia only in small units of six people per group. Until such a group was infiltrated into the enemy territory, no other group of trained cadres was allowed to cross.243 These procedures were important to follow because they served various purposes. First, they allowed both governments of Zambia and Tanzania to maintain strict control of the movements of the freedom fighters in and between the two countries. Second, they helped cadres uphold a sense of discipline and dedication to the struggle and third, it was essential to maintain secrecy, speed and security during transiting of the cadres.

242 NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967 See letter dated 13 May 1967 addressed to Mr. V.J Mwaanga, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President by G.S Magombe, Executive Secretary, OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. See also NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Political Parties/Rhodesia, 1966-1969, see confidential letter dated 23 March addressed to the Chief Representative, ZANU Office, Lusaka by L.P. Chihota, Chief Representative, ZANU office, Dar-es-Salaam.

Apart from according transit rights to cadres, Zambia allowed safe transmission and storage of military materials, including arms, ammunitions and other logistics for the liberation movements in the region. Military weapons mainly came from two sources, namely, the stockpile purchased by the Liberation Committee and donations by countries from within Africa and abroad.\textsuperscript{244} Shipment of military weapons was a highly sensitive issue because of the security implications. For instance, as early as September 1965, Zambia police temporarily impounded a vehicle carrying a large quantity of arms at Kapiri Mposhi, in central province destined for the FRELIMO depot in Lusaka.\textsuperscript{245} The reason for impounding the vehicle was that it was transporting arms without police escort, raising fears about the possibility of weapons finding their way in the hands of unauthorised persons, thereby posing a security threat to local communities. However, once police established the source and destination of the arms, and security guarantees for their transportation, they released the vehicle shortly afterward.

It can be argued that during the early years of the struggle, liberation movements lacked adequate arms. Because of desperation, they sometimes used unorthodox methods to obtain and transport weapons. In April 1966, Zambia Police again impounded a vehicle carrying a huge amount of weapons from Tanzania and destined for a dispersal base in Zambia. One of its occupants was sentenced to one year imprisonment for illegally possessing 200 grenades, 200 detonators, rifles and a revolver.\textsuperscript{246} Evidence suggests that, as liberation struggles in southern Africa raged, the presence of freedom fighters in the country

\textsuperscript{244} Algeria, Cuba, China and USSR among other countries were importance sources of military weapons (both donated and purchased), for liberation movements in southern Africa. See NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969, Minutes of the First Regular Meeting of the Permanent Representatives to the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, Thursday 20 March, 1969.
\textsuperscript{245} Morris, \textit{Armed Conflict in Southern Africa}, p.249.
\textsuperscript{246} Morris, \textit{Armed Conflict in Southern Africa}, p.249.
increased and the cases of unauthorised movements of weapons became more frequent, posing serious security threat to local communities. For instance in July 1966, the Zambian government was forced to revoke recognition of Noel Gabriel Mukono as a ZANU representative after he shot a local Zambian man with a pistol in Chieftainess Waitwika’s area in Isoka District for unknown reason. The decision by the Zambian government to establish weapons’ dumps in specific areas of the country’s eastern, northwestern, southern and western provinces was partly a response to and an expression of concern with the unauthorised proliferation of weapons in the country. It was also partly a decision taken in response to recommendations adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers in July regarding the establishment of depots and storage of war materials in OAU member countries.

It is important to emphasise the significance of providing transit facilities to liberation movements by the Zambian government. The border between Zambia and Rhodesia became highly militarised after Rhodesian white settlers unilaterally declared independence from Britain in November 1965. It was policed on a regular basis by both the Zambian and Rhodesian armed forces. Consequently, many ZAPU, ZANU, ANC and PAC militants could only be recruited and transported for military training in East Africa and abroad through Zambia via an independent country, Botswana. However, cadres frequently experienced difficulties transiting through the country because immediately after independence in 1966, the Botswana government did not allow its territory to be used as a transit for freedom fighters. It adopted a policy described by Wazha Morapedi as one


designed to avoid “provoking the white minority regimes in neighbouring countries.”

This was partly because of its unenviable geopolitical position. It was surrounded by powerful and edgy colonial neighbours, all engulfed by the flames of the revolution; Rhodesia under a white settler regime to the east, apartheid South Africa to the south, South West Africa (Namibia) to the west, and the Portuguese colony of Angola to the north, separated only by a tiny strip of land (the Caprivi Strip). Moreover, Botswana had a tiny population and a correspondingly small police force, rather than an army. Because of these factors, Botswana was in a difficult position and consequently, it was too much to expect it to provide guerrilla training camps or to act as a spring board for guerrilla attacks against the neighbouring white minority regimes.

Similarly and perhaps for economic reasons, Malawi and Lesotho governments were reluctant to allow freedom fighters to transit through their territories. They refused to implement the policy endorsed by the OAU of supporting armed liberation struggles in southern Africa. Rather, they collaborated with the white minority regimes. The Congo Kinshasa government also for some time prevented MPLA from using its territory to transmit weapons and cadres to the battlefront because it supported a rival nationalist movement, the FNLA. Given the above scenario, the liberation movements in the sub-region mainly depended on Zambia for transit facilities, operational bases and later, guerrilla

training camps. It can be argued that, in many ways, the positive attitude adopted by the Zambian government concerning the provision of transit facilities significantly helped liberation movements in the region to successfully prosecute liberation struggles.

However, support for the liberation movements was not confined to providing transit facilities and operational bases. It was extended to provision of broadcasting facilities. As in other matters concerning liberation movements, Zambia sought to provide these facilities as a response to OAU’s appeal that:

independent African countries in whose territories freedom fighters operate … should place at the disposal of such movements facilities for informing and stirring nationalist opinion … and make available an allocated time per week for the dissemination of propaganda on their radio and information media into occupied territories.\(^{252}\)

It was in this context and the realisation that armed struggle could not be prosecuted only on the battle field but also through an effective propaganda machinery—a crucial tool for the conduct of psychological warfare—that Zambia allowed use of its broadcasting facilities by the liberation movements. As early as May 1966, the Zambian Cabinet endorsed the decision by the UNIP Central Committee to allow ZAPU to make broadcasts on the Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS), subject to vetting by the Minister of Information and Postal Services.\(^ {253}\) By December 1966, the Zambian government approved ZANU’s request to use

---

\(^{252}\) NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organisation of African Unity Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966, see letter dated 17 December 1965 and addressed to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU by the Executive Secretary of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa together with a cover letter dated 5 January 1966 addressed to the Ministers of Foreign/Internal Affairs of all O.A.U Member States by the General Secretariat of the OAU in Addis Ababa.

\(^{253}\) NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)-Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969 See confidential letter dated 24 November 1966 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and copied to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services.
broadcasting facilities on Radio Zambia on condition that the broadcasts would be vetted by the Minister of Home Affairs, the Hon Mainza M. Chona.254

Chapter 3 will discuss the provision of broadcasting facilities to ZAPU and ZANU more extensively. Suffice it to emphasise here that Zambia accorded the privilege of access to its broadcasting facilities to recognised liberation movements as a demonstration of its commitment to the liberation struggles in southern Africa. For instance, in January 1971, the MPLA was allowed to begin a daily 45-minute program on ZBS called “Angola Combatente.” It quickly acquired a wide audience. By May 1973, Zambia formally inaugurated its new external services—“The War of Words Channel” with the aid of powerful Chinese transmitters. FRELIMO, ZAPU, ZANU, MPLA, ANC and SWAPO were each allocated an hour a day. Consequently, as Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw noted, Radio Zambia blanketed the sub-continent for more than forty hours a week in twenty-two languages with the liberation movements accepting responsibility for all the contents. This constituted assistance on a massive scale and undoubtedly had a significant impact on African opinion throughout southern Africa.255

Zambia’s commitment to the liberation of southern Africa also found expression in financial and material aid granted to liberation movements. It adopted both bilateral and multilateral approaches in providing financial and material support. On a bilateral basis, Zambia provided medical facilities, food and accommodation to freedom fighters. In most cases, Zambia also met their travelling expenses. For instance, the MPLA expressed

254 NAZMFAI/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)-Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969 See confidential letter captioned “Granting of Broadcasting Facilities” dated 3December 1966 addressed to the Publicity Chief, ZANU, Lusaka by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and copied to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services, Lusaka.
255 Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, p.243.
gratitude to Zambia “for the important role which they did not cease to play in the struggle to liberate Angola” adding that “at present MPLA sends to the Zambian hospitals sick and wounded persons who do not find medical care inside Angola.” 256 Similarly, SWAPO emphasised that wounded militants on the battlefront were often brought to Zambia for medical treatment. 257 Provision of financial and other forms of material aid was essential for the day to day operations of liberation movements and maintenance of freedom fighters based in Zambia. Bilateral aid was usually drawn from Zambia’s own resources. Given the limited resources at the disposal of the Zambian government at a time when it was consolidating its own independence, drawing upon its coffers to finance activities of the liberation movements placed an extra burden on state resources. For this reason, in 1968, the government was compelled to seek financial relief from the Liberation Committee to meet ever increasing emergency needs of the liberation movements based in Lusaka. In a letter addressed to the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee, the Zambian government stated:

From time to time, the government of the Republic of Zambia is called upon by the liberation movements based in Zambia to make certain emergency financial contributions. The government is finding this burden rather difficult to continue bearing. It is for this reason that the Zambian government is requesting the Liberation Committee to set aside a sum of about K50,000 (£25,000) to be deposited in an account in Zambia for the following purposes; (i) emergency travel within and outside Zambia, (ii) emergency maintenance of vehicles (iii) the purchase of emergency medical supplies. 258

256 NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969, OAU Coordinating Committee for the liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Defence, 26 June 1969.
257 NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969, OAU Coordinating Committee for the liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) 15th Regular Session Memorandum Submitted by the South West People’s Organisation (SWAPO) Dakar, Senegal, 15 July 1969.
258 NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee, 1969 See latter dated 13 February 1969 addressed to the Executive Secretary, OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam by
The request was approved. It was, in fact, in this context that the OAU Liberation Committee, at its 14th Regular Session in Dar-es-Salaam in March 1969, decided to open a Sub office of the Liberation Committee in Lusaka. The Sub office was required to manage contingency funds to meet emergency needs such as the supply of medicines for freedom fighters, transportation of food and arms to the war front, infiltration of freedom fighters and management of vehicles at the war front. Apart from making payments of fixed amounts to liberation movements based in Lusaka, the Sub office also supervised all forms of assistance and weapons given by the Liberation Committee to different liberation movements. It also supervised the infiltration and training of cadres in Lusaka.259 The Sub office drew its administrative funds from the OAU Liberation Committee Special Fund and it worked closely with the African Liberation Centre.

Liberation movements also benefitted from Zambia’s bilateral financial aid in the form of tax relief. As early as mid-1965, the Zambian Cabinet approved a recommendation from the Ministry of Finance to waive import duty on all items imported by the liberation movements, particularly motor vehicles and office equipment. The principal object was to grant financial relief to liberation movements and enhance their effective operations.260 This gesture by the Zambian government constituted a substantial contribution to the liberation struggles in southern Africa.


260 NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969 see Cabinet Memo No. 26 CAB 3/65, Signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, 14/09/65.
On a multilateral basis, Zambia channeled financial aid to liberation movements through the Liberation Committee’s Special Fund. A Foreign Currency Account was opened at Barclays Bank in Dar-es-Salaam into which all OAU member states deposited their contributions to the Liberation Committee. The Liberation Committee derived its revenue for financing liberation movements from three principal sources, namely, contributions by member countries of the OAU in accordance with the established scale of assessment, subventions from OAU headquarters on a quarterly basis, and donations by institutions and organisations in Africa and abroad.\(^{261}\) For its operations and budgetary allocations to liberation movements, the Liberation Committee relied almost exclusively on the good will contributions on a regular basis by OAU member states. That the Liberation Committee often experienced financial difficulties, partly as a result of lack of financial contributions and partly because of possible mismanagement of resources, constitutes an important theme that characterised the period of its existence.\(^{262}\) Though the Liberation Committee frequently lacked financial resources due to lack of contributions by member countries, Zambia played its full part in meeting its financial obligations to the Special Fund. Zambia was always consistent in meeting its financial obligations to the committee. Its financial commitment to the Liberation Committee was clearly visible.\(^{263}\)

\(^{261}\) NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 301 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969, Organisation of African Unity Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Report of the Executive Secretary to the Fourteenth Session of the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, 8 February 1969 See “Appendix A” Draft Budget of the Special Fund of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa for the Fiscal Year 1968/69


\(^{263}\) See Appendix I, II, III, IV and V concerning contributions of OAU member states to the Liberation Committee between 1965 and 1969. From Appendix I, a closer analysis of the figures suggests that next to Algeria, Zambia was the only country that paid a bigger amount of £30,000 to the Special Fund in 1965/1966. It was also the only country that contributed an excess payment of £14,000 ahead of Tanzania and Somalia which paid £2,000 and £1,989, respectively. Similarly, during the years 1966/67 and 1967/68, as shown in Appendix II and III, Zambia consistently met its financial obligations to the Special Fund. Particularly in 1967/68, it contributed an excess amount of £2,575 ahead of Mali and Sierra Leone which contributed £921

© University of Pretoria
Although Zambian authorities pledged in 1966 to continually honour their financial obligations to the Liberation Committee and since then, consistently did so, by 1970, they became increasingly disillusioned and frustrated by the failure of OAU members to meet their financial obligations to the Special Fund. In particular, Kaunda accused independent African countries of letting down Zambia by “failing to give financial support to the liberation struggles in southern Africa.” He complained bitterly; “you see our economy is in tatters because of the liberation struggles. We are still able to pay the little that we are asked to the Liberation Committee.”264 He charged that “those countries which failed to honour their financial obligations to the Liberation Committee were being unfair because the struggle in southern Africa was for the dignity and emancipation of Africa as a whole.”265

By 1971, the Liberation Committee Executive Secretary, George Magombe reported that of the 15 countries which contributed to the Liberation Committee, only seven countries had paid in full to the Special Fund. These were Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Libya, Ethiopia and Algeria.266 Thus, Zambia again met fully its financial obligation to the Special Fund. In 1975, Kaunda confirmed Zambia was up-to-date with its payments to the OAU and the Liberation Committee. He explained that:

We are always up to date in our financial contributions to the OAU because we believe in its principles and want it to be an effective tool for the unity of Africa. We are always up to date in our financial contribution to the OAU Liberation Committee because we want the task to be

and £240, respectively. In 1969, as demonstrated in Appendix IV, Zambia was among the only five countries including Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda which did not owe the Liberation Committee arrears.

264 Times of Zambia 18 February 1970. See also NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organisation of African Unity Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966, see “confidential” letter dated 28 September 1966 addressed to the Zambia High Commissioner to Tanzania by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,


© University of Pretoria
completed quickly. Our assistance will continue to flow to those areas where the armed struggle needs our help.\footnote{UNIP16/3/29 Press Releases/Speeches, 1974-1975, Speech by His Excellency the President Dr. K.D Kaunda at the Opening of the 5th Participatory Democracy Seminar of the Zambia Defence Forces, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, Tuesday 2 December 1975.}

If consistency and regularity of payments to the Liberation Committee formed part of the criteria of assessing a country’s commitment to the liberation struggle in southern Africa, then Zambia fully qualified.

**Diplomatic Support**

Apart from hosting liberation movements, facilitating delivery of weapons and transit of cadres proceeding for military training, and providing financial and material aid and broadcasting facilities—all benefits of recognition, Zambia extended support to liberation movements on the diplomatic front. At various international fora, such as the Organisation of African Unity, United Nations, Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AASO), Zambian representatives consistently supported numerous resolutions and declarations designed to express solidarity with liberation movements. They also backed international resolutions calling for economic, political, military sanctions and various forms of boycotts designed to undermine white minority governments in southern Africa. They did not only play a leading role in formulating and influencing the character of some of the collective statements, but also mobilised the international community to support policies aimed at promoting the struggle for black majority rule in the region. In the context of backing liberation struggles in southern Africa, the significance of Zambia’s diplomatic effort at the international level was evident. First, it helped to legitimise armed struggle in the region, thereby attracting
international aid and assistance for the struggle. Second, it served to magnify and clarify the problem of white minority rule in the eyes of the world community.\textsuperscript{268}

**Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa**

For Zambia, one of the key diplomatic successes in galvanising the international community towards the struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa was, as noted in Chapter 1, the hosting of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Summit Conference of East and Central African States (CECAS) in April 1969. In his opening speech to the conference which was attended by leaders of 14 African countries, Kaunda emphasised that convening the meeting in Zambia, “adjacent to the hostile minority regimes,” was “a mark of progress” and “a milestone on the road to the complete liberation of this continent.”\textsuperscript{269} That Zambia hosted the conference only five years after securing independence and placed itself in the vanguard of opposition to colonial rule was a direct challenge to white minority regimes in the region. It also highlighted the strategic significance of Zambia’s diplomacy regarding efforts aimed at resolving the outstanding problem of white minority rule in the region. The significance of the conference was the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto on southern Africa. Part of the Manifesto stated:

… on the objective of liberation … we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred … to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill …. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of southern Africa, we have no choice but to give the people

\textsuperscript{268} NAZMFA1/1/70 Loc. 503 O.A.U Summit, Accra Conference, 1965. See letter dated 13 November 1965 addressed to Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia by His Excellency M. Leopold-Sedar Sengor, President of the Republic of Senegal, Dakar, Senegal.

\textsuperscript{269} *Africa Research Bulletin* Vol. 6 No. 4 (1969), p.1371A.
of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against oppressors.\textsuperscript{270}

The key aspect of the manifesto was that it gave priority to negotiations first as opposed to violence as the basis for achieving change. This strategy became the dominant feature of Zambia’s diplomatic efforts aimed at promoting the struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa. As noted earlier, although the Manifesto was a collective statement of all African leaders present at the conference, Douglas Anglin claimed that the principle authors were Kaunda and Nyerere,\textsuperscript{271} reflecting the crucial diplomatic role of the two leaders in regional affairs. The Manifesto was subsequently adopted by the OAU and endorsed both by the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement at a conference in Lusaka in 1970.

For the Zambian government, the manifesto was designed to express solidarity with liberation movements, at least on the diplomatic front. However, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, it prompted concern from representatives of the liberation movements based in Zambia, who not only questioned the manner of adopting the Manifesto but also its provisions. For instance, in paragraph 3 of the manifesto, African leaders stated that:

\begin{quote}
We recognize that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equalities is being effected.\textsuperscript{272}
\end{quote}

But leaders of liberation movements such as ZAPU, ZANU and FRELIMO, among others, objected to the idea of transferring power from whites to the blacks under transitional arrangements. Instead, they preferred direct transfer of power from the white minority

\textsuperscript{270} See the full text of the Manifesto at UNIP 6/7/24 Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, Manifesto on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14-16 April, 1969.
\textsuperscript{272} UNIP6/7/24 Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14-16 April 1969.
government to the black majority.\textsuperscript{273} The general complaint by nationalist leaders revolved around two issues. First, they complained that the manifesto was drawn up without consulting them. Second, they objected to the acceptance by African leaders of the principle of negotiations which, in their view, weakened the case of freedom fighters.\textsuperscript{274} However, the Zambian government defended itself. A. N Chimuka, the acting Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the nationalists’ concerns claiming that although the Heads of State “were under no obligation to consult liberation movements” in adopting the Manifesto, they “took into account the aspirations of freedom fighters.” Adding that the African leaders were responsible for preferring “negotiations to bloodshed,” Chimuka concluded:

It would have been unwise and undiplomatic to be uncompromisingly inflexible …. Negotiations were only acceptable on condition that the colonial powers accept the principle of transfer of power to the indigenous populations in which case the bone of contention would then revolve on the period and terms of transfer of effective power ….\textsuperscript{275}

Despite objections to certain aspects of the Manifesto by the nationalist leaders, its significance, at least from the diplomatic perspective could not be underestimated; it enhanced Zambia’s standing in Africa as a key player in the struggle against white minority rule in southern Africa.\textsuperscript{276} This culminated in the election of Kaunda as Chairman of the Seventh Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government Summit meeting in Addis

\textsuperscript{273} NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee 1969, see letter dated 9 December 1969 captioned “‘The April 1969 Lusaka Manifesto” addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Zambia’s High Commission, Nairobi by A.N. Chimuka, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

\textsuperscript{274} NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee 1969, See letter dated 28 October 1969 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs by R.M Kapangala, Acting High Commissioner to Kenya, Nairobi.

\textsuperscript{275} NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee 1969, see letter dated 9 December 1969 captioned “‘The April 1969 Lusaka Manifesto” addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Zambia’s High Commission, Nairobi by A. N. Chimuka, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ababa in September 1970. Here, the Heads of State mandated Kaunda to lead a delegation of Foreign Ministers of Algeria, Cameroun, Kenya and Mali, and the OAU Secretary General, Diallo Telli to countries supplying arms to South Africa to dissuade them from doing so.277 Between 8 and 10 September 1970, Kaunda played host to the Third Non-Aligned Summit conference which extended his mission to include all the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Prior to his European mission, Kaunda successfully presided over the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement attended by more than fifty countries. Liberation movements such as ZAPU, ZANU, SWAPO, FRELIMO, ANC of South Africa, the National Movement for the Liberation of the Comoros Islands, the Movement for the Liberation of French Somaliland (FLCS) and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) were also represented.278 In his opening speech, Kaunda stressed that in southern Africa, “imperialism, colonialism and racial oppression still reign,” emphasising that “overt political, economic and military support given by western nations to the regimes in South Africa, Portugal and rebel Rhodesia, have given a stamp of recognition and encouragement to the dominance exercised by the minorities over the majority.” He wished that “western countries can heed our warning that those who delay the discharge of justice, those who stand in the way of peaceful change towards majority rule, make violence inevitable.”279 The conference produced several resolutions. The key ones which dealt with the pertinent issue of white

278 Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 7 No. 9 (1970), pp.1877C-1878A.
279 UNIP7/19/3 Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K. D Kaunda on the occasion of the opening of Third Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 8September, 1970.
minority rule in southern Africa, included the Resolution on Zimbabwe, Resolution on the Portuguese colonies, Resolution on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination and the General Resolution on Decolonisation. Three important themes were dominant in all the resolutions on southern Africa. First, leaders of non-aligned countries not only condemned white minority governments for their racist, discriminatory and oppressive policies, but they also called for strengthening of economic sanctions against them. Second, they expressed solidarity with oppressed Africans in dependent territories and, third, pledged renewed commitment to providing material and moral support to liberation movement. That Zambia successfully hosted the Non-Aligned Conference attended by a huge number of world leaders, represented a key diplomatic achievement.

Meanwhile, Kaunda undertook his European mission to the NATO countries in 1970. Authorised by African Heads of State and endorsed by the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, the object of the mission was two-fold; to dissuade NATO countries from supplying military weapons to South Africa and to formally present resolutions and declarations of the two conferences to the United Nations. Kaunda visited Italy, West Germany, Britain, France and the United States of America. During his visits to Italy and West Germany, he urged the two governments to stop supporting firms participating in the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme because the project was not only an extension to Mozambique and to Angola of the “hated policy of oppression followed by South Africa,” but also designed to “consolidate Portuguese colonialism” in Africa. In Britain, during a

---

280 For detailed content of these resolutions, see UNIP7/23/16 Heads of State Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Lusaka September 1970 NAC/CONF. 2, 3, 4 and 6.
meeting with the British Prime Minister Edward Heath, Kaunda advised him to halt his government’s intention to sell arms to South Africa because it would give South Africa “a badge of respectability.” He also called for the expulsion of Britain from the Commonwealth.284

The context in which the United Kingdom (UK) proposed to resume arms sales to South Africa must be established. The Soviet Union established a military presence on the Indian Ocean in 1968 to serve its strategic interests during the period of the Cold War. It also established military facilities in Somalia, supplied arms to Egypt and maintained a number of Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia. To prevent further Soviet advances in Africa and secure its economic interests, the British government sought to supply arms to South Africa to counter Soviet threats. Yet Kaunda interpreted issues differently. He did not only object to arms sales to South Africa but also expressed concern over the wider implications in southern Africa of such a move. He interpreted British intentions to sale arms to South Africa as an indirect way of strengthening Smith’s illegal government in Rhodesia and Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola.285

The theme of arms sales to South Africa dominated Kaunda’s speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1970. He pointed out that to supply arms to south Africa “is to cast a vote for apartheid” because the sales would support “South African expansionism and dominance” and give her “authority to establish her military presence in the rest of southern Africa.”286 He also challenged the Portuguese government to dismantle its African empire, suggesting that Zambia and the OAU were “prepared to assist” it “in any efforts to prepare

285 UNIP7/23/28 Foreign Affairs Correspondence, 1971, Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia and Chairman of the O.A.U to the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa 21 June, 1971, see section of the speech on “arms sales."
the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau for self-determination and independence.” Kaunda warned the Portuguese government that if they continued with their “inflexible policy,” Zambia and the OAU would be prepared to “continue supporting the freedom fighters in their struggle for freedom, peace and justice” and that Portugal was “bound to lose the war.”

Kaunda’s mission to NATO countries met with limited success. He failed to dissuade Britain from supplying arms to South Africa and equally failed to secure a meeting with Richard Nixon, the US President. Nixon declined to meet Kaunda and his delegation because he found the meeting “mutually inconvenient.” This move infuriated Zambian authorities. Sikota Wina, the Minister of Information noted that Zambia took exception to Nixon’s behaviour towards Kaunda who was to present the views of the Lusaka Non-Aligned Summit Conference representing half the world’s population. He warned the United States: “we do not brook this type of nonsense from any nation in the world. We are an independent nation and we expect other nations to accord us the same amount of respect as we do to them.”

Upon returning to Lusaka, Kaunda, in apparent reference to Edward Heath, called on Zambians not to hate the British people “for the stupidity of one man even if he is their leader.” Notwithstanding his international diplomatic efforts aimed at highlighting the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa, Kaunda and more generally Zambian leaders, felt frustrated with western countries for according low priority to resolving the outstanding problem of white minority rule in the region. That Kaunda succeeded in clearly

---

articulating the position of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement on white minority rule in southern Africa constitutes the most significant outcome of his European mission.

Zambia’s diplomatic efforts aimed at exerting pressure on western governments to act in favour of justice for the vast majority of blacks in white minority controlled territories in southern Africa did not end with the mission to NATO countries. It was extended to other international fora, including the Commonwealth. At the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in 1971, during which the question of arms sales again featured prominently and threatened the very existence of the organisation, Kaunda’s diplomatic skills prevailed. Under his influence and leadership, the Heads of State and Government approved the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles. The large part of the declaration was based on the draft introduced and presented by Kaunda. Part of the text of the declaration criticised white minority governments for promoting racial discrimination and oppression and called upon all Commonwealth members to support the principles of self-determination around the world and southern Africa in particular. The significance of the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore was that it not only provided a platform for Commonwealth leaders to denounce racial discrimination globally, but also offered another opportunity for African leaders, led by Kaunda, to exert more pressure on Britain to resolve white minority rule in Rhodesia and exercise influence on South Africa to dismantle apartheid.

Dialogue with South Africa and African Unity

Throughout the 1970s, Kaunda emerged as the leading critic of white minority regimes in general and particularly, South Africa’s apartheid system. He was well placed to spearhead the OAU’s campaign to dissuade governments in Africa and elsewhere from collaborating with the South African government. However, while addressing parliament in April 1971, South Africa’s Prime Minister, John Vorster seized the opportunity to “expose” Kaunda as a “double talker.” He explained that it was in the interest of southern Africa that people should realise that Kaunda had been talking to South Africa since 1968 while urging other countries not to hold a dialogue with her. He had condemned trade with South Africa, while Zambia, itself, traded with South Africa. The Zambian government responded by publishing details of the correspondence that took place between the two leaders. The exchange of letters suggests that it was, in fact, Vorster who had been making overtures to Kaunda through secret envoys for a meeting with the South African Prime Minister. Sikota Wina emphasised that “these attempts, as correspondence was available to prove, had failed due to the irreconcilable political philosophies of President Kaunda and Mr. Vorster on the central question of the dignity and equality of man.” He added that accusations that “President Kaunda had been dealing in double talk were an utter fabrication at a very high level.”

Attempts by Vorster to discredit Kaunda as a “double-talker” and the subsequent disclosure of his secret diplomacy with the Zambian Head of State must be seen in the

291 Nolutshungu, South Africa, p.231.
293 See “Dear Mr. Vorster … Details of Exchanges between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa” University of Zambia Library’s Special Collection Gov. Zam (02) 1971.
294 Dear Mr. Vorster … Details of Exchanges between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa’ University of Zambia Library’s Special Collection Gov. Zam (02) 1971.
295 Dear Mr. Vorster … Details of Exchanges between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa’ University of Zambia Library’s Special Collection Gov. Zam (02) 1971., see also Times of Zambia April 23 1971.

© University of Pretoria
proper context. During this period, the South African government was implementing what Sam Nolutshungu described as its new “outward-looking policies” of which the concept of Dialogue formed an essential element. With these policies, South Africa sought, by patient persuasion rather than defiance, to win over African and Asian states to a new attitude towards South Africa. First proposed by Dr. Verwoerd and later adopted by Vorster, the concept of Dialogue first came into South Africa’s political vocabulary in 1969 when it began to be used by South Africa’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller.

Vorster hoped to win over Kaunda especially because he was not only the Chairman of the OAU but also a virulent critic of the South African government and its racist policies. Vorster’s failure to change Kaunda’s attitude to South Africa’s policies produced frustrations. Thus, his disclosures were calculated to embarrass and discredit Kaunda and plausibly plant seeds of discord within the OAU. The timing of his announcement was also critical. It coincided with a press conference held by Ivory Coast President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the new victim of the “outward-looking policy,” at which he launched his campaign of dialogue with South Africa. President Houphouet-Boigny’s endorsement of the policy of Dialogue with South Africa set the stage for the struggle which almost divided the OAU between the Pro-Discourse club led by Ivory Coast and the rest of Africa. However, the Eighth Summit Conference of the OAU held in June 1971 in Addis Ababa overwhelmingly rejected dialogue with South Africa. The victory against the pro-dialogue

296 Nolutshungu, South Africa, p.256.
298 Legum (ed), Africa Contemporary Record, p.A70.
299 As against 28 countries which voted in favour of the anti-dialogue resolution, only Ivory Coast, Malawi, Gabon, Lesotho, Madagascar and Dahomey voted against the resolution. See Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 8, No.6 (1971), p.2126C.
club was consolidated at the Seventh Conference of the East and Central African States in Mogadishu in 1971.

**From Lusaka Manifesto to Mogadishu Declaration**

In October 1971, the Heads of State of East and Central Africa held a conference in Mogadishu during which they reviewed the situation concerning the decolonisation process in southern Africa. Subsequently, they produced the “Mogadishu Declaration” which affirmed the necessity of intensifying armed struggle as the only method of liberating southern Africa.\(^{300}\) Contrary to the Lusaka Manifesto which was primarily a statement of principles, the Mogadishu Declaration outlined the strategy of liberating southern Africa. The emphasis on armed struggle impressed some liberation movements. For instance, the ANC of South Africa welcomed the declaration as “a revolutionary document” which would serve both as a “call and a rallying point for all revolutionary African States and liberation movements to close their ranks.”\(^{301}\) Similarly, the PAC described the conference as “the best conference ever held in East Africa” which ushered in a new era in the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism.” They claimed that “the shift from the Lusaka Manifesto to the Mogadishu Declaration” represented “a qualitative change from the euphemism of the former to the revolutionary rhetoric of the latter” and, thus, “the advocates of dialogue once more met with a crushing defeat because the question has been buried for good.”\(^{302}\) The revolutionary character of the Mogadishu Declaration had a psychological impact on the liberation movements. The renewed promise by African leaders to provide political, military and material aid encouraged liberation movements to intensify armed struggle in southern Africa. The collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and

---

\(^{300}\) See the text of the Declaration in *Africa Research Bulletin* Vol. 8, No.10 (1971), pp.2247A.

\(^{301}\) *Africa Research Bulletin* Vol. 8, No.10 (1971), p.2248C.

Angola in 1975 directly resulted from the escalation of armed struggle waged by FRELIMO and MPLA, respectively.

Although Zambia participated in drawing up the Mogadishu Declaration, the document had limited impact on its own perception of the anti-colonial struggle in southern Africa. At least up to 1974, Zambia continued to regard the principle of negotiations enunciated in the Lusaka Manifesto as the basis for dismantling white minority rule in southern Africa. In this context, Zambia did not hesitate to seize every opportunity to mediate between liberation movements and minority regimes, especially when they demonstrated signs of being ready to talk to each other. Zambia’s favourable response to South Africa’s initiative to resolve peaceably white minority rule in Rhodesia, in what was to become commonly known as détente, provide a classic example. Chapter 3 and 5 expands on this theme.

While FRELIMO intensified armed struggle in Mozambique, Kaunda opened secret contacts with the Portuguese colonial administration in September 1973. The goal was to find a political solution in Mozambique rather than continuing with the armed struggle. Thus, the collapse of the Portuguese colonial administration, partly as a result of a coup d’état staged by General Antonio Spinola in April 1974, was a welcome development to Zambia. Kaunda played an instrumental role in facilitating talks between the new Portuguese government and liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola which

culminated in the installation of transitional governments leading up to independence of the two countries in June and November 1975, respectively. However, Kaunda’s inclination to facilitate a rapid political settlement of the problem of white minority rule in Portuguese colonies and later Rhodesia must be seen in proper context. During this period, Zambia’s economy was undergoing enormous strain, aggravated partly by the Rhodesian border closure in 1973 and partly by external forces, such as declining commodity prices of copper and a rise in oil prices on the international market. A quick end to armed struggle would have certainly reduced the country’s economic problems as it was dependent on trade routes via Rhodesia to Mozambican ports and through Benguela Railway in Angola for its export and import trade with the outside world.

**The Angolan Crisis and Zambia’s Ambiguous Position**

While Mozambique proceeded to independence, a new political reality, civil war emerged in Angola, posing a serious challenge to the OAU and exposing the divided attitudes of the organisation’s membership. The contest for political power among the three Angolan liberation movements—MPLA, FNLA and UNITA—had its immediate roots in the transitional arrangements constituted a few months prior to independence. In December 1974, Kaunda facilitated a meeting in Lusaka attended by Agostinho Neto, President of MPLA, and UNITA leader, Jonas Malheiro Savimbi and the Portuguese High Commissioner, Vice-Admiral Rosa Coutinho to discuss transitional arrangements. Neto and Savimbi agreed, with OAU support, to jointly establish, with Holden Roberto’s FNLA, “a common political platform” which would “serve as a basis for the discussion with the

---

Portuguese government on the formation of the transitional government.”\textsuperscript{308} In January 1975, Portugal and the three liberation movements signed an historic Independence Agreement in Portugal. The salient feature of the Agreement was “Portugal’s recognition of all the three liberation movements as sole representatives of the Angolan people” and the “establishment of a Transitional Government composed of the Portuguese High Commissioner and the three liberation movements.”\textsuperscript{309} This was a fragile arrangement essentially because, as Shubi Ishemo has shown, the FNLA and UNITA maintained certain ambitions and sought to utilise their presence in the interim government to prepare to take power. Moreover, the political situation in Portugal was unstable as the conservative forces of General Spinola and the “progressive” Armed Forces Movement in the armed forces contested for state power.\textsuperscript{310} Thus, it was not long before the transitional government collapsed.

The ensuing civil war seriously divided the OAU, reflecting new political alignments and global contest for influence by Cold War arch rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. At an emergency OAU Summit Conference convened in Addis Ababa in January 1976 to deliberate on the Angolan situation, unambiguous differences emerged between countries supporting MPLA backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, on one hand, and those supporting the pro-western alliance of FNLA and UNITA, on the other. The crucial issue was whether to recognise MPLA as a legitimate government representing the Angolan people or to recognise a government of national unity, incorporating all the three liberation movements. The Summit conference reached a deadlock as out of 46 countries, 22 supported

recognition of MPLA while an equal number of countries expressed preference for a government of national unity. Two remained neutral.\textsuperscript{311}

The issue which caused concern was Zambia’s attitude in support of the establishment of a government of national unity, incorporating the three nationalist movements. Former UNIP leaders’ and government official accounts have long propagated the view that the basis for supporting a government of national unity was to forestall the escalation of the conflict which not only attracted foreign intervention but also threatened to engulf the entire sub-region into super-power conflict.\textsuperscript{312} With the benefit of hindsight, Zambia’s attitude on the Angolan crisis was informed by the OAU long-standing policy which urged the membership to provide support to liberation movements recognised by the continental body. And MPLA, FNLA and UNITA had all been recognised by the OAU. Yet on the challenge presented by the Angolan crisis, the OAU lamentably failed to produce a unified stand, allowing individual countries to interpret and define their approach to the conflict. For Zambia, the position it assumed was politically embarrassing, a reflection perhaps of its failure to correctly interpret the situation. Yet it may also be argued that underlying its attitude were strong economic interests at stake. The position it adopted was revealing.

By supporting an inclusive government in Angola, Zambia assumed a stance consistent with the position adopted by South Africa and the US government. Both the United States and South Africa intervened in support of UNITA and FNLA to counteract what they referred to as “communist threat” in Angola in view of the fact that both Cuba and

\textsuperscript{311} Africa Research Bulletin Vol.13, No.1 (1976), p.3883A.
the Soviet Union had intervened and provided massive military support for MPLA. Thus, by aligning itself with the pro-western alliance in the conflict as discussed in chapter 4, the Zambian government came under severe criticism by Zambian students who accused it of serving western imperialist interests.313

In retrospect, it can, thus, be argued that Kaunda’s real position on the Angolan situation was not merely that of advocating a government of national unity and neither was he neutral. He backed UNITA under the guise of supporting a government of national unity. A transcribed record of Kaunda’s meeting with the United States President, Gerald Ford in Washington, in April 1975, suggests that he desperately backed a “compromise proposal” to ensure Savimbi became President of Angola after independence in November. In this scheme, Kaunda solicited American support. He told Gerald Ford that:

We almost ignored Jonas Savimbi …. Our colleagues [in the OAU] had ignored Savimbi in the past, but this time he emerged as someone who could save the situation …. The only chance we had of putting someone forward to the OAU with the possibility of acceptance was to suggest that Neto and Roberto should each lead his party and Savimbi would be the compromise leader of all three …. Savimbi does not even know of the compromise proposal for having him as President although it may have leaked. We have not yet told Savimbi. We must convince him of the rightness of it …. Regardless of the outcome of the elections, Savimbi would be the President …. We look for leadership on the question of Southern Africa.314

Zambian authorities switched their support to Savimbi when they realised that the MPLA, backed by thousands of Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers, was about to capture Luanda, the Angolan capital. Kaunda persuaded the United States to provide military assistance to Savimbi in his fight against the MPLA. For Kaunda, the US military support

---

314 See President Kaunda’s Visit to Washington: Discussion with US President Ford, file scanned from the National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
for UNITA was essential to counteract the MPLA and frustrate Soviet designs in Angola.\textsuperscript{315}

Kaunda’s intervention in the Angolan crisis had a profound effect in escalating armed tension in the region. It not only led to intensified involvement of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Angola with massive arms deliveries but also led to the American encouragement of the South African invasion of Angola.\textsuperscript{316}

Because the Zambian government was determined to secure Savimbi’s leadership of Angola, it also provided military support to UNITA. There is sufficient evidence that while Zambian leaders publicly backed the establishment of a government of national unity in Angola, they secretly allowed Tiny Rowland’s Lonrho jet to fly arms to Savimbi via Lusaka Airport. There was also proof that at the height of the crisis, a Zambia Airways plane laden with ten tonnes of arms and ammunition from the Zambia Army had taken off for Huambo, UNITA’s headquarters in southern Angola.\textsuperscript{317} Embarrassingly for Kaunda and more generally the Zambian government, the pro-western alliance was defeated by the MPLA. It took time for Zambian authorities to recognise the MPLA government in Angola. And as discussed in Chapter 4, Zambia’s reluctance to back MPLA provoked massive student backlash at the University of Zambia.

\textsuperscript{315}Zukas, \textit{Into Exile and Back}, p.144.
\textsuperscript{316}Zukas, \textit{Into Exile and Back}, p.144.

© University of Pretoria
End of Portuguese Rule and Shift in Zambia’s Attitude

Following the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola, regional dynamics of armed struggle were reconfigured, reflecting new political and military realities. The emergence in Mozambique and Angola of black ruled governments expanded the area of armed conflict, exerting intense military pressure on Rhodesia and South Africa, the two remaining bastions of white supremacy in the sub-region. It also necessitated a shift in Zambia’s rhetoric and attitude to armed struggle in southern Africa.

After assessing developments in southern Africa following the defeat of Portuguese colonialism, the OAU Council of Ministers met in Dar-es-Salaam in April 1975. They drew up the “Dar-es-Salaam Declaration.” It recognised that the “decisive defeat” of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique “radically altered the balance of forces in southern Africa” and “undermined the geopolitical position of the South African regime.” The declaration further singled out Rhodesia and Namibia as priorities in the continuing struggle and also identified South Africa as a key factor to the complete decolonisation of southern Africa, in view of its illegal occupation of Namibia and extension of military, political and economic support to Rhodesia. The Front Line States (FLS)—Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola—were also mandated to use diplomatic means in seeking South Africa’s help in finding a political solution to armed conflicts in Zimbabwe and Namibia. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, Kaunda led Frontline leaders—Nyerere of Tanzania, Sereste Khama of Botswana, Samora Machel of Mozambique and Agostinho Neto of Angola—in efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian conflict.

From the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration onwards, Zambia, together with Front Line States and the OAU, intensified diplomatic efforts aimed at finding political solutions to the problem of minority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. However, after 1975, a closer assessment of statements by Zambian leaders generally on southern Africa suggests a clear shift from initial pacifist and less confrontational stance to a more militant posture. This reflected one vital development, the fall of Portuguese colonialism. The collapse of Portuguese white minority rule in Mozambique and Angola injected a renewed sense of confidence in Zambian authorities that diplomatic efforts to effect political change in the sub-region were producing results. For instance in 1975, Kaunda noted that “events in Mozambique opened new opportunities for intensifying armed struggle in Zimbabwe,” suggesting that “there was no alternative to the escalation of the war in the rebel colony.”

In 1977, Zambia’s Prime Minister, Mainza Chona emphasised that “only intensified armed struggle could bring down the rebellion in Rhodesia and effectively open the road to genuine freedom and independence for the majority.” Again when opening parliament in 1978, Kaunda reaffirmed that:

Intensified armed struggle remains the only credible and effective means by which southern Africa can be liberated. Unless the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia act in unity in the liberation struggle, 1978 will pass by without independence being achieved …. Zambia reaffirms her fullest and irrevocable support for the intensified armed struggle in southern Africa until victory is won …

---

Later the same year, Kaunda explained that the war in Rhodesia was intensifying and that the crisis could only be solved by that war, noting that “Zambia and all concerned have to face up to the consequences of Zimbabwe born by arms.”

While the above statements seem to suggest Zambia abandoned peaceful means in favour of the exclusive support for intensified armed struggle to secure political change in southern Africa and Rhodesia in particular, this was not so. It could be interpreted that, by supporting intensified armed struggle in southern Africa, especially after 1975, Zambia sought to compel white minority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa to come to the negotiating table. The negotiations which Zambia facilitated between Zimbabwe nationalist leaders and the Rhodesian government, culminating in the Lancaster House talks, which paved the way for Zimbabwe’s independence, were, partly, a product of the escalation of armed struggle. This will be discussed at length in the next chapter. Thus, Zambia’s approach to resolving the question of minority rule in southern Africa was not consistently fixed. It employed a dual strategy; it always demonstrated preparedness to support armed struggle, while at the same time, it continued to explore possibilities for peaceful political change. This approach remained, throughout the period under review, consistent with the principle of negotiation outlined in the Lusaka Manifesto in 1969.

Conclusion

The discussion presented in this chapter demonstrates that Zambia played a leading role in liberation struggles of southern Africa. The chapter has documented key aspects in which Zambia contributed to the liberation struggles in the sub region. It has noted that the commitment to support the armed struggles formed a vital element of Zambia’s foreign
policy after independence. The chapter has sought to establish the context in which Zambia accepted the legitimacy to support armed conflicts and to demonstrate the nature and forms of practical support accorded to various liberation movements, both at local and international levels. At national level, the liberation movements were accorded recognition, sanctuary, transit and broadcasting facilities, and financial and material aid. At international level, Zambia assumed the role of “spokesperson” for the liberation movements. It provided diplomatic support and expressed solidarity with the liberation movements at various international fora, such as the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement. It also supported and participated in formulating a wide range of resolutions and declarations which defined collective international attitudes towards white minority rule in southern Africa and provided direction on how to dismantle the minority regimes. Yet, as has been argued, despite supporting numerous declarations and resolutions on southern Africa, Zambia maintained its own attitude to the resolution of white minority rule in the region. Its attitude was not consistently fixed on the employment of a single method. It oscillated between fiery revolutionary rhetoric, on one hand, plausibly as a response to OAU pressure, and conciliatory offers when the situation dictated, on the other. This approach was consistent with the Lusaka Manifesto. While affirming its support for armed struggle, available evidence suggests that Zambia always demonstrated preference for a political solution in resolving the question of white minority rule in southern Africa. It supported armed struggle as an instrument of compelling white minority regimes to negotiate a political solution and, ultimately, avoid unnecessary deaths. This approach was applied successfully in its support for black majority rule in Zimbabwe.
Chapter 3

Zambia’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle

Introduction

From 1964 to the latter part of 1979, Zambia played a leading role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. It provided various forms of support to ZAPU and ZANU, the two liberation movements that waged armed struggle against the Rhodesian government. Zambia’s commitment to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was expressed at domestic and international levels. At local and regional levels, the Zambian government closely coordinated efforts with Tanzanian authorities in establishing guerrilla training camps for the two liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU. As noted in the previous chapter, Zambian authorities provided transit facilities for combatants who went for military training in Tanzania and beyond to socialist countries like China, North Korea and the Soviet Union, among other places, and who came back for infiltration. They also facilitated the shipment of arms and ammunition to the battlefront. Apart from hosting ZAPU and until 1975, ZANU, Zambia provided rear bases, food, medicines, clothing and broadcasting facilities which significantly helped the nationalist movements organise publicity and propaganda. The government also accorded limited financial aid to the liberation movements, and hosted thousands of ordinary Zimbabwean refugees who fled the conflict zones and brutality of the Rhodesian government.

At the international level, Zambian leaders used diplomacy to help legitimise Zimbabwe nationalist movements in the eyes of the international community. They routinely urged the global community to grant nationalist leaders a hearing and extend recognition to the liberation movements. At international fora such as the Organisation of African Unity, United Nations, Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement and Afro-Asian Solidarity
Organisation, Zambian representatives implored leaders of other countries to support policies aimed at promoting black majority rule in Zimbabwe.

At the United Nations, and despite strong opposition from Western powers, Zambian diplomats often took a leading role in sponsoring resolutions calling on the international community to take effective measures against the Rhodesian government for denying majority Africans the right to self-determination. Apart from supporting economic sanctions designed to isolate the Rhodesian regime, they consistently applied diplomatic pressure on Britain to assume responsibility over its colony and urge it to accept the principles of black majority rule and self-government. In view of the divisions which characterised the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe, Zambian leaders did not relent in attempts to unify the leadership of the liberation movements. Partly because of the practical, moral and diplomatic support Zambia gave the liberation movements, the result was that Zimbabwe secured black majority rule in April 1980.

This chapter attempts to analyse the ways in which Zambia supported the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe, from the early days of independence to the latter part of 1979, when a series of negotiations between the nationalist leaders and the Rhodesian government led to the Lancaster House Agreement in London and paved the way for the independence of Zimbabwe. It seeks to examine the broad range of assistance which the Zambian government offered to the liberation movements during the struggle against white minority rule. The central argument in this chapter is that, in its support for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, Zambia consistently sought to secure a peaceful political solution to Rhodesia’s problem of white minority rule, as opposed to exclusive reliance on violent methods. The chapter contends that for practical and moral considerations, Zambia
reluctantly supported armed struggle only to an extent that it was a necessary instrument of coercing the Rhodesian government to the negotiating table. As Mark Chona, former President Kaunda’s Special Assistant for Political Affairs, intimated, Zambia employed “dual revolutionary tactics;” it supported the use of violence when the Rhodesian government remained intransigent, and backed peaceful means when its leaders demonstrated willingness to negotiate.\(^{323}\) Although the emphasis between supporting armed struggle and pursuing peaceful methods varied, the goal remained constant, namely, securing majority rule in Zimbabwe.

Zambia joined the OAU after attaining independence from Britain in 1964. The following year, it was admitted as the ninth member of the Liberation Committee, an organisation created by African leaders to coordinate efforts to promote the liberation of African territories still under colonial domination.\(^{324}\) The OAU established the headquarters of the Liberation Committee in the Tanzanian capital, Dar-es-Salaam, while a sub-committee of the organisation was also set up in Lusaka six years later. During the period of its existence, the Liberation Committee was often headed by a Tanzanian designated as Executive Secretary. Among these included George Magombe and Colonel Hashim Mbita (now a retired Brigadier General). Because of its geographical proximity to dependent territories in southern Africa, Zambia was to play an active role in the Liberation Committee in promoting the struggle against white minority rule in the region as a whole and particularly in Rhodesia. It collaborated with members of the Liberation Committee and

---

\(^{323}\) Interview with Mark Chona, Makeni, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia 27 June 2013.

worked very closely with the Front Line States—Tanzania, Botswana, and, after 1975, Mozambique and Angola to secure Zimbabwe’s independence.

Zambia also hosted meetings of the Liberation Committee and chaired its committees which dealt with various aspects of the struggle. These included the Standing Committee on Defence, the Standing Committee on Finance and the Standing Committee on Administration and General Policy. The Standing Committee on Defence often discussed the financial needs of the Liberation Committee and various liberation movements and training centres and reported their requirements to the Standing Committee on Finance. While the Standing Committee on Finance allocated funds to liberation movements on the recommendation of the Standing Committee on Defence, the Standing Committee on Administration and General Policy dealt with general policy and administrative matters. As will be shown below, Zambia also featured prominently in most of the OAU sub-committees on Rhodesia.

**Quest for ZAPU / ZANU Unity**

Following Rhodesia’s threat to declare independence by unilateral means in mid-1965, a number of problems pertaining to the OAU’s response emerged. First, the problem was whether the OAU should confront the threat of UDI militarily or not. Second, another concern was whether it should recognise and support the creation of either a ZAPU or ZANU government-in-exile. Another dilemma that confronted it was whether it should provide military support to the two liberation movements in the event that they launched armed struggles separately rather than as one united movement. Lastly, there was the

---

325 NAZMFAI/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969 see Organization of African Unity Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Report of the Executive Secretary to the Fourteenth Session of the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-e-salaam, 8 February 1969.
question of how to create a common front between the two nationalist movements.\textsuperscript{326} The report of the OAU Administrative Secretary General presented to the fifth Extra-Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in Lagos, Nigeria, in June 1965, highlighted the magnitude of the dilemma which confronted the continental body. It stated:

The problem that the OAU must now face is … very grave. The situation in Rhodesia has become dangerous not only because of … Smith’s threat but also because the OAU and its member states may not be in a position to retaliate automatically, unless they take the necessary steps, as a matter of urgency, to ensure that the differences now existing between the leaders of the two nationalist movements are removed …. UDI will place the OAU … in a very embarrassing position because the formation of two governments-in-exile is a distinct possibility. If there were two governments-in-exile, African states would, as a result, be in great difficulties when it came to recognizing one or the other ….\textsuperscript{327}

The threat of UDI highlighted the dilemma which confronted the OAU and revealed the wider divisions between “radical” members who advocated strong action and “moderates” who preferred a nonviolent approach to the Rhodesian crisis. Some “radical” members, such as Ghana and Tanzania, called for military confrontation with the Rhodesian government. In particular, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah argued for the establishment of an African Military High Command to mount military operations against the Rhodesian government.\textsuperscript{328}

Although Julius Nyerere also advocated for strong action against Rhodesia, he emphasised the importance of creating an African Political High Command as a precondition to the establishment of an African Military High Command. He argued against the idea of liberation movements forming governments-in-exile because such a move would not gain them international prestige. In his view, prestige could only be gained on the battlefield and


not from offices away from the fighting front. In contrast, Zambia initially aspired for a non-violent approach as a strategy of confronting the Rhodesian government. However, as a last option, it supported either armed struggle or the establishment of a government-in-exile based only on a united action front by the Zimbabwe nationalist movements. Thus, Zambia supports the establishment of a government-in-exile when and if necessity arises. If the worst comes to the worse, Zambia supports in principle the armed struggle carried out by a concerted action by Rhodesian nationalists …. Zambia strongly takes the view that the prerequisite for the successful establishment of a government-in-exile or the launching of an armed struggle by freedom fighters is the formation of a strong common action front by African nationalists and their people.

The significance of Zambia’s stand was that it determined, to a large extent, the collective position ultimately assumed by the OAU—the necessity of forging a ZAPU-ZANU common front as a requirement to supporting either a government-in-exile or an armed struggle. While eliminating the viability of a military response to the threat of UDI, the OAU unanimously supported armed struggle based on a joint ZAPU-ZANU united front.

Consequently, the OAU embarked upon the task of reconciling the two nationalist movements in order to create a machinery of channeling material and military support in the event of UDI. In June 1965, the OAU Council of Ministers convened in Lagos, Nigeria, to reconcile ZAPU and ZANU. On the recommendation from African Heads of State, the Council of Ministers constituted a Special Commission of six countries composed of Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Malawi to urgently assist ZAPU and ZANU establish a common front. The Special Commission subsequently met in Nairobi, Kenya in July 1965 and adopted a resolution mandating Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya to

---


assist in reconciling ZAPU and ZANU. They also threatened to withdraw the OAU’s support if the two nationalist movements failed to create a common front by 15 August 1965.\footnote{NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee 1964-1968 see Confidential Resolution SRC/1 RES 22 July 1965, Special Commission of Six States-Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Malawi 20 to 22 July 1965, Nairobi, Kenya.} When ZAPU and ZANU failed to meet the ultimatum, the OAU convened another reconciliation meeting of the Special Commission of six countries in August 1965. The conference failed to achieve its objective as the two liberation movements assumed irreconcilable positions.\footnote{NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee 1964-1968, Report of the O.A.U Special Commission of Six Conference, held in the Nairobi City Hall from 27 to 28 August 1965, Nairobi Kenya.}

The necessity and urgency of the call by the OAU for the nationalist movements to create a common front must be seen in context. It was a decision taken in response to political developments in Rhodesia. It also underlined the Africanisation of the Rhodesian crisis and highlighted the dilemma of an appropriate African response. During the Rhodesian elections of 7 May 1965, Rhodesia’s ruling party, the Rhodesian Front (RF) emerged victorious, securing all the 50 white seats and effectively retaining power with a comfortable majority in parliament.\footnote{L. T. Kapungu, Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom (New York: Orbis Books, 1974), p.52.} The imminence of UDI became a practical possibility as every political obstacle within Rhodesia’s parliament was eliminated. For the OAU, the call for the establishment of a ZAPU-ZANU alliance reflected its attempt to evade an embarrassing situation of recognising two governments-in-exile in the event that the two liberation movements launched one separately.\footnote{NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organization of African Unity on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966, Report of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to the Council of Ministers Six-Nation Commission for the Reconciliation of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU).}
The quest to reconcile Zimbabwe nationalist movements did not begin at the Lagos Conference in June 1965 or terminate with the OAU’s failure to unify the two liberation movements at the Nairobi Conference in August 1965. The latest exercise was a culmination of a series of unsuccessful attempts which began in July 1963, following a split in the leadership of ZAPU and the subsequent formation of ZANU. During its Third Ordinary Session held in Dar-es-salaam in December 1963, the Liberation Committee failed to reconcile the two nationalist movements. This followed submissions from the two liberation movements on the causes and circumstances that led to the differences of opinion within the leadership of ZAPU and the resultant formation of ZANU. In July 1964, during the Third Ordinary Session held in Cairo, Egypt, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on Southern Rhodesia in which they recommended that Tanzania and Malawi should “offer their good offices” to bring about a united front of all nationalist parties in Southern Rhodesia. The resolution was adopted at the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. African leaders requested Zambia to host the reconciliatory meeting in September 1964. Again, the Conciliatory Commission, composed of Tanzania and Malawi, failed to reconcile the nationalist movements on account of ZAPU’s refusal to sit at the conference table with the representatives of ZANU.³³⁵ Upon realising the impending danger posed by the electoral victory of Ian Smith in the elections of May 1965, the Liberation Committee convened an Extraordinary Session in Dar-es-Salaam from 6 to 7 May 1965 to try and reunite the two movements. Again, they failed to persuade ZAPU and

ZANU to forge a united front.\textsuperscript{336} By the time the reconciliation conference convened in August 1965 in Nairobi, Kenya, the two Zimbabwe nationalist movements had hardened their attitudes on the question of establishing a common front.

**ZAPU and ZANU Attitudes**

ZAPU leaders refused to reconcile with ZANU on the basis that they did not recognise it following a split that led to its formation. They insisted on the dissolution of ZANU and that members should then apply to rejoin ZAPU on an individual basis. They stuck to the principle embodied in its declaration of 1963 at the Cold Comfort Farm Conference near Salisbury that “the doors of ZAPU shall remain open to those who had gone out of step.”\textsuperscript{337} On the other hand, ZANU leaders accepted in principle, to establish a common front with ZAPU but only based on a “Joint High Command,” a military alliance and an arrangement which would allow both movements to retaining separate political identities. However, they objected to ZAPU’s demand that ZANU disbands.\textsuperscript{338}

On the question of forming a government-in-exile, ZAPU leaders called for the establishment, and OAU’s recognition, of its government-in-exile because they believed that the nationalist struggle would be served best under such an arrangement.\textsuperscript{339} However, ZANU dismissed ZAPU’s call for a government-in-exile and warned the OAU not to recognise such a government because it would divide the people of Zimbabwe. Claiming that it was “not an answer to UDI” and that they were better placed to establish one because they had the “manpower, and the party political cohesion and unity,” ZANU leaders argued

\textsuperscript{336} NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organization of African Unity, Fifth Extra Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers June 1965 Report of the Administrative Secretary-General on the Situation in Rhodesia.
\textsuperscript{337} NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968, See Memorandum submitted to the Foreign Ministers of Six Nation Committee on Rhodesia by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, 20July 1965, Nairobi Kenya.
\textsuperscript{338} Times of Zambia 29 July 1965.
that a government-in-exile should only be entertained within the framework of a pre-
arranged plan agreed to by the Zimbabweans and the OAU countries. ZANU also claimed
they were better prepared than ZAPU to launch an armed struggle. ZANU’s Secretary for
Pan-African and International Affairs, Simpson Mtambanengwe and Noel Mukono, the
party’s Secretary for Public Affairs and Director of Central Bureau of Information
emphasised that, unlike Joshua Nkomo who had preoccupied himself with calling for the
establishment and OAU’s recognition of a ZAPU government in exile, ZANU had laid a
“firm foundation for a serious struggle” because they had trained and deployed 150 men
inside Zimbabwe and had “remained united and militant.”

Clearly, the OAU’s persistent quest to reunite Zimbabwe nationalist movements
under a common front could not succeed. There were deep ethnic and personal differences
between the leadership of the two organisations. The leaders of the nationalist movements
were also driven by selfishness and personal ambition, and were mainly concerned about
safeguarding their positions in a future African government in the event that it came
about. Consequently, they could not contemplate creating a united front. Their differences
were not limited to issues of ethnicity and personality, but were also extended to methods of
prosecuting the struggle. In the initial stages of the struggle, ZANU believed in direct

340 NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee 1964-1968, see Zimbabwe African National Union
Special Supplementary Memo on the question of Government-in-Exile and related matters, 7 May 1965.
341 NAZMFA 1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968, Zimbabwe National Union
Supplementary Information, 6 May 1965 signed by S.V Mtambanengwe, Secretary for Pan-African and
International Affairs and N.G Mukono, Secretary for Public Affairs and Director of Central Bureau of
Information.
342 Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe, p.57.
343 NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968, see Some Observations made at the
O.A.U Conference in Nairobi by High Commissioner, Ali M. Simbule, Zambia High Commissioner, Dar-es-
Salaam, Confidential, 27 July 1965. See also NAZMFA 1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-
1968 “secret” Report of the Meeting of the OAU Special Commission composed of Zambia, Tanzania,
Malawi, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya held in Nairobi from 20 to 23 July 1965 addressed to the Hon. Simon
Mwansa Kapwepwe, M.P Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 26
July 1965.
confrontation with the enemy, while ZAPU emphasised the importance of first mobilising international support against Rhodesia’s white minority government. In spite of the differences in strategies, the ideological basis of the policies and goals of the two nationalist movements were similar; they both believed in African unity and espoused anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

As 1965 came to a close, two developments occurred which were to define and shape Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. First, UDI became a reality in November 1965. Second, following its failure to secure a ZAPU-ZANU united front, the OAU resolved to recognise and support ZAPU as the majority party representing the people of Zimbabwe. ZAPU’s recognition meant that it became the sixth nationalist movement to be identified and recognised as an authentic liberation movement after ANC of South Africa, SWAPO of Namibia, FRELIMO of Mozambique, MPLA of Angola and PAIGC of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. The concept of the “sole, official and legitimate or authentic” liberation movement originated from an organisation created during the Cold War period known as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AASO), led by the Soviet Union. It was AASO which took the decision on which liberation movements should be regarded as “authentic.” In other words, the term “authentic six” was used to distinguish those liberation movements in Sub Saharan Africa which the Russians considered as belonging in their sphere of influence. Thus, the so-called legitimate liberation movements were those original nationalist movements that enjoyed support of the people in the respective countries of

---

344 Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe, pp.56-57.
345 Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe, p.56.
346 Tor Sellstrom interview with Gora Ebrahim (PAC-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Member of the National Assembly) 22 July 1995, Harare, Zimbabwe, http://www. liberationafrica.se/intervstories/interviews/ebrahim/?by-name=1 accessed on 18/05/2015 15:53 pm.
347 Mutambara, The Rebel in Me, p.98.
origin. The USSR’s backing of these nationalist movements through AASO was partly aimed at spreading Soviet influence in Africa, where China equally vied for politico-military dominance over nationalist organisations it supported such as ZANU of Zimbabwe and PAC of South Africa. Tor Sellstrom pointed out that

The alliance of ‘authentic’ liberation movements was a confirmation of long-standing political and ideological affinities between the six movements and existing relations with the Soviet Union in the military field. For the Soviet Union, the formal constitution of an allied group of the leading southern African liberation movements was highly significant, not least in the on-going ideological struggle with … China for influence in Africa. For the movements themselves … it strengthened their international standing, in particular vis-à-vis the communist countries and the Non-Aligned Movement, but also within many solidarity organisations in the west.\(^\text{348}\)

The significance of backing only “authentic” liberation movements was that the Soviet Union and more generally, the OAU contributed towards heightening tensions among the members and reinforced the differences between competing nationalist organisations such as the ANC and PAC of South Africa and ZAPU and ZANU of Zimbabwe. But, the recognition of ZAPU by the OAU did not prevent individual African countries from supporting ZANU.\(^\text{349}\) Consequently, ZANU and ZAPU launched an armed struggle against the Rhodesian government.

As noted in the previous chapter, the question of who first launched an armed struggle between ZANU and ZAPU is a subject of conflicting interpretation, depending on the nature of sources one reads. For David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, it was ZANU that fired the first shot when a group of seven insurgents clashed with Rhodesian security forces


near Chinhoyi/Sinoia on 28 April 1966.\textsuperscript{350} Throughout the period of the liberation struggle, ZANU commemorated this date as the “Day of the Second Chimurenga” or the beginning of armed struggle.\textsuperscript{351} However, this claim has been disputed by Eliakim Sibanda and Dumiso Dabengwa who contended that it was, in fact, ZAPU that first launched an armed struggle after it sent a small unit of guerrillas into Rhodesia in 1965.\textsuperscript{352}

Despite this controversy, and irrespective of who struck first, the fact is that by the late 1960s, both ZANU and ZAPU were not yet seriously engaged in armed struggle partly because they lacked training and were inadequately equipped with arms. For ZAPU, it was also engulfed in a serious internal crisis as will be discussed in chapter 5. Thus, the struggle could not be consolidated until members of the Liberation Committee, mainly Zambia and Tanzania, in conjunction with the nationalist movements, embarked on an intensive training program of the militants in preparation for guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia. Meanwhile, the Zambian government first had to deal with domestic concerns about its possible role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

**Domestic Debates on Rhodesia**

Zambia’s quest to back armed struggle in Zimbabwe was a highly contentious issue in local political discourse. The decision was contested less by Cabinet Ministers within the UNIP government and more by Opposition and Independent Members of Parliament (MPs). Sikota Wina, a former Minister of Information in the first Cabinet of the Kaunda government, revealed to the author that during discussions on foreign policy matters, including the question of supporting liberation struggles generally in southern Africa and

\textsuperscript{350} Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, pp.9-12.
\textsuperscript{351} The “first Chimurenga” was fought during the 1890s when Africans resisted imposition of European colonial rule.
Zimbabwe in particular, Cabinet Ministers were apprehensive about pursuing such a policy. They often expressed concern about the possible risks that supporting armed conflicts in neighbouring countries might entail for the country’s economy. These concerns were due to the fact that Zambia’s economic survival depended, to a large extent, on supply routes controlled by Rhodesia, a country it was trying to oppose.

The anxiety among Cabinet Ministers emanated from the dilemma Zambia confronted in the wake of the Rhodesian crisis. The Zambian government, in line with OAU decisions, was willing to back armed struggle against the Rhodesian government, but the country’s economy was firmly tied to its southern neighbour. If the Zambian government remained neutral or at best decided, for economic reasons, to cooperate rather than oppose white minority regimes in Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique by withdrawing support for liberation movements, it was bound to lose face among African countries. The magnitude of this quandary was highlighted during Cabinet meetings in August 1965. One Cabinet Minister said:

> Withdrawing our support from the freedom fighters would be in conflict with the avowed aims of the OAU and other self-respecting states in Africa, apart from being in violation of our fundamental principles upon which Zambia was founded. Such action would also make Zambia one of the most sinister nations that have ever polluted the pages of the history of the independent movement in Africa. Zambia has the moral duty to help in the historic movement of wiping out colonialism in favour of the democratizing process.

While the Zambian government did not want to lose face and appear to be a weak link in the OAU’s confrontation with Rhodesia, it was deeply concerned about the potential damage of pursuing a confrontational course. At stake was the country’s economic survival. Here was a

---

353 Interview with Sikota Wina Makeni Lusaka Zambia 27 September 2013.
case in which the government sought to strike a balance between its economic interests and pursuing a revolutionary course. Thus, as another Cabinet Minister argued:

… the question of keeping the Congo/Angola route open depends also in part on whether or not we provoke the Portuguese in Mozambique. It is necessary for us … to be more cautious in our pronouncements on Rhodesian issues in order not to encourage action of aggression from that country which would lead to the closure of the southern route in the event of UDI, for it is my firm belief that an adverse reaction by Mozambique would perforce have further adverse repercussions on the Angola section of the western route. It is noted that we have a moral duty to help the Rhodesian nationalists, but this should take into account the difficulties of keeping the machinery of our economy running smoothly in the interests of this nation. In this respect I suggest that as little as possible is said about Rhodesia unless we are forced to make a reply.355

From the above statement, it is clear that Cabinet Ministers were concerned about the country’s economy. Despite the apprehension expressed by Cabinet Ministers, as Wina observed, it can be argued that there was more consensus than disagreement on policy within the UNIP government regarding the decision to support liberation struggles in the region and in Zimbabwe, in particular. This is borne by the fact that public statements by government leaders on matters concerning liberation struggles in southern Africa were often in harmony. In fact, from the government and party documents examined by this author, there is no evidence to suggest there was open, intense disagreement within the Cabinet or UNIP Central Committee on foreign policy, especially on the question of supporting armed struggle in Zimbabwe and, more generally, in southern Africa.

If Cabinet Ministers were apprehensive, the Opposition and Independent Members of Parliament were much more vocal in contesting government policy on Rhodesia, as shown in some detail in Chapter 4. It suffices, however, to mention here that the Opposition parliamentarians expressed serious concerns about the government’s decision to back armed

struggle in Zimbabwe. For instance, as early as 1965, Harry Nkumbula, the president of the opposition African National Congress (ANC) Party and MP for Monze, described the government’s decision to support the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe as a “very unwise policy” which amounted to quarrelling with neighbours.\(^{356}\) The following year, another opposition ANC MP for Namwala, Edward Mungoni Liso questioned the government policy of allowing Zimbabwe liberation movements to open offices in Zambia because such a policy amounted to “provocation” which could create a situation where the safety of the citizens would not be guaranteed if Rhodesian authorities carried out “retaliatory measures” against Zambia.\(^{357}\) Despite these concerns, Zambia implemented the OAU’s policy on Rhodesia; it supported armed struggle against the white minority government.

**Preparations for Armed Struggle**

The development of UDI in Rhodesia and the subsequent failure to unify the two liberation movements forced the OAU to “accept the divisions” between the nationalist parties and urged them instead to “concentrate on fighting.”\(^{358}\) The focus shifted to making adequate preparations to assist ZAPU and ZANU embark on an armed struggle. In this context, at a meeting in Accra, Ghana, in October 1965, African leaders created a Committee of Five countries (also known as the Action Team) composed of Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, the United Arab Republic (now Egypt) and Nigeria to plan for an armed struggle in Rhodesia, to assist freedom fighters and to advise them on matters related to


guerrilla warfare. Although the Action Team was composed of five countries, it was mainly Zambia and Tanzania which played a leading role of assisting ZAPU and ZANU to prepare for armed struggle. This reflected the strategic significance of the two countries in the struggle for black majority rule in Rhodesia. While Tanzania provided guerrilla training camps, Zambia, on account of its geographical nearness to Rhodesia, offered crucial transit points for both war materials and the rank-and-file of ZAPU and ZANU nationalist fighters who proceeded for military training in Tanzania and beyond in the socialist countries such as China, USSR, North Korea and Yugoslavia, among others, and who came back for infiltration to the battlefront.

In his recent autobiography, *The Rebel in Me: A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Bush War, 1975-1980*, Agrippah Mutambara argued that Tanzania “made the most pronounced contribution” to the liberation struggles in southern Africa because it provided guerrilla training camps for all the liberation movements in the sub region. Mutambara’s assertion is not entirely correct partly because he portrayed Tanzania as having acted alone when it hosted training camps. However, as will be argued below, available evidence suggests that Tanzania did not act in isolation; rather, it was a collective effort by the OAU in general and particularly, the Front Line States, especially Zambia and Tanzania. Tanzania’s decision to set up guerrilla training camps was undertaken in close collaboration with Zambian authorities. It can, thus, be argued that Tanzania accepted to host training camps for strategic purposes. It was, at the time, the only independent country in the sub region nearest to the white minority regimes. Moreover, Tanzania was situated far away

---

from most colonial regimes in southern Africa (the only exception was the Portuguese colony of Mozambique with which it shared its southern frontier). There, thousands of cadres could undergo military training relatively safe and secure without being targeted by white minority regimes.

Nonetheless, for a country like Zambia which was closer to the scene of action prior to Mozambique’s independence, the risk of retaliatory strikes against guerrilla bases was often high. Zambia’s proximity to white minority regimes and the fear of retaliatory attacks, could not allow it to establish guerrilla training camps especially in the initial stages of the struggle. There were huge security risks for both the Zambian government and the guerrillas to operate training camps in the country. The absence of guerrilla training camps in Zambia comparable to those located in Tanzania did not thus, diminish its contribution to the liberation struggles in southern Africa as a whole and Zimbabwe in particular. As noted in Chapter 2, it played a vital role as a transit state for thousands of militants who went for military training in Tanzania and beyond. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the Zambian government also played a crucial role on the diplomatic front.

Thus, the overall strategy of preparing Zimbabwe nationalist movements to launch the armed struggle began with the establishment of training camps. In February 1967, at the sidelines of the meeting of the 8th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Action Team met and authorised Zambia and Tanzania to explore the possibility of establishing training camps on behalf of the OAU and before the Committee of Five could meet the following month in Dar-es-salaam to prepare the strategy for military operations in Rhodesia. They assigned the two countries three specific objectives; to assess the suitability of existing camps in Tanzania, to explore the possibility of establishing new camps for the Zimbabwe freedom fighters and to advise on the issue of transiting through
Zambia. Consequently, in March 1967, Captain Diallo A. Oumar and Captain Kimario, Tanzania’s representatives to the Action Team, and Musyani K Simumba, Zambia’s representative to the Action Team, visited Wami and Kingolwira camps in Tanzania to assess the suitability of utilising the two camps for training Zimbabwe freedom fighters. They concluded that Wami camp was unsuitable on account of its rugged terrain. On the other hand, they found Kingolwira suitable, although it required expansion to increase its capacity. Simumba also confirmed that transiting of trained Zimbabwe nationalist fighters through Zambia would not be a problem.

Eventually, on the recommendation of the Action Team, the Committee of Five agreed to “place Kingolwira camp at the disposal of the Action Team for training Zimbabwe freedom fighters.” The secretary of the Committee of Five was requested to prepare the camp to receive the first recruits by 15 May 1967. They further agreed that training of Zimbabwe nationalist fighters would be undertaken on a rotational basis; the first group would consist of 100 ZAPU trainees followed by a similar number of ZANU cadres. The Committee of Five also decided to establish another military training camp at Kongwa and a transit camp at Chunya which was to be used for nationalist fighters who had finished their training and were waiting to be deployed at the war front.

---

363 Musyani K. Simumba would later become the Director of the African Liberation Centre in Lusaka, replacing Mukuka Nkoloso, who held the post since its inception in 1965.
365 NAZMFA1/6/26 Loc. 2624 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967, Organization of African Unity, Report of the Action Team of the Committee of Five of the organization of African Unity signed by Captain Diallo A. Oumar, Tanzania’s representative to the Action Team and M.K Simumba, Zambia’s Representative to the Action Team and copied to Hon. H. Makame, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Tanzanian Chairman, Committee of Five, Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. I.R Mwajasho, Principle Secretary, Second Vice President’s Office, Dar-es-Salaam, Brigadier M.S.H Sarakikya, Chief of Defence Forces, T.P DF, Dar-es-Salaam, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tanzania, Attention: Mr. A.B Nyaki, Principle Assistant Secretary, Dar-es-Salaam, Hon. M.
It is worth stressing that, while Tanzania played host to a number of military training camps for Zimbabwean nationalist movements, Zambia did not have any such camps. Brigadier General Timothy Kazembe, the former Defence Secretary, Grey Zulu, the former Zambia’s Minister of Defence and Sikota Wina, the former Minister of Information in Kaunda’s government, emphasised that Zambia did not have any military training camps either for Zimbabwe liberation movements or for other nationalist organisations that were hosted in the country. As noted above, the Zambian government maintained a policy of not allowing liberation movements to train any military cadres on its soil. If there was any form of training that occurred, it would have been on a very limited scale and outside the knowledge of the Zambian government. The decision not to allow liberation movements to conduct military training of their cadres on Zambian territory was meant to minimise the risks involved in harboring freedom fighters. There was constant danger of retaliatory military strikes by neighboring white minority regimes. The Zambian government, however, maintained transit camps around the country for the liberation movements it hosted. With time, however, as Mark Chona emphasised, some form of military training began to be undertaken in some transit camps such as Chikumbi as the liberation struggle raged on.

---

M Chona, Minister for Presidential Affairs, Republic of Zambia, Lusaka, Hon. L. Changufu, Minister of Home Affairs, Republic of Zambia, Lusaka, H.E R.T Sikasula, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lusaka and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, Attention: H.E Ambassador N. El. Sadr, Cairo. See also NAZMFA1/6/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967, see letter dated 11 April 1967 captioned “Establishment of a Camp for Zimbabwe Freedom Fighters” and addressed to Mr. I.R Mwajasho, Principle Secretary, Second Vice President’s Office, Dar-es-Salaam by Dr. M.S Sami, Secretary, Committee of Five.

366 Wina interview cited, Zulu interview cited and Kazembe interview cited. Brig. Gen. Kazembe served in the Zambia Army from 1970 to 2003. During the period of the liberation struggle, he served as Defence Secretary, an office that was coordinating the movement of freedom fighters in Zambia. He also earlier on served as Border Centre Officer in Siavonga, covering Chirundu and Sinazongwe where he was in charge of infiltrating and exfiltration of Zimbabwe freedom fighters.

367 Chona interview cited.
The major transit camps for Zimbabwe nationalist movements were established at Chikumbi, Mboroma, Mkushi and in Lusaka West, among other places.\textsuperscript{368}

**Mobilisation and Training of Combatants**

After establishing training camps in Tanzania, the Liberation Committee instructed ZAPU and ZANU to mobilise and send cadres for military training. In the initial stages, the principal sources of trainees were those recruited from among the host of refugees who crossed into Zambia. In 1967, ZANU’s Chief Representative in Dar-es-Salaam L. P. Chihota explained that:

> We have resident in Zambia Zimbabweans who number well over 40,000. Of these we can easily claim a membership of well over half. These people, perhaps more than the people in Zimbabwe are much more politicized and are a major source from which to get our fighters at least for this initial stage. We have in the past got some of our recruits from among these people but this was done unofficially …\textsuperscript{369}

The presence of such a large number of Zimbabwean refugees in the country offered a vital and convenient source of mobilising militants by the nationalist movements partly because refugees were considered to be “more politicized” than ordinary Zimbabweans who remained at home. However, because the cadres were sometimes forcefully recruited, especially in the early stages of the struggle, Zambian authorities did not approve the process and, consequently, banned it. For the Zambian government, forced recruitment amounted to kidnapping, an exercise which violated regulations governing operations of liberation movements in the country. Among other regulations, the government did not

\textsuperscript{368} Kazembe interview cited.

\textsuperscript{369} NAZMFA1/6/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967, see letter dated 1 April 1967 addressed to the Secretary, O.A.U Action Committee, Dar-es-Salaam by L.P Chihota, Chief Representative ZANU Office, Dar-es-Salaam.
allow nationalist movements to coerce Zimbabweans ordinarily resident in the country to join the struggle as a method of recruiting members.\textsuperscript{370}

The nationalist movements also recruited cadres for military training directly from Zimbabwe. They used middlemen who usually demanded a lot of money to help cadres across the border through selected crossing points arranged by Zambian authorities along the Rhodesian–Zambian frontier.\textsuperscript{371} Since Rhodesia’s border with Zambia became highly militarised after UDI, and on account of the challenge posed by the Zambezi River as a natural obstacle, ZAPU and ZANU recruited and transported their cadres mainly by road from Zimbabwe to Livingstone in Zambia via Francistown in Botswana. Once the militants were in the country, Zambian authorities contacted the Tanzanian government indicating the number of Zimbabwean freedom fighters ready to proceed for military training in Tanzania. After formalities had been completed and cadres filled in recruitment forms, Tanzanian authorities permitted the Zambian government to transport (or escort) the cadres to Nakonde-Tunduma border into Tanzania. The same process was followed in reverse order after militants finished military training in Tanzania. These procedures were repeated as cadres came in small groups at different times.\textsuperscript{372}

\textsuperscript{370} NAZMFA1/1/262 Loc. 532 OAU Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1968, see letter dated 23 October 1968 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs by E.M Mwamba, Zambia’s Acting Ambassador to Egypt together with a Memo submitted to the Member States of the Liberation Committee of the OAU by ZANU on 2 October 1968. See also NAZMFA1/1/176 Loc. 519 Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU): Political Parties and Organizations/Rhodesia, 1966-1968, see Republic of Zambia, Outward Telegram No.M864 to Zambian Delegation OAU, Algiers from Foreign Lusaka sent on 5 September 1968 and copied to Mr. G. Chimpampapa.

\textsuperscript{371} Kazembe interview cited. See also NAZMFA1/6/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967 see letter dated 1 April 1967 addressed to the Secretary, O.A.U Action Committee, Dar-es-Salaam by L.P Chihota, Chief Representative, ZANU Office, Dar-es-Salaam.

\textsuperscript{372}NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967 See letter dated 13 May 1967 addressed to Mr. Vernon J. Mwaanga, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President by G. S Magombe, Executive Secretary, OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. See also NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Political Parties/Rhodesia, 1966-1969, see confidential letter dated 23 March addressed to the Chief Representative, ZANU Office, Lusaka by L.P. Chihota, Chief Representative, ZANU
As soon as cadres were placed in training camps, they were subjected to rigorous military training often lasting between 4 to 6 months. Under the supervision of Chinese military instructors recruited by the Liberation Committee as well as instructors seconded by the nationalist movements, the militants were trained in combat operations which included physical fitness, combat march, and handling of small arms, rocket launchers and light mortars. They were also trained in field engineering, plastic explosives, sabotage, ambushes, patrols, raids, defence and attack up to platoon level. Other forms of military training included elementary knowledge of regular army tactics and modern guerrilla warfare tactics. Similar forms of training took place in Algeria and Egypt. Large groups of Zimbabwe nationalist fighters also obtained training at Half Assini and Abenamadi camps in Ghana early in 1965.

Outside Africa, the militants obtained training from socialist countries, mainly from the USSR, China, North Korea, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In the Soviet Union, small groups of African nationalists, mainly from ZAPU, obtained training under Russian instructors in the use of explosives, arms, sabotage and guerrilla tactics (ambushes against vehicles and personnel, camouflage and spoor-covering; basic radio communication and map reading). Other forms of training included military engineering, paramilitary training and intelligence. Most of this training took place in areas around Moscow such as Koxhovskaya and Chirimuski. Training also took place in Simferopol and Odessa. Among the early ZAPU

373 http://www.rhodesia.nl/commsupp.htm see Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political groups in Rhodesia accessed on 27/08/2012 at 11:03AM.
373 http://www.rhodesia.nl/commsupp.htm see Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political groups in Rhodesia accessed on 27/08/2012 at 11:03AM.
members to obtain military training in the Soviet Union was Dumiso Dabengwa.\cite{Dabengwa}

He later played a prominent role in the liberation struggle as ZAPU’s Head of Military Intelligence.

In China, ZANU cadres obtained training in camps near Peking and Nanking. Josiah Tongogara was one of the prominent ZANU members who received military training in the Nanking Military Academy.\cite{Tongogara} He would later become ZANU’s Chief of Defence, commanding the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU. Under Chinese military instructors, the modes of training included among others, revolutionary tactics, arms, explosives, sabotage techniques, communications and strategy. In North Korea, the nationalists were trained in the use of explosives and arms in a camp near Pyongyang by North Korean military officers.\cite{NorthKorea} In order to support their investment in training the combatants, China and the Soviet Union individually supplied weapons, ammunition, explosives, uniforms, finance and food to the Liberation Committee for distribution to the nationalist movements. The Soviet Union and China also channeled military aid directly to ZAPU and ZANU, respectively.\cite{SovietChina}

**Hosting Zimbabwe Nationalists**

Another key role played by Zambia in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was by hosting Zimbabwean refugees. The context in which Zambian authorities agreed to host refugees from Zimbabwe and southern Africa more generally, must first be established. After Zambia became independent, it joined the United Nations. It, thus, ratified, among other international instruments, the UN Convention on Refugees. Enacted in July 1951 and modified by the protocol of January 1967, the UN Convention on Refugees was the basic

\begin{footnotesize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \cite{Dabengwa} Dabengwa, “ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation,” pp.24-36.
  \item \cite{Tongogara} Chung, \textit{Re-Living the Second Chimurenga}, p.130.
  \item \cite{NorthKorea} \url{http://www.rhodesia.nl/commsupp.htm} see Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political groups in Rhodesia accessed on 27/08/2012 at 11:03AM
  \item \cite{SovietChina} Kazembe interview cited, Zulu interview cited.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
and universal instrument relating to the status of refugees. It reflected the deep concern and
desire of member states to establish common standards for the treatment of refugees. The
OAU defined a refugee as:

… every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. The term
“refugee” … also applies to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or internal disorder affecting
either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge
in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

In this context, Zambia accepted to host Zimbabwean refugees who fled the country in fear
of being persecuted by Rhodesian authorities on account of either belonging to a particular
social group or expressing contrary political opinion. Zambian authorities were careful to
distinguish between various categories of Zimbabwean refugees who came into the country,
as this determined the manner they dealt with them. As Kenneth Grundy explained;

Essentially, there are two types of people the host country must deal with-
firstly, the political exile who has escaped or been expelled from the target
country because of his involvement in political causes there and secondly,
the refugees who have fled usually in large numbers, the repression or
general unrest in or near the fighting zones …

Like with other refugees from dependent territories from southern Africa, Zambian
authorities recognised two categories of Zimbabwean refugees; first, the leadership of the
liberation movements, designated as political party organisers, and the general membership

---

of the nationalist organisations which sought military training abroad. Second, there were ordinary Zimbabweans who fled spontaneously in large numbers from the conflict zone prompted by armed struggle. This study’s present focus is on the former group of refugees who identified themselves as leaders and members of ZAPU and ZANU. The leadership and the general membership of both ZAPU and ZANU were accommodated in the townships of Lusaka such as Mtendere, Matero, Makeni, Chelston, Chilenje, Kanyama, Kabwata, Kamwala, Lilanda and Emmasdale, among other places. For Chris Chirwa, integrating foreign cadres among Zambian nationals was meant to prevent the enemy from easily locating and identifying them unlike when they were located in isolated areas. The Zambian government ensured it paid rentals, electricity, water and telephone bills for the nationalist fighters. The entire arrangement was carried out clandestinely with tenancy registered under pseudo names for security reasons.

Apart from accommodating leaders as well as members of both ZAPU and ZANU, Zambian authorities accorded the two nationalist movements a wide range of privileges. It provided them with office space at the Liberation Centre in Lusaka which housed all the liberation movements recognised by the Zambian government. At the Centre, managed initially by Mukuka Nkoloso, and later, by Musyani Simumba, representatives of the liberation movements were given facilities for organising publicity activities and the general day-to-day administration of their organisations. Such amenities were vital for the smooth operations of the nationalist movements. The Liberation Centre, in collaboration with the sub-office of the Liberation Committee which was established in Lusaka in 1969, worked

383 Interview with Mama Chibesa Kankasa, Kabulonga, Lusaka, Zambia, 3 June 2013.
384 Chirwa, “Zambia and Developments in the South African Liberation Struggle, 1960-1994,” pp.277-327. Although the idea of integrating members of liberation movements among Zambian nationals was meant to increase protection of the cadres, but their security could not be guaranteed partly because the nationalist movements were often infiltrated by agents and informers of the Rhodesian government.
closely with the Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam to ensure the efficient operation of the liberation movements.\textsuperscript{385}

\textbf{Broadcasting Facilities}

The provision of broadcasting facilities for propaganda purposes constituted another crucial form of support which the Zambian government rendered to the nationalist movements. The decision was taken partly in response to appeals by the OAU that member countries should “make available an allocated time per week for the dissemination of propaganda on their radio and information media into occupied territories.”\textsuperscript{386} It was also a decision taken against the backdrop of realising the growing significance of the media in stimulating nationalist opinion in dependent territories. In this context, Zambian authorities initially availed broadcasting facilities only to ZAPU in order to enable it to appeal directly to Rhodesian Africans to rise against the illegal declaration of independence in 1965. The content of the messages transmitted to Africans ranged from incitement to violence, civil disobedience, destruction of property and livestock, strikes, and boycotts, to non-payment of taxes. The intention was to precipitate a breakdown of law and order, which, it was hoped, would stimulate British intervention and lead to the collapse of the regime.\textsuperscript{387}

Until ZANU’s application to broadcast on Zambia Broadcasting Services was approved early in December 1966, ZAPU continued to enjoy the monopoly of broadcasting

\textsuperscript{385} NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1969 See Minutes of the First Regular Meeting of the Permanent Representatives to the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, Thursday 20 March, 1969.

\textsuperscript{386} NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organization of African Unity Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966, see letter dated 17 December 1965 and addressed to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU by the Executive Secretary of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa together with a cover letter dated 5 January 1966 addressed to the Ministers of Foreign/External Affairs of all O.A.U Member States by the General Secretariat of the OAU in Addis Ababa.

\textsuperscript{387} NAZMFA1/1/176 Loc. 519 Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), Political Parties and Organizations/Rhodesia, 1966-1968, see letter dated 6 April 1966 addressed to the Parliamentary Secretary, Commonwealth Affairs by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services., see also another letter dated 18 March 1966 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services by the Director, Zambia Broadcasting Services.
on Radio Zambia because of its recognition as a majority party both by the OAU and the Zambian government. Nonetheless, when Zambian authorities temporarily suspended ZANU’s broadcasts, because of apparent reshuffles in the Ministry of Information in January 1967, ZANU expressed concern that the Zambian government was discriminating in favour of ZAPU.\(^{388}\) ZANU’s concerns underlined the dominant perception of Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, that it favoured ZAPU over ZANU. While Sikota Wina and Bautis Kapulu intimated that Zambia preferred ZAPU because of the historical long-standing relationship forged between UNIP and ZAPU, and particularly, Kaunda and Joshua Nkomo, respectively, Mark Chona and Grey Zulu dispute such assertions. They emphasised that the Zambian government did not adopt a discriminatory approach in its support for the two nationalist movements. In particular, Grey Zulu contended that ZANU’s complaints were typical of “a wife in a polygamous marriage.”\(^{389}\) It is not an exaggeration however, to suggest that on account of Nkomo’s close association with Kaunda and by virtue of strong historical ties forged between UNIP and ZAPU, Zambian authorities inevitably appeared to prefer ZAPU over ZANU.

Nevertheless, the Zambian government allowed both ZAPU and ZANU to broadcast permanently on an alternating basis. The privilege to use Radio Zambia as a propaganda tool was granted on condition that scripts were approved before being aired.\(^{390}\) The messages, transmitted mainly in Shona, Ndebele and English, were broadcast on a weekly basis on


\(^{389}\) Wina interview cited, Kapulu interview cited, Chona interview cited and Zulu interview cited.

\(^{390}\) NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)-Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969 See confidential letter captioned “Granting of Broadcasting Facilities” dated 3 December 1966 addressed to the Publicity Chief, ZANU, Lusaka by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and copied to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services, Lusaka.
selected days. For instance, ZAPU presented a programme called “Voice of Zimbabwe” from Mondays to Fridays from 19:15 hours to 20:00 hours p.m. and twice on Sundays at 08:00 hours to 08:30 hours a.m. and 21:00 hours to 21:30 hours p.m.\textsuperscript{391} On the other hand, ZANU presented a programme called “Voice of the Revolution” on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays between 21:15 hours and 22:30 hours p.m. and on Sundays between 08:00hrs and 09:00 hours a.m.\textsuperscript{392} As the struggle gained momentum, the content of the messages transmitted also underwent a qualitative shift from initial emphasis on stirring up an uprising against the illegal Rhodesian government to a greater focus on boosting the morale of Rhodesian Africans and appealing to them to join the struggle. The radio broadcasts were significant in many ways. They served as a medium through which the liberation movements informed and updated the masses inside Rhodesia on the progress of the struggle, and possibly stimulated their opinion regarding the legitimacy of the struggle. They also helped to galvanise solidarity between the masses within Zimbabwe and those in exile.

**Diplomatic Backing for Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle**

Apart from supporting nationalists locally, Zambian leaders also mobilised diplomatic backing for the liberation movements. At international fora such as the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity, the Non Aligned Movement and the United Nations, they often petitioned leaders of other countries to support policies designed to promote the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe. They supported the application of strong measures, both economic and political, against the Rhodesian government for denying Rhodesian Africans the right to self-determination. Zambian representatives also continuously applied pressure on Britain, as the legal authority in Rhodesia, to dismantle

\textsuperscript{391} *Zimbabwe People’s Voice* Vol. 2, No.40 and 41 October 6 and 13(1979).
\textsuperscript{392} See *Zimbabwe News* Vol. 8, No.2 February 1974.
UDI and secure the country’s independence based on majority rule. Zambia also took advantage of international meetings to lobby and mobilise material and financial support for the Zimbabwe nationalist movements.

**Zambia in the Commonwealth**

The Commonwealth was established as an association of former British colonial territories found in all parts of the globe—in Asia, Africa, the Americas and the Caribbean islands. Naturally, as a former British colony, Zambia joined the Commonwealth soon after independence. Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence became a British and a Commonwealth problem on two accounts; it was a rebellion against both the British Crown as the sovereign, legal authority in Rhodesia and as Head of the Commonwealth. It also constrained Zambia’s ability, as a Commonwealth member, to chart an uninterrupted development process because of its economic dependence on Rhodesia. 393

On the same day Rhodesian authorities proclaimed UDI, Britain imposed economic and financial sanctions on Rhodesia 394 because it, like the rest of the international community, regarded such action an act of rebellion. At the United Nations, the Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/216) condemning UDI and called upon all countries not to recognise the illegal regime and to “refrain from giving it any assistance.” The following day, the Security Council (France abstained) passed another resolution (S/RES/217) which noted the gravity of the situation caused by UDI. Describing the declaration “an act of rebellion,” the continuance of which “constitutes a threat to international peace and security,” the Council called on all states to refrain from recognising the illegal regime, to

---

avoid any action assisting and encouraging it and “in particular to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.”\textsuperscript{395}

The resolution also called upon Britain to quell the rebellion and the OAU to assist in the implementation of the resolution. The action against Rhodesia rested on a continuing recognition of British sovereignty and legal authority over the territory.

For Zambia, Rhodesia’s act of rebellion was not only an economic problem, but also a political and ideological challenge. As Jan Pettman has shown, Zambian leaders interpreted UDI in the wider context of nationalism and anti-colonialism, applying their belief that a denial to Rhodesian Africans the right to self-determination simply because they were blacks was, in effect, an attack on all Africans everywhere.\textsuperscript{396} Placed in the vanguard of the struggle against white minority rule in southern Africa, Zambian leaders regarded Smith’s action as clogging the wheels of African nationalism in Rhodesia, a concern they articulated at an emergency Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Lagos, Nigeria in January 1966.\textsuperscript{397}

Zambian leaders were concerned that the continued existence of a white minority regime south of the country’s frontier would guarantee the oppression of the black majority by a small white minority group, subsequently threatening international peace and security. Thus, they requested for British military intervention to crash the rebellion and offered


\textsuperscript{396}Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict, p.155.

Zambia’s territory as a base for British military action against Rhodesia if any such response was to be carried out. However, Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, rejected the use of force, insisting on the application of economic sanctions as the best approach of resolving the crisis. Despite Zambia’s reservations regarding the effectiveness of economic sanctions and the practical possibility of them harming its economy, the view prevailed that economic sanctions should be given an opportunity to work and bring down the Rhodesian government. Zambia reluctantly joined the sanctions policy led by Britain, but the failure of the Rhodesian government to collapse under the weight of economic sanctions “within a matter of weeks rather than months” as promised by Wilson at the Lagos Conference, and his perceived mishandling of the problem became the source of deep mistrust and frustration between Kaunda and Wilson, subsequently threatening the unity of the Commonwealth.

At a Commonwealth meeting held in London in September 1966, again, a considerable amount of time was spent discussing the Rhodesian situation. Despite overwhelming demands from Afro-Asian and Caribbean members, supported by Canada, for a British commitment to the principle of majority rule before independence, the meeting concluded without such a commitment. Britain refused to use force in spite of the fact that the leaders had “expressed their firm opinion that force was the only sure means of bringing down the illegal regime in Rhodesia.”

---

398 UNIP7/23/5 Foreign Affairs Statements, 1966 see ‘Confidential’ Background Paper on Zambia’s Views on the Rhodesian Situation to be submitted to the Commonwealth Conference.
400 Times of Zambia 13 July 1966.
Although Zambian leaders failed to secure British commitment to overthrowing the Rhodesian government by military means, they did not give up in advocating for black majority rule in Rhodesia. They continued to lobby the international community within the Commonwealth context, to dismantle white minority rule in Rhodesia. They appealed to Commonwealth leaders to oppose colonial domination and racial oppression, and reminded them that such practices were against the principles upon which the organisation was founded. In fact, Zambia ensured that at each Commonwealth meeting, the question of Rhodesia was placed top on the agenda.\textsuperscript{402} For instance, at another Commonwealth conference in Singapore in 1971, where the question of British arms sales to South Africa featured prominently, Kaunda spearheaded attacks on the British government for their intentions to sale arms. He contended that by selling arms to South Africa, Britain was indirectly strengthening the instruments of oppression, not only in South Africa but also Rhodesia where arms would ultimately find their way on account of South Africa’s support for Ian Smith.\textsuperscript{403} Under his leadership, the Commonwealth leaders adopted the “Declaration of Commonwealth Principles” in which they rejected colonialism and affirmed the principle of self-determination for the oppressed people in all parts of the globe. They also criticised, albeit indirectly, minority regimes in southern Africa and particularly Rhodesia and South Africa for promoting racial oppression and denying the majority Africans the right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{404}

During the Commonwealth conference held in Kingston, Jamaica in April 1975, Kaunda appealed to Commonwealth leaders to support Africa’s efforts aimed at advancing

\textsuperscript{402} Chona interview cited.
\textsuperscript{403} UNIP7/23/28 Foreign Affairs Correspondence, 1971, Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia and Chairman of the O.A.U to the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa 21June, 1971.
the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe and southern Africa as a whole. He urged them to adopt “Africa’s strategy” on southern Africa, an approach rooted in the Lusaka Manifesto. Adopted in Lusaka by African leaders of East and Central African States in April 1969, as noted, the manifesto gave priority to peaceful means rather than exclusively relying on armed struggle as the basis for resolving the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa.

The OAU Context

From the diplomatic perspective, the Lusaka Manifesto should be seen against the backdrop of the effort by the OAU to present a unified approach to the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa and Rhodesia in particular. But it was not the first attempt. As early as October 1965, the OAU attempted to present a common African approach in response to Smith’s moves to secure white dominance in Rhodesia. However, it failed. In October 1965, African leaders met in Accra, Ghana to formulate an appropriate African response in the event of UDI. They agreed on a conditional resolution calling upon all OAU member states to sever diplomatic ties with Britain if it failed to prevent UDI and secure Rhodesia’s independence under majority rule. The British government refused to use force and Smith secured independence. African leaders met again on 3 December 1965 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Among other resolutions, they threatened to cut diplomatic relations with Britain if by 15 December 1965, it failed to quell the rebellion and restore order in Rhodesia. However, when the ultimatum finally came and Britain failed to crush UDI,

---

405 Speech by Dr. K. D Kaunda on the Situation in Southern Africa, Commonwealth Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 30 April 1975, University of Zambia Special Collection Gov. Zam (1975)
408 Nyerere, Rhodesia, p.3.
only nine out of thirty six African countries represented at the Addis Ababa conference actually implemented the resolution to sever diplomatic ties with Britain.\textsuperscript{409}

The failure by the OAU to mount a common diplomatic approach against Britain highlighted the inherent weakness in the application of collective resolutions. The OAU did not possess instruments of coercion, compelling the members to implement the resolutions. It also underlined an often recurring problem in international diplomacy; the contradiction between pursuing one’s national interest as opposed to implementing collective decisions perceived inimical to a country’s national interest. For the majority of African countries which refused to sever diplomatic ties with Britain, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that their decision was dictated by considerations of their national interests. Zambia’s decision was not an exception.

Like the position assumed by most African States, Zambian authorities refused to completely break diplomatic relations with Britain. They insisted on maintaining contacts with the former colonial power because of Zambia’s economic vulnerability to pressure from and dependence on Rhodesia. As already noted elsewhere in this chapter, almost the entire structure of Zambia’s economy—transport, commodity trade, electricity and energy requirements—was dependent on and inextricably intertwined with its southern neighbor. Since Zambia’s economic reliance on Rhodesia was well established at the time of UDI, its response was calculated to take into account this fact. In the context of the OAU’s response to UDI, Zambia sought to strike a balance between supporting the OAU’s revolutionary approach on one hand, and on the other, taking into account its economic concerns. It is possible to suggest that in the initial stages, Zambia’s economic concerns constrained its ability to play a full part in the OAU’s efforts to dismantle UDI. However, as the struggle

\textsuperscript{409} Nyerere, \textit{Rhodesia}, p.7.
progressed and Zambia began to progressively extricate its economy from Rhodesia by
developing alternative routes as shown in Chapter 6, it assumed a more decisive role in
Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

By the time the Lusaka Manifesto was adopted in 1969, and following the successful
hosting of the conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka in 1970, the OAU
recognised the significance of Zambia’s diplomatic efforts in the struggle for black majority
rule in southern Africa. Consequently, African leaders elected Kaunda as Chairman of the
OAU in September 1970 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. During his tenure as chairman, Kaunda
emerged as a leading critic of white minority supremacy in southern Africa. He did not only
consistently express solidarity with liberation movements, but also persistently denounced
white minority regimes for promoting oppressive policies against Africans and denying
them the right to self-determination. He also vigorously campaigned against western support
of white minority regimes in the sub-region.410

Within the OAU context, it is important to emphasise the significance of the Lusaka
Manifesto in relation to Zambia’s diplomatic role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. As
noted, the manifesto underlined negotiations first rather than exclusive emphasis on violence
as the basis for achieving change. This approach became the dominant strategy of Zambia’s
diplomatic efforts designed to promote the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe.
From the diplomatic perspective, the Lusaka Manifesto was not the only attempt by the
OAU to try and define an appropriate strategy of confronting the problem of white minority

410 UNIP7/19/3 Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K.D Kaunda on the
occasion of the opening of Third Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 8
September, 1970., see also UNIP7/23/16 Heads of State Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries,
Lusaka September 1970, NAZMFA1/1/24 Loc. 512 International Conference on Economic Sanctions against
South Africa, 1965-1970. Republic of Zambia, Inward Telegram No. 932 sent to Foreign Affairs Ministry,
Lusaka from Foreign Ministry Nairobi on 21/07/1970.

© University of Pretoria
rule in Rhodesia and southern Africa in general. When the OAU recognised that white minority regimes had failed to embrace the overtures on peaceful negotiations contained in the Lusaka Manifesto, they revised the strategy. In October 1971, the OAU adopted the Mogadishu Declaration in which it expressed total support for the liberation movements and affirmed the necessity of intensifying armed struggle.\(^411\) Again in April 1975, following the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola, the OAU adopted the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration in which African leaders singled out Rhodesia and Namibia as priorities of concentrating the struggle. They also recognised the strategic significance of South Africa to the complete decolonisation of southern Africa in view of its extension of military, political and economic support to Rhodesia and illegal occupation of Namibia.\(^412\)

Although the OAU revised its strategies on southern Africa, it had limited impact on Zambia’s own perception of the preferred method of dismantling white minority rule in southern Africa and Rhodesia in particular. As noted, the Zambian government maintained a dual approach in supporting the struggle against white minority rule in Rhodesia. While it backed armed struggle ferociously waged by the liberation movements, it simultaneously continued to explore possibilities of securing a negotiated diplomatic political solution to the Rhodesian problem. In this endeavor, Zambia’s role was successful.

**Zambia at the United Nations**

The Commonwealth and the OAU were not the only platforms where Zambia played a key diplomatic role in promoting the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe. After joining the world body in 1964, Zambia played the same role and maintained its reputation as one of the leading UN member states in the frontline of the struggle for international

---


peace and security. Concerning the liberation of southern Africa, Zambia’s stand at the UN was based on the premise that the continued presence of the racist minority regimes in the region constituted a permanent threat to international peace and security.\footnote{NAZMFA1/1/141 Loc. 515 UN General Assembly Twenty First Session, 1966, see Address to the United Nations by His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, Tuesday 15 November 1966.} Thus, they needed to be dismantled. For Rhodesia, the problem of white minority rule emerged as one of the most important political issues which dominated debates at the UN, both in the General Assembly and the Security Council from the mid-1960s onwards. Zambia actively participated in all the UN debates on Rhodesia as an emissary of the OAU represented by the African Group as well as in its own individual capacity.\footnote{In December 1965, the OAU Council of Ministers elected Zambia, Senegal and Algeria to represent OAU’s interests on Rhodesia at the UN. The three countries constituted the African Group.} As in the Commonwealth and the OAU, the persistent theme which characterised Zambia’s statements at the UN was the demand that Britain enforces its authority in Rhodesia by military means to quell the rebellion.\footnote{NAZMFA1/1/141 Loc. 515 UN General Assembly Twenty-First Session, 1966 Address by the Hon. S.M Kapwepwe, M.P Zambia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of Zambia’s Delegation to the Twenty-First Session of the General Assembly, 1966, NAZMFA1/1/141 Loc. 515 UN General Assembly Twenty-First Session, 1966 see United Nations General Debates, Statement by Hon. S.M Kapwepwe, M.P Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Twenty-First Session of the General Assembly 14 October 1966. See also NAZMFA1/1/141 Loc. 515 UN General Assembly Twenty-First Session 1966 see Address to the United Nations by His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, Tuesday 15 November 1966.} That the problem of white minority rule in Rhodesia became more understood by the international community was partly as a result of Zambia’s diplomatic effort at the UN. The President of Senegal, M. Leopold-Sedar Senghor confirmed this fact when he addressed a letter to Kaunda in November 1966:

… I wish to express my appreciation and that of my government and people for the efforts which your country has made in finding solutions to the problem of Rhodesia. As a member of the OAU, and particularly as one of the three countries elected by the OAU Council of Ministers in December last year [1965] to look after Rhodesia at the United Nations, your Foreign Minister has done a lot of work in presenting the issue in the
best possible way. That Rhodesia is more understood by the world today is partly due to the contribution made by your country.\textsuperscript{416}

Zambia’s diplomatic role at the UN in relation to the Rhodesian problem became more visible when it was elected to the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member in January 1969, a position it held until December 1970. Zambia’s election to the Security Council was based on its dedication and devotion to the promotion of international peace and security. During the two-year period it sat on the Security Council, Zambian representatives effectively participated in the 15-member council’s deliberations aimed at maintaining peace and security globally. For Zambian diplomats, Rhodesia was often uppermost on the agenda. They issued numerous statements, drawing the Security Council’s attention to the injustices inflicted on Africans by the Rhodesian government. They also played a leading role in supporting and co-sponsoring resolutions calling on the Security Council to take firm action against the Rhodesian government. Zambian representatives interpreted the continuation of white minority rule in Rhodesia as an existential threat to international peace and security. Thus, it had to be removed. They exposed and condemned all forms of political maneuvers embarked on by the Rhodesian government in its attempt to gain international legitimacy and acceptance. So long as such political ploys failed to guarantee self-determination to Rhodesian Africans, Zambia denounced such tactics and urged the international community to reject Rhodesia’s bid to gain international recognition.

For instance, when the Rhodesian government announced its intentions to hold a referendum in order to establish a new constitution in June 1969, Zambia’s Minister of

\begin{footnotesize}\textsuperscript{416} NAZMFA1/1/70 Loc. 503 O.A.U Summit: Accra Conference, 1965, see letter dated 13 November 1966 addressed to Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of Zambia by his Excellency M. Leopold-Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal, Dakar, Senegal.\end{footnotesize}
Foreign Affairs was categorical in denouncing such moves. Addressing the Security Council on 13 June 1969, Elijah Mudenda stated that:

Any so-called ‘constitution’ promulgated by the rebels, especially if it is, as it can only be, a rejection of the principle of self-determination, will never be recognized by my government. I have every hope that this will be the view of all peace loving nations. The basic issue is the existence of an illegal racist minority regime in Rhodesia which has denied the majority of the people of Zimbabwe the right to self-determination …. To remove that regime and to bring about the effective application of the principle of self-determination, majority rule and sovereignty is our goal ….

In addition, Mudenda not only denounced the British government for their “disastrous proposals on the Fearless” which, in his view, would “put off majority rule in Zimbabwe for a lengthy period of time,” but also called on the Security Council to adopt effective measures against the Rhodesian government. Again in March 1970, a Zambian diplomat, L. S Muuka appealed to the Security Council to adopt effective measures to overthrow the Rhodesian regime following its declaration of a republican status. During the same month, Zambia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Moto Nkama, issued several statements to the Security Council calling for the strengthening of sanctions on Rhodesia. He condemned Britain for failing to implement effective sanctions against the illegal regime, and for blocking the Security Council from taking firm action on Rhodesia. He also

---

418 The Fearless Proposals of 1968 were part of the wider attempt by the British government to secure a political settlement of the Rhodesian problem by direct negotiations with Ian Smith. The Fearless Proposals were preceded by the talks aboard the British HMS Tiger in 1966 and subsequently by the Pearce Deliberations in 1971. The Tiger Talks, the Fearless Proposals and the Pearce Constitutional Referendum were all rejected by both ZAPU and ZANU on account of their failure to guarantee immediate majority rule for the Africans.
emphasised the need for the Security Council to provide material support to ZAPU and ZANU.\textsuperscript{421}

Furthermore in November 1970, Zambia’s Ambassador to the UN, Vernon Johnson Mwaanga, called a meeting of the Security Council in order to: i) reaffirm its condemnation of the illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia; ii) urge the government of the United Kingdom not to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia before majority rule; iii) ensure that the Conservative government in Britain continues the policy of sanctions against the illegal Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia; iv) urge all states to observe Security Council sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; v) deplore the attitude of those states which have persisted in giving moral, political and economic assistance to the rebel colony and; vi) urge all states not to grant any form of recognition to the illegal regime in Salisbury.\textsuperscript{422} Mwaanga also urged the Security Council to seriously consider the problem of white minority rule in Rhodesia by not only supporting resolutions aimed at maintaining pressure on the illegal Rhodesian government but also by taking practical measures to implement them.\textsuperscript{423}

The themes that featured prominently in statements and speeches issued by Zambian diplomats and representatives at the UN,\textit{vis-à-vis} Rhodesia can be summarised into the following specific aspects: they i) condemned the Rhodesian government for denying Africans the right to self-determination based on majority rule; ii) urged Britain to adopt

military measures to dismantle UDI; ii) maintained pressure on Britain to live up to its responsibility of granting independence to Rhodesia based on majority rule; iii) appealed to the Security Council to adopt strong measures on Rhodesia including tightening of economic and political sanctions; iv) lobbied the Security Council and the wider international community to provide diplomatic, moral and material support for the Zimbabwe nationalist movements; v) urged the international community to isolate the Rhodesian government by refraining from giving it any form of recognition and; vi) supported all resolutions which were aimed at sustaining economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Rhodesia’s white minority government.

From the diplomatic perspective, Zambia’s role at the UN in relation to promoting the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe was positive and achieved some measure of success. It managed to attract the attention of the international community to the problem of white minority rule and the need to grant the people of Zimbabwe the right to self-determination based on majority rule. Nonetheless, Zambia’s diplomacy at the world body was partly frustrated on account of the attitude of western powers. Because of their vested economic and political interests in Rhodesia and the wider southern Africa sub-region, the USA and Britain, supported by France, Italy, West Germany and Japan, often vetoed or abstained from several resolutions introduced by Zambian diplomats calling for strong measures against the Rhodesian government. For instance, on 21 November 1969, Britain and the United States voted against a resolution on Rhodesia, tabled by Zambia and supported by Afro-Asian countries, affirming the inalienable right of the peoples of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence. The resolutions also called for, *inter-alia*, condemnation of Britain for its refusal and failure to crash the racist rebels and urged it to
take effective measures against Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{424} Again in March 1970, the United States and Britain vetoed a resolution tabled by Zambia and backed by Sierra Leone, Nepal, Burundi and Syria condemning “the Republic of Rhodesia and British failure to deal effectively with the rebels.” The resolution also called for withdrawal of South African troops from Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{425}

**Zambia and the Front Line States**

After the mid-1970s, subsequent to the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa, Zambia’s commitment to the liberation of Zimbabwe entered a new phase. It intensified diplomatic efforts aimed at finding a peaceful political solution to Rhodesia’s problem of white minority rule. Zambia, in collaboration with other Front Line States—Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola,\textsuperscript{426} played a decisive role in the final years leading up to the end of white minority rule and the creation of an independent Zimbabwe in 1980.

**Détente**

After the Portuguese colonial empire collapsed and Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola emerged as independent states, attempts to secure a peaceful political solution to the Rhodesian conflict became a practical possibility. Kaunda recognised the strategic significance of South Africa’s role to the continued survival of the Rhodesian government. After all, since 1965, South Africa had been extending economic, political and military aid to the Rhodesian government in defiance of international sanctions.\textsuperscript{427} But the thaw in the relationship between South Africa—the seat of white supremacy in southern Africa—and

\textsuperscript{424}Zimbabwe News Vol. 8, No.10 (1974), see article entitled “Zimbabwe and Zambia: Comrades in Arms”, pp.4-5.

\textsuperscript{425}Zimbabwe News Vol. 8, No.10 (1974), pp.4-5.


the rest of Africa was initiated by the South African Prime Minister, Johannes Balthazar Vorster when he realised that white supremacy in Rhodesia was indefensible in the face of increased military pressure by the liberation forces in the region. Thus, in October 1974, Vorster gave a conciliatory speech seeking to improve South Africa’s relations with the rest of Africa.\textsuperscript{428} Kaunda seized the opportunity and responded favourably to Vorster’s speech, describing it as “the voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting.” This heralded the beginning of détente in southern Africa.\textsuperscript{429}

The beginning of détente in the region coincided with an eruption of a serious internal crisis in ZANU resulting in the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, ZANU’s Chief of Operations in Lusaka in March 1975. Later in Chapter 5, when examining the attitudes of Zimbabwean nationalists regarding Zambia’s role in the liberation struggle, the theme of ZANU internal crisis and Chitepo’s murder, and other related developments will be analysed in detail in the context of détente which the Zambian government fiercely promoted. This is vital because of the enduring ZANU nationalists’ narratives about Zambia’s alleged attempt to halt the armed struggle in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{430}

 Meanwhile, Zambia embarked on extensive diplomatic consultations with South Africa in order to enlist its support for a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian conflict.\textsuperscript{431}

\textsuperscript{430} There are several accounts which propagate this view, but for the comparatively recent works, see the two memoirs by ZANU members who played vital roles in the liberation struggle: Agrippah Mutambara, The Rebel in Me: A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Rhodesian Bush War, 1975-1980 (Pinetown: 30° South Publisher, 2014), pp.96-101 and Fay Chung, Reliving the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe Liberation Struggle (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006), pp.85-123. See also Luise White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp.16-40.
\textsuperscript{431} In any case, diplomatic consultations between the two leaders had been going on since 1968 through intermittent exchange of letters, see ‘Dear Mr. Vorster … Details of Exchanges between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa’ University of Zambia Library’s Special Collection Gov. Zam (02) 1971.
Because South Africa had been giving military support to the Rhodesian government, the Zambian government urged it to exercise its unique influence by exerting pressure on Ian Smith to negotiate with Zimbabwean nationalists. Thus, Kaunda appealed to the South African leader to withdraw police units from Rhodesia which had been assisting Rhodesian security forces in counter-insurgency operations against ZANLA forces. He responded by pledging to freeze the guerrilla war if Rhodesians would come to the conference table.\textsuperscript{432}

Ostensibly under pressure from Vorster, Smith temporarily released some black nationalist leaders from detention in November 1974 in order for them to attend a meeting in Lusaka. These included among others, Ndabaningi Sithole, President of ZANU, Joshua Nkomo, President of ZAPU and Robert Mugabe, the Secretary General of ZANU. They had been in detention since 1964. They were joined by Abel Bishop Tendekayi Muzorewa, leader of the African National Council (ANC), and James Chikerema, President of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI).\textsuperscript{433} The ANC was formed in December 1971 by leading Rhodesian African clergy and some former members of banned nationalist parties. Led by Bishop Muzorewa, the head of the United Methodist Church and Rev. Canaan Banana, another African Methodist leader as Vice-Chairman, the ANC’s major aim was to campaign against the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals signed between the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Rhodesia’s Prime Minister, Ian Smith.\textsuperscript{434} By March 1972, the ANC was transformed into a political party.

\textsuperscript{432}\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol. 11, No. 10 (1974), p.3404A.  
\textsuperscript{433}FROLIZI was formed in October 1971 by some ZAPU and ZANU elements who sought to be “independent of squabbling leaders of the two liberation movements.” The front was initially led by Shelton Siwela. ZAPU leadership condemned FROLIZI as “a haven of refuge for political rejects while ZANU described it as a “nepotistic grouping” which was “determined to sabotage the liberation struggle.” See \textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol. 8 No. 10 15 November 1971, p.2264B  
\textsuperscript{434}For details of the proposed settlement, see a “Special Documentation Supplement on Rhodesia” in \textit{Africa Research Bulletin} 15 December (1971), pp.2-15. Against opposition from African nationalists, the British
Between November and December 1974, and backed by Frontline leaders, Nyerere and Khama, Kaunda held secret but separate meetings with nationalist leaders in which he informed them that a new situation (détente) was developing in southern Africa and that it presented a unique opportunity to achieve Zimbabwe’s independence without further bloodshed. At the same time, secret diplomatic contacts were taking place between Kaunda and Frontline leaders on one hand, and South African and Rhodesian governments, on the other. The secret negotiations culminated in a meeting on 6 December 1974 at State House in Lusaka between the nationalists and representatives of the Rhodesian government. The object of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of convening a constitutional conference on Rhodesia. However, the meeting foundered on account of procedural pre-conditions which both parties attached to attending any future meeting. The nationalists, represented by ZANU, ZAPU and the ANC demanded: i) release of all political prisoners by the Rhodesian government; ii) revocation of sentences for political offences and suspension of trials of political offences; iii) lifting of the ban on ZANU and ZAPU as well as the 16-year old state of emergency; iv) withdrawal from Zimbabwe of all South African soldiers and; v) general amnesty to all Zimbabweans outside and inside the country.

On the other hand, the Rhodesian government representatives demanded an end to “terrorist activities” and an agreement to conduct political activities peacefully and within the law. These demands were unacceptable to the nationalists. They emphasised that there would be no ceasefire unless a definite date was set for a constitutional conference based on government presented the settlement proposals to the people of Rhodesia through a “Test of Acceptability.” This was a British requirement which was conducted by a Commission (Chaired by Lord Pearce) appointed by the British government to ascertain whether or not those proposals were acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as whole. Predictably, Rhodesian Africans overwhelmingly rejected the proposals, see Africa Research Bulletin Vol.9 No.5 15 June 1972, p.2480A

Ellert, The Rhodesian War Front, p.59.

immediate transfer of power to the majority. Recognising the significance of unity among the nationalists in confronting future negotiations, Kaunda, backed by Nyerere and Khama, convinced Zimbabwean nationalists to forge a united front. Consequently, nationalist leaders—Sithole for ZANU, Nkomo for ZAPU, Muzorewa for ANC and Chikerema for FROLIZI—signed the Unity Accord on 8 December 1974 incorporating the four nationalist organisations under a United African National Council (UANC) with Muzorewa as president. Although the talks in Lusaka collapsed, Kaunda continued with secret diplomatic efforts designed to secure South Africa’s help in convincing the Rhodesian government to quickly return to a constitutional conference. Calling for the speedy progress towards the conference table, Kaunda warned Smith not to act “like an ostrich, burying his head in the sand, blind to reality” because

It is either majority rule through peaceful means—and there has been more than a fair chance for this in the past few months—or the resumption of armed struggle …. Smith has not got a chance in a million in the current liberation struggle. We say to him, yield, yield or Salisbury will fall like Phnom Penh and Saigon. Smith and his henchmen will flee like puppet Thieu. The ANC must pin Mr. Smith down either at the conference table or on the battle field. It is either negotiation or armed struggle. There is absolutely nothing in between.

By June 1975, both the Rhodesian government and the ANC agreed to discuss Rhodesia’s problem without pre-conditions. Vorster, Smith and Mark Chona, representing Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania met in Pretoria and, after two days of talks, produced what came to be commonly known as the Pretoria Agreement on 9 August 1975. It stated that an agreement had been reached on proposals which could lead to a settlement of Rhodesia’s constitutional problem. The main provisions of the “Pretoria Agreement” stated that:

439 See the full text of the Unity Accord at *Africa Research Bulletin* Vol.11 No.12 (1975), p.3467C.
i) the Rhodesian government through its ministerial representatives and the ANC, through their appointed representatives will meet not later than 25 August on the Victoria Falls bridge in coaches supplied by the South African government for a formal conference without any pre-conditions:

ii) the objectives of the formal meetings are to give the parties the opportunity to publicly express their genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable settlement;

iii) after this the conference will adjourn to enable the parties to discuss proposals for a settlement in committee or committees within Rhodesia;

iv) thereafter, the parties will meet again in formal conference anywhere decided upon to ratify the committee proposals which have been agreed upon;

v) the South African government and the governments of Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, respectively, have expressed their willingness to ensure that this agreement is implemented by the two parties involved.\(^{441}\) The Pretoria Agreement formed the basis for the Victoria Falls constitutional conference.

**Victoria Falls Conference**

Held on 25 August 1975 in a railway coach belonging to South African Railways on the bridge over the Victoria Falls on the Rhodesia-Zambian border, the conference was attended by the Rhodesian government led by Ian Smith and the nationalists led by Bishop Muzorewa as well as representatives of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique. It was convened to afford both parties the opportunity to declare their intentions to negotiate an

\(^{441}\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} \ Vol. 12, No. 8 (1975), p.3738A.
acceptable settlement of the Rhodesian problem. Although Kaunda and Vorster had given the Rhodesian government and the ANC an ultimatum to begin constitutional talks within seven days and produce a settlement within two months, the meeting ended in deadlock, each party blaming the other for the breakdown of the discussions. Clearly, talks ended in deadlock mainly because both parties had little appetite to ensure their success.

There were compelling reasons which prompted Vorster and Kaunda to seek a negotiated political solution to the Rhodesian conflict. Vorster recognised that political patterns in southern Africa had shifted in favour of liberation forces following the defeat and subsequent withdrawal of Portugal from Mozambique and Angola. New prospects of an escalating guerrilla war along Rhodesia’s eastern frontier with Mozambique emerged after FRELIMO led by Samora Machel took over the country’s government. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces had begun a new offensive by opening a second front against Rhodesia, infiltrating heavily armed groups from Zambia across the Zambezi River into the north and north-western areas of the country. South Africa needed a stable neighbour in Rhodesia but it was no longer prepared to defend it given the mounting guerrilla threat. Rhodesia was becoming a burden, economically and militarily. By securing a peaceful political settlement in Rhodesia, South Africa hoped to

443 UNIP8/4/9 Political, Constitutional and Foreign Affairs Reports, 1975, see “ANC Press Statement,” see also UNIP 7/23/53 Reports, 1975-78 “Speech by His Honour A.G Zulu, M.C.C, Secretary General of the Party at a Banquet in Honour of the Indian Vice President, New Delhi, 2 September, 1975.
tame the tide of increased guerrilla activity and guarantee the stability of its erstwhile neighbour and, ultimately, its own.

For Kaunda, there were both practical reasons and moral considerations which accounted for his preference for a negotiated solution in Rhodesia. From the practical perspective, economic considerations were of paramount concern. During the period under review, Zambia’s economy was under enormous strain, precipitated, partly, by the border closure with Rhodesia in January 1973 and, partly, by external forces. As noted in Chapter 6, on 9 January 1973, Ian Smith closed the border with Zambia for allowing its territory to be used as a “terrorist” launching pad for military attacks on Rhodesia. The closure of the border affected the entire structure of the Zambian economy. The blockade entailed complete diversion of Zambia’s import and export traffic from the southern route to other routes. At the time of the blockade, the import and export trade stood at 900,000 tonnes and 400,000 tonnes, respectively.446 To divert this traffic required huge amounts of resources. Moreover, Zambia could not use the Benguela Railways on the route through Angola to Lobito on the Atlantic coast for its import and export trade due to the civil war which had broken out in Angola.447 However, the economic problems which Zambia experienced during this period were also as a result of external forces. The global economic recession engendered a decline in commodity prices of copper and a rise in oil prices on the international market. Due to the reduction of copper prices on the London Metal Exchange

447 See Chapter Two.
(LME), Zambia’s foreign asset position rapidly eroded away from the record high of around K245 Million in June 1974 to only K26 Million in April 1975.  

By securing a swift political settlement in Rhodesia, Zambia hoped to ease its economic strain because a new friendly government would guarantee its supply lines for import and export trade which had been severely disrupted by the liberation war. Thus, there was an economic motive behind Zambia’s diplomatic moves to secure a negotiated solution to Rhodesia’s problem. This confirms assertions by some scholars that Zambia participated in détente for its economic interests. Propagating a ZANU narrative of détente, scholars such as Fay Chung and Andre Astrow have questioned the entire détente exercise and Zambia’s role in it, claiming it was designed to disarm ZANLA, stop the liberation war and bring about a moderate African government in Zimbabwe. They contend that Zambia keenly promoted détente mainly for economic reasons. It is true that Zambia was facing economic difficulties during this period and thus, certainly for practical reasons, Kaunda played an active role in promoting détente. However, to suggest that Kaunda wanted to stop the liberation war in Zimbabwe at any cost in order to promote détente is not entirely correct. He only resorted to negotiations when it was convenient and circumstances offered the best prospects for a genuine settlement. But when he recognised, as this study suggests, that negotiations were no longer viable due to the intransigence of the Rhodesian government, he promptly reinvigorated his support for an intensified guerrilla war.

449 Wina interview cited, Kazembe interview cited.
Chung and Astrow’s narratives tend to overlook the aspect of Kaunda’s moral sensibilities in determining his attitude towards war. As a disciple of Gandhi, Kaunda believed in non-violence and therefore regarded the continued loss of lives through armed struggle as a direct challenge to the sanctity and dignity of human life. A speedy political settlement in Rhodesia would have certainly removed the cause of war and spared many lives which, otherwise, were bound to be lost in a protracted liberation war.

There was also a genuine belief within the leadership of the Zambian government that Zimbabwe liberation war would ultimately be resolved by negotiations no matter how protracted the war would rage. Consequently, Zambia found it necessary to talk to its enemies and encouraged the nationalists to negotiate in order to bring an end to the war. Nonetheless, because of Kaunda’s willingness to negotiate a political settlement of the Rhodesian conflict and because he sometimes conducted secret diplomacy to try and achieve this objective, some Zimbabwean nationalists and Frontline Presidents, particularly Samora Machel and Julius Nyerere, not only questioned his revolutionary credentials, but also accused him of conspiring to install Joshua Nkomo as president of an independent Zimbabwe. Chapter 5 presents a detailed discussion of this theme.

Intensification of Armed Struggle

Soon after the collapse of the Victoria Falls Conference, cracks began to appear within the ANC. Early in September 1975, Bishop Muzorewa expelled Joshua Nkomo from the organisation for opposing the establishment of an external section of the ANC under the name of Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC). The election of Joshua Nkomo as President

---

453 Wina interview cited, Chona interview cited.
454 Chona interview cited.
455 See Chapter 5.
of the ANC at a two-day congress in Salisbury on 28 September 1975 sealed the
disintegration of the organisation.\footnote{\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol. 12, No. 9 (1975), p.3766A.} Nkomo emerged as the leader of the internal faction of the ANC based in Rhodesia while Muzorewa remained the leader of the external wing of the ANC based in exile in Lusaka. Between December 1975 and March 1976, Nkomo, backed by Kaunda, attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a constitutional settlement with Ian Smith. The negotiations reached an impasse mainly because Ian Smith only accepted majority rule in some indefinite future “too far ahead to be accepted by the ANC.”\footnote{\textit{Zimbabwe Review} Vol.5 No.2 March/April (1976) “End of the Talks: What Next?”}

As a result of this impasse, Zambia reinvigorated its commitment to an intensified armed struggle, hoping to force the Rhodesian government back to the negotiating table. A catalogue of Kaunda’s statements reflected Zambia’s determination to strengthen its commitment to escalate guerrilla war against the Rhodesian government. For instance in February 1976, Kaunda noted that a Rhodesian constitutional settlement was unlikely and that a blood-bath was inevitable. He warned that “before Zimbabwe is born, there is going to be a blood-bath in that country” adding that Zambia had to be prepared for the resultant turmoil.\footnote{\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol. 12, No. 12 (1976), p.3939A.} Shortly before a meeting of Frontline Presidents in Lusaka in March, Kaunda explained that since Smith had refused to accept peaceful change, majority rule must “irrevocably be decided on the battle field.”\footnote{\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol.13 No.2 (1976), p.3973B, \textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol.13 No.2 (1976), p.4002C.} Again during a luncheon held in honour of the US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger at State House in April 1976, Kaunda appealed to the United States government to persuade Smith to hand over power to the majority, warning that:
... we together with the six million Zimbabweans are no longer walking on the road of peaceful change ... Zimbabweans are on the war path. We support them as we did before. Just as we left no stone unturned on our previous roads, we will leave no stone unturned in the march to majority rule by armed struggle. Our commitment to intensified armed struggle is as total as that which led us into discussions with Mr. Vorster. The war in Rhodesia will not stop until Zimbabwe is born. Therefore, the answer to ending the war is very simple. Smith and his colleagues must hand over power to the majority and then the war will end.\textsuperscript{460}

Kaunda’s warnings about the escalation of the guerrilla war were not empty rhetoric. They reflected practical realities on the ground. The immediate background to the intensification of the armed struggle during the period under review was—as will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 5—the creation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) by the Front Line States in January 1976. It confirmed David Moore’s assertion that the failure of détente convinced the leaders of the Front Line States to look for an alternative mode of pressuring the powers that were to push Ian Smith out of Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{461} Led by an 18-man High Command, ZIPA was created by integrating some ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas into one fighting force. The objective was to: i) consolidate unity among ANC fighters; ii) recruit and integrate training of cadres in preparations for the intensified armed struggle; iii) jointly deploy combatants and mobilise the masses; iv) consolidate a single military command.\textsuperscript{462}

Thus, ZIPA opened a “third-front” from Mozambique and stepped up guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia. The ZIPA offensive followed the announcement by Mozambican President Samora Machel in March 1976 that he had closed his country’s border with Rhodesia, “put his country on a war footing” and would rigidly enforce sanctions on the

\textsuperscript{460} Kenneth D. Kaunda, “From Negotiations to Armed Struggle in southern Africa:” Speech by President Kaunda at a Luncheon in honour of the American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, 27 April 1976 \textit{Zango: Zambian Journal of Contemporary Issues,} No.1, September 1976, pp.1-5.

\textsuperscript{461} David Moore, “The Zimbabwe People’s Army: Strategic Innovation or More of the Same?” in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds) \textit{Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War} Vol. one (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), pp.73-86.

\textsuperscript{462} \textit{Zimbabwe Review} Vol.5 No.5 September/October (1976), see ‘editorial’.

© University of Pretoria
Meanwhile, ZIPRA forces based in Zambia also stepped up guerrilla attacks by infiltrating armed bands across the Zambezi into Rhodesia. This was partly as a result of the steady increase in the shipment of duty free military weapons into the country from the Soviet Union. Thus, the opening of the “third front” by ZIPA forces from Mozambique combined with increasing military support of ZIPRA fighters based in Zambia enabled the nationalist guerrilla forces to intensify attacks in Rhodesia.

The escalation of guerrilla war in Rhodesia prompted Ian Smith to begin modifying his attitude towards majority rule. In March 1976, he not only hinted at the possibility of abandoning UDI, but also invited the British government to play a positive role in Rhodesia’s constitutional issues. In response, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, James Callaghan outlined four pre-conditions under which Britain would be prepared to re-enter negotiations on Rhodesia’s constitution for independence. They included the following: i) a time limit of 18 months to two years for elections establishing majority rule; ii) acceptance of majority rule; iii) agreement that there will be no independence before majority rule and; iv) that negotiations must not be long drawn out. But these proposals were rejected by the Rhodesian government.

---

464 Kazembe Interview cited.
Kissinger Strategy

In the mid-1970s, the US government led by President Gerald Ford\textsuperscript{467} began to take active interest in the affairs of southern Africa. In 1976 Henry Kissinger toured southern Africa. Among other leaders, he met Kaunda in Lusaka in April. He “reaffirmed American support for the 1969 Lusaka manifesto on southern Africa” and the principle of “self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the people of southern Africa.”\textsuperscript{468} But the primary concern of the US administration in the region was more strategic than humanitarian. Its interest in the sub region was mainly dictated by Cold War considerations. The US government hoped to counteract the growing Soviet influence in the region. As discussed in Chapter 2, just the previous year in 1975, the Soviet Union had intervened in the Angolan civil war by providing military aid to the Cuban-backed MPLA government which eventually defeated the pro-western alliance of FNLA-UNITA. The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the Zimbabwe nationalist forces by extending military aid, advisors and training.\textsuperscript{469} The visit to the region in March 1977 by both the Soviet President, Nikolai Podgorny and Cuban leader Fidel Castro was a public demonstration of their support for the liberation forces waging armed struggle against the white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. The commitment by the US administration to resolving the Rhodesian problem by peaceful means was partly meant to prevent the escalation of guerrilla war and preclude the possible intervention of its Cold War arch-rival—the Soviet Union. It was partly in response to Kaunda’s diplomatic initiative. In April 1975, Kaunda visited Washington and held discussions with President Ford concerning

\textsuperscript{467} He assumed office in 1974, replacing President Richard Nixon who was forced to resign following the Watergate Scandal in 1972. Ford would lose the 1976 elections to Jimmy Carter.

\textsuperscript{468} Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 13 No.2 March 15, 1976, p.4004B.

\textsuperscript{469} http://www.rhodesia.nl/commsupp.htm see “Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political Groups in Rhodesia” accessed on 27/08/2012 at 11:03 A.M.
problems of southern Africa. He secured American support for Zambia’s policy on Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{470}

During his shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger met both Kaunda, and Vorster on two occasions in 1976; first in Bavaria, West Germany in June and in Zurich, Switzerland in September. He also held discussions with Smith in Pretoria in September. The objective of these meetings was to affirm the US commitment to an early negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian problem.\textsuperscript{471} Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy culminated in a set of principles which formed the basis of his proposals for the constitutional settlement of Rhodesia’s problem of white minority rule. These included: (i) acceptance of majority rule within two years by Smith; (ii) the establishment of a transitional government; (iii) the structure of the transitional government; (a) council of state half of whose membership would be black, half white with a white chairman without voting power; (b) council of ministers with a black majority but the posts of defence and internal affairs going to whites; (iv) the United Kingdom to pass necessary independence legislation followed by a similar legislation being passed in Rhodesia; (v) once a transitional government is established, sanctions will be lifted, armed struggle will also end and; (vi) the international community will be asked to give economic aid. An Anglo-American trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia to help the country and compensate departing whites.\textsuperscript{472}

Both the South African and Rhodesian governments accepted the Kissinger Plan, but the Front Line States denounced the proposals claiming they were not sufficiently consulted.

\textsuperscript{470} See President Kaunda’s visit to Washington: Discussions with US President Ford, file scanned from the National Security Advisor’s Memorandum of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R Ford Presidential Library. See also Kaunda, “From Negotiations to Armed Struggle in southern Africa: Speech by President Kaunda at a Luncheon in honour of the American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, April 27, 1976,” pp.1-5.

\textsuperscript{471} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol. 13, No. 8 (1976), p.4131B.

The nationalists, whose approval was not sought, similarly rejected the Kissinger plan. Nonetheless, the Kissinger proposals were to form the basis of negotiations at Geneva. Following the failure of the Kissinger plan, Kaunda and his colleagues, Nyerere, Machel, Khama and Neto continued to maintain military pressure on the Rhodesian government through their support of guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia. At the same time they began calling on Britain as a colonial power to assume full decolonising responsibility for Rhodesia based on majority rule. Late in September 1976, they issued a statement in which they called upon Britain to immediately convene a conference outside Rhodesia with “the authentic and legitimate representatives of the people” to discuss the structure and functions of the transitional government and to set it up, to discuss the modalities for convening a full constitutional conference to work out the independence constitution and to establish the basis upon which peace and normality could be restored in the territory.

In response, the British government announced in September its intentions to convene a conference to discuss the formation of an interim government. The announcement set the stage for a conference in Geneva. Consequently, in response to British intentions to convene a conference, Kaunda and Frontline leaders prevailed on the nationalists to establish a common front so they could negotiate as a united political alliance. In October 1976, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe announced the formation of a joint “Patriotic Front”—a loose political alliance made up of ZAPU and ZANU. The co-leaders “decided to intensify the armed liberation struggle until the achievement of victory.” They also agreed to attend any conference as a joint delegation under joint leadership.

---

474 http://www.chronology: Rhodesia UDI: Road to Settlement accessed on 21/01/2014 at 10:30hrs.
475 http://www.chronology: Rhodesia UDI: Road to Settlement accessed on 21/01/2014 at 10:30hrs.
It is important to emphasise, in this context, the significance of Zambia’s role, particularly of Kaunda, in promoting unity among the Zimbabwean nationalists. Kaunda had long advocated for the creation of a common front among the nationalists since they commenced the armed struggle. Working with Vorster and Smith, he secured the release from prison in 1975 of the black nationalists so they could dialogue with them. Together with Nyerere, Kaunda assisted the nationalists to come together to talk as a unified front. Securing such a unified front was central to successful negotiations as it allowed both parties at the negotiating table to have equal power—a vital tool in all successful negotiations. With the creation of the Patriotic Front, he endeavoured to maintain the unity of the political alliance and kept them unified in their demands for black majority rule during negotiations.

**Geneva Conference**

The Geneva Conference opened on 28 October 1976 in Geneva Switzerland under the chairmanship of Ivor Richard, the British Ambassador to the United Nations. The Rhodesian government, led by Ian Smith, and the nationalists, led by Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa, Rev Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe attended the conference. Government observers from Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique as well as representatives of the OAU and Commonwealth also attended plenary sessions. The bone of contention between the Rhodesian government and the Patriotic Front was mainly the central issue of the structure and functions of an interim government. The major sticking point was the question of who was supposed to control the army and police during the transition period. The Patriotic Front proposed a 25-man Council of Ministers to rule the country during the interim period, of whom 80% would be members of the liberation

---

movements, ZAPU and ZANU. It supported the idea of a British Resident Commissioner during the transitional period, but on the crucial question of law and order, and defence, the Patriotic Front insisted that these must be in African hands.\textsuperscript{477} The Rhodesian government representatives rejected the idea of having a British Resident Commissioner during the transitional period. They also totally objected to the control of the army and police by the Patriotic Front. \textsuperscript{478} Ivor Richard adjourned the talks in December 1976. The talks were supposed to resume in January 1977 but they never did. The Geneva conference had failed.

At a meeting in Luanda, Angola, in January 1977, the Front Line Presidents decided to recognise the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the Zimbabwean people. In doing so, they effectively excluded Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC and Sithole’s ANC, the two nationalist groups which also attended the Geneva conference because, unlike the Patriotic Front, they were not controlling any army that was fighting against the Rhodesian forces. A stage was set in which Kaunda and the Front Line leaders would begin a vigorous campaign to convince the OAU that the Patriotic Front was the only legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe and, consequently, worthy of diplomatic, political, material and military support. In February 1977, the Front Line States secured the support of the Liberation Committee to provide unqualified support to the Nkomo-Mugabe alliance.\textsuperscript{479}

It was not until July of the same year that Kaunda secured the OAU’s recognition of the Patriotic Front as the only nationalist movement representing the Zimbabwean people.\textsuperscript{480} At the 14\textsuperscript{th} Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in

\textsuperscript{477} The Zimbabwe Review Vol.6 January (1977), see “The Patriotic Front’s Structure of Proposed Interim Government presented to Geneva Talks.”
\textsuperscript{478} Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 14 No. 1 (1977), P.4297B.
\textsuperscript{480} Zimbabwe News Vol.9 No. 2 May-June (1977), see editorial: Smith Inevitable Doom.”
Libreville, Gabon in July 1977, Kaunda spoke on behalf of the Frontline presidents, all of whom were absent from the conference. He told delegates that “the new Zimbabwe can only grow out of the barrel of a gun.” Appealing for recognition of the Patriotic Front as the only liberation force in the guerrilla war, Kaunda said: “it would be suicidal to allow the existence of more than one army.” Eventually, the conference adopted a resolution on Zimbabwe which, among others, called upon Zimbabweans devoted to the struggle for the liberation of their country to do so within the Patriotic Front and requested the Front Line States to assist in that direction.

Both the Prime Minister of Angola, Lopo do Nascimento and Joaquim Chissano, the Mozambican Minister of Foreign Affairs, observed after the meeting that Kaunda had played a decisive role in winning the conference over to the point of view of the Front Line countries. In particular, Chissano explained that Kaunda was able to convey the feelings of not only his fellow Heads of State in the Front Line countries, but also the feelings of the people of the southern African countries “who suffer the direct consequences of the liberation struggle.” The significance of the OAU’s recognition of the Patriotic Front as the sole liberation movement meant that only the Nkomo-Mugabe nationalist alliance could enjoy diplomatic, financial, political, material and military support from the OAU. However, the OAU’s decision had the effect of alienating other nationalist organisations, forcing them to return to Rhodesia and begin realigning themselves with the Rhodesian government which was hoping for an internal settlement.

Meanwhile, Ian Smith had to psychologically prepare the internal black leaders to accept an internal settlement. He began to progressively reform some racially discriminatory

---

legislation. For instance, he coopted some blacks into his cabinet, amended the Land Tenure Act which effectively opened up white agricultural land for purchase by people of all races. He also repealed legislation prohibiting multiracial sports at schools and other social activities and removed restrictions on the proportion of African children attending private schools.\textsuperscript{484} Although Smith’s “reforms” were cosmetic, they were good enough to attract internal nationalist leaders—Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema and Chief Jeremiah Chirau—who, as will be shown, participated in crafting a coalition government with Ian Smith in March 1978.

**Anglo-American Proposals**

Meanwhile, the failure of the Geneva conference and the escalation of guerrilla war prompted the British government to begin another search for a negotiated diplomatic solution to the Rhodesian problem. The drive for a new peace process was initiated by Dr. David Owen when he became the British Foreign Secretary early in 1977. In seeking the basis for negotiations on Rhodesia’s constitution for majority rule, he was assisted by a ‘Consultative Group’ on southern Africa consisting of John Graham, the Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in charge of African Affairs, and Stephen Low, the US Ambassador to Zambia. He also worked closely with Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State, and Andrew Young, the US Ambassador to the UN.

After a few months of consultations with the Front Line States, South African and Rhodesian governments, as well as the Patriotic Front, Dr. Owen presented the Anglo-American proposals on 1 September 1977. Apart from nominating Field Marshal Lord Carver as British Resident Commissioner-Designate to preside over the transitional period leading to majority rule elections, other proposals included: i) the surrender of power by the

illegal regime and a return to legality; ii) an orderly and peaceful transition to independence in the course of 1978; iii) free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage; iv) the establishment by the British government of a transitional administration with the task of conducting the elections during the transitional period; v) a United Nations presence, including a United Nations military force during the transition period; vi) an independent constitution providing for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination, the protection of individual human rights and the independence of the judiciary and; vii) a development fund to revive the economy of the country which the United Kingdom and the United States view as predicated upon the implementation of the settlement as whole.485

Both the South African and Rhodesian governments rejected the Anglo-American proposals. South Africa condemned the proposals for security arrangements in the country as incapable of creating the necessary conditions for a cease fire. Similarly, Smith denounced certain aspects of the proposals as “crazy’ and “insane” and dismissed the entire plan as “a very cunning scheme” designed to get the Patriotic Front into power.486 On the other hand, the Frontline leaders welcomed the proposals suggesting that they formed a “sufficient basis for further negotiations between the parties concerned.” Similarly, the Patriotic Front equally welcomed the Anglo-American plan but objected to certain specific aspects of the proposals, especially those dealing with the issue of transitional arrangements; the role of the Resident Commissioner, the question of who controls the army and police, and the role of the UN peace keeping force.487 In a statement released in Lusaka on 14 September 1977, Nkomo, the co-leader of the Patriotic Front, explained that the Anglo-

---

American “mechanics” for the transfer of power to Rhodesia’s 20—1 black majority would not lead to a genuinely independent Zimbabwe and emphasised that guerrilla war would continue until genuine independence was attained. He added that the Patriotic Front could not regard the Resident Commissioner as a neutral or impartial officer in view of the powers at his disposal:

> While we believe that a Resident Commissioner is inevitable for the process of decolonization, we cannot agree to his assumption of absolute colonial powers. Who can trust a colonialist with absolute power? The installation of a Resident Commissioner did not introduce neutrality. It is just a question of a preferable British colonial officer replacing an embarrassing one—Smith.488

In addition, Nkomo rejected proposals that the Rhodesian police force and elements of the army remain intact during the transition. He suggested that they should be completely dismantled. The Front also opposed the creation of a United Nations force contending that the force would be used to “frustrate and not advance the liberation struggle.”489

Smith’s rejection of the Anglo American proposals confirmed his desire to secure an internal settlement with the internally-based black leadership, an ambition he began cultivating after the failure of the Geneva conference. Late in November 1977, he began negotiations with internal black leaders such as Bishop Muzorewa, leader of the UANC, Ndabaningi Sithole (ANC) and Chief Jeremiah Chirau, leader of the Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation (ZUPO). While Smith was realigning himself with internal nationalist leaders, Dr. Owen, backed by Young, continued to make consultations on his proposals with the Front Line States and the Patriotic Front. This was in order to find an acceptable basis

for a negotiated settlement of Rhodesia’s constitutional problem. These consultations culminated in a meeting in Malta from 29 January to 1 February 1978.

**Malta**

The meeting was attended by Dr. Owen and Young, on one hand, and by Nkomo and Mugabe, the co-leaders of the Patriotic Front, on the other. Lord Carver and General Prem Chand, the UN special representative, was also in attendance. The aim of the meeting was to discuss the Anglo-American proposals. Most of the proposals presented by Dr. Owen were based on the original Anglo American plan outlined in September 1977. The only difference was that at Malta, Owen proposed a transitional constitution establishing a governing council which the Commissioner would be obliged to consult. The governing council would be presided over by the Resident Commissioner and would be composed of 10 other members to represent the parties which took part in the Geneva conference of 1976. The UN special representative, General Prem Chand would be able to attend all the meetings of the governing council and to take part in its discussions but without the right to vote. The governing council would be empowered to forward draft legislation to the Resident Commissioner which would become law, providing he agreed.⁴⁹⁰

Dr. Owen also proposed a two-tier system to assist the Resident Commissioner. At the upper level, there would be two committees under the chairmanship of the Resident Commissioner. These would be the Cease-fire Maintenance Committee, which would be responsible for all aspects of the organisation and maintenance of the cease-fire and the Transitional Military Committee which would be responsible for the reorganisation of the existing security forces and the creation of the Zimbabwe national army.⁴⁹¹

---

On the other hand, the Patriotic Front’s proposals called for total dismantling of the existing Rhodesian army and its replacement with the guerrilla forces which would become the country’s sole army. The proposals allowed for acceptable units of the Rhodesian forces to be incorporated into the nationalist army. The Patriotic Front also demanded that the internally-based nationalist leaders should not be given any seats on the proposed governing council and that a UN force should monitor a ceasefire in Rhodesia and supervise the registration of voters and independence elections based on one-man one-vote. The proposals also called for the removal of many judges and magistrates during the transition. The proposals did not mention any special safeguards for whites as previously envisaged in the Anglo-American plan.492

The meeting in Malta ended when the parties failed to compromise on two crucial issues—where power should lie in the transitional period leading up to independence and who should be in charge of law and order. While Nkomo and Mugabe insisted that it must be their guerrilla armies, Dr. Owen and Young maintained that it must be the UN peacekeeping force. On this rock, the Malta conference foundered.493 Despite disagreeing on the crucial issues, the parties achieved some measure of success regarding the role of the UN and the function and status of the Resident Commissioner. They both recognised that the UN and the Resident Commissioner would play a role but the difference lay in their interpretation of their roles. For example, the British envisioned the UN playing a major role while the Patriotic Front envisaged a minor one. The British expected that the Resident Commissioner would be the supreme leader in the land until elections, while the Patriotic

Front envisioned him being subordinate to and a member of a governing council made up of nominees of the Patriotic Front.\textsuperscript{494}

It would take another meeting (Malta II) in Dar-es-Salaam in April 1978 for the parties to secure agreement on contentious issues which previously divided them. This was partly as a result of the concessions given by the Patriotic Front. For instance, the Patriotic Front agreed to drop its opposition to a UN force controlling the police as long as the force had a clearly defined mandate. Concerning the powers of the Resident Commissioner, the Patriotic Front agreed to allow Lord Carver to exercise executive powers over the security forces on condition that it was accorded a dominant role in the governing council of which the Resident Commissioner would be a member.\textsuperscript{495}

**Internal Settlement**

Dr. Owen’s attempt to enlist the support of the Patriotic Front for his proposals coincided with Smith’s frantic efforts to secure a negotiated settlement with internal nationalists. Since December 1977, Smith had been negotiating with internal black leadership. The talks culminated in an eight-point agreement in February 1978. In March, Smith signed the constitution, legalising the internal settlement.\textsuperscript{496}

The internal settlement galvanised Zambia’s determination to intensify the armed struggle. Soon after Smith announced the internal settlement, Kaunda issued several statements in parliament affirming Zambia’s support for an intensified armed struggle.\textsuperscript{497}

But he construed Zambia’s commitment to the escalation of guerrilla war not as an end, but

\textsuperscript{494}Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 15, No. 2 (1978), p.4755B.

\textsuperscript{495}Africa Research Bulletin Vol.15, No. 4 (1978), p.4827B.

\textsuperscript{496}See the full text of the agreement at Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 15, No. 3 (1978), pp.4787C-4788B.

a means of coercing the Rhodesian government back to the negotiating table with the Patriotic Front, the “legitimate and authentic” representatives of the Zimbabwean people. The Front Line States also pledged to support the intensification of the armed struggle. The Patriotic Front equally denounced the internal settlement as a “sell-out” and vowed to overthrow the Rhodesian government through armed struggle. Addressing the UN Security Council, Mugabe explained that the “so-called internal settlement” did not address the “transfer of power to the majority with respect to the institutions of power that are the linchpin of the racist colonial system of the Rhodesian minority regime.” Nkomo similarly observed that following an internal settlement, there was no fundamental change in the Rhodesian situation because the “seat of power—the army, the police, the judiciary, the civil service” remained firmly in the hands of Ian Smith and his minority. Mugabe also spoke about the internal settlement after attending the OAU Foreign Ministers meeting in Tripoli in February 1978. He rejected the “agreement between Ian Smith and some reactionary puppets in Zimbabwe” and pledged to continue with armed struggle until total victory.

Guerrilla Buildup and Escalation of War

Clearly, the foregoing statements affirming the intensification of the armed struggle reflected a new phase in the liberation war propelled by increased numbers of recruits and the quality of weapons and training at the disposal of the liberation movements. ZANLA had been sending armed groups from Mozambique into Rhodesia, steadily building up the numbers of guerrillas in the country. It was estimated that by mid-1979, there were around

498 For the full text of the communique see Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 15, No.3 (1978), pp.4791C-4792A.  
10,000 to 11,000 ZANLA fighters inside Rhodesia and between 2,000 and 3,000 ZIPRA forces.\textsuperscript{501} The concentration of armed bands of guerrilla fighters inside Rhodesia was overstretching the Rhodesian security forces.

Because of an increased recruitment rate, there was also a steady build-up of ZIPRA fighters in Zambia in 1978. It was reported from Botswana, the main conduit for Nkomo supporters seeking military training, that in 1977 alone, 15,000 men had fled Rhodesia, ostensibly to join ZIPRA.\textsuperscript{502} Most of the men were being trained by Cuban forces in several training camps across the Zambian border with Angola. They were regularly transported to rear bases in Zambia by lorries with Cuban escort. By June 1978, there was an estimated number of between 8000 and 10,000 fully trained ZIPRA fighters stationed in Zambia and ready to march into Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{503}

The shooting down of two Air Rhodesia Viscount civilian aircraft in September 1978 and February 1979, not only underlined the escalation of the war, but also reflected the nature and quality of weapons at the disposal of the ZIPRA forces. The Soviet Union increased supply of sophisticated weapons including the ground-to-air missiles, high caliber anti-aircraft guns and recoilless rifles to ZIPRA forces, a move that prompted Mugabe to express concern that the USSR was only arming Nkomo’s men with sophisticated weapons at the expense of his Chinese-backed ZANLA forces. In May 1979, he complained that:

\begin{quote}
We still do not receive direct arms shipment from the Russians, but our relations are improving. We know that ZAPU gets direct arms shipments from Russia and we have never condemned them for that. But we have argued that such equipment should be shared by all those fighting in Zimbabwe. Now we have unity this should not be a problem. As far as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{501}\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol. 16, No. 5 (1979), p.5281C.
\textsuperscript{502}\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol. 15, No. 2 (1978), p.4761C.
\textsuperscript{503}\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} Vol. 15, No. 6 (1978), p.4940A.
ZANU is concerned, we have plenty of weapons with which to fight the war, but what we need badly is sophisticated equipment, like ground-to-air missiles and long-range rockets. The war is changing and these are the weapons we need.\textsuperscript{504}

The intensification of guerrilla activity coincided with increased military raids by the Rhodesian Air Force on guerrilla bases in Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola. As discussed in chapter 6, between 1977 and 1979, Rhodesia’s armed attacks on suspected guerrilla bases in neighbouring countries and, particularly, Zambia became a permanent feature of Rhodesia’s final years under white minority rule.

Throughout 1978 and 1979, the war intensified. Rather than capitulating, Ian Smith was determined to consolidate the internal settlement. In May 1979, Bishop Muzorewa was sworn-in as the first black Prime Minister of Rhodesia after winning the April fraudulent elections.\textsuperscript{505} The following month, Rhodesia became Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Given the atmosphere of hostility generated by the internal settlement, the new Muzorewa-Smith government was confronted with the task of seeking international legitimacy. The goal was to secure recognition, removal of sanctions and, consequently, an end to war. Calls for recognition and removal of sanctions were based on a myriad of economic, social and political reforms that Ian Smith claimed to have instituted prior to and after the internal settlement. For instance, the Rhodesian government banned political executions, released political detainees, lifted a ban on political activities, offered general amnesty to all guerrillas who wished to return to Rhodesia, dismantled protected villages set up in rural

\textsuperscript{504} Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 16, No.5 (1979), p.5282A.
areas to deny food and shelter to nationalist fighters, repealed the notorious Land Tenure Act and abolished racial discrimination in schools and all public places.\textsuperscript{506}

Despite undertaking these cosmetic reforms, it did not secure international legitimacy. Sanctions remained in place. The US government almost recognised Muzorewa’s government when Senate voted 75 to 19 in favour of lifting sanctions. But the US President Jimmy Carter announced in June 1979 that the United States government would continue applying sanctions. Carter’s decision to continue with sanctions, despite pressure from Senate was taken because of the following plausible factors. He acknowledged the warning sounded by Front Line States about the possible harm such a decision would inflict on US strategic interests in Africa. At a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, the Front Line States Ministers of Foreign Affairs specifically warned the US against lifting sanctions because it risked its diplomatic and trade ties with independent African countries.\textsuperscript{507} Nigeria, the largest supplier of oil to America, also warned the US against ending sanctions. President Carter was also concerned about the possible Soviet intervention on the side of the Patriotic Front in the event that the US government recognised the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government at the exclusion of the Patriotic Front.\textsuperscript{508} Moreover, Carter was also under strong pressure by the leaders of the black community in the US. Because of the above factors, the Carter Administration decided to continue with sanctions on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The major weakness of the Muzorewa led government was that it lacked legitimacy partly because it excluded Nkomo and Mugabe, the two externally-based nationalists who

\textsuperscript{507}Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 16 No. 6 (1979), p.5314B.
were controlling the army fighting against it. Moreover, the structure of his new government did not reflect fundamental changes leading to a complete transfer of power to the majority. Although Muzorewa was elected Prime-Minister, the real instruments of power, the army, the police, the judiciary and the civil service, remained in the hands of the minority. For instance, General Peter Walls remained the Supreme Commander of the combined Rhodesian Forces and was at the centre of overseeing military operations against ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrilla forces. Despite these inadequacies, the new British Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher declared its intention to recognise Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It took the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, during which Kaunda played a vital role, to change Thatcher’s mind.

Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka

Kaunda hosted and chaired the 22nd Commonwealth conference in Lusaka in August 1979. The conference played a decisive role in the final search for a peaceful political settlement of the Rhodesian problem. It secured agreement on the new constitutional proposals for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It also recognised the responsibility of Britain as the colonial power to grant legal independence to Rhodesia. Despite being attended by 39 Heads of State and Government, the large measure of success of the conference could be attributed to Kaunda’s diplomatic role as chairman of the conference.

In his opening speech, Kaunda declared that Rhodesia was still in rebellion; its leaders were rebels against the British Crown and there was an escalating liberation war led by the Patriotic Front to end that rebellion. He added that:

Africa will win this war. The elections held in April this year [1979] were illegal. The elections produced an illegal and puppet government. Bishop Muzorewa succeeded rebel leader Ian Smith in office, but did not succeed him in power. Majority rule must mean the total transfer of power from
the minority. Power was not transferred to the majority in Rhodesia. What we have in Salisbury today is white power clad in black habiliments. 509

Kaunda’s speech set the tone of the meeting. It became clear that the question of Rhodesia would dominate the conference. Although he spoke to the Commonwealth leaders, Kaunda’s speech was specially directed to Margaret Thatcher who, prior to attending the meeting, had expressed willingness to recognise Muzorewa’s government. On account of the tense atmosphere which characterised the meeting and the prospects of a clash over Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Kaunda adjourned the conference on 3 August for weekend talks involving a “contact group” consisting of Kaunda, Nyerere, Thatcher, Australian Prime Minister Malcom Fraser, Nigerian External Affairs Commissioner, Gen. Adefope and the Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley. It was during the “retreat” that intensive, behind-the-scene diplomatic lobbying took place.

By the time the six leaders emerged from the weekend talks, it was clear they had secured an agreement on a new settlement initiative for Rhodesia. They produced a document on Rhodesia which was subsequently approved by all 39 heads of delegation at the conference. It stated that in relation to the situation in Rhodesia, Heads of Government:

(i) confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;

(ii) recognised in this context that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects;

(iii) fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;

---

(iv) recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict;
(v) were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to
the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours;
(vi) accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a
democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities;
(vii) acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution
must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British government
authority and with commonwealth observers;
(viii) welcomed the British governments’ indication that an appropriate procedure for
advancing towards those objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to
which all the parties would be invited;
(ix) and consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation
of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementing of a lasting
settlement.\footnote{Mark Chona interview cited.}

Mark Chona recalled that the above document on Rhodesia was drafted in State
House during the “retreat” of the Heads of State Commonwealth Conference. It was a very
separate meeting just to discuss Rhodesia and when the conference resumed, the document
was circulated to the rest of the Commonwealth leaders and debated by the entire
conference. It was subsequently included in the final document which Margaret Thatcher
had already accepted during the weekend talks.\footnote{Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 16, No. 8 (1979), p.5360.} In other words, the six leaders simply
sought an endorsement of a document by the entire Commonwealth Conference on which
they had already previously agreed during private talks at State House chaired by Kaunda over the weekend.

**From Lusaka to London’s Lancaster House**

After the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, the British government formally invited Bishop Muzorewa, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and the co-leaders of the Patriot Front to participate in a constitutional conference at Lancaster House in London. The meeting was intended to achieve three objectives: (i) to discuss and reach an agreement on the terms of an independence constitution; (ii) to deliberate on how elections would be supervised under British authority in order to enable Rhodesia proceed to legal independence and; (iii) to discuss peaceful settlement of differences between the parties.\(^{512}\)

The conference opened on 10 September 1979 under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. It concluded on 15 December after 47 plenary sessions. The parties reached agreement on the following issues: the independence constitution, the transitional arrangements and a ceasefire.\(^{513}\)

The negotiations were protracted and difficult, but throughout the talks, Kaunda and his colleagues in the Front Line States consistently urged the Patriotic Front to remain united, backed them in their demands and sometimes prodded them, where possible, to make certain concessions for the sake of progress. For instance, during negotiations on the constitution, and as a result of pressure from the Frontline leaders, on 24 September, the Patriotic Front agreed to 20% reserved seats for whites in the proposed parliament of an

---


During previous negotiations, the Patriotic Front had always rejected the idea of guaranteeing special “safeguards” for the white minority, including seats in a future black majority rule parliament.

In another instance, the Frontline leaders supported the Patriotic Front during negotiations on the land question. On 10 October Lord Carrington adjourned the conference because the nationalists refused to give an unqualified acceptance of the draft constitution. The Patriotic Front had expressed reservations on some key constitutional issues including the question of land ownership. They wanted to obtain sufficient guarantees concerning who would provide money to compensate white farmers whose land was expropriated. But Lord Carrington insisted that the Patriotic Front should simply give a categorical “yes” or “no” answer if they accepted or rejected the draft constitution. The Patriotic Front did not provide a categorical answer but reserved their position on the land question. Lord Carrington responded by adjourning the conference. This prompted the Frontline leaders to call an emergency meeting in Dar-es-Salaam on 17 October 1979 to consider the crisis at Lancaster House. A communique released after the meeting reiterated that the “Front Line leaders regarded the land issue as an important matter and considered that the Patriotic Front was right in seeking assurances that funds for compensation would be available.” The Patriotic Front only accepted the constitution and agreed to return to the negotiating table.
after they obtained assurances from the British government that the multi-national fund for the redistribution of land would be provided.\footnote{Baumhogger, The Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent Developments of Zimbabwe (1975-1980) Volume VI: Doc. 900-1050 (September-December 1979, see Doc. 938: The Patriotic Front’s “Further Reply to Chairman’s Statement of 9 October 1979” and Statement by the Conference Spokesman, 18 October 1979, p.1113., see also Doc.939: Reports on a Statement Concerning the Proposed Development Fund by R. Byatt, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office in Salisbury, 19 October, 1979, p.1114.}

Furthermore, Kaunda also exercised some influence on the Patriotic Front during negotiations on the proposed transitional arrangements. Concisely, the British proposals on transitional arrangements provided for a Governor to control a brief election period with British political, military, police and legal advisors to run the territory using the existing civil service and elements of security forces.\footnote{Zambia Research Bulletin Vol. 16, No.11 (1979), p.5485A.} The talks were tense particularly because the Patriotic Front objected to certain aspects of the transitional arrangement such as the role of the Rhodesian Security Forces. However, they obtained important concessions. The British accepted to accord ZIPRA and ZANLA forces equal status under the authority of the governor as the existing Rhodesia’s army.\footnote{Zambia Daily Mail 13 November 1979.} Kaunda played a major role in this outcome. When the talks were on the brink of breaking down, Kaunda was reported to have “rushed to London” where he prodded the Patriotic Front to “accept Lord Carrington unsatisfactory transitional arrangements.”\footnote{Zambia Daily Mail 8 November 1979, Zambia Daily Mail 9 November 1979, Zambia Daily Mail 12 November 1979 and Zambia Daily Mail 13 November 1979.}

Once agreement was secured on the independence constitution, the transitional arrangements and cease-fire, the British government appointed Lord Soames on 7 December 1979 as Governor to run the country during the transitional period leading to independence. On 12 December 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia became Southern Rhodesia reverting to its colonial status under the British government. A ceasefire agreement was signed on 21
December indicating the end of the war in Rhodesia. Elections were held in March 1980. Mugabe emerged victorious. Zimbabwe became independent.

**Conclusion**

The arguments presented in this chapter shows that the Zambian government played a vital role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. It assisted ZAPU and ZANU to embark on the armed struggle by facilitating, along with Tanzania, the establishment of guerrilla training camps for the combatants. Zambian authorities also provided necessary logistical support to the nationalist movements, including rear bases, transit and broadcasting facilities, food, accommodation, medicine and financial aid. At the international level, Zambian leaders also played a key diplomatic role in supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation war. This role was most discernible in the following areas: they i) effectively implemented the Lusaka Manifesto; ii) highlighted Rhodesia’s problem of white minority rule as one requiring international attention; iii) secured the interest of other neighboring countries in the problem of Rhodesia, an effort which resulted in the Frontline phenomenon; iv) worked for the unity of the nationalist leaders; v) maintained pressure on Britain as the administering authority to find ways and means of dealing with the Rhodesian question; vi) worked for the convening of talks aimed at a constitutional settlement of the Rhodesian problem and; vii) provided leadership in the implementation of the OAU and UN sanctions decisions and the effort to isolate the Smith regime, thereby weakening it and making it possible to come to a conference table.

Thus, in supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, the Zambian government and Kaunda, in particular, maintained a dual strategy. For moral and practical reasons, he preferred to dismantle white minority rule by securing a negotiated political settlement especially when the Rhodesian government expressed willingness to negotiate. Nonetheless,
diplomacy was not pursued at any cost; it was limited by the intransigence of the Rhodesian government to concede black majority rule. Once Kaunda recognised that the Rhodesian government remained inflexible, he reinvigorated his determination to support the intensification of armed struggle. He used this approach to coerce the Rhodesian government back to the negotiating table. When a window of opportunity to negotiate emerged, he exercised his influence to halt guerrilla war in order to give chance to negotiations. This explains why each time constitutional talks broke down they were almost immediately followed by a resumption and escalation in the liberation war. The negotiations at Lancaster House were largely a product of an escalating guerrilla war. Zambia, and therefore Kaunda played a decisive role in both.
Chapter 4
Contesting Zambia’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle

Introduction

In local Zambian political discourse, government’s policy towards Rhodesia, including the question of backing the armed struggle against the white minority government, was, for various reasons, highly contested by diverse groups of people. Students from higher learning institutions across the country supported government and advocated radical policies towards the Rhodesian government. On the other hand, Members of Parliament and, more generally, the business community urged government to exercise caution over its policies towards the Rhodesian government. This chapter examines concerns advanced by different groups of Zambians in relation to government’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. This analysis is based on the assumption that a country’s pursuit of certain foreign policy goals usually has implications on its domestic political processes. This is because diverse groups of people tend to either support or contest government’s foreign policy on a wide range of international issues. In Zambia’s case, government’s support for Zimbabwe’s liberation war provoked varied reactions from students, opposition political parties and the business community. By analysing concerns of these groups of people, the chapter argues that the Zambian government did not wield unchallenged monopoly over its role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

The chapter is divided into four interrelated sections. The first part briefly examines Zambia’s perception of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in the context of the politics of decolonisation in southern Africa. In many ways, Zambia’s view of UDI was critical in shaping the nature of its response. UDI altered Zambia’s view on anti-colonial struggle and the strategy of political transformation in Zimbabwe. The illegal seizure of
power in Rhodesia reinforced Zambia’s willingness to support armed struggle as a legitimate strategy for the liberation of Zimbabwe from white minority rule. The generalised argument, which this chapter attempts to challenge, is that, in confronting the illegal regime in Rhodesia via its support for the nationalist movements, the Zambian government mobilised the general populace and the citizenry readily supported its anti-colonial policies. The second section highlights students’ views reflecting their consistent support for government’s policy on Rhodesia, while the concerns of opposition parliamentarians and the business community, underlining their opposition to government’s confrontational stand against Rhodesia’s white minority rule, are discussed in sections three and four, respectively.

**Zambia, UDI and Decolonisation**

In order to capture the concerns advanced by various groups of people in relation to government’s policy on Rhodesia, it is imperative first to briefly examine the perception of Zambian leaders towards the development of UDI in Rhodesia, particularly in the context of the politics of decolonisation in southern Africa. This is imperative because the government’s view of UDI was crucial in determining the nature of its response. It has been argued that in responding to the illegal regime in Rhodesia, the Zambian government rallied domestic support.

In November 1965, Smith announced that Rhodesia was independent and sovereign, not subject to the laws of any other country. In what became known as Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the action of Smith constituted a rebellion against the British Crown. Like many African countries and, more generally, the international community,

---

522 Kanduza, “Zambians against UDI in Rhodesia,” p.5.
Zambian leaders regarded UDI as an illegal act which could not be tolerated, but had to be eliminated. The decision to oppose UDI in Rhodesia should be understood within the wider context of the anti-colonial struggle in Africa and southern Africa in particular. After attaining independence from Britain in 1964, Zambian leaders took an ideological stance against white minority rule in southern Africa. As discussed in Chapter 2, they had hoped that the winds of change which began with the independence of Ghana would similarly sweep across southern Africa and subsequently lead to the independence of all the countries in the region. However, the process of decolonisation in southern Africa and Rhodesia, in particular, was brought to an abrupt halt when Smith proclaimed UDI in defiance of world opinion.

Smith’s action provoked global public outrage. Kaunda was among the first African leaders to denounce it as a treacherous act. While condemning it as an act of treason, he did not indicate what his government would do in response. As Jan Pettman observed, this hesitation reflected Zambia’s ambiguous position. Kaunda and his governing elite felt duty bound to oppose UDI and yet, they had to take into account the fact that Zambia had established strong economic ties with and was economically dependent on Rhodesia. Despite this dilemma dictated by fears of economic strangulation, Zambian authorities expressed concern that the development of UDI south of its border would forestall the anti-colonial struggle and “perpetuate the rule of a tiny white settler minority in a preponderously black neighbouring country.”

---

525 See NAZ MFA 1/1/38 Loc. 498 International Reaction to UDI, 1965.
526 Times of Zambia 12 November 1965.
527 Pettman, Zambia, p.155.
528 UNIP7/23/5 Foreign Affairs Statements 1966 ‘Speech by the Vice President of the Republic of Zambia at the Emergency Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia, 11 January 1966 “Embargoed Against Delivery.”
In the context of the politics of decolonisation in southern Africa, UDI had far-reaching implications in terms of Zambia’s perception of the process of political transformation in Rhodesia and, more generally, in white minority ruled territories in the region. For Zambian authorities, Smith’s action was an attempt to establish and maintain “continual existence of a minority regime,” and an act “calculated to preserve racial and minority dominance for all time.”529 In a memorandum submitted to the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government in Lagos in January 1966, Zambian leaders rejected Smith’s attempt to usurp power illegally because it was “inconceivable that a small number of 200,000 whites should continue to subject 4,000,000” Africans “to a rule by oppression bounded by the racial bigotry of a small lunatic fringe.530 Zambia interpreted UDI as an act that was not only illegal but also “a permanent threat” to the country’s security.531 Within the regional context therefore, UDI, as discussed in Chapter 2, was a geopolitical disaster which threatened to “roll back the winds of decolonisation.”532

Zambia’s immediate response to UDI was to call for British military intervention to end the rebellion.533 For Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw, controversy concerning the use of military force to quell the rebellion “arose in three different contexts, corresponding to the

529 UNIP 7/23/5 Foreign Affairs Statements, 1966 Speech by the Vice President of the Republic of Zambia at the Emergency Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia, Lagos, 11 January 1966 “Emargoed Against Delivery.”
532Kanduza, “Zambians against UDI in Rhodesia.” p.5.
533 Andrew J. De Roche has coined what he described as “national security theory” to explain Zambia’s response to UDI including its call for British military intervention, see Andrew J De Roche, “You Can’t Fight Guns with Knives’: National Security and Zambian Response,” pp.77-97

© University of Pretoria
three more or less distinct phases in the Rhodesian crisis: the period prior to UDI, the immediate aftermath of UDI and the years since, following the consolidation of settler support for Ian Smith’s regime, and the failure of economic sanctions to bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months.\textsuperscript{534} However, during all these phases the British government refused to quell the rebellion by military means, insisting that economic sanctions remained the best option. UDI and the subsequent failure by the British government to crush it galvanised Zambia’s willingness and determination to support an armed struggle as a legitimate strategy for political transformation in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{535} To that effect, Zambian leaders allowed Zimbabwe liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU to establish offices and bases in the country from where they could organise armed resistance against the Rhodesian government. Thus, for Benedict Mtshali and Ackson Kanduza, Zambian leaders enlisted the support of the people in pursuing policies designed to dismantle UDI and the citizenry rallied behind the government program.\textsuperscript{536}

This chapter challenges the view which emphasises united national popular support for government’s policy on Rhodesia. While it is true Zambians generally supported government’s policy on Rhodesia, this study contends that some sections of society opposed government’s hardline policy and urged it to exercise caution in confronting the illegal Rhodesian regime. Moreover, available evidence suggests domestic support was confined to the immediate post-UDI period. While acting initially as a unifying factor among Zambians, the vexing economic problems unleashed by Zambia’s support for the liberation war and its sustained diplomatic campaign against the Rhodesian government matured into social and

\textsuperscript{534} Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, p.114.
\textsuperscript{535} Mudenda, Zambia, p.52, see also Kanduza, ‘Zambians Against UDI in Rhodesia’, p.5.
political discontent. The initial expression of solidarity with government’s radical approach towards the Rhodesian government in the immediate post-UDI period transformed into criticism and intense opposition especially in the mid 1970’s when the country began experiencing serious economic problems. In short, this chapter argues that the concerns projected by various interest groups vis-a-vis government’s response to the illegal regime in Rhodesia were not uniform but were varied in nature throughout the period under review. While some backed the government’s policy of supporting armed struggle in Zimbabwe, others opposed it.

**Students’ Attitude**

The role of students in politics and social movements in general is well documented in many parts of Africa. In Zambia, student activism was largely spearheaded by University of Zambia (UNZA) students. During the 1960s and 1970s, student activism was fundamentally rooted in matters of Zambia’s foreign policy in southern Africa. At various times, UNZA students protested and demonstrated against white minority rule in southern Africa. The position adopted by students was a clear expression of solidarity with government’s anti-colonial policy in the region. This present discussion examines various aspects of students’ views regarding government’s policy on Rhodesia.

---

539 Balsvik, “Student Life at the University of Zambia: Strikes, Closures and Disruption of Learning, 1965-92”, pp.7-14, see also L.P Mangani, ‘Students Activism at the University of Zambia, 1966-1990’ University of Zambia, BA History Research Project Essay, August 1991.
UNZA students were affiliated to the National Union of Zambian Students (NUZS) through their union, the University of Zambia Students’ Union (UNZASU). NUZS was a coalition of Zambian students from various higher learning institutions in the country, notably Evelyn Hone College, Natural Resources Development College (NRDC), Zambia Institute of Technology, (now Copperbelt University, CBU) and the Northern Technical College (NORTEC), among others. NUZS coordinated students’ activities at national level, routinely calling for national symposia for purposes of either holding elections for new office bearers in the NUZS executive committee or for adopting a unified position on various national and international issues. At national level, UNZA students played a vital role in organising protests and demonstrations on various matters relating to government policy.

From the outset, students were unanimous in supporting the government for opposing the illegal regime in Rhodesia and more generally in southern Africa. Students’ manifestation of support of government’s policy on Rhodesia was not only reflected in various student publications on campus, but their views and opinions also often found expression in actual demonstrations and protests. In 1965 and 1966, students staged several demonstrations in front of the British High Commission in Lusaka in protest against UDI in Rhodesia. Students felt obliged to express their views on issues that affected the nation.540

Prior to UDI, Zambian authorities repeatedly called on the British government to take pre-emptive military action to prevent UDI.541 In Zambia’s view, the use of force constituted the best strategy for the quick resolution of the impending UDI. When UDI was

541 NAZ CO17/1/5 Loc. 6920 General Papers Prior to 1 May 1966, ‘His Excellency’s Address at the National Rally, Lusaka Saturday 23 October 1965.
finally proclaimed, it simply reinforced the views of the Zambian government that force was not only the best, but the only viable option. Zambia revived calls for British military intervention to quell UDI with greater intensity.\textsuperscript{542} Zambian leaders believed the British government had inspired UDI because the Prime Minister Harold Wilson refused to heed calls to prevent it by military means thereby giving Ian Smith the leeway to proclaim independence. Thus, Zambian authorities attributed the legal responsibility of resolving the crisis to the British government. Moreover, they were convinced that the longer the white minority settlers upheld UDI, the greater would be the cost in terms of human life to maintain it.

UNZA students expressed similar concerns. For instance, following the killing of ZANU combatants at the battle of Chinoyi/Sinoia on 28 April 1966 by the Rhodesian security forces, students demonstrated in protest against the British government. They interpreted the massacre of Africans as a direct result of British mishandling of UDI. In an article entitled “Student Protest: A Report at First Hand,” Sibeso Mubitana, a student at UNZA, accused the British government of having “stood agape, helpless and apparently commiserating with the turn of events to the south of us.”\textsuperscript{543} According to Mubitana, students interpreted “the political impotence of Britain over Rhodesia … as a deliberate attempt to let down the masses of Africans in Zimbabwe” and their protest was “a show of utter contempt” in order to “re-awaken Britain to the realities of the situation in Rhodesia.”\textsuperscript{544}


Another UNZA student, Mbuza Simukonda appealed “to African leaders to continue to bring pressure on both Harold Wilson and Smith before the situation gets out of hand and we have unprecedented mass killings.” He also hoped that Zambians would be congratulated for having “advisably demonstrated their hatred for the injustice being done to the Africans in Rhodesia.” Similarly, Orlick Mwangelwa, another student at UNZA, pleaded with independent black governments to send soldiers to liberate oppressed Africans in Rhodesia. Moreover, as a demonstration of their commitment to the fight against white minority rule in Rhodesia, students volunteered to be recruited into the Zambian military service for deployment in hotspots along the Zambezi frontier facing Rhodesia and the Caprivi Strip facing South West Africa (now Namibia), a territory occupied by apartheid South Africa. In response to the meeting held in December 1972 between UNZASU, the Dean of Students, and the Commandant of the Zambia National Service, Lt. Colonel Nyirenda, to discuss the involvement of UNZA students in the military service, students reiterated that:

We are all genuine Zambians carrying green national identity cards. We have no dual citizenships. We have nowhere to run to if Zambia is invaded. We have a duty to defend this country to the bitter end …. We support the military service….

The foregoing statements clearly show that students were not only opposed to white minority rule in Rhodesia and British mishandling of the illegal regime, but they adopted a position that rallied them firmly behind the Zambian government’s policy on Rhodesia.

---

547 See the lead story “UNZA to the Barracks” and “Opinion” UZ Spokesman: The Silent Majority Spokesman Vol. 1, No. 17 Tuesday 19 December 1972, See also the University Observer: For Unity and Truth Vol. 1 No. 2 14 September 1971.
Students’ expression of solidarity with government’s policy on Rhodesia was further reflected in the position they adopted when Zambia threatened to relinquish its membership of the Commonwealth. The immediate background to this development was that, after attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference held in January 1966 in Lagos to discuss the Rhodesian crisis, Harold Wilson arrived in Lusaka on 13 January 1966 for talks with Kaunda. Wilson assured Kaunda that Britain would impose new sanctions on Rhodesia which would bring down the Rhodesian regime within “a matter of weeks rather than months.”548 When asked if he would attend the next Commonwealth Heads of State meeting slated for July 1966, Kaunda confidently stated that “I don’t for one moment think that Smith will be in power then.”549 However, Kaunda was profoundly incensed when he learnt about Wilson’s announcement in the House of Commons in April 1966 that his government would hold informal talks with the Rhodesian government to see whether a basis for negotiations for Rhodesia’s return to constitutional rule “genuinely existed.”550 Addressing the nation on radio and television on 24 May 1966, Kaunda angrily stated that he was “utterly contemptuous” of Britain’s handling of the Rhodesian situation, suggesting that British policy had been “shifty and evasive.” In his view, by holding informal talks with Rhodesian officials, Britain demonstrated that it had given de facto recognition to Smith’s government.551

Kaunda was infuriated with the fact that while he had made economic sacrifices by faithfully committing the country to British sponsored sanctions against Rhodesia, the

British government did not enforce the sanctions to make them effective. The “quick kill” of the Rhodesian rebellion which the British government predicted at the Commonwealth Conference in Lagos had not been achieved. Worse still, the financial assistance which the British government promised the Zambian government to meet the cost of Zambia’s participation in the economic sanctions did not materialise.\footnote{552} There was a crisis of confidence in British intentions.

Moreover, during a rally in Lusaka in May 1966, Kaunda indicated that he would propose the expulsion of Britain from the Commonwealth unless it resolved UDI before the Commonwealth Heads of State Conference in July 1966. However, he was deeply angered with Britain’s announcement of the postponement of the Commonwealth Conference from July to September 1966. In his recent publication,\textit{ A Matter of Weeks Rather than Months: The Impasse between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith; Sanctions, Aborted Settlements and War, 1965-1969}, J. R. T Wood argued that Wilson’s aim in rescheduling the conference was meant to secure a three-month postponement of the Commonwealth demand for UN mandatory sanctions and for denial of independence until Rhodesia had majority rule.\footnote{553} Kaunda interpreted the postponement of the conference as a breach of faith for which he held Wilson personally accountable. Undoubtedly, Kaunda felt betrayed and in anger threatened to pull out of the Commonwealth. He reiterated that:

\begin{quote}
While the British government may have the ability to organise the calling of the Commonwealth Conference in September instead of July when in fact the present problems calls for it, they have no ability to organise me to remain within that organisation. What I have worked
\end{quote}


for is my country to remain in a Commonwealth in which there lies sincerity and not cleverness of organisation—I repeat cleverness of organisation can be likened to a body without soul. I want to admit this has been and is still an agonising period. But if leaving the Commonwealth is the only way Zambia can show that soulless cleverness wins rounds but not victories, then we must take this step.554

This statement clearly revealed Kaunda’s frustration with Wilson’s disingenuous handling of the Rhodesian crisis. It was in this context that students backed Kaunda’s threats to withdrawal Zambia’s membership of the Commonwealth. During the 3rd Annual Congress of the NUZS held in September 1966 at UNZA and attended by delegates from member unions, students passed a resolution denouncing the Commonwealth “as a capitalist club dominated by Britain” and “endorsed Zambia’s stand to quit the Commonwealth.”555

Similarly in July 1971, students staged another demonstration in support of government’s anti-colonial policy in southern Africa. The demonstrations, which turned violent, were staged at the French Embassy, situated then at Kulima Tower building in the heart of Lusaka. The background to this development was that in July 1971, the French government sold a license to manufacture military jets to South Africa, abrogating a long-standing UN ban on such transactions because of the country’s apartheid system. The French decision was part of the wider military support given to South Africa by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Earlier in June, the British government had also announced its intentions to resume arms sales to South Africa.556 The Zambian government opposed the sale, not only because of the country’s apartheid system, but also on account of its strategic significance to the survival of the illegal Rhodesian

554Times of Zambia 13 July 1966.
556UNIP 7/23/28 Foreign Affairs Correspondence 1971, Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia and Chairman of the O.A.U to the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Organisation for African Unity, Addis Ababa 21 June 1971, See section on “arms sales”

© University of Pretoria
government. The move to sale arms to South Africa was interpreted as an indirect way of strengthening Rhodesia’s instruments of oppression since the South African government had publicly declared its support for Ian Smith and, as noted in Chapter 3, had been providing military and economic aid to his government. Not surprisingly, students demonstrated against the sale of arms in support of government policy. Following the 1971 demonstrations, UNZA was closed because as Bizeck Phiri argued, “students and the government took different approaches on issues they agreed on.”

The closure of the university should be seen in the broader context of government’s strategy to secure a negotiated political settlement of the Rhodesian problem. When it became evident that Rhodesia’s white minority rule would not be resolved quickly following Britain’s failure to crush UDI by military means, Zambian authorities adopted a dual strategy in their approach to the Rhodesian crisis; they supported the intensification of the armed struggle against the Rhodesian government and, at the same time, pursued diplomatic options when white settlers demonstrated willingness to negotiate with nationalist leaders. Thus, as shown in chapter 3, apart from supporting the armed struggle, when it was convenient, Zambian authorities opened secret contacts with the South African apartheid government in an attempt to resolve the Rhodesian conflict peacefully. Because of its leverage over Rhodesia, Zambian authorities enlisted South Africa’s support to secure a negotiated political settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. However, in the eyes of students, this was tantamount to compromising the principle on the fight against white minority rule in southern Africa.

557 Phiri, *The Crisis of An African University*, p.58, see also UNIP 7/19/5 Address to the National Assembly by Hon. A. Milner M.P, Secretary General to the Government, “Why UNZA was Closed?” 20 July 1971.
558 Chona interview cited.
with white minority regimes was inconsistent with its anti-colonial policy. The letter signed by UNZASU officials and addressed to Kaunda reflected this view. It stated in part:

… your activities so far with the racist south of Zambezi are inconsistent with this principle [on the fight against white minority rule] … we believe … that the people of Zambia should be given the opportunity to make their sentiments felt on this issue rather than leave it to you alone. Your Excellency … you have in the past communicated with the enemy. Does it not occur to you … that you are asking too much of us and the Zambian nation as a whole by saying we leave things to you.560

In spite of inconsistencies students perceived in government’s policy on southern Africa and Rhodesia, in particular, when viewed in broader perspective, their position was largely consistent with government’s anti-colonial policy. The difference lay in the approach of implementing the policy. While students advocated a strong, militant and radical approach in the fight against white minority rule in Rhodesia, the government varied its strategies. It willingly backed armed struggle when Rhodesian authorities remained intransigent. Nonetheless, it readily supported negotiations when white settlers expressed willingness to discuss. But students failed to comprehend government’s approach and this became the basis of their confrontation with Zambian authorities.

1976 Student Protests

However, in 1976, students took a position that was at variance with government’s official position on an issue that was not directly related to Zimbabwe but constituted an important element of the government’s broader anti-colonial policy in the region. As noted in Chapter 2, the Portuguese coup of April 1974 facilitated the independence of Angola and the other Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. Nevertheless, a problem arose as to who should be recognised as a legitimate government in

Angola among the three competing liberation movements—MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. While Zambian authorities backed a government of national unity, incorporating all the three rival factions, UNZA students recognised MPLA as the only legitimate government on the basis that it represented the majority of Angolan people.

Zambia’s stance on the Angolan civil war provoked a serious student backlash at UNZA. From mid-January to the first week of February 1976, more than 1500 students staged a series of protests in support of MPLA and against failure by Zambian authorities to recognise it as a legitimate government in Angola. In the intervening period, Zambian security forces arrested and detained 18 student leaders for organising the demonstrations. Another four expatriate UNZA academics and one Zambian lecturer were also detained for allegedly fomenting student protests. On 9 February 1976, UNZA was closed. Those arrested were detained at various prisons around the country, including Mukobeko Maximum Security Prison in Kabwe, Mumbwa Prison and Lusaka Central Prison (Chimbokaila). They were incarcerated under the Preservation of Public Security Regulation, the notorious piece of legislation which was introduced in 1964 and allowed State authorities to detain suspects over an extended period without trial.

Sixteen students were incarcerated at Mumbwa. They included Fanwell Makungu, Keith Nalumango, Mulenga Chewe, Mubita Mwiya, Enerst Beyani, Tentani Mwanza, 


Maketo Maketo, Mbwayu Likokoto, Paulsen Himwiinga, Alexander Kamanga, Guy Stokes, Samuel Miyanda, Simuchoba Sibanze, Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, Vincent Musakanya and Packford Chilomo. At Lusaka Central Prison were Makiwa Matsikidze, Johannes Antonio Venter and Edward Kufakumetsu. Lionel Cliffe, Robert Molteno, George Siemensma and Younus Gulam Lulat, the four UNZA lecturers were imprisoned at Mukobeko Maximum Security Prison. Klaus Van der Berg, a Dutch Engineering lecturer and Dario Longhi, an academic in Sociology were also briefly detained and released. As discussed in some detail in the following Chapter, the imprisonment of Cliffe and his colleagues provided him with an opportunity to meet several ZANU leaders such as Henry Hamadziripi, Mukudzei Mudzi, Josiah Tungamirai, Rugare Gumbo, and Josiah Tongagara who were also detained at Mukobeko for their alleged involvement in the murder of Herbert Chitepo in March 1975.

Due to local and international pressure exerted by the Amnesty International, Cliffe and his colleagues were set free and deported after spending more than eight weeks in prison in Kabwe, while the majority of UNZA students were released after spending five months of incarceration at Mumbwa Prison. A Zambian lecturer, Younus Lulat and two other UNZA students, Samuel Miyanda and Mubita Mwiya were only set free after more than eight months of imprisonment. Because Cliffe supported ZANU, when he was released and

---

564 See Chapter 5.

© University of Pretoria
deported to London, he played an active role in campaigning for the freedom of ZANU political detainees still incarcerated in Zambia.\textsuperscript{566}

The 1976 student demos should not only be seen as a reflection of students’ challenge of state policies on Angola, but they must also be viewed in the broader context of students’ radicalism at the University, inspired partly by radical foreign academics who supported the liberation struggles in Southern Africa more generally, and, Zimbabwe in particular. It also highlighted the political ferment which characterised the détente exercise during this period.

Fay Chung acknowledged that there were approximately 400 Zimbabwean lecturers and students who supported the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{567} The prominent Zimbabwean academics at the University of Zambia included Fay Chung in the School of Education, Dzingai Mutumbuka from the Chemistry Department, Simbi Mubako from the School of Law and Sam Geza from the Department of Economics. These academics worked closely with students to “study challenges and problem areas that Zimbabwe would face in future. They formed study groups to analyse different aspects of development in Zimbabwe. These groups were organised by ZANU and comprised of hundreds of students led by Joseph Masangomai, Tungamirai Mudzi and Ronnie Chiviya.\textsuperscript{568} Emmerson Mnangagwa was also studying at UNZA during this period.

There were also many white expatriate lecturers across all schools at UNZA. At the time of opening the institution in 1966, there very few qualified local academics who could take up teaching positions at the institution. Like many African universities at the time,

\textsuperscript{566} See Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{567} Chung, \textit{Re-living the Second Chimurenga}, p.75.
\textsuperscript{568} Chung, \textit{Re-living the Second Chimurenga}, pp.75-76.
UNZA became an attractive destination for many foreign academics. Thus, the government employed a substantial number of white expatriates to various teaching positions at the university. Lionel Cliffe and Robert Molteno belonged to this group of white expatriate academics employed in the Department of Political Science.

The radical consciousness among UNZA students was principally inspired by Frantz Fanon’s writings. His works especially *The Wretched of the Earth*—a recommended text in the social sciences—had a very profound influence on student thinking. Through his analysis of historical process, Fanon provided not only the concepts with which to understand experiences of the colonised, oppressed people in Third World countries but also how to transform society by revolutionary means. The activities of the student society called the Frantz Fanon Club helped create a radical student consciousness which in 1975 saw the student body differ with the UNIP government on a matter of foreign policy.

The majority of students who contested Zambia’s policy on Angola belonged to the radical Fanon society whose establishment at campus was partly influenced by Lionel Cliffe after he left Dar-es-Salaam and joined UNZA. Cliffe was not only popular among the students, but he also had a history of principled support for the liberation of Africa from...
colonial rule, dating back to the 1960s.\textsuperscript{571} It is plausible that Cliffe’s contact with students partly helped to create a revolutionary student populace willing to challenge government policy. So, when UNZA students, both local as well as foreign, demonstrated against the government policy on Angola, Zambian authorities quickly pointed the finger at “counter revolutionaries” who had infiltrated a number of institutions, including institutions of higher learning. For example, in a speech in Ndola, a member of UNIP’s Central Committee, Frank Chitambala, claimed that some “misguided Marxist lecturers” at UNZA were inciting students there to oppose the government’s stand on Angola.\textsuperscript{572} Branded as deadly foreign subversive elements, plausibly with tacit Soviet support, Zambian authorities acted ruthlessly against Cliffe and his expatriate colleagues at the institution.

The brutal action against students and expatriate lecturers was part of Zambia’s grand attempt to promote détente and eliminate radical elements within the University of Zambia and nationalist movements such as ZANU which opposed its policies in Southern Africa. For instance, after he was declared a Prohibited Immigrant and deported to the United Kingdom, Robert Molteno disclosed that at the height of the interrogation by Zambian security personnel, he was not only “stripped naked and threatened with torture,” but was also “asked to name Socialists [Marxists] inside and outside the university and to give details of a lecture he had delivered to the Historical Association of Zambia in 1974 on

détente in Southern Africa.”  

Similarly, on arrival in London, Lionel Cliffe was said to have rejected the statement in the press that he was “politically active” and “directly involved in student activities” and “Soviet efforts.” He claimed he and his colleagues were “all victims of détente.” Such revelations confirmed suspicions that the Zambian state was determined to eliminate every opposition to its policies in Southern Africa.

However, the brutal suppression of the radical elements opposed to détente by the Zambian state security was based on intelligence information that filtered into the upper echelons of the security apparatus. Molteno revealed that the CIA agents had heavily infiltrated UNZA, insisting that many American academics at the institution were working as agents of the American government. He claimed that his position in the Department of Political Science enabled him to assess research proposals submitted by American academics and to identify their financial backers. He argued that Stephen Goodman, a former UNZA lecturer publicly acknowledged that he was a CIA Southern African economic specialist. Molteno also pointed out that another CIA agent, C. Taylor left the American embassy in Lusaka in 1975 after it was revealed that the defunct Mozambican party, COREMO had been funded by the CIA through Taylor to step up ant-FRELIMO activities. He also revealed that there were attempts by American academics to establish long term research projects into Zambian based liberation movements. 


575 Arnold Raphail, “There are CIA Agents at UNZA-Lecturer” Times of Zambia 18 February 1976 in Select Material on the 1976 Events, Part 2: University of Zambia Political Activism at
Thus, the presence of foreign intelligence agents at UNZA and possibly other state institutions in the country during this period may have played a role either in fomenting anti-government activities including protests or may have encouraged the state authorities to firmly act against radical forces within state institutions and foreign nationalist movements opposed to its policy of détente in Southern Africa. As discussed in chapter 5, foreign surreptitious agents may have infiltrated ZANU and probably worked with the Zambian state security to disrupt ZANU for opposing détente. Thus, the unrest at UNZA in the mid-1970s was part of the fallout of détente.576 While, on one hand, students continued to support “radical and progressive” liberation movements prosecuting armed struggle in Zimbabwe and other white-minority ruled territories in the region, including Angola, Zambian authorities, on the other, were desperately trying to reach an accommodation with racist regimes. The effect of this contradiction was to arrest students, foreign academics and members of radical wings of nationalist movements such as ZANU who consistently denounced détente.

For UNZA students, the radical consciousness created by Marxist-Leninist thought influenced them to express their sentiments on international issues along radical lines. They supported MPLA because in their view, it represented a radical and “progressive” movement which enjoyed the support of the majority of Angolans:

When we saw our country shunning … MPLA, we found it was a shame to progressive socialist countries. How could anyone ever hope to help imperialism, neocolonialism … stay in Africa? Could America and South Africa help a party win power for the sake of helping? We as progressive students realised [that if Angola fell under FNLA or UNITA], it would have been a dancing ground for imperialism and it could have been from Angola where the imperialist network could have emanated to engulf the


576 Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, p.104.
whole of neighbouring countries. We wanted our government to understand the issue and help MPLA win, but we were given a deaf ear. There was only one way to show our disgust for the wrong principles local politicians were taking and that was to demonstrate.\textsuperscript{577}

Despite adopting a “different approach on issues they agreed on” with the government, that is, the fight against white minority rule in the region, the students’ position on Angola demonstrates that they pursued a consistent approach towards the question of resolving white minority rule in southern Africa in general. They advocated for a radical approach in the fight against colonialism in the region. Unlike students who consistently supported government’s anti-colonial policy in southern Africa and Rhodesia, in particular, Independent and Opposition MPs adopted a position that was critical of such a policy. They called on the Zambian government to exercise caution in confronting the Rhodesian government.

**Concerns of Members of Parliament (MPs)**

After Rhodesian white settlers announced UDI, Zambian authorities adopted several strategies designed to resolve the crisis. They included an appeal for military intervention and assistance, participation in the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, the search for economic support\textsuperscript{578} and assisting liberation movements to step up armed struggle. These and many other government policies were contested by Opposition and Independent MPs. The views and concerns of opposition parliamentarians were highlighted during parliamentary debate sessions from the mid-1960s onwards. Unlike students who advocated a militant approach in the fight against white minority rule in Rhodesia, opposition MPs refused to support radical policies and urged the government to tread cautiously in


confronting the Rhodesian government. They interpreted government’s strategies designed to resolve the Rhodesian crisis as inimical to the country’s national security.

Between 1964 and 1972, Zambia was governed under a multiparty system led by UNIP as the ruling party. The opposition political parties which dominated the political scene were the African National Congress (ANC) led by Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, the United Party (UP) led by Nalumino Mundia and the United Progressive Party (UPP) led by Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe. However, UP and UPP’s existence was short-lived. Formed in 1966, UP was banned two years later. Until UPP’s proscription in February 1972 after being in existence since August 1971, and the establishment of one party system in 1973, ANC remained the dominant opposition political party in parliament. ANC MPs and Independent parliamentarians were the most outspoken in criticising government’s policy on Rhodesia.

Reacting to government’s call for British military intervention in Rhodesia in 1965, Harry Nkumbula, ANC president and MP for Monze, warned the government that “if war was staged here and the British started fighting Smith, we will be the people who will suffer most.” He emphasised that “it is very unwise policy to quarrel with your neighbour ...."\(^579\)

In 1966, an ANC MP for Namwala, Edward Mungoni Liso castigated government’s continued calls for the use of force to crush the rebellion because “Britain has plainly said that she will not fight Rhodesia, but we go on crying like babies ... we are just disgracing ourselves."\(^580\) In a later session, Liso again criticised the government for hosting freedom fighters because such a policy amounted to “provocation” which could create a situation

---


where the safety of the Zambians could not be guaranteed, “if the worst comes to the worst.”

He pointed out that:

… we have allowed the citizens [freedom fighters] of … Rhodesia to establish offices here. Would it not be logical … for Rhodesia … to think that we have [military] training camps for them after, in fact saying we offer the British government Livingstone as a base from where to operate in order to crush Rhodesia by force? … that Sir is provocation …. How safe will our people be should retaliatory measures be taken against us? Shall we be able to contain the situation if the worst comes to the worst?581

In addition, Liso accused the government of working against the interest of black Rhodesians when it publicly announced that Zambia would be used as a base for a British military offensive against Rhodesia. In his view, the negotiations to allow Britain to establish a base in Zambia to fight Rhodesia should have been conducted secretly. He accused the government of being childish, insincere and questioned who they tried to “convince” and “impress” by announcing publicly that Zambia would be used as a British military base against Rhodesia, instead of negotiating secretly with the British government.

In his view, the Zambian government was “showing off to some African states” that it is a “champion of African nationalism.” He added:

And worse still, you went on advertising that the Rhodesian African freedom fighters would wage guerrilla war against Rhodesia from Zambia. You gave them offices in town labeled ZAPU, ZANU and what have you …. You were just working against the interests of Rhodesian Africans …. The Rhodesian whites knew that the organisation is being done in Zambia, the offices are in Zambia, they knew how to infiltrate those offices. It should have been secret.582

Liso further castigated the government;

You even went so far as to allocate time on Zambia Radio to the freedom fighters in Rhodesia, even if no one in Rhodesia was listening. It should have been secret, if you wanted you could have taken a pirate radio, hid it somewhere for the Rhodesian Africans to broadcast. And if you are asked in Zambia you say that you do not know anything about it. But you exposed every card on the table and you think the whites in Rhodesia are foolish. I know you wanted to show off to some of the African countries.  

Furthermore, during the mid-1966 debates, an independent MP for Ndola, Cecil Burney expressed worry that in the fight against the Rhodesian government, “no one is taking an open ended risk …. At this stage in our development we cannot afford to either because no one is going to look after us except ourselves.” In addition, Nkumbula contended that Zambia was the “only country in the world that has thrown its strength in the liberation movements of Rhodesian Africans.” He feared that “in the shortest possible time Zambia would be left alone in the struggle.” In conclusion, he asked, “Who is going to pay? Zambians again!” In 1967, Burney again wondered whether Zambia’s confrontational attitude towards the white minority government in Rhodesia was in the best interest of the country:

I cannot believe that this is in the interest of Zambia … I have often asked whether the policy of this government is Zambia first. I am trying today to put forward the theme that it is not in the interests of Zambia continually to be quarrelling with our neighbours and I would like to see the government take positive steps to defuse this situation so we could get back to a more normal form of life here.

Another Independent MP for Midlands, Hugh Mitchley, suggested to the Zambian government that “what is needed is a policy for all countries to stop arguing with their

---

neighbours and get on with their development." In 1968, an ANC MP for Mbabala, Edward Nyanga argued that government’s stance against the Rhodesian government made it difficult for the warring parties in Rhodesia to negotiate. He urged the Zambian government to directly negotiate with the Rhodesian government in a peaceful manner instead of threatening war. Similarly, Copperbelt Central Independent MP Richard Farmer advised the Zambian government to carry out a “reassessment” of its foreign policy on Rhodesia and see whether “the policy cannot be modified into a more conciliatory one.” In addition, in his campaign for the 1968 general elections, Nkumbula announced that if ANC won elections and formed government, his party would end all the sanctions against Rhodesia because in his view, they had harmed Zambia more than any other member of the UN. He contended that Zambia should not concern herself with the Rhodesian question since it was “primarily a matter between the British government and the people of Rhodesia.”

Clearly, opposition and independent MPs including Nkumbula as leader of the major opposition political party, refused to support government’s radical approach in solving Rhodesia’s problem of white minority rule. Instead they adopted a pragmatic view of dealing with Rhodesia. They advocated dialogue and a resumption of normal relations with the white south in order to promote accelerated development in Zambia by ridding it of the costly burden of trade route diversification. Later, this view was also shared by Simon Kapwepwe when he defected from UNIP and formed his party, UPP in 1971.

---

588 Times of Zambia 5 December 1968.
State of Emergency and MPs

The imposition of the state of emergency by the Zambian government was, in the context of the Rhodesian crisis and the general problem of white minority rule in southern Africa, another aspect which further provoked stern political disapproval from opposition parliamentarians. 590 The imposition of the state of emergency was one of the immediate policy moves initiated by the government in response to UDI in Rhodesia. The government initially declared the state of emergency prior to independence in July 1964 to deal with the large-scale violence which erupted between the Lumpa cult followers of a prophetess Alice Lenshina and members of UNIP in northern and eastern provinces of the country. 591 In the wake of the Rhodesian crisis in 1965, the regulations were extended to cover the whole country. 592 However, as the crisis continued and the Zimbabwe liberation movements stepped up the armed struggle, it became necessary in the eyes of the Zambian government to maintain the state of emergency in order to deal with security concerns.

After every six months, the government sought parliamentary approval to renew the declaration enabling enforcement of emergency regulations. The basis for seeking parliamentary endorsement rested on government’s conviction that it needed to exercise a wide range of powers to deal with security problems engendered by the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and southern Africa in general. The imposition of the state of emergency was clearly a constitutional matter. Nonetheless, on several occasions, the opposition

591 For a re-interpretive account of the conflict between UNIP and the Lumpa Church, see David M. Gordon, “Rebellion or Massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa Conflict Revisited” in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfellar and Giacomo Macola (eds) One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia (Lusaka: Lembani Trust, 2009), pp. 45-76.
592 Sklar, “Zambia’s Response to UDI”, p.29
parliamentarians severely criticised and sometimes rejected government sponsored motions aimed at upholding the emergency regulations on grounds that, apart from the primary object of dealing with security problems unleashed by the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, it sought new justification for its maintenance. For instance in 1967, Liso refused to support the government–sponsored motion to extend the state of emergency because in his view, the government abused the emergency regulations to deal with its perceived political opponents.

During the same debate, Nkumbula accused the UNIP government of hypocrisy. He castigated government leaders for loudly criticising the oppression in Rhodesia while they themselves oppressed the Zambians. He stated that:

… in Zambia we have the Lumpas, people who tried to worship God … but … we are punishing them and yet at the same time, we shout about our fellow Rhodesians in Rhodesia, we are fighting for our fellow Africans in South Africa, forgetting that we have more than 10,000 of our own people outside this country, who have run away from the terror of our government.

In 1969, Nkumbula repeated his attacks and urged the government to “make the state of emergency a permanent thing” because it “is perpetually extending this declaration in order to keep people whom they do not like out of active life.” Nkumbula added that:

Government has not told us or told this house how many from … Rhodesia whom they have detained or kept in restriction here for security reasons. The only people who are kept in detention and restrictions are Zambians themselves … yet we are told time and again about a common

man, Humanism, what no sense! The security of Zambia depends on what government does with its own citizens.597

While it is true that government’s initial motive for imposing emergency regulations was designed to deal with security problems unleashed by supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, yet it used the same reasons as a pretext in its subsequent attempts to seek further extensions of emergency regulations even when it was not necessary. Thus, the MPs’ rejection of the extension of emergency regulations was based on their concern that the state of emergency was not serving its intended purpose, that is, to deal with security problems unleashed by government’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation war. In their view, the government used the state of emergency as a strategy to firmly deal with government’s opponents. They broadly interpreted government’s moves to maintain emergency regulations as a tool designed to strengthen its coercive apparatus in order to crack down on dissents in the country.

Evidently, as opposed to students, the opposition, as well as independent MPs, adopted a position that was critical of government’s policy on Rhodesia. Bautis Kapulu, a former member of UNIP Central Committee, recalled that the MPs were critical of government policy in parliament because they were not privy to the state of the security situation created by Zimbabwe’s liberation war in the country.598 However, contrary to Kapulu’s view, the concerns of opposition parliamentarians reflected the general popular discontent with government’s support for the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe and generally in southern Africa. They contended that government’s ideological stand against white minority rule in Rhodesia was undermining the country’s economic and political stability.

598 Kapulu interview cited.
Both Peter Matoka and Sikota Wina, former Cabinet Ministers in the first Zambian government, explained that some sections of the Zambian society were frustrated with government policy of hosting freedom fighters from Zimbabwe and, generally, from southern Africa because they believed that the government was spending a lot of resources, both financial and material, maintaining the “foreigners” at the expense of Zambians.\textsuperscript{599} The position of opposition parliamentarians was also shared by the business community.

**Views of the Business Community**

Like the opposition MPs, the business community equally denounced and largely opposed the policy of supporting armed struggle against the Rhodesian government. The expression “business community” is used here in reference to wealthy Zambians, especially those individuals that had links with both local and international capital. It falls within the wider political class which included technocrats, entrepreneurs, national politicians and civil servants.\textsuperscript{600}

Opposition to government’s policy on Rhodesia by individuals had been building up for years since independence. However, C. Baylies and M. Szeftel observed that “a class conscious and active indigenous capitalist class emerged” in the early seventies which began exerting increasing pressure on the government’s aggressive policy on Rhodesia. They pointed out that:

> About 40\% of those who placed their names for nomination [for the 1973 General Elections] had business interests and of those elected, about 44 per cent owned businesses or state land farms or had shares in local

\textsuperscript{599}Interview with Peter Matoka, University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia 5 July 2007 and interview with Sikota Wina Makeni Lusaka 27 September 2013.

companies. But of all capital-owning MPs, about 40 per cent had large scale or multiple enterprises or commercial farms. 601

With substantial representation in the National Assembly, businessmen-cum-parliamentarians began to question the government’s practical wisdom of maintaining the border closure with Rhodesia in view of the country’s declining economic fortunes. As noted in Chapter 6, Smith closed the Rhodesian side of the border because Zambia was, ostensibly, allowing its territory to be used as a “‘terrorists’” launch-pad for guerrilla attacks on Rhodesia. For Ian Smith, the decision to close the border was “not a deliberate effort to impose a boycott against Zambia but an effort to get its leaders to their senses.”602 Although, the Rhodesian government announced the reopening of the border on 3 February 1973, Kaunda refused to open Zambia’s side of the border with Rhodesia. Instead, he decided to permanently abandon the southern route on grounds that it would remain unreliable.603 The decision was also part of Zambia’s contribution to the UN sanctions on Rhodesia.

From the mid-1970’s, the MPs with business interests began expressing increasing concern over the continued closure of the Rhodesian border on the basis that it was causing a lot of hardship for the ordinary people.604 They urged the government to reopen the border. Among the MPs who spearheaded calls for the reopening of the border were Valentine Kayope, MP for Bahati, Arthur Wina, MP for Livingstone, and Peter Chanshi, MP for Mwansabombwe. These parliamentarians called for the “utilization of the southern route”

---

602 See Africa Research Bulletin 10, 1 1973, p.2735C.
which was “closed for reasons totally unrelated to the interests of the country.” They questioned government’s practical wisdom of importing farming inputs like tractors made in South Africa through Malawi instead of buying them directly from South Africa through Rhodesia. In short, they viewed government’s policy of diverting trade routes through Rhodesia as unnecessarily costly and economically unwise.

Their agitation was founded mainly on the economic effects of Zambia’s anti-colonial policy generally in southern Africa and, particularly, on Rhodesia. The MPs refused to accept the objectives of the border closure as justifiable given the sacrifices the Zambian people had to make. They felt that the border closure caused too many economic hardships, mainly because it restricted the scope of importing machinery and manufactured goods from the nearest and cheapest source, South Africa. The Chief Executives of the mining industry on the Copperbelt shared similar sentiments. They castigated the government for deciding to close the border on a permanent basis and for its failure to provide assurances regarding imports and supply of essential commodities needed in the mining sector. They called for government’s reversal of the policy on the closure of the border with Rhodesia.

It is significant to note that in calling for adjustment of government’s policy on Rhodesia, the businessmen-cum-parliamentarians particularly had two broad objectives. Firstly, they sought to protect their business interests. They were pushing for increasing the economic opportunities available to Zambian private businessmen. For example, Chanshi

---


607 See UNIP7/2/27 Reports 1977, “Secret” Letter from the Minister of Finance, John Mwanakatwe to His Excellency the President and copied to Minister of Defence, Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Education and Culture, Minister of Trade and Industry and the Secretary General to the Government, 23 February 1977.
suggested in the National Assembly in March 1977 that government should abolish the parastatals and return them all to private hands. Secondly, they had wider political interests at stake. In view of the general elections in 1978, they used the border closure as a campaign tool to seek re-election as MPs. They capitalised on the prevalent mood of bitterness over food shortages to inform the public that such shortages were caused by the border closure. This strategy won them considerable public support.

However, the economic problems which engulfed the country from the mid-1970s should not be solely attributed to the border closure. They should be seen in the wider context of global economic recession which characterised this period. The declining commodity prices of copper and the rise in oil prices on the international market had considerable adverse effects on the Zambian economy from the mid 1970’s onwards. As a result of mounting domestic political discontent and pressure from international financial institutions, on 6 October 1978, Kaunda announced the reopening of the border with Rhodesia. However, Mark Chona, the former special political advisor to Kaunda contended that the decision to reopen the border was a tactical decision dictated by concerns for national security because it became necessary to divert the cargo, including the much-needed bags of fertiliser which were marooned at Dar-es Salaam port in Tanzania. In his

---

611 See Chapter 5.
view, if the border had not been opened to allow the in-flow of fertiliser, there would have been severe food shortages which could have possibly triggered serious food riots in the country. Ultimately, the Rhodesian and South African governments would have plausibly exploited the situation to their advantage. Chona concluded that Kaunda had an option of either to pay the price of food riots the following year or face criticism from Frontline leaders, especially Nyerere and Machel. He chose the latter.\footnote{Interview with Mark Chona, Makeni, Lusaka 16 March 2009, see also University of Zambia Special collection Library Gov.Zam (02) 8 August 1979 “ZAMBIA, Cabinet Office, Contingency Planning Secretariat Why Zambia Re-opened the Southern Railway Route.}

**Conclusion**

The discussion presented in this chapter has shown that there is a strong link between a country’s foreign policy and domestic political actions. This is because individuals and various interest groups tend to hold diverse views regarding government’s stance on a particular foreign policy issue. When they are affected by government’s pursuit of certain foreign policy goals, different groups of people feel compelled to project their concerns. This chapter has demonstrated that the views advanced by certain sections of Zambia’s population concerning government’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle were diverse. While students consistently advocated a militant approach and supported government’s policies designed to resolve the problem of white minority rule in Rhodesia, the opposition parliamentarians and the business community opposed the government and urged it to tread cautiously in dealing with the illegal Rhodesian government. The different views and concerns projected by diverse sections of Zambian society demonstrates that the government’s anti-colonial polices became a site of intense domestic political contest. The decision by the governing elite to pursue anti-colonial policies in Rhodesia through support for nationalist movements, therefore, did not go unchallenged. The decisions, policies and
strategies were highly contested by both the students and the MPs. This chapter attempted to capture the views of these different groups of Zambians. Nonetheless, Zimbabwean nationalists also had their own concerns about Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.
Chapter 5

An Uneasy Relationship: Reconstructing the Zimbabwean Nationalists’ Attitudes towards Zambia’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle

Introduction

For Zimbabwean nationalists, success in prosecuting the armed struggle against the Rhodesian government depended, to a larger extent, on neighbouring states like Zambia which provided rear bases, financial aid, transit facilities, and logistical support to the nationalist movements, ZAPU and ZANU. Although nationalist leaders often acknowledged the centrality of Zambian support, their relationship with the government was sometimes characterised by tension and mutual distrust. The strained relationship was partly as a result of conflicting expectations; as hosts, Zambian authorities expected Zimbabwean nationalists to focus on prosecuting the liberation struggle. But because the nationalists were constantly preoccupied with internal squabbles, often with deadly consequences, Zambian authorities sometimes intervened to enforce discipline in the liberation movements. However, the nationalists interpreted such intervention as tantamount to interference in their operations and meddling in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe. This chapter attempts to investigate the origins and nature of tensions which characterised the nationalists’ relationship with their Zambian hosts. By highlighting these tensions, the study seeks to reconstruct the nationalists’ attitudes towards Zambia’s role in the liberation struggle. This analysis reinforces some of the nationalists’ perception that, throughout the liberation struggle, Kaunda consistently supported and sought to impose a particular nationalist leader as president of Zimbabwe after independence.

By locating the discussion within the context of the OAU which persistently appealed for the reconciliation of ZAPU and ZANU, the first section of this chapter
highlights the attitude of the nationalist leaders towards calls to unite their liberation movements. The theme of unity between the nationalist movements is critical, for it constantly preoccupied the OAU and particularly Zambia’s efforts in promoting the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The second part discusses the nationalists’ concerns regarding the Lusaka Manifesto. This is vital because, while the Lusaka Manifesto emphasised the principle of negotiations as the basis of achieving change in white minority ruled territories in southern Africa, leaders of liberation movements refused to accept the OAU strategy. Although the OAU revised the strategy by adopting the Mogadishu and Dar-es-Salaam Declarations in 1971 and 1975, respectively, 613 Zambian authorities in general and Kaunda, in particular, maintained the principle of negotiations enshrined in the Lusaka Manifesto as the basis of resolving the Rhodesian conflict. Kaunda backed a diplomatic solution to the Rhodesian crisis rather than exclusive reliance on armed struggle, but ZANU nationalists accused him of undermining the liberation struggle, meddling in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs and conspiring to install Joshua Nkomo as President of Zimbabwe after independence. These nationalists’ concerns will be the focus of this chapter.

OAU’s Early Efforts at Unity and Nationalist Attitudes

Following a split in ZAPU’s leadership and the subsequent formation of ZANU in August 1963, the Organisation of African Unity embarked on efforts to reconcile the two nationalist movements. The actual reason for the split is subject to conflicting interpretation. For Ndabaningi Sithole, his defection from ZAPU along with other executive members—Robert Mugabe, Morton Malianga and Leopold Takawira—was mainly due to their dissatisfaction with Joshua Nkomo’s handling of the struggle. 614 This group regarded

613 See Chapter Two.
Nkomo as an indecisive leader who failed to adopt a revolutionary programme for national liberation. However, Nkomo refutes such assertions, insisting that the “dissidents” defection was partly encouraged by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who “sought to dominate the policies and the personalities of the liberation movements to which he gave hospitality.”

For Nkomo, the split was also partly motivated by “tribal feelings” against him, a view shared by Eliakim Sibanda and Dumiso Dabengwa. They both blame the tribal “dissidents” for “engineering” the split because they “harboured secret agendas” and “had been waiting for an opportunity to promote their personal ambitions by dividing the organisation.” However, Wellington Nyangoni attempted to provide a detailed, balanced account of the split. He saw the division as emanating from a combination of factors; dissatisfaction with Nkomo’s leadership of the nationalist movement, differences in approaching the struggle and the problem of ethnicity. Whatever the reasons for the split, the problem would become an issue which constantly preoccupied the OAU until Zimbabwe became independent.

As discussed in Chapter 3, between December 1963 and August 1965, the OAU tried fruitlessly to reconcile ZAPU and ZANU. The OAU’s effort was consistent with its policy of promoting united fronts in African dependent territories where more than one

---

liberation movement existed. But in this context, the early efforts and urgency to create a common front was partly dictated by political developments in Rhodesia. In the May 1965 elections, the Rhodesian Front party led by Ian Smith, emerged victorious; it secured all the 50 white seats, effectively retaining power with a comfortable majority in parliament.\(^{620}\) Smith’s determination to secure Rhodesia’s independence from Britain by unilateral means became a real possibility, presenting a serious challenge to the OAU. In anticipation of a UDI, the OAU hoped to confront the threat by constructing a ZAPU-ZANU common front in order to create machinery for channeling aid in preparation for launching an armed struggle.\(^{621}\) UDI became a reality in November 1965, but for various reasons, the nationalist leaders refused to reconcile and form a united front. They adopted conflicting attitudes towards unity, positions which they articulated at a meeting of African Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Nairobi, Kenya in July 1965.

ZAPU leaders rejected calls to reconcile with ZANU because they regarded the OAU as having contributed to dividing the nationalist movements when it initially recognised ZAPU as a majority party in July 1963, but, later decided to also accept ZANU in December. They interpreted ZANU’s acceptance as a significant departure from the OAU’s stance adopted in June 1963 when it refused to recognise minority splinter groups such as the National Party (NP) led by P. Matimba, Pan African Socialist Union (PASU) led by Phineas Sithole and John Rice’s People’s Democratic Union (PDU).\(^{622}\) Because ZAPU leaders regarded their organisation as a majority party which rightly secured OAU’s


\(^{622}\) NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 596 OAU Liberation Committee 1964-1968 Memorandum to the Foreign Ministers of Six-Nation Committee on Rhodesia by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union 20 July 1965, Nairobi Kenya.
recognition, they refused to reconcile with ZANU, a party they considered to be a minority splinter group. They insisted on the dissolution of ZANU and that those who had formed it should rejoin ZAPU as individual members. However, ZANU leaders refused to disband their party. They preferred to reconcile and form a common military front with ZAPU, but with both parties to retaining separate political identities.

Persistent appeals to unite ZAPU and ZANU must not only be seen in the context of the two liberation movements clamouring for recognition, but also in the light of political divisions which engulfed the OAU in the wake of the Rhodesian crisis. Backed by Kaunda, the Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, ZAPU, led by Nkomo, secured the OAU’s recognition as a majority party representing the Rhodesian Africans in July 1963. Meanwhile, ZANU, supported by Nyerere, also vied for recognition. As UDI approached, the contest for recognition was played out within the OAU, sparking intense debate between “radical” members, such as Nkrumah and Nyerere who advocated for a militant approach in combating the Rhodesian crisis and “moderates,” led by Kaunda, who aspired for a peaceful political solution. The “moderates” supported ZAPU, which called for the establishment of a government-in-exile, while the “radicals” backed ZANU, which preferred direct military confrontation with the Rhodesian government. The debate was concluded when the OAU unanimously dismissed the notion of mounting a military invasion of Rhodesia by an African force in favour of an armed struggle spearheaded by a ZAPU-

623 NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 596 Memorandum to the Foreign Ministers of Six-Nation Committee on Rhodesia by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union 20 July 1965, Nairobi Kenya.
625 Nkrumah, Rhodesia File, p.97, see “Note from Nkrumah to Heads of State of Congo, Zaire, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, 19November 1965.”
Although the OAU repeatedly appealed for the reconciliation of ZAPU and ZANU, the leaders of the two nationalist organisations consistently refused to reunite. Deep ethnic differences, selfishness and personal ambition among them coalesced to make reconciliation impossible and mutually unacceptable.

The nationalists’ concerns were not limited to rejecting continuous calls to reconcile their liberation movements. They also complained about the general attitude of the OAU towards the nationalist movements, such as the failure to sufficiently support the liberation struggle financially and to accord them adequate representation at OAU meetings, among others. Sometimes, the nationalists accused the OAU of playing a negative role in the liberation struggle. As early as February 1965, Michael Andrew Mawema, ZANU’s National Organising Secretary, accused the OAU of discriminating against his party in the allocation of funds to the two liberation movements. He claimed that out of £50,000 that was allocated to Southern Rhodesia, the Liberation Committee gave ZAPU £40,000 while ZANU was allocated a meagre £10,000. He interpreted the disparity as a “sign of ill health” in the Liberation Committee, claiming that it destroyed the spirit of sacrifice and honesty among the nationalist leaders who received the funds. Again in March 1967, ZAPU’s Deputy National Secretary, Edward Silonda Ndlovu castigated the Liberation Committee for failing to provide sufficient funds to enable his party to recruit and transport cadres to

---

628 NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968 Memorandum Submitted to the African Liberation Committee at Moshi, Tanzania, Southern Rhodesia New Political Proposal by the Zimbabwe African National Union, 24 February signed by Michael Andrew Mawema, National Organizing Secretary for ZANU.
Tanzania for military training. He appealed to the Liberation Committee to take into account the party’s financial difficulties when requesting for cadres to be sent for training. Similarly in July 1967, ZANU leaders expressed frustration at the lack of effective representation at OAU meetings and for being excluded in decision making. During the Liberation Committee meeting in Kampala, Uganda, they lamented that:

Our experience in attending OAU meetings leaves us with much regret. It seems our presence doesn’t serve much in the way decisions affecting us are taken. We are relegated to the foyers to lobby and argue our point of view to whoever may listen. We strongly feel that when discussions in committees, of matters to deal with Rhodesia take place we should be taken in full confidence .... The OAU has to take us more seriously than has happened hitherto in these discussions. We insist that much time, much effort is wasted subsequent to any summit meeting, as we battle to understand what exactly is required of us under any subcommittee that may be set up ....

The above concerns reflect the basic nationalists’ attitudes towards the OAU, underlining the fact that, despite their dependency on the support of the continental body in the early stages of the struggle, they were capable of expressing independent views on matters which affected them. Nonetheless, because the OAU in general and, particularly, individual member states such as Zambia supported and hosted the liberation movements, they imposed certain rules and regulations to govern their operations. Similarly, on the diplomatic front, Zambian leaders articulated and implemented a clearly defined policy of promoting black majority rule in Zimbabwe and southern Africa as a whole. They backed negotiations rather than exclusive support for armed struggle. But such a policy was

---

631 Details of these rules can be found at NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, Letter from D.C Mulaisho, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President dated 28 June 1966 addressed to the Chief Representatives for ZAPU, MPLA, SWAPO, FRELIMO, ANC (S.A) COREMO, ZANU PAC(S.A) and AAC and UM.

© University of Pretoria
incompatible with strategies espoused by the nationalists in advancing the struggle. It, therefore, became a source of misunderstanding between the Zambian government and the liberation movements. The adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto illustrated this fact.

**Zimbabwean Nationalists and the Lusaka Manifesto**

As noted in Chapter 2, in April 1969, Kaunda hosted the 5th Summit Conference of East and Central African States in Lusaka which was attended by leaders of 14 countries. They subsequently issued a Manifesto on southern Africa (the Lusaka Manifesto), authored mainly by Kaunda and Nyerere. The signatories to the manifesto presented negotiations and armed struggle as two sides of the same coin. That peaceful negotiations should be pursued whenever possible and violence be resorted to only when dialogue failed became the basic strategy employed by the OAU in general and particularly Zambia in confronting Rhodesia’s problem of white minority rule. Although some scholars, such as Douglas Anglin and John Mwanakatwe, portrayed the Manifesto as an “historic document” which enhanced Kaunda’s prestige, they did not seriously take into account the attitudes of the nationalist leaders towards the Manifesto.

Leaders of nationalist movements raised several concerns regarding the Lusaka Manifesto ranging from the principles outlined in it to the method of its adoption. For instance, paragraph 3 of the manifesto stated in part that:

\[
\text{we recognize that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equalities is being effected.}
\]

---

632 See the full text of the Manifesto at UNIP6/7/24 Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14-16 April 1969. A Copy of this document is in possession by this author.


However, leaders of various nationalist movements, including ZAPU and ZANU, objected to the proposed notion of transferring power from the white minority to the black majority under transitional arrangements. Rather, they underlined the need for immediate effective transfer of power.\textsuperscript{635} For ZAPU and ZANU leaders and their counterparts in other liberation movements, the general concern about the Lusaka Manifesto was that they were not consulted in drawing it up. They rejected the principle of negotiations accepted by African leaders claiming it weakened the case for freedom fighters.\textsuperscript{636}

Although the Zambian government tried to defend its position by suggesting that “the Heads of State were under no obligation to consult liberation movements” and that the “manifesto took into account the aspirations of freedom fighters for whose benefit it was declared,”\textsuperscript{637} the nationalists refused to accept it because of its explicit emphasis on negotiations. They would later call for its withdrawal by “those who adopted it.”\textsuperscript{638} The nationalists’ criticism of the Lusaka Manifesto would become intense when, as will be discussed later in the chapter, Zambian authorities implemented it through their participation in détente and their intervention in the ZANU crisis of 1974-1976 which claimed the life of

\textsuperscript{635} NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee 1969, see letter dated 9 December 1969 captioned “the April 1969 Lusaka Manifesto” addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Zambia’s High Commission, Nairobi Kenya by A.N Chimuka, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chimuka reported that during the last week of November 1969, the Zambian government summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives of liberation movements in Zambia to hear their views and reaction to the manifesto. Among liberation movements which attended the meeting included ZAPU, ZANU, FRELIMO, SWAPO and Unity Movement of South Africa.


\textsuperscript{637} NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee 1969, see letter dated 9 December 1969 captioned “The April 1969 Lusaka Manifesto” addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Zambia’s High Commission, Nairobi Kenya by A.N Chimuka, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

the party’s Chairman, Herbert Chitepo. However, Zambia’s intervention in the internal crises of Zimbabwe nationalist movements did not begin with ZANU. Early in 1970, ZAPU was similarly rocked by a leadership crisis which compelled Zambian authorities to intervene, subsequently straining their relationship with some ZAPU freedom fighters.

**ZAPU Crisis and Zambia’s Response**

While Eliakim Sibanda and Dumiso Dabengwa have documented the origins and significance of the 1970/1971 ZAPU crisis to the liberation struggle, they did not fully highlight the concerns of some ZAPU militants regarding Zambia’s role in the crisis. This is because the cadres whom they portrayed as “dissidents’ had fallen out of favour with the mainstream ZAPU for expressing their concerns on matters which affected them, namely the leadership crisis in the party. It is necessary to capture the views of ZAPU guerrillas, for while they were depicted as dissidents who had mutinied, their concerns reveal salient aspects of the nature of Zambia’s response to internal crises of the foreign nationalist movements it hosted, reflecting what some critics regarded as Zambia’s dubious role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle and southern Africa, more generally.

The internal crisis which rocked ZAPU from the late 1960s to the early 1970s was caused by two interrelated factors, namely the party’s Acting President, James Chikerema’s unilateral attempts to negotiate with ZANU for a united front and his unauthorised filming of ZIPRA guerrilla fighters while they crossed the Zambezi into Rhodesia. Late in the 1960s, Chikerema, backed by George Nyandoro, the party’s Secretary General, began to

---


641 UNIP6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters, see document “All ZAPU Secrets Revealed to the Smith Regime”.

© University of Pretoria
negotiate with representatives of ZANU, first with Nathan Shamuyarira (then a lecturer at the University of Dar-es-Salaam) and, later, Herbert Chitepo, the National Chairman of ZANU. The talks were aimed at forming a united front.\textsuperscript{642} Chikerema’s initiative was acceptable in as far as he was responding to perennial calls by Zambian leaders and the OAU to unite his party with ZANU, but within ZAPU, his actions were unpopular. He encountered opposition from executive members such as Jason Moyo, the party’s Treasurer, Tasisius Silundika, in charge of Publicity, and Edward Ndlovu, the party’s Deputy National Secretary. They refused to support Chikerema, claiming he had been negotiating a merger with ZANU on his own without consulting them.\textsuperscript{643} But Chikerema contended that his colleagues opposed negotiations with ZANU because of tribal concerns and fear of losing their positions in the party.\textsuperscript{644}

Irrespective of the personal or ethnic differences and Chikerema’s unilateral decision to negotiate with ZANU, one thing is clear; the crisis was compounded by the filming incident. According to Sibanda,

Early in 1969, Chikerema took a group of foreign journalists on a tour of ZAPU military camps [in Zambia], and on January 1 1970 he screened a documentary on ZIPRA that was shown to overseas audiences, in Britain and West Germany. From a tactical and military standpoint, this action by Chikerema was unconscionable as it compromised ZIPRA’s military strategy as a guerrilla movement and also exposed its incursions routes


\textsuperscript{644} UNIP6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters “ZIP Zimbabwe: Richard Gott in Lusaka on the prospects of Unity between ZAPU and ZANU.”
into Rhodesia. Worse still, it exposed the identity of guerrillas to Rhodesia and South African intelligence which probably purchased the film.\(^{645}\)

The incident was significant for two reasons. Firstly, it embarrassed Kaunda because the documentary was carried out on Zambian territory without his knowledge and authority. After all, he had been consistently denying the existence of any guerrilla bases or staging posts in Zambia. Secondly, the filming incident infuriated ZAPU members. In response, Moyo published a paper called “On the Observation of Our Struggle” in which he criticised Chikerema’s authoritarianism and irresponsible behaviour particularly his publicity methods such as the filming incident.\(^{646}\) Moyo’s response ignited intense disagreement within the political leadership of ZAPU. Chikerema rejected Moyo’s criticism, emphasising that the political leadership had no right to decide on a military matter, an issue that fell within his jurisdiction as Head of the Party’s Department of Special Affairs.\(^{647}\)

Moreover, Moyo, Ndlovu and Silundika jointly produced yet another document called “On the Coup Crisis Precipitated by Chikerema” in which they further accused Chikerema of staging a coup d'état in the party. They also accused him of dictatorial tendencies, insatiable appetite for power, tribalism, nepotism and inordinate personal ambition.\(^{648}\) Moyo, Ndlovu and Silundika portrayed Chikerema as a power-hungry tribalist while depicting themselves as concerned executive members eager to solve the party’s problems perpetrated by Chikerema. In his book, *The March 11 Movement in ZAPU: A

---

\(^{645}\) Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961-87*, p.143


Revolution within the Revolution, Owen Tshabangu observed that the resultant effect of bickering within the leadership of ZAPU was the creation of “two centres of authority” in the party whereby each attempted “to sink the other, using all means including tribalism and, eventually, actual physical violence.” For Tshabangu, the two factions were clearly crystallised along ethnic lines; Moyo, Ndlovu and Silundika emerged as leaders of what he termed the “Dengezi Group” in ZAPU, an all-Ndebele tribal faction, whereas Chikerema, backed by Nyandoro, emerged leading a Shona faction, a group which in tribal parlance was termed the “Murewa Society.”

The crisis became acute, dividing the party into two hostile camps; the one led by Chikerema and the other by Moyo. It culminated in serious intra-party violence with deadly consequences. In April 1970, it was reported that six men were seriously injured while four others went missing after a deadly running battle of rival supporters outside a ZAPU residential hostel (also known as Zimbabwe House) in Emmasdale, Lusaka. The following month, a man was murdered outside the same premises allegedly by a group of Chikerema’s supporters. By the end of November, Zambian intelligence sources revealed that Chikerema had survived a grenade attack allegedly planted by Dumiso Dabengwa, ZAPU’s Chief of Military Intelligence and Maisa Ndlovu. The two were believed to have been sent by Silundika and Moyo. Similar grenade attacks also took place at the same residential hostels in Emmasdale.

---

649 Owen Tshabangu was one of the prominent young ZAPU militants who organised a mutiny.
650 Tshabangu, The March 11 Movement in ZAPU, p.35.
651 Tshabangu, The March 11 Movement in ZAPU, p.35.

© University of Pretoria
Meanwhile, in February 1971, after fruitless appeals to the ZAPU leadership to resolve the crisis, a group of about forty ZAPU guerrillas at Camp F or Freedom Camp (also known as Chikumbi, located approximately 20 kilometres north of Lusaka city), signed and sent a letter to the OAU Liberation Committee, criticising ZAPU leaders in exile and calling for a conference to deal with the leadership problem. The young guerrilla leaders who signed the letter included Walter Mthimkhulu, Matsikidze Gutu, Eli Mthethwa, Charles Gwenzi, Phineas Bepura, Owen Tshabangu, Gershom Phangwane, Jabulani Mazula, J. Z Mzilethi, Cain Mathema, Joshua Mpofu, Job Maphosa and Stolom Ndlovu, among others. They expressed lack of confidence in the leaders of the party and complained that they had been abandoned by them. They also accused their leaders of tribal squabbles, and petty and selfish leadership in-fighting.655

The military cadres wanted to ensure the leadership crisis was resolved and armed struggle resumed, but because they were frustrated from being ignored, they took matters into their own hands. They devised a plan to kidnap all the political leaders, including Chikerema, Moyo, Ndlovu, Silundika and Nyandoro and bring them to face ZIPRA cadres in the camps. In his recent autobiography, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, Joshua Mpofu, one of the prominent young militants who organised the rebellion, provides a detailed account of the strategy to kidnap political leaders by force. He reveals that the guerrillas constituted a special task force to procure light fire arms from the frontline camps so they could arm themselves for the operation. The task force, comprising Walter Mthimkhulu, Job Maphosa, Stolom Ndlovu and J. Z Mzilethi as commander,
organised a 40 tonne lorry and procured the weapons from the Zambezi Valley. Having obtained the fire arms, Mpofu explained, time for action had arrived.\textsuperscript{656}

Meanwhile, the guerrillas had formed what they referred to as the Revolutionary Council and summoned a General Assembly of freedom fighters from various camps including Nkomo Camp, Vietnam Camp, Luthuli Camp, Freedom Camp, Garden Camp and Zimbabwe House to a meeting at Chikumbi. On 11 March 1971, the cadres (who later formally adopted the name \textit{The March 11 Movement} after the date when they arrested their leaders) took up positions and captured almost all the members of the Dengezi and Military Administration including Moyo and Silundika at Zimbabwe House in Emmasdale and ZAPU offices in Lusaka. The following day, they apprehended Nyandoro, but because he was not properly tied up, he escaped into the streets of Lusaka city centre and went to warn Chikerema about the mission of the cadres. The two momentarily escaped the guerrillas’ drag-net and informed Zambian authorities about the incident.\textsuperscript{657} However, Dabengwa provide a different account. He claims that the “dissidents” were organised by Chikerema but they mutinied and sought to arrest Chikerema himself and Nyandoro except they could not find them.\textsuperscript{658} The three leaders still at large were only captured with the help of the Zambia Police. Mpofu noted that

\begin{quotation}
In spite of the setbacks, we never stopped hunting down Chikerema and Nyandoro to join their colleagues in the camps …. A day later we intercepted Chikerema in the company of an Assistant Commissioner of [Zambia] Police, we humbly informed the … Commissioner that … Chikerema was required to join others at F Camp and he obliged, we went further to respectfully ask the … Police to assist us get hold of … Nyandoro and … Ndlovu and indeed, they delivered the following day.\textsuperscript{659}
\end{quotation}

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
Thus, by the third day, all the ZAPU leaders—Chikerema, Nyandoro, Moyo, Ndlovu and Silundika—were detained by the guerrillas at Chikumbi in the outskirts of Lusaka. The guerrillas arrested their leaders because they wanted them to call for a conference at which the leadership question would be resolved.

Obviously, Joshua Mpofu and Owen Tshabangu portrayed the guerrillas’ action against their leaders as utterly legitimate because of the following plausible reasons. Firstly, both Mpofu and Tshabangu participated in organising the rebellion and therefore could only depict their action as essentially appropriate for correcting the party’s problems. Secondly, the young militants secured the full backing of the majority of cadres in the camps to carry out “a new revolutionary transformation of ZAPU” so as “to remove archaic ways of directing the struggle and bring about revolutionary changes and strategies of waging well-planned guerrilla warfare.”

Thirdly, the cadres thoroughly articulated their grievances about the leadership crisis in the party and sufficiently made diplomatic representation to Zambian authorities who, in turn, sympathised with their desire to resolve the problem amicably. However, as will be argued later in the chapter, the young revolutionaries were shocked when Zambian authorities refused to cooperate with them in resolving the leadership crisis in the party, but brutally disarmed them.

It was as a result of deteriorating security situation within ZAPU which prompted Zambian authorities to intervene. The Zambian authorities appealed to the guerrillas to release their leaders and, in return, promised to call for a conference. Finally, the guerrillas freed the captives and a conference was convened at Mboroma (a small town outside

---

661 Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.170.
Mkushi in central province, hundreds of kilometers northeast of Lusaka) which was chaired by Aaron Milner, the Secretary General to the Zambian government. The meeting foundered partly because Milner rejected the agenda proposed by the guerrillas. He also dominated the proceedings without giving the guerrillas opportunity to express their views.\footnote{UNIP6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters, “Kasama Restrictions for Opposing Chikerema’s Selling”} After the conference reached an impasse, Zambian authorities detained about forty ZAPU guerrillas and later deported another 129 back to Rhodesia, accusing them of being “an instrument for imperialist counter-subversion within the liberation struggle.”\footnote{UNIP6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters, see “Latest Developments on the ZAPU-Fighting Force”} In 1974, after much publicity about their plight, those who remained incarcerated in Zambia, particularly the group led by Mthimkhulu were offered scholarships by the British government to study in the United Kingdom.\footnote{UNIP UNIP6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters “All ZAPU Secrets Revealed to Smith Regime.” See also Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, p.147.} These developments will be discussed in detail later in the chapter when recounting the plight and ordeal suffered by the leadership of the \textit{March 11 Movement} at the hands of Zambian authorities.

According to Dabengwa, the significance of the ZAPU crisis was that it split the party into three factions; (i) a separate political party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) emerged under the leadership of Shelton Siwela and, later, Chikerema, (ii) a group led by Walter Mthimkulu broke away and remained neutral and independent, (iii) the original ZAPU remained, now led by Moyo.\footnote{Dabengwa, “ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation,” pp.24-36.} Reflecting upon circumstances leading to the split in ZAPU, Dabengwa concluded that:

Many of us strongly believed that the events leading up to the 1971 split did not arise merely out of disagreements between our political leaders but were also a result of external influence. For example, we suspected that
the Mthimkhulu group was influenced by Britain. We also suspected that some African countries had played a part in the split, particularly in the formation of FROLIZI which was marketed as a party that was going to unite ZAPU and ZANU ….

Dabengwa’s assertion that “the 1971 split did not arise merely out of disagreements between our political leaders but were also a result of external influence” raises some critical questions which require examination. He also attributes the split and the resultant formation of FROLIZI to “some African countries” which, by conjecture, meant among them, Zambia, since it not only gave sanctuary to ZAPU but also consistently appealed for a united front and intervened in the party’s crisis.

Zambian authorities were certainly known to support Nkomo’s leadership of ZAPU, who, at the time of the crisis, was still languishing at Gonakudzingwa restriction camp in the south-eastern part of Rhodesia. This raises a number of questions, namely: If Zambian leaders supported Nkomo, why would they engineer a leadership split in a party led by someone they supported? If they played a role in splitting the ZAPU leadership in Zambia, why could not they back the “dissidents” led by Mthimkhulu but crushed them, instead? In whose interest would Zambian authorities split a party when they consistently and passionately called for the leadership of ZAPU and, for that matter, other liberation movements to sink their differences and unite? The split in ZAPU’s leadership cannot be attributed to the Zambian government or some other African country, as Dabengwa claims. There is no hard evidence to suggest Zambia or any other African country played a part in splitting ZAPU’s leadership. In all likelihood, the split was part and parcel of Zimbabwean nationalist politics where ethnic identities more often determined political affiliation and loyalties.

---

Although Sibanda refutes assertions that ethnicity played a part in the leadership split of ZAPU, available evidence suggests it played a major role. Moyo and Silundika (both of Kalanga descent) and Ndlovu, a member of the Ndebele, a minority group, ganged up to reject unity proposals spearheaded by Chikerema and supported by Nyandoro, both of whom were Shona. Although they conceivably feared to lose their posts if a united front with ZANU materialised, it is plausible that they opposed a merger primarily because of the evident ethnic identities which not only became highly politicised but also crept into the nationalist movements during this period.

Noticeably, Dabengwa and Sibanda’s narratives of the ZAPU crisis portray it as a minor event and a necessary outcome of a nationalist movement undergoing self-evaluation and re-organisation. Consequently, they depicted a group of guerrillas led by Mthimkhulu as “dissidents” who had “mutinied,” overlooking the fact that they had legitimate concerns about the leadership crisis in the party which was proving counterproductive to the liberation struggle. Because of their support for Nkomo, a position which Zambian authorities assumed when they clamped down on the “dissidents,” Dabengwa and Sibanda deliberately ignored or failed to fully highlight the concerns and the plight of the cadres vis-à-vis Zambia’s response to the crisis and its overall role in the liberation struggle.

---

667 Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, p.144.
Concerns, Ordeal and Plight of the March 11 Movement

As noted, after a group of young revolutionaries arrested the party’s political leaders at the height of the crisis in 1971, ostensibly to force them to call for a conference, Kaunda sent Milner to mediate in the impasse. He met representatives of the cadres and an agreement was reached that: i) ZAPU leaders would be guarded by the Zambia police jointly with a couple of ZIPRA fighters; ii) ZIPRA guerrillas would have a final say in resolving the leadership crisis in the party; iii) the five beleaguered leaders would be sent to Kamfinsa paramilitary police camp under the joint watch of two guerrilla fighters and Zambia paramilitary police; iv) a conference, to be attended by all ZIPRA freedom fighters, would be held at a venue far away from Lusaka and that the government would facilitate at the conference to find a solution to the crisis once and for all; v) the fighters would leave their weapons under the watch of a small unit of ZIPRA guerrillas; vi) the Zambian government would pick up all the fighters from every ZIPRA camp in Zambia and the ZAPU representative in Tanzania would be instructed to prepare for the transportation of the recruits who were waiting at Morogoro military training camp in Tanzania and vii) the government would provide supplies to the entire ZIPRA fighters where they were due to assemble. 669

Consequently, Milner appealed to ZIPRA cadres to release their leaders as a condition of convening a conference. At the same time, he promised them that when a conference was convened, they would be accorded an opportunity to express their views on the leadership crisis in the party. Meanwhile, in readiness for the conference, Walter Mthimkhulu, Gershom Phangwane and Joshua Mpofu prepared a speech to be read at the

669 Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.173. See also Tshabangu, The March 11 Movement in ZAPU, p.46.
conference by Mthimkhulu who had been nominated by the March 11 Movement's Revolutionary Council. The cadres also submitted a list of agenda items to be considered during the meeting. They included the following: i) the suspension of the present ZAPU leaders until the crisis was settled; ii) the establishment of a code of conduct and behaviour for ZAPU leaders and cadres; iii) discussion of the party ideology and; iv) agreement on the general protocol of the party, that is how members should conduct themselves vis-a-vis the party hierarchy. The guerrillas freed their political leaders and Milner convened the conference at Mboroma. In the meantime, while the rest of the cadres were assembled at Mboroma, Zambian security forces ordered the small unit of ZIPRA cadres who had remained to guard the weapons to surrender them and join their colleagues at Mboroma. Tshabangu pointed out that:

As soon as the conference began we realised … something was definitely wrong. We … first realised … all was not well when … comrades we … left behind to guard our weapons … arrived at the conference site in military trucks, baggage and all. They informed us that … the [Zambia] police … demanded that they hand over weapons, as soon as the main body … moved to conference. The weapons having been handled over they were told that the camp was to be destroyed.

This development raised suspicion among ZAPU cadres about government’s intention and signaled “something worse to come.”

As soon as the meeting started, Milner shocked the cadres when he reneged on his earlier promise to allow cadres to express their views. He declared he would be chairman and that the meeting was not a conference but a gathering of freedom fighters and their leaders to sort out some misunderstanding. He further pointed out that the agenda items

---

671 Tshabangu, The March 11 Movement in ZAPU, p.49.
672 Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.173.
circulated by the cadres would not be taken into account and pointed out that activists in exile had no right to decide the question of the leadership of ZAPU. He vowed to deal ruthlessly with anyone who questioned or deviated from these guidelines. Although Milner was emphatic about the status of the meeting, he allowed the guerrillas to speak first ahead of the leaders. Representing the cadres, Mthimkhulu gave a detailed speech, highlighting, among other issues, the origins of the crisis in the party, the failures of the entire exiled leadership and the possible solutions to the ills in the nationalist movement. He explained that:

i) The ZAPU leaders in exile, with a mission to wage armed struggle against the Rhodesian government, exhibited their strategic shallowness by their outburst in documentary accusations of each other in public in 1970;

ii) The leaders admitted that there was no strategy and no guerrilla warfare to fight the Rhodesian government. They regarded the initial guerrilla efforts as a sabotage campaign designed to frighten the regime into accepting round table negotiations on majority rule, while the guerrillas thought they were trained and deployed to launch guerrilla warfare as a first phase to wear down the enemy’s military power;

iii) Although ZAPU was the main vehicle of national liberation in Zimbabwe at the time, external ZAPU leaders treated it like a private company gone bankrupt. Instead of constructively working together to resuscitate armed struggle, they lifted high the banner of tribalism and degenerated into the level of antiquated village chiefs in dispute over succession to the throne;

---

iv) The crisis was the consequence of inability to find a better and appropriate strategy to overthrow the Smith’s regime at a time when there was a compelling need for a comprehensive review of the entire strategy and tactics against the backdrop of a series of tragic failures in field operations;

v) It was this failure that exploded into a quarrel between them, thus, disqualifying themselves from leading a revolution of the nature that needed a leadership of depth in thought to plan sound strategies and capability in the execution of planned strategies;

vi) Our leaders failed to understand the transcendence from a civilian driven struggle for majority rule to a revolutionary process driven by fire power guided by an enlightened revolutionary leadership with clear goals of freedom for a liberated nation;

vii) Having torn leadership cohesion apart by taking refuge in tribal cocoons, their positions have become irreconcilable between themselves, let alone, between themselves and the freedom fighters because tribalism and revolution are dialectically opposed to each other as the former reverts to and thrives in primitivism while the latter is propelled by the dynamics of social transformation towards a better society;

viii) The five discredited leaders consisting of Chikerema, Nyandoro, Moyo, Silundika and Ndlovu should be suspended from leadership for the duration of the struggle or until a ZAPU elective congress was held to decide their fate.674

As Mthimkhulu formally moved the motion to suspend the five executive members, Milner intervened. He declared that the motion implied that the choice was between

674 Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.174.
rejecting Nkomo’s leadership and remaining loyal to him. He decided to call a “vote” over the question of who was for the "leadership" of Walter Mtmkhulu and who was for the old "leadership." According to David Moore, about three-quarters of the voters opted for the March 11 Movement's interpretation of the so-called leadership question. In spite of Milner's deliberate inclusion of Nkomo's name into the issue, the majority of the guerrillas and exiles voted "against" the old leadership, knowing fully well that the vote was not over such a narrowly framed issue, but on questions of the nature of the leadership's relationship with the cadres and of the prosecution of the armed struggle.675

For Owen Tshabangu, it was at this time that the situation became murky. Zambian authorities bundled into a military truck those they considered to be ring-leaders while the rest of the participants were taken to Kabwe and detained overnight at a police station. The idea was to separate the ring-leaders from the rest of the cadres because it was believed that that would change the attitude of the majority of those at the conference. After the second session, the guerrilla leaders were bundled into the troop carriers and under armed escort, driven to Kamfinsa Paramilitary Police Camp on the Copperbelt where they were detained about 1000 miles from Mboroma, the venue of the conference.676

When it became clear that the conference at Mboroma had failed to resolve the leadership crisis in ZAPU and the guerrillas could not budge and bow to pressure, Zambian authorities assembled the cadres and announced that the trained cadres should be separated from the recruits. A contingent of trained guerrilla fighters were taken to a camp down the slope of the valley westwards and dumped near a river to the east, an area described by

---

676 Tshabangu, The March 11 Movement in ZAPU, p.50.

© University of Pretoria
Joshua Mpofu as the “Fridge” because of its extremely cold environment. After spending about two months at the “Fridge,” on 5 June 1971, a senior Zambia Police officer arrived at the camp and assembled the cadres and read out a list of 41 names of the guerrillas he claimed were a delegation to meet Milner. It turned out that the 41 cadres were actually arrested and transported in military trucks to Milima Prison, a few kilometres outside Kasama town, near the Tanzanian border in Northern Province of Zambia. They would spend the next three years in prison.

While the 41 guerrillas were incarcerated at Milima Prison, the rest of the cadres remained in Mboroma. Here, Zambian authorities attempted, by force, to order the cadres to join their “legitimate” leaders, but they refused. Some escaped from the camp and mingled with the Zambian population while others joined ZANU. Among the cadres who remained at the camp and refused to join the discredited leaders of ZAPU, about 129 were taken in troop carriers and driven to the Rhodesian border and handed over to the Rhodesian authorities. The Zambian government claimed that the cadres were “an instrument for imperialist counter-subversion within the liberation struggle.” After arriving in the country, the cadres were put on trial. Those who were considered to be dangerous were sentenced to death and others to life imprisonment, depending on whether they participated.

677 Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.177.
678 Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.182. Tshabangu claims that of the 41 guerrillas arrested, 34 were detained in Kasama while 7 were detained in Chipata and 1 in Mongu, see Tshabangu, The March 11 Movement in ZAPU, p.59.
679 Many ZIPRA cadres began defecting to ZANU soon after the eruption of the crisis in ZAPU in 1969, but the exodus continued into the early 1970s as the crisis deepened. Among the most prominent ZIPRA guerrillas who defected included Rex Nhongo, Rabson Manyika, Thomas Nhari and Solomon Badza. Some of these high profile personnel were highly trained and possessed distinguished military skills and experiences in the theater of operation. Thus, it has been argued that there departure from ZAPU diminished ZIPRA’s capabilities and boosted the operational capacity and capability of ZANLA in the execution of armed struggle. This partly explains the significant rise of ZANU in the field of operations following the collapse of ZAPU in 1970. See Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.188.
680 UNIP6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters, see “Latest Developments on the ZAPU-Fighting Force”
in fighting or not. The recruits were given short sentences and released. If indeed these young ZAPU revolutionaries were Rhodesian spies, as Zambian authorities alleged, it is surprising that most of them were hanged.

Reflecting on the manner Milner presided over the conference and the subsequent brutal treatment they were subjected to, the guerrillas concluded that Milner, and more generally, Zambian authorities wanted to obstruct the resumption of armed struggle in Zimbabwe. The cadres claimed that, during the meeting,

The Chairman, Mr. Milner was lecturing us most of the time and had very little patience to listen and made no effort to be neutral between the leadership and the cadres. The Chairman answered—and to no one’s satisfaction—all the allegations, charges and questions meant for the leadership. On the question and programme of how the struggle is to continue in the future, there Mr. Milner’s dictat had to apply …

For the young ZAPU militants, the major cause of the crisis during the conference was that Milner shielded and appointed himself spokesman of the “discredited and unpopular leaders” and, therefore, criticisms of the five leaders were interpreted by Milner as criticism of the Secretary General to the government and also an attack on Zambian authorities and President Kaunda himself. They interpreted Milner’s “attitude and way of reasoning” as tantamount to “stifling of the peoples’ right to self-expression and self-determination.”

Thus, they declared:

We wish to make it plain and in sincere humility that we take no delight in expressing bitter words to the government of a host and fraternal country. In this respect, this has indeed become the most painful phase of our struggle. We just hope and pray that the Zambian leaders and by that

681 Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.178, 181.
683 UNIP 6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters, “Kasama Restrictions for Opposing Chikerema’s Selling”
virtue our leaders also will see our stand not in the perspective that we are expressing bitter words, but in the perspective that we are reporting and recording the harsh facts of history. We say this in deep sorrow because we fear that we may be misunderstood … we do not regard and find it impossible to regard Mr. Milner as a sympathizer with our armed struggle. We do not take this view because he is Mr. Milner, but because of his actions, attitude and whole disposition towards our case as freedom fighters …

The concerns of the freedom fighters were not limited to complaints about Milner’s behaviour. They also criticised the government’s brutality during their arrest and detention. They claimed that Mr. Katambi, the Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, ostensibly acting under Milner’s orders, unleashed police officers from the Mobile Unit who found the cadres asleep, woke them up at “gun-point” and ordered them into the police trucks. They complained that “some were lifted up by police and thrown into the police trucks together with their blankets.”

As a result, the cadres appealed to the Zambian government to re-examine its policy and attitude towards the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. They also questioned the government’s commitment to the revolution and pointed out that its policy was in “doubt” and could “not be seen to operate in practice.” Furthermore, they argued that, if the Zambian authorities were genuinely committed to advancing the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, it was necessary for them to commit themselves to: i) allow the Zimbabwean people to hold free party meetings to discuss the crisis within their organisation ZAPU; ii) release from restriction, detention and prisons of the Zimbabwean revolutionaries imprisoned for their disagreements with Milner in Kasama, Chipata and Mboroma; iii) allow


© University of Pretoria
ZAPU members in Zambia, that is, the civilian population, to hold a free and democratic conference together with the guerrillas within Zambia and those in East Africa; iv) take steps to ensure that ZAPU party documents containing sensitive information are removed from Milner’s hands and taken to either the Liberation Centre or the office of the liberation movements in the Ministry of Provincial and Local Government or to some other place agreeable to the members of the ZAPU Fighting Force. The alternative would be to declare ZAPU banned on Zambian soil publicly and, thus, removing the illusion inside Zimbabwe that there are external efforts being made to liberate the Zimbabwean masses. This would, at least, bring the people in Zimbabwe face to face with realities of the need to seek ways of liberating themselves without deluding themselves that they were receiving support from abroad and thus making them to become self-reliant if they wish to be free.688

The cadres’ interpretation of Zambia’s intervention in the party’s internal crisis amounted to “liquidating the Zimbabwe revolution,” attitudes which persisted, and as will be discussed, were later also held by ZANU, following Zambia’s participation in détente.

Joshua Mpofu—one of the leading members of the March 11 Movement—attributed economic and ideological factors in compelling Zambia to deport 129 ZAPU guerrillas to Rhodesia. He claimed that Zambian authorities might have exchanged freedom fighters with maize meal as per agreement with the Rhodesian government partly because shortly after the deportations of the cadres, there was maize delivered to Zambia.689 Whether or not the two countries struck a deal, it is difficult to ascertain and as Mpofu rightly noted, there was no direct evidence. Nonetheless, states sometimes strike bilateral deals secretly.

689 Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.179.
Another plausible explanation was that the guerrillas had become too radical for Zambian authorities to tolerate their presence in the country. According to Mpofu, there were fears that the cadres had internalised the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology considered to be a threat to capitalism, which was a pearl of western Multinational Corporations in southern Africa. While acknowledging that everybody made serious blunders in this saga, Mpofu concluded that

… with due respect, the Zambian government made a tragic strategic error of judgement that cost ZAPU its viability as an armed liberation movement, thus disabling it to nearly one hundred percent disability that marked the beginning of its demise as a national movement …. It was a huge political error for … government to treat freedom fighters like common criminals who were caught doing crime. The arresting of freedom fighters and sending some of them to enemy hands was inexcusable by any reasonable measure of political consideration.¹⁶⁹⁰

It may not be entirely correct to conclude, as Mpofu argued, that Zambian action against the guerrillas cost ZAPU’s “viability as an armed liberation movement” and “marked the beginning of its demise as a national movement.” For, while the heavy handed methods of clamping down on cadres were unjustifiable, the militants represented only a minute sector of the membership of ZAPU as a nationalist movement. Therefore, Zambia’s action against them did not amount to liquidating ZAPU, but, on the contrary, was an attempt to secure its security interests and uphold the legitimate leadership of the nationalist movement it consistently supported. Unlike in ZAPU where Zambian authorities intervened in support of the leaders, during a similar but much more serious crisis in ZANU, the Zambian government intervened and arrested almost the entire leadership, rendering the liberation movement moribund and grinding armed struggle to a halt.

¹⁶⁹⁰ Mpofu, My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, p.180.
Meanwhile, after spending two years at Milima detention centre in Kasama, the cadres were transferred to Livingston Prison. In 1974, they were released and deported to the United Kingdom where they were given scholarships by the British Council to study at various universities and colleges. David Moore pointed out that the release of the guerrillas from detention coincided with two factors. First, Joshua Mpolo’s spouse, Ratie, had been working tirelessly through the World Lutheran Federation, Amnesty International, the Committee for the Relief of Zimbabwean Political Prisoners, and the British Labour Party for their emancipation. Ratie’s protracted publicity about the predicament of the incarcerated cadres in Zambian jails resulted in the intervention of Joan Lester and Judith Hart, prominent members of the Labour government, and finally, the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan. As a result, Mpolo was released and sent to Britain for a year as a "test case." Mpolo, Ratie, along with their colleagues, Mzilethi and Jacob Moyo, arranged scholarships and accommodation for the rest through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.691

Second, with the arrival of détente in 1974 and the release of the political leaders in Rhodesia, Kaunda—and no doubt ZAPU—wanted the dissidents out. Détente, as discussed in detail below, was a period from December 1974 to January 1976 when tension eased between states that had hitherto experienced hostility over the right to self-determination of the black southern African majority living under white minority rule.692 At the time of détente and efforts to forge a "moderate" nationalist leadership, Zambian authorities thought it necessary to deport the cadres far away from where they might have influence over events,

and even in prison they might have had that. Since it was always Zambia’s intention to deport the members of the March 11 Movement, the success of the "test case" made it seem practical and "humane" for the militants to be exiled to Britain, thousands of miles away from where they might stir up trouble. Certainly all the local conditions at the time made acceptance of the British arrangements most propitious, arrangements that were, in any case, the result of intensive pressure from outside either the British or the Zambian state.\(^\text{693}\)

**ZANU, Zambia and Détente**

Partly precipitated by FRELIMO’s military victory in Mozambique, the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in Lisbon in April 1974 reconfigured regional dynamics of armed struggle and expanded the area of conflict in southern Africa. Although the South African government propped up the Rhodesian government with sufficient economic and military aid,\(^\text{694}\) the Rhodesian Front regime faced a new political and military reality on its northeastern frontiers. The newly inaugurated President of Mozambique, Samora Machel allowed ZANU’s ZANLA forces to open a new front along the country’s border with Rhodesia and to step up military operations against the Rhodesian white settlers. Facing intense military pressure and the prospect of Rhodesia falling to the guerrilla forces, Vorster, backed by Kissinger, initiated talks with Kaunda to try and find a negotiated political settlement to the Rhodesian conflict. In any case, diplomatic consultations between the two leaders had been going on since 1968 through an intermittent exchange of letters.\(^\text{695}\) For Kaunda, Vorster’s overtures to secure a peaceful political plan for Rhodesia were seen as an


\(^{695}\) ‘Dear Mr. Vorster … Details of Exchanges between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa’ University of Zambia Library’s Special Collection Gov.Zam (02) 1971.
opportunity to implement the Lusaka Manifesto. In the process, he was severely criticised by ZANU nationalist leaders who felt that the entire détente project was a hoax designed to disarm ZANLA and stop guerrilla war, especially since it was, at the time, the only army engaged in active combat with Rhodesian forces.  

Following intensive secret negotiations between Vorster and Kaunda, Smith, ostensibly under pressure from the former, agreed to temporarily release leaders of the nationalist movements who had been incarcerated at Que Que and Gonakudzingwa detention camps in Rhodesia in order for them to attend a meeting in Lusaka. Nonetheless, the Frontline Presidents—Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama and Machel—were completely unaware of the leadership crisis in ZANU. While in prison, Ndabaningi Sithole was toppled by Robert Mugabe as president of ZANU in August 1974, an incident described by Fay Chung as a palace coup. Sithole was deposed partly because, while in jail, he began to vigorously campaign for his release from detention by offering, among other things, to stop armed struggle which had just been launched in 1966. This was said to have been the beginning of the feud between Sithole and the ZANU Secretary General, Robert Mugabe. Later, the entire Central Committee of the party sided with Mugabe, when Sithole put the matter to them. After their release from prison, the ZANU nationalists announced to the Frontline Heads of State—Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama and Machel—that Mugabe was their leader and head of the delegation for the Unity talks. However, the Heads of State were surprised and suspicious about this prison coup, and consequently, refused to accept Mugabe. In particular,

696 Zimbabwe News Vol.9 No.1 (January 1975), pp.2-7, see “Zimbabwe African National Union Memorandum to the OAU Liberation Committee meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, 5th January 1975” presented by Rugare A.N. Gumbo, Secretary for Publicity and Information, see also Zimbabwe News Vol. 8 No.11 November 1974 see article “Alarming Gestures of Peace in Southern Africa.”

697 Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, p.86.

698 See article “Sithole shows true Colours” in Zimbabwe News Vol. 9, No. 4 May-June (1977), pp.19-21.

699 Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, p.86.
Nyerere was said to have been so angry that he refused to talk to Mugabe and demanded that he and his followers go back to Rhodesia and return with Sithole.\footnote{700} The crisis was temporarily shelved and Sithole was reinstated, but his power was diminished.

Meanwhile, from November to December 1974, Kaunda, backed by Nyerere, Machel and Khama, convened secret but separate meetings at State House in Lusaka with nationalist leaders, including Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Dr. Elliot Gabella of the African National Council (ANC), Joshua Nkomo and Joseph Msika of ZAPU and ZANU representatives, Ndabaningi Sithole, Morton Malianga, Robert Mugabe, and Maurice Nyagumbo. The internal nationalist leaders were given an opportunity to meet and consult with leaders of the external wings of their parties. The objective of Kaunda’s meetings with the Zimbabwean nationalists was to inform them about the détente exercise which, in his view, presented an opportunity to achieve Zimbabwe’s independence without bloodshed.\footnote{701}

Early in December, the nationalist leaders agreed and signed the ‘Unity Accord’—Muzorewa for ANC, Nkomo for ZAPU, Sithole for ZANU and Chikerema for FROLIZI. Among other issues, the nationalists agreed to i) incorporate their respective parties under the banner of an enlarged ANC; ii) prepare for a constitutional conference leading to the transfer of political power; and iii) to recognise the inevitability of the armed struggle until total liberation of Zimbabwe was achieved.\footnote{702} Meanwhile, Kaunda backed by Nyerere, Machel and Khama, had already agreed with Vorster and Smith, on behalf of the nationalists, that the Rhodesian government would i) call a constitutional conference within 4 months; ii) release all political prisoners, including South Africans imprisoned for their...
part in the Zimbabwe struggle; iii) lift the ban on political parties, ZANU and ZAPU and allow free political activity; and iv) suspend emergency laws, revoke death sentences and repeal discriminatory laws.\textsuperscript{703} In return for these concessions, Smith demanded a ceasefire on the part of the nationalists. For the proposed constitutional conference to take place, it was necessary for both sides to observe the cease fire. However, ZANU refused to lay down weapons because the Rhodesian government was not also committing itself to a ceasefire and had breached the conditions agreed upon and observed only one, that is, the partial release of political prisoners.\textsuperscript{704}

The decision by the liberation movements to merge into the enlarged ANC was strongly opposed within ZANU. Although they signed the Unity Accord, evidence suggests ZANU leaders were reluctant to subscribe to the document. Sithole revealed that at the time they came to Lusaka for Unity talks, the atmosphere was tense in his camp; while some believed in Unity, others thought otherwise. He further acknowledged that at the time of signing the Declaration of Unity, there was a strange feeling in the ZANU delegation such that “some felt that we should not have signed it.”\textsuperscript{705} The reluctance by ZANU nationalists to commit to a ceasefire through signing the Unity Accord was based on their fear that they would be robbed of an opportunity to wage armed struggle, which, in fact, ZANLA was successfully spearheading. They were also suspicious that other parties to the Unity Accord might ride on the back of ZANU’s success in armed struggle and subsequently “reap that for

\textsuperscript{704} Zimbabwe News Vol.9 No.1 January 15 (1975) see editorial “Genuine Independence is our Goal.”
which they had not toiled.” Since ZANU leaders did not agree with the Unity Accord, they felt less obliged to observe its terms of reference, including the cease fire.

Meanwhile, Zambian authorities, desperately seeking to enforce unity and secure ceasefire—the two key ingredients to ensuring détente’s success—imposed punitive measures on the Zimbabwean nationalists. It banned ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI, the three former nationalist movements on the ground that, given the Unity Accord, they no longer had reason to exist. In particular, the government arrested ZANU leaders and closed its border to cadres and weapons destined for guerrilla units inside Rhodesia. For ZANU, the situation was even more critical because it not only refused to observe a ceasefire, but also Zambia’s application of repressive measures against it coincided with an eruption of internal crisis within the party which claimed the life of Herbert Chitepo, ZANU National Chairman.

**ZANU Crisis and the Zambian Government**

The détente exercise, pursued actively by Kaunda and firmly backed by Vorster, coincided with an eruption of a crisis in ZANU towards the latter part of 1974. Like the ZAPU crisis of 1970/1971 discussed earlier, the crisis in ZANU was precipitated by young military officers who became increasingly disillusioned with their political leaders and military commanders regarding the conduct of the liberation struggle. For ZANU, the crisis

---

708 Chitepo was not the first and last prominent African nationalist leader to be murdered in the course of prosecuting the liberation struggle. On 3 February 1969, Eduardo Mondlane, the President of FRELIMO was assassinated in the Tanzanian capital, Dar-es-Salaam by a parcel bomb ostensibly sent by the agents of the Portuguese intelligence. Again, the Secretary General of the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PIAGC), Amilcar Cabral, was shot dead on 20 January 1973 outside his house in Conakry by the “poisonous hands of international imperialism and Portuguese colonialism,” see Africa Research Bulletin February 15 Vol.10, No.1 (1973), p.2735A., Similarly, Jason Moyo, the external head and military chief of ZAPU was killed in Lusaka by a parcel bomb on 22 January 1977 allegedly supplied by the Rhodesian Front agents, Andre Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way (London: Zed Press, 1983), p.128.
was much more serious. It seriously divided the liberation movement, led to deadly intra-party violence which saw many cadres killed including the chairman of the party, Herbert Chitepo. The crisis also provoked the wrath of Zambian authorities. They arrested and detained almost the entire leadership of ZANU and rounded up more than 1000 cadres, an action which Fay Chung and Agrippah Mutambara described as an attempt to “immobilise” the nationalist movement and “undermine the execution of the armed struggle.”

Nhari Rebellion and Chitepo’s Assassination

In November 1974, a crisis emerged in ZANU when young ZANLA commanders led by Thomas Nhari, Dakarai Badza, Ceasar Molife and Cephas Tichatonga organised a rebellion against the military and the political leadership of the party. At the time, the Military High Command was led by Josiah Tongogara, the Chief of Defence. His deputy was William Ndangana (the Chief of Operations) while Robson Manyika (the Chief Camp Commander of all Camps) was third in command. Other members of the High Command included Cletus Chigowe (Chief of Intelligence), Justine Chauke (Chief of Logistics) and Mayor Hurimbo (Political Commissar). The field commanders included Solomon Mujuru, Vitalis Zvinavashe, Joseph Chimurenga and Sheba Gava.

Moreover, at the time of the mutiny, the political leadership of ZANU was headed by Herbert Chitepo as Chairman. Other executive members included Mukudzei Mudzi (Executive Secretary), Henry Hamadziripi (Financial Secretary), Josiah Tongogara (Chief of Defence), Noel Mukono (Foreign Affairs Secretary), John Mataure (Chief Political Commissar), Rugare Gumbo (Publicity and Information Secretary) and Kumbirai Kangai (Labour, Social Services and Welfare Society). They were elected to the Dare Re

---

709 Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, p.96 and Mutambara, The Rebel in Me, p.97.
710 See Report of the Chitepo Commission, p.29, Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, p.87 and 90.
Chimurenga or the Supreme Council (War Council) during a party conference held in Lusaka in September 1973.\textsuperscript{711}

Nhari and his military cadres at the battle front had numerous grievances. Luise White alluded to these grievances,\textsuperscript{712} but the \textit{Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Chitepo} provides a more detailed account. According to the report, the rebels complained that:

i) There were short supply of essential commodities and war materials such as food, clothing, shoes and, arms and ammunitions for the guerrillas at the battle front. They sometimes obtained these items from FRELIMO in Mozambique. They often relied on FRELIMO to assist them with crude boats to ferry cadres across the Zambezi River to and from the fighting zones because the commanders failed to provide properly constituted boats for the operations;

ii) Those in charge of operations in the Military High Command were completely out of touch with what was obtaining at the Front. They rarely visited the operational areas where the fighting was taking place even at the request of the field officers. Consequently, they were not in a position to appreciate the difficulties the front line fighters were facing or to assess what was involved;

iii) The Military High Command was riddled with nepotism, tribalism and corruption. They misappropriated funds donated by the OAU intended for the prosecution of the war and use by freedom fighters. Some ZANU leaders in Lusaka not only lived in luxury and affluence, but also engaged in business while rumours were circulating that a member of the Military High Command was building a house in Lusaka for his wife;

\textsuperscript{711}See \textit{Zimbabwe News} Vol.7 No.9 September (1973), p.6.
\textsuperscript{712} See White, \textit{The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo}, p.20.
iv) Although drinking at the Front was forbidden, Tongogara violated, with impunity, an important military code of conduct by sending a case of whisky and cigarettes to his relative, Josiah Tungamirai. Here, the cadres thought, was a member of the High Command flagrantly violating an important code of discipline, only to favour a relative;
v) The irregular promotions by the Military High Command. For instance, Josiah Tungamirai was promoted to the position of Provincial Political Commissar within the first month of arriving at the Front at the expense of those who had been serving for a long time;
vii) Class distinction amongst the children of the political and military leaders. The rebels complained that some of these children were attending special schools in Lusaka while wives of some members of the Dare and Military High Command were engaged in remunerative employment. More generally, the personal lives of some of the political and military leaders caused resentment among the rank and file;
viii) The policy of sending people to the Front as a form of punishment was considered wrong and dangerous. They argued that if soldiers were sent to the war zone as punishment, every soldier committed to fighting would regard orders to go to the battlefront as a punishment and would subsequently be inclined to lose heart in the overall purpose of the fighting;
viii) Another burning issue with the guerrillas at the Front was the abuse of young female cadres as house-maids and concubines by senior leaders of ZANU. Although the female cadres were trained to serve as nurses, soldiers and teachers in the war zone, ZANU political and military leaders in Lusaka deviated from this objective and used them as girlfriends and even made some of them pregnant;
ix) The cadres from operational zones came across people they were convinced were enemy agents, but despite making repeated requests to the Military High Command about this issue, no action was taken.\footnote{Report of the Chitepo Commission, pp.14-16. See also White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p. 20, Chung, Re-Living the Second Chimurenga, p.89.}

The question of who actually instigated the rebellion is subject to varying interpretation. The former director of Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), Ken Flower, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, and more recently P. J. H Petter-Bowyer have long propagated the view that the rebellion was inspired by Rhodesian secret agents. Like Martin and Johnson, Flower claimed that Rhodesian agents held several clandestine meetings with Nhari and Badza at the front for over a year, listening to their complaints, and once the two heard talk of a negotiated peace, they were “ready tools” who became “willing conspirators.”\footnote{Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: Rhodesia’s CIO Chief on Record (Alberton: Galago, 1987), pp.146-7 as quoted in White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p.35.} Petter-Bowyer similarly claimed that Nhari was persuaded by the Rhodesian Special Branch (SB) that he could secure power to himself and his followers and then come to an accommodation with the Rhodesian government.\footnote{P. HJ Petter-Bowyer, Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot (Newlands: 30° South Publishers, 2003), p.251.}

However, the report of the Chitepo Commission insists that the rebellion was masterminded by some ZANU leaders in Lusaka. It claims that prior to November 1974, Badza, Nhari and Molife came to Lusaka to seek medical treatment. While in Lusaka, they held several meetings with some ZANU leaders such as Noel Mukono, Sanyanga Santana and George Mpini who advised them that the solution to the problems they were facing at the Front was for them to have a new Military High Command.\footnote{Report of the Chitepo Commission, p.17.}
Whether the claims and counter-claims about who instigated the rebellion were true or false, it is difficult to ascertain. Moreover, irrespective of whether the mutineers’ grievances were legitimate or not and regardless of who inspired them, the impact of the rebellion was devastating for ZANU. It seriously split ZANU and significantly undermined the prosecution of the liberation war. The crisis also marked the beginning of the end of ZANU’s operations in Zambia.

Disillusioned with the prevailing situation, Nhari organised a group of thirty cadres and marched towards Chifombo, a ZANLA camp situated in Zambia’s eastern province, near the border with Mozambique. After securing control of Chifombo, Nhari and his armed cadres set off to arrest the members of ZANU’s Military High Command in Lusaka. It is claimed that Nhari and the group executed about 70 cadres who refused to join them.\(^{717}\)

Heavily armed with automatic rifles and travelling in two trucks, the rebels stormed Lusaka in December 1974 while the Unity and ceasefire talks were taking place. A gun battle ensued in the streets of Kamwala, south of Lusaka city centre as the Nhari rebel force tried to gain control.\(^{718}\) In the process, the rebels kidnapped 19 people including Tongogara’s wife, Angelina and his three daughters. Kumbirai Kangai and Mukudzei Mudzi, the two members of the Dare were also kidnapped. The members of the Military High Command, William Ndangana, Joseph Chimurenga and Charles Dauramnzi were also kidnapped a week before.\(^{719}\)

The Zambian security forces intervened and arrested almost all the rebels, including Nhari himself. A few escaped back to Chifombo. However, those who were detained by the police escaped custody almost at once after being captured. That the Nhari rebels received

\(^{717}\) Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.92.
tacit support from the Zambian security forces is beyond any doubt. For how were they allowed to bring their heavy arms into Lusaka to kidnap and kill people with impunity and repeatedly escape custody after each arrest?\(^\text{720}\)

In wake of the crisis caused by the Nhari rebels, ZANU leaders met in Lusaka to discuss the appropriate response. According to White, the ZANU top hierarchy was divided: some wanted tough action against the rebels while others wanted to negotiate with them.\(^\text{721}\) However, Tongogara was of the view that the rebels should be neutralised by force. Thus, with the assistance of almost 300 newly trained guerrillas mobilised from ZANLA camps in Tanzania, Tongogara quelled the rebellion and recaptured Chifombo. Nhari and his supporters were quickly tried at Chifombo after which they were executed, including John Mataure who did not even take part in the rebellion. The number of the rebels who were executed is unclear, but Miles Larmer estimated it to have been between 60 and 250.\(^\text{722}\) The execution of ZANU dissidents on Zambian soil led to a further deterioration of an already tense relationship between ZANU and the Zambian authorities.\(^\text{723}\) It was during this tense, confused and uncertain situation that Chitepo was suddenly killed in March 1975, when a bomb planted in his car exploded at his Chilenje house along Muramba road in Lusaka.\(^\text{724}\) Sambwa Chaya, a young Zambian boy who lived next door, was also killed together with Chitepo’s bodyguard, Silas Shamiso while Sadat Kufamadzuba, another bodyguard, survived with serious injuries. As will be discussed below, the subsequent investigation of Chitepo’s death by the Zambian authorities and the publication of the report of the

\(^{721}\) White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p.27.
\(^{723}\) White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p.41.
commission of inquiry further fueled division and discontent between the ZANU nationalists and the Zambian state. The ZANU nationalists believed the investigation was an attempt by Zambian authorities to cover-up their involvement in the murder of Chitepo.

**Arrest, Detention and Torture of ZANU Nationalists**

In response to Chitepo’s murder, the Zambian security forces swiftly swung into action after “receiving information” that some ZANU leaders were apparently involved in the crime. Consequently, they arrested and incarcerated 57 top ZANU officials at Kabwe’s Mukobeko Maximum Security Prison in Central Province of Zambia. Almost 1550 cadres were also detained at Mboroma and ZANU offices and camps across the country were closed down. Ten ZANU cadres who resisted arrest at Mboroma were shot dead by the Zambian state security while others were wounded. For many in ZANU, this incident marked the end of Ndabaningi Sithole as an acceptable leader of the nationalist movement. At the time when his leadership was needed most during this difficult situation, Sithole is allegedly thought to have disowned his followers. He refused to sympathise with the massacre of ZANU cadres and failed to attend the funerals or visit the wounded comrades in hospital. Rather, he chose to fly to the United States to see his daughter.

---

Meanwhile, the Commission of Inquiry appointed by Kaunda to investigate Chitepo’s murder in March 1975 published the report a year later. It concluded that Chitepo was murdered by his colleagues in the Dare and the Military High Command because they had the “means, the motive and opportunity to carry out the crime.” The basis of this claim was that “there existed a state of bitter struggle and conflict in ZANU” between the Karanga and the Manyika tribal factions within the Dare and the Military High Command. Thus, the “Karanga element” assassinated Chitepo because they regarded him as an obstacle to their “individual and collective ambitions.”\footnote{730 Report of the Chitepo Commission, p.44.} Although the Report attributed all the members of Dare and the High Command as “principals to the murder because, jointly and severally, they actively desired to bring this about,” it specifically identified Tongogara, Chigowe, Mudzi, Gumbo, Kangai and Hamadziripi as chief culprits.\footnote{731 Report of the Chitepo Commission, p.50.}

**Critique of Détente**

The publication of the Report of the Chitepo Commission prompted the ZANU detainees to write a critique of détente which was published as a pamphlet in London in April 1976 and circulated by Fay Chung and her associates.\footnote{732 “The Price of Détente: Kaunda Prepares to Execute more ZANU Freedom Fighters for Smith” at \url{www.http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/to/10.5555/al.sff.document.ranger000273.pdf} accessed on 28/11/2015 at 16:15hrs. See also White, \textit{The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo}, p.29.} This document demonstrates that the incarcerated ZANU nationalists carefully read through the Report of the Chitepo Commission, “pointing out problems, errors, and those turns of phrases that cast doubt on the entire enterprise of the investigation.”\footnote{733 White, \textit{The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo}, p.29.} The critique of détente did not only question the “unbelievably naïve findings” of the Report, but it also provided a detailed account of the brutal interrogation which ZANU nationalists endured at the hands of Zambian jailors between April and June 1975. The ZANU detainees lamented that:
During … our interrogations … most of us were subjected to the most cruel, barbaric and humiliating interrogation …. We were stripped naked and physically tortured. Electric shock methods were used. We were beaten by pieces of broken pens, chairs, forced to do continuous exercises and dumped into cold water for a night. The interrogation usually lasted 72 hours, but some of the comrades spent a week if not more under torture. Some comrades such as Tongogara, Chigowe and Chimurenga were tortured until they fainted and were only revived after the police poured some cold water over their bodies. Others like comrades Charles Dauramanzi and Patrick Mpunzarima suffered broken ribs and fingers. Even … Kufamadzuba … was severely tortured before he had even fully recovered from the injuries he sustained in the bomb blast that killed Chitepo. Most of us were never allowed to go to the hospital for treatment. Our wounds were left to heal on their own.734

The ZANU detainees added that:

The most shocking phenomenon about our interrogation was that the Zambian security officers were not interested in our version of the events leading to the death of comrade Chitepo. They were interested in their nearly typed statements which they asked us to copy and sign in our own handwriting so that they would appear as if they were voluntarily made by us. These were the false confessions which Dickson Mpundu, the Zambian Assistant Commissioner CID who headed our investigation presented to the so-called commission of inquiry as evidence that ZANU men murdered Chitepo. The truth is that these statements presented to the commission by Dickson Mpundu were falsely extracted from most comrades and have since been refuted by the people who made them at Force Headquarters ….735

The ZANU nationalists did not only condemn the brutality of the Zambian jailors, but they also disparaged the methods employed by the Commission to obtain evidence, which in their view, were “perfunctory and highly prejudicial” to their case. Among other concerns, the nationalists argued that:

i) The Commission heard evidence in camera. It accepted evidence from witnesses who included people who had nothing to do with ZANU, like Chikerema and Muzorewa, people who had supported our detention and asked the Zambian government to hang us;

ii) All our sworn enemies were called and given ample time to accuse us in our absence. No cross examination of these false witnesses was allowed;

iii) We, the accused, were not allowed to call witnesses in our defence. We the people who were accused and found guilty were either called at short notice or were not called at all to give evidence. Often our lawyers were harassed and intimidated by Mainza Chona until they were forced to abandon their clients.

iv) The Commission condemned all the members of ZANU Supreme Council (57 people) and the Military High Command (18 people), but only three members of the High Command, namely, Manyika, Tongogara and Chimurenga, were called to give evidence. The Commission did not see 46 out of 57 people languishing in Zambian prisons since March 1975;

v) The Commission admitted that it only saw one of the detained ZANU leaders, but 30 of their enemies. To us the Commission was reduced by the Zambian government to nothing better than a secret inquisition using Star Chamber methods. The result was Kangaroo Justice which has been meted out to us.736

The revelations about the brutal interrogations of ZANU detainees and the methods employed by the Commission to obtain evidence highlighted the weaknesses of the Report, but it also reinforced the long-standing belief that the Commission was constituted to

---

exonerate the Zambian state in the murder of Chitepo.\textsuperscript{737} There were major lapses and fundamental weaknesses in the Commission of Inquiry into Chitepo’s death, which, ultimately, cast doubt about the conclusions of the Report. First, according to Fay Chung, the Commission failed to provide normal checks and balances of a judicial trial, as the accused could not be defended by lawyers, yet it had power to declare persons and organisations guilty of crimes, including the crime of murder.\textsuperscript{738} Second, apart from being highly selective in the choice of witnesses and evidence adduced before it, the Commission was set up with “unwieldly membership.” Many in Lusaka believed that the presence of the Frontline states influenced its findings.\textsuperscript{739} Third, the fact that the Chairman and the Chief Prosecutor were both Zambians and the venue was Zambia, the Zambian authorities had undue influence on the Commission: it reported what was unpalatable to the accused and acceptable to the Zambian authorities.\textsuperscript{740} This lent credence to the view that the Commission was not only formed to rubberstamp the Zambian opinion, but also from the beginning, it was determined to find the ZANU leaders guilty even if there was no evidence. Thus, for many in ZANU, the Commission was constituted not to get the truth, but for self-cleansing exercise by the Zambian authorities.\textsuperscript{741} Fourth, White concluded that:

The Commission had more in common with colonial and postcolonial Commissions of Inquiry than with the truth Commissions that were to follow in southern Africa and elsewhere. The Chitepo Commission did not address any institutional practices and it did not seek any kind of healing through truth, in which all parties could speak without fear of retribution.

\textsuperscript{738} Chung, \textit{Re-living the Second Chimurenga}, p.134.
\textsuperscript{739} White, \textit{The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo}, p.48.
Rather, it sought to establish who the assassin or assassins were. All testimony was given to the police or to the Commission. No one could talk back to their accusers and critics, so … the overall impact of the testimony is a catalogue of events, evils, and ills, an exercise in show and tell.\textsuperscript{742}

Meanwhile, the prolonged detention and brutal interrogation of ZANU nationalists in Zambian prisons prompted ZANU members such as Fay Chung, Simbi Mubako, Ignatius Chigwendere, Dzingai Mutumbuka and Rex Chiwara to form a small committee in order to “carryout a concerted campaign for the free and fair trial” of ZANU leaders incarcerated in Zambian jails.\textsuperscript{743} Known as the Zimbabwe Detainees’ Defence Committee (ZDDC), the committee was chaired by Kees Maxey (a former labour councilor and ardent supporter of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle) and supported by Basil Davidson (a prominent scholar of African History) and Bruce Kent (a Roman Catholic Papal representative in Britain) as patrons. Other prominent members of the ZDDC included Judith Todd (a daughter of Garfield Todd, a former liberal Prime Minister of Rhodesia), Rev Michael Scott (an Anglican priest and anti-apartheid activist), Robert Molteno (a former South African UNZA academic) and as well as his colleague, Lionel Cliff.

As already discussed in Chapter Four, Cliff was one of the several expatriate lecturers at UNZA accused of fomenting student protests against the government’s policy on Angola. He was arrested in February1976 and imprisoned at Mukobeko Maximum Security Prison in Kabwe. Cliff’s detention was significant. Because Zambian authorities did not know that he was an ardent supporter of ZANU and Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, they incarcerated Cliff along with his ZANU colleagues imprisoned in March 1975 for allegedly assassinating Chitepo—Henry Hamadziripi, Joseph Chimurenga, Rugare Gumbo, Kumbirai

\textsuperscript{742} White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitope, p.48.
\textsuperscript{743} Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, p.136.
Kangai, Mukudzei Mudzi and Josiah Tongogara, among others. This explains why upon his release and deportation to the United Kingdom (UK), he played an active role in campaigning for the release of his ZANU comrades.

As a result of vigorous international campaign for the release of ZANU detainees, the ZDDC secured funding and hired a lawyer, John Platta-Mills who managed to get the prisoners released from their trail on the grounds that they were tortured. In September 1976, all the ZANU detainees were set free after spending almost 19 months at Mukobeko Maximum Security Prison in Kabwe. But the timing of their release was significant. It was just in time to get the prisoners to the October 1976 Geneva conference where they supported Robert Mugabe’s claim to have the guerrilla’s loyalty when it was being challenged by the Zimbabwe Peoples’ Army (ZIPA) commanders who did not want to support one leader alone. Although ZANU prisoners were eventually released, it is vital to examine the context of their detention and torture and the various interpretations of the crime they were accused of committing.

Theories of Chitepo’s Murder

Following the conclusion of the Report of Chitepo Commission, the official position of the Kaunda government was that Chitepo was killed by his colleagues in ZANU. However, some former government, UNIP and military officials interviewed by this author held different views. For instance, Brig. Gen Timothy Kazembe (retired), the former Defence Secretary in charge of military intelligence in the Zambia Army during the Kaunda


745 See Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, pp.137-139.

746 See Chapter Three. See also David Moore, “The Zimbabwe People’s Army: Strategic Innovation or More of the Same?” in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds) Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War Vol. one (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), pp.73-86.
government, suspected that Chitepo died as a result of factional fights within ZANU.\textsuperscript{747} Kazembe’s view was the same as the findings of the Report of the Chitepo Commission. When asked about who killed Chitepo, the former Minister of Defence in the UNIP government, Grey Zulu expressed ignorance of Chitepo’s murderer(s). He said: “I wouldn’t know, I didn’t know, even now I don’t know, except to say it was the enemies of freedom fighters.”\textsuperscript{748} However, Sikota Wina, the former Minister of Information in the UNIP government was categorical in his response. He claimed that:

> It was definitely the agents of Ian Smith because … Chitepo was head and shoulder above both Nkomo and Mugabe, he was very high, he was the qualified lawyer from the UK and … very very high standing. Obviously that’s what raised the suspicion that the death perhaps was an internal struggle for power. But I genuinely believed myself that it couldn’t be. But after his assassination, Kenneth Kaunda, I remember walking into his office and he told me, look Sikota, I have lots of problems … there is this problem of Herbert Chitepo. The police, the CID definitely suspect that there are some suspects within ZANU who were responsible for his death. So he arrested some of them … I think about eight of them which made [Robert] Mugabe and [Edgar] Tekere go into Mozambique. That is where the bitterness between Mugabe and Kaunda heightened.\textsuperscript{749}

Like Sikota Wina, Mark Chona, Kaunda’s special assistant and political adviser and the major proponent of détente, suspected that Chitepo’s death might have been the work of either his colleagues within ZANU or the Rhodesian government. He recalls that the death of Chitepo became a difficult story. We can only explain what President Kaunda was told, and I was present, by Herbert Chitepo, just before he died … there were a lot of problems in ZANU … in 1974 … again in 1975. But again, you know, all these organisations were infiltrated. So Mr. Chitepo named some people just before he died who were the threat to his life … so he named them and the day he died, the night [before] he died, he was actually moving [driving] along the Independence Avenue and he would have actually made a call to say he suspected some, he never suspected anything. But you see Ian Smith people claimed that they actually did it.

\textsuperscript{747} Interview with Brig. Gen Timothy Kazembe Leopards Hill, Lusaka, Zambia, 15\textsuperscript{th} January 2014.
\textsuperscript{748} Interview with Grey Zulu, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia, 4\textsuperscript{th} June 2013.
\textsuperscript{749} Interview with Sikota Wina, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia, 27\textsuperscript{th} September 2013.
Chitepo also said these other people did it [conspired to kill him], so you really never know but that’s what the enemy does, because the enemy takes advantage of the confusion, the conflict within [the liberation movement] to strike and say it’s not me, you see, they are just fighting among themselves. So that is beyond what the report [of the Chitepo Commission] says, one cannot say one has to look at the claims by Ian Smith that he did. Whether he is the one who did it, he caused the circumstances surrounding Chitepo’s death.\footnote{Interview with Mark Chona, Makeni, Lusaka, 27\textsuperscript{th} June, 2013.}

This thesis does not provide a definitive, detailed discussion of Chitepo’s murder. Luis White, in her remarkable piece, \textit{The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe}, and arguably, the most authoritative discourse on Chitepo’s murder to date, has thoroughly examined this subject.\footnote{Luis White, \textit{The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe} (CapeTown: Double Storey Books, 2003).} Rather, this study simply attempts to briefly highlight various interpretations of Chitepo’s murder, and in the context of this chapter, interrogate the charge advanced by ZANU nationalists that the Zambian government may have colluded with the Rhodesian and the South African governments to assassinate Chitepo.

Another interpretation, propagated by ZANU nationalists is that Chitepo was murdered by Zambian authorities in collaboration with the South Africans and the Rhodesians because he vigorously opposed the détente exercise which Kaunda, backed by Vorster, actively pursued between the late 1974 and early 1976. The basis of this argument is premised on the failure of the détente exercise which Kaunda attributed to ZANU’s intransigence to disarm and negotiate peace with the Rhodesian government. While Kaunda and Vorster were attempting to secure a negotiated political settlement of the Rhodesian conflict, Chitepo and his colleagues in ZANU resisted these political maneuvers. Chitepo strongly opposed Kaunda’s negotiations with Vorster and Smith. Whilst Kaunda insisted again and again that all guerilla warfare should stop, ZANU leaders, most especially
Chitepo strenuously resisted this. In short, Chitepo solidly opposed détente and ceasefire which was a package deal with the Unity Accord. Kaunda’s insistence on imposing a ceasefire on ZANU convinced Chitepo and the top leadership in ZANU that he was out to thwart the liberation movement in order to destroy the armed struggle in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{752} Kaunda blamed the failure of the détente exercise on ZANU’s unwillingness to halt guerrilla infiltration into Rhodesia. The assassination of Chitepo and the subsequent mass arrests and detention of ZANU leaders and the nationalist cadres provided the Zambian authorities with an opportunity to incapacitate the nationalist movement for refusing to disarm. Thus, ZANU nationalists pointed out that:

Many people may wonder why … Kaunda who has always claimed to be the champion of the liberation of Zimbabwe should arrest, detain, torture and even murder female and veteran ZANU freedom fighters. The answer is very simple …. First, our arrest, detention, torture and even murder by Zambians were Zambia’s contribution towards the détente exercise in Southern Africa. It is a well-known fact that … Kaunda is very bitter over the failure of the détente exercise in which he had invested so much in both money and his prestige. Rather than blaming the failure of détente on Smith’s intransigence, President Kaunda secretly blames us for not effecting the ceasefire which he had signed with South Africa behind our backs. In fact it is now an open secret in Zambia that Zambia and the racist regimes of Smith and Vorster had reached an agreement to destroy ZANU … to destroy armed struggle and pave way for a neocolonialist government in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{753}

Accusations of Zambia’s attempt to thwart the armed struggle in Zimbabwe and the detailed account of its alleged involvement in the assassination of Chitepo were also highlighted in an anonymous document known as “Kaunda’s Role in Détente” which circulated in Lusaka.


a few days after Chitepo was assassinated and the Zambian authorities detained more than 1000 ZANU cadres. The authors of this document claimed that Zambia’s economic decline and rising internal opposition forced Kaunda to seek a political deal over Rhodesia that would unlock United States and South African aid. In exchange, Zambia promised to ensure that a “moderate” government took power in Zimbabwe and that the radical section of the nationalist movement, especially the radical wing of ZANU and ZANLA is destroyed by any means. Its authors accused Cornelius Sanyanga (a ZANU member) of being close to Mark Chona, LONRHO and Kaunda, and claimed that, when leftist factions threatened the détente initiative, the Zambian government had colluded with South Africa to assassinate Chitepo and then blame his murder on divisions within ZANU, portrayed as an ethnic dispute.

Furthermore, the authors of “Kaunda’s Role in Détente” insisted that the bomb which killed Chitepo was placed on his car at State House grounds, Kaunda’s official residence, by the South African agent with the connivance of Zambian authorities. They charged that:

An emissary from South Africa, a forty-year-old bearded white man, arrived at State House on March 17. That very night, Chitepo went there alone, without his body guards from 7:30 to 10:30, to confer with Kaunda and Muzorewa, and with Chikerema and Nyandoro of FROLIZI about how to implement the unity agreement. Chitepo refused to hand over ZANLA to a joint military command. After heated exchanges, they adjourned, agreeing to meet again at State House the next morning. Chitepo was on his way there when his car blew up. Facts show that the bomb was a plastic bomb, planted in the boot, or trunk of Chitepo’s Beetle, in the front of the car. Such a bomb could only have been placed in Chitepo’s car in the State House grounds. It was probably placed there by the South African or his agent with the full knowledge of the Zambian authorities.

---

754 As quoted by Larmer, Rethinking African Politics, p.204.
755 As quoted by Larmer, Rethinking African Politics, p.204.
756 White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p.49.
Clearly, ZANU, which was increasingly becoming dominated by an emerging click of Mugabe loyalists, openly accused Kaunda of being complicit in the assassination of Chitepo. They argued that Kaunda colluded with Vorster and Smith to eliminate the more militant ZANU to frustrate the struggle in Zimbabwe as part of the illegitimate pact for détente in southern Africa. Kaunda’s assumed connection to both South Africa and the Smith regime was further strengthened by the revelations that the man who later confessed to have planted the bomb which killed Chitepo, Chuck Hinde, was a member of the elite but secretive British Special Air Services (SAS) regiment. In the 1970s, Hinde trained the initial intake of the Zambian elite paramilitary police force that formed the spine of Kaunda’s bodyguards. This special force was also primed to counter any coup attempts by the Zambian Army. To this day, this Hind-trained battalion-strength unit provides security to Zambian Presidents and guards the official residence, State House. Perhaps unknown to Kaunda, Hinde was already a paid up member of the Rhodesian CIO when he was training the presidential guards.757

The question of who murdered Chitepo is clearly an emotive subject which, given the continued contestation about the identity of the assassin(s), will perhaps persist to elude scholars. His death still remains a mystery. Whether the claims and counter-claims about who killed Chitepo are true or not, it is difficult to determine. However, what is certain is Chitepo was murdered at the time when the political climate within ZANU and across Southern Africa was muddy. It was riddled with intrigue, high stakes diplomacy, mistrust,

power struggles, international espionage, tribalism, racism and Kaunda’s considerations for his country’s national interests.\textsuperscript{758}

The tacit support of the Nhari Rebellion, the alleged involvement in the murder of Chitepo, the subsequent arrest, detention and brutal interrogation of ZANU nationalists by the Zambian authorities reflect the dominant ZANU narrative about Zambia’s role in the liberation of Zimbabwe. The popular perception is that Zambia participated in détente primarily to secure its economic interests and, in pursuing this objective, it seriously undermined the liberation struggle. However, Douglas Anglin disputes this assertion. He insists that Zambia’s participation in détente was not motivated by economic reasons, but by its desire to genuinely solve Rhodesia’s political difficulties.\textsuperscript{759}

Moreover, Fay Chung’s assertion that the Zambian government promoted détente in order to immobilise ZANU, stop the war in Rhodesia and bring in a government sympathetic to its own capitalist and Christian ideology is not entirely correct. Like Carol Thompson correctly observed,\textsuperscript{760} it is true that for national security interests, Zambia wanted, if possible, to secure a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. However, Zambia’s policy was not entirely based on securing a negotiated political settlement at any cost. Kaunda only resorted to negotiations when it was convenient and when circumstances offered the best prospects for a genuine settlement. When he recognised that negotiations were no longer viable due to the intransigence of the Rhodesian government, he promptly reinvigorated his

support for an intensified guerrilla war.\textsuperscript{761} Therefore, to claim that Zambia wanted to stop the war in Zimbabwe at all costs, as seen through its intervention in ZANU, is not entirely correct.

The weakness of Chung’s argument, which is also shared by Karen Eriksen and Kren Eriksen, and Andre Astrow,\textsuperscript{762} is that it fails to take into account the context of Zambian intervention in the ZANU crisis. Like ZAPU, as noted earlier, ZANU was facing a serious leadership crisis which resulted in deadly intra-party violence with fatal consequences. The Zambian government could not tolerate a foreign nationalist organisation with weapon-wielding cadres staging deadly battles and executing one another on its territory. It had to intervene and stop ZANU’s threat to the country’s national security and peace. Chung’s argument not only obscures the serious intra-party violence in ZANU, but also, overlooks the fact that Zambia had legitimate concerns about threats to its national security posed by hosting nationalist movements with thousands of undisciplined cadres. Her argument ignores the enormous burden, costs and sacrifices the Zambian government accepted and endured for supporting Zimbabwe nationalist movements, including ZANU.

Thus, Zambia’s intervention in the ZANU crisis must be seen primarily in terms of its attempt to preserve the country’s peace and security rather than merely to incapacitate ZANU and stop the war in Rhodesia. After all, when negotiations for a constitutional settlement of the Rhodesian conflict collapsed in August 1975, Kaunda readily supported the resumption and intensification of armed struggle led by a combined ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrilla force under ZIPA in 1976. He would later play a leading role, not only in


promoting the creation of the Patriotic Front, a loose political alliance between ZAPU and ZANU, but also in securing its recognition by the OAU as the “legitimate and authentic” representatives of the Zimbabwean people in 1977.

**Secret Diplomacy: Conspiracy to Install Nkomo as Zimbabwe’s Leader**

One theme that consistently runs through Kaunda’s preoccupation with Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was his constant support for Nkomo, the president of ZAPU. This is hardly surprising. Kaunda and Nkomo cultivated a long-standing personal relationship, dating back to Zambia’s pre-independence days when UNIP and ZAPU collaborated on matters of mutual interest, including the anti-colonial struggle.\(^{763}\) Therefore, Kaunda’s persistent rhetoric that the choice for the leadership of Zimbabwe was a matter for the Zimbabweans to decide cannot be taken at face value. Available evidence suggests Kaunda preferred Nkomo to assume the leadership of Zimbabwe after independence and worked relentlessly to achieve this objective. As early as April 1964, Kaunda, then Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, appealed to African Heads of State to support Nkomo as leader of Southern Rhodesian people.\(^{764}\) The appeal for Nkomo’s support was muted as the liberation struggle gained momentum and the OAU recognised both ZAPU and ZANU as legitimate representatives of the people in Zimbabwe.

However, Kaunda’s preference for Nkomo assumed prominence and became more visible during his periodic efforts at unifying the nationalist movements. This confirms Karen Eriksen and Kren Eriksen’s contention that Kaunda’s insistence on unity was often accompanied by his intervention to uphold a particular leader with an ideological stance compatible with his own.\(^{765}\) Like Kaunda, Nkomo was believed to be a “moderate” element

\(^{763}\) Wina interview cited, interview with Bautis Frank Kapulu Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia 10 June 2013.  
unlike Robert Mugabe who espoused the Marxist-Leninist ideology. As the war intensified towards the final stages of white minority rule, Kaunda conducted secret diplomacy, though unsuccessfully, to try and secure a negotiated settlement between Nkomo and Smith to the exclusion of Mugabe, the co-leader of the Patriotic Front. Kaunda’s support for Nkomo infuriated Mugabe and other nationalist leaders, such as Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema, who had fallen out of favour with the Zambian government. Kaunda’s action also strained his relationship with the Frontline presidents. The next section attempts to highlight the attitudes of the nationalists towards Zambia, particularly Kaunda’s role within the evolving, changing circumstances in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle after 1975.

After constitutional talks between the Rhodesian government and the nationalist leaders at Victoria Falls broke down in August 1975, the UANC split into two main factions; one led by Muzorewa and the other by Nkomo. Nkomo was elected President of the ANC in September 1975 at a congress in Rhodesia which was boycotted by all the parties to the Unity Accord signed in Lusaka. He emerged as the leader of the internal faction of the ANC based in Rhodesia, while Muzorewa remained leader of the external wing based in Zambia. With the nationalist movement in disarray without effective leadership, Kaunda backed Nkomo’s continued negotiations with Smith for a political settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. For nationalist leaders like Muzorewa, the congress which elected Nkomo as “president of the ANC” was stage managed. He claimed that Smith

766 Thompson, Challenge to Imperialism, p.63.
767 By the time the two parties converged for the conference, there was little appetite on both sides to ensure its success. It collapsed almost immediately, with both sides blaming the other for the breakdown of talks, see UNIP8/4/9 Political, Constitutional and Foreign Affairs Reports, 1975 “ANC Press Statement.” The significance of the collapse of the Victoria Falls Conference is that it led to the disintegration of the enlarged United African National Council (UANC), undermining the basis of the Unity Accord. The united front split first into two main groups, one led by Muzorewa and the other by Nkomo. After all, from inception, the parties to the Unity Accord, especially ZANU, considered the UANC to be a loose political alliance. They reluctantly joined it, insisting on maintaining a separate political identity.
allowed Nkomo to hold the congress in order to legitimise his leadership of the ANC and give credence to secret negotiations that were taking place between them.\textsuperscript{769}

By November 1975, strong rumours emerged that Kaunda had initiated a process that would lead to a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. The rumour was based on an article which appeared in \textit{Daily American} on 28 November 1975.\textsuperscript{770} Quoting a well-placed Zambian source in Dar-es-Salaam, the article suggested that Kaunda had assured Vorster of full Zambian backing for Nkomo for a proposed settlement with Ian Smith. It added that, once a Nkomo-Smith agreement was formally announced, Kaunda and Vorster would pledge to give their full backing and that the former promised to get approval for the agreement from the OAU. In return for securing OAU’s support, the article went on, Kaunda received assurances that Nkomo would become Rhodesian Foreign Minister in a Rhodesian government with greatly enlarged African representation. As part of the settlement package, the article suggested, Zambia would receive a “massive” interest free loan from South Africa with repayment to begin after a 15 year grace period.\textsuperscript{771} If the reports were true, they confirmed Chung’s assertion that Kaunda’s role in détente was partially influenced by economic considerations. Although the Zambian government vehemently denied the reports,\textsuperscript{772} it is possible they were almost certainly true because during this period, Nkomo, backed by Kaunda was pursing secret negotiations with Smith. The talks only collapsed in

\textsuperscript{770} UNIP7/23/52 Correspondence from Foreign Embassies, 1975-1976 see \textit{Daily American} 20 November 1975 “Whites, Blacks said to reach agreement on Rhodesia Conflict.”
\textsuperscript{771} UNIP7/23/52 Correspondence from Foreign Embassies, 1975-1976 see \textit{Daily American} 20 November 1975 “Whites, Blacks said to Reach Agreement on Rhodesia Conflict”
March 1976 after Smith rejected Nkomo’s demand for immediate majority rule. But as will be noted in the latter section of this chapter, secret negotiations between Nkomo and Smith resumed in 1977 in Zambia partly at the behest of Kaunda.

Reflecting on the Nkomo-Smith secret negotiations which started after the Unity Accord disintegrated, Muzorewa accused Kaunda of supporting Nkomo and sowing seeds of dissension among the Zimbabwean nationalists. He recalled that:

Moves by President Kaunda and others to strengthen Joshua Nkomo’s hand, served to widen the split between us. Beginning in October 1975, Mr. Nkomo talked frequently with Ian Smith, claiming that they would work out a constitutional settlement. Dr. Kaunda of Zambia threw his full resources behind these talks, sending political advisers and a secretariat to Salisbury to assist Mr. Nkomo.

Concerned about Kaunda’s support for Nkomo, the Acting Publicity Secretary of the Muzorewa-led faction, Rev. Max Chigwida observed in December 1975 that:

Zambian involvement in Rhodesian affairs is no different to South African and American involvement in Angola. One wonders what Zambia is doing meddling in Rhodesian affairs: if they are further dividing the people of Zimbabwe by actively supporting one tiny section of the people as opposed to the majority.

The nationalists’ accusations intensified when, Nyerere and Machel backed by Kaunda, created ZIPA in November 1975 in order to reinvigorate the armed struggle. In April 1976, Muzorewa issued a protest Memorandum to Nyerere condemning the Frontline leaders for:

i) creating the so-called Third Force (ZIPA), a deliberate act meant to undermine the unity of the Zimbabwe people and the ANC; ii) intolerably interfering in the internal affairs of the ANC; iii) taking decisions concerning Zimbabwe without involving the nationalist leaders; iv) grossly violating the OAU principles of respect for the sovereignty and non-interference

---

in the internal affairs of member states and liberation movements recognised by it (OAU), which principles are enshrined and reflected in its charter and resolutions; v) secretly flying Joshua Nkomo from Rhodesia to Mozambique in mid-April 1976 with a view of imposing him as the overall leader of the nationalist movement; vi) depriving the people of Zimbabwe their fundamental right to choose their own leaders and the basic right to be their own liberators; vii) blocking the ANC leadership from physical contact with the cadres and recruits in the camps and preventing the ANC leaders from directly delivering supplies to them and; viii) torturing and killing cadres and recruits who were openly loyal to the ANC leadership.\textsuperscript{776}

**The Rise and Fall of ZIPA**

ZIPA originated from the turmoil which followed the incarceration of many ZANU cadres in Zambia. The flight of some ZANLA militants to Tanzania and Mozambique provided an opportunity for a new type of leadership committed to attaining the objectives of the armed struggle to emerge in ZANU military and refugee camps in Mozambique and Tanzania. Some ZANU militants escaped the Zambian drag-net and went to Tanzania and Mozambique. These ZANLA guerrillas, together with their comrades at Mgagao camp in Tanzania, later published what was referred to as the Mgagao Declaration in October 1975. The salient features of the Declaration included the following: i) the freedom fighters condemned negotiations with Smith and disassociated themselves from the Nkomo’s faction of the ANC; ii) they rejected Ndabningi Sithole and accepted Robert Mugabe as their leader for “defying the rigors of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique”; iii) they

condemned the “cold-blooded” murder of their comrades by Zambian security forces at Mboroma and appealed to both the Tanzanian and Mozambican governments to evacuate stranded cadres from Zambia; iv) they directly and passionately appealed to the Mozambican and Tanzanian governments to support the armed struggle by releasing the consignment of arms and ammunition from China and granting safe passage for the militants to infiltrate Rhodesia and resume guerrilla war; v) the guerrillas not only recognised the primacy of the armed struggle to win independence, but also, pledged to die for the liberation of Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{777}

The Mgagao Declaration was clearly a reasoned statement of protest against perceived attempts by Front Line States, especially Zambia to stop guerrilla war in Zimbabwe. The guerrillas’ appeal for support to resume guerrilla war was rewarded. The Frontline Presidents, especially Nyerere and Machel—although Kaunda was to support the move after Nkomo-Smith negotiations collapsed—decided to bring together ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas into one fighting force under an 18-man Military High Command in order to resume the armed struggle.\textsuperscript{778} Thus, ZIPA was created. A joint programme of recruitment and training of cadres in Tanzania was drawn up as a prerequisite to the resumption of the armed struggle. Contrary to recent claims by Wilfred Mhanda\textsuperscript{779} that ZIPA was a product of voluntary meager of ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres,\textsuperscript{780} evidence suggests that the guerrillas were compelled to unite by powerful external forces within the Front Line States at the time when ZANLA cadres were suspicious of Nkomo (for his continued attempts to negotiate

\textsuperscript{779} Known by his nom de guerre as Dzinashe Machingura, Wilfred Mhanda was a guerrilla commander and one of the prominent ZIPA leaders.

© University of Pretoria
with Smith), and therefore, less likely to forge a military alliance with his cadres.\footnote{See “Report on Massacre of ANC Cadres” in Zimbabwe Review Vol.5 September/October (1976), pp.5-8.}

Similarly, Lovemore Ranga Mataire has demonstrated that although the leadership of both ZANU and ZAPU assented to unifying their guerrilla armies under a single Military High Command, it was clear that it had been forced down their throats despite the apparent differences in military strategy and ideological grounding of the two parties.\footnote{See Lovemore Ranga Mataire, “Dzino—A self-serving narrative” at http://www.herald.co.zw/dzino-a-self-serving-narrative-2 accessed 12/05/2016 at 14:48hrs.}

However, between May and June 1976, deadly violence broke out between ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas at the joint military training camps at Morogoro and Iringa in Tanzania. ZANLA guerrillas massacred more than 50 ZIPRA militants and instructors. The investigations carried out by the ANC revealed that violence was caused by several factors which included the following: a) ZANU partisan slogans, many of them hostile to ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo; b) the presence of Chinese military instructors who were inclined to favour ZANU instead of instructors from the OAU; c) differences in training programmes especially political programmes; d) refusal by ZANLA cadres to share administrative duties and authority with ZIPRA guerrillas; e) food shortages;\footnote{“Report on Massacre of ANC Cadres” in Zimbabwe Review Vol.5 September/October (1976), pp.5-8.} f) ZANLA’s suspicion that ZIPRA forces intended to take over political leadership of ZIPA. ZAPU leaders suspected Tanzania’s complicity in the murder of ZIPRA cadres because the government and security officials not only failed to thoroughly investigate the incident, but also facilitated the escape from the country of ten ZANU men involved in the massacre of ZIPRA combatants.\footnote{Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, p.147.}

The massacre of ZIPRA militants at Morogoro and Iringa military training camps marked the beginning of the end of ZIPA as a united army.\footnote{ZIPRA commanders withdrew}
from ZIPA and instructed their guerrillas to return to their base in Zambia. Although ZIPA was to continue in name until the end of 1976, it consisted of only ZANLA, but a ZANLA under the leadership of the Vashandi (workers) commanders. Wilfred Mhanda emerged as one of the prominent Vashandi commanders. David Moore aptly summarised the circumstances which coalesced to produce a new leadership within ZIPA:

The militant transformationalists within ZIPA rose to prominence within ZANU’s ideological contradictions, and a confluence of coincidence, circumstance and strategy. The political and military vacuum following Zambia’s incarceration of ZANU’s Dare … for allegedly masterminding Chitepo’s … murder, combined with détente disaster, the de facto non-leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole, and Mugabe’s enforced restraint in Mozambique while he tried to assert his as yet unsanctioned authority over ZANU, all contributed to a situation ripe for ZIPA’s assumption of leadership and for the construction of the foundations necessary for the execution of a struggle based on the postulates of socialist transformation.

The rise of “military transformationalists” who expressed ideological commitment to socialist transformation of Zimbabwe through the armed struggle coincided with the hosting of the Geneva Conference and the release of ZANU militants from Zambian prisons. During this period, Robert Mugabe’s claim to have the guerrillas’ loyalty was being challenged by ZIPA guerrillas who did not want to support one leader alone. Moreover, unlike Mugabe, ZIPA guerrillas controlled all the military training and refugee camps in Mozambique and Tanzania. But as Mugabe emerged as an indisputable political leader of ZANU, and after securing the backing of Machel and Nyerere, it became imperative to have incarcerated ZANU guerrilla leaders released in order to support him at the Geneva conference.

786 Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga, p.147.
However, ZIPA commanders initially refused to attend the Geneva conference because they believed the constitutional talks “had been organised to sabotage the armed struggle” when the Rhodesian forces were about to be defeated. They also branded all-would-be participants as traitors. But as Fay Chung has shown, the absence of key military commanders meant that the ZANLA army would probably not accept any agreement that was reached at Geneva. Thus, Mhanda and his colleagues were forced to go to Geneva by Samora Machel.\(^788\) The former ZANU detainees, including members of the “old guard” such as Henry Hamadziripi, Rugare Gumbo, Kumbirai Kangai, Mukudzei Mudzi and Josiah Tongogara began to increasingly regard the Vashandi as “dissidents” who were bound to destabilise independent Zimbabwe, if left alone. With the help of the Mozambican authorities who were now unreservedly backing Mugabe-led ZANU, the Vashandi were brutally suppressed in 1977. About 600 guerrillas and 64 top commanders including Wilfred Mhanda were rounded up and detained. They would spend another three years in Mozambican prisons.\(^789\) This marked the end of ZIPA under the Vashandi commanders.

Meanwhile, Muzorewa’s attacks of Front Line States were not only confined to their role in creating ZIPA. He also attacked them, especially Kaunda, for encouraging the creation of the Patriotic Front (PF) in October 1976 and for leading the campaign for its recognition, a move which amounted to imposing a leader on Zimbabwe. Addressing a news conference in Salisbury, Muzorewa accused the Frontline leaders of trying to impose a leadership “on the 7 million people of Zimbabwe.” He claimed that there was a Zambian “plot” to impose Nkomo as “leader of Zimbabwe,” a single scheme in which the Frontline States, “wittingly or unwittingly are being used as a cover” while Mr. Mugabe was “a mere

\(^{788}\) Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, pp.149-150.

pawn.” He delivered a scathing attack on Kaunda, describing his “unbeatable record of backing losing horses.”

Again after Kaunda and the Frontline Presidents secured the recognition of the PF by the Liberation Committee, Sithole’s spokesman described the decision as “indefensible interference in Rhodesia’s internal affairs which can only lead to civil war in our country.” Although Muzorewa and Sithole’s accusations were true that Kaunda attempted to impose Nkomo as leader of Zimbabwe, their allegations were symptoms of frustrated nationalist leaders who had been alienated by their former supporters, and seeking to remain relevant to the political process in Rhodesia, colluded with Smith in crafting an internal settlement later in March 1978.

**Kaunda and Smith Secret Encounter**

Despite numerous concerns by Muzorewa and Sithole about a Zambian plot to impose Nkomo, Kaunda continued promoting Nkomo’s leadership, through secret diplomacy amidst escalating guerrilla war in Zimbabwe. On 25 September 1977, he secretly met Ian Smith at State House in Lusaka. Although there was a media blackout concerning the nature of the meeting, coupled with the government’s denial, there were strong suspicions that discussions were centered on negotiating a political settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. This was confirmed by Ellert when he chronicled the Kaunda-Smith encounter:

Smith, accompanied by Jack Gaylard and a member of the Rhodesian CIO, flew to Lusaka for talks with President Kaunda. Kaunda expounded on the merits of a possible settlement with Nkomo which would involve safeguards for the European population. Smith noted details of the

---

proposals before returning to Salisbury where he placed them in front of his cabinet colleagues who rejected them in favour of the evolving internal settlement arrangements.\footnote{Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, p.69.}

Despite the government’s denial, the above statement clearly suggests Kaunda was seeking to secure a political settlement between Nkomo and Smith even at the cost of “safeguarding” European interests. But the significance of this meeting—ostensibly facilitated by Roland “Tiny” Rowland, the Chairman of London and Rhodesia Holding Company, Ltd (LONRHO), a Multinational Corporation with extensive business interests in both Zambia and Rhodesia—was that it infuriated Robert Mugabe, the co-leader of the Patriotic Front. Expressing his objections, Mugabe explained that the meeting had created an atmosphere of mistrust within the Patriotic Front and strengthened the hand of the internal nationalist factions. Suggesting the meeting should never have taken place, Mugabe questioned the right of outsiders to negotiate on behalf of Rhodesia’s six million Africans.\footnote{Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 14, No. 10 (1977), p.4614B.} In fact, ZANU officials claimed immediately after the Kaunda-Smith meeting that a private deal had been worked out to bring Nkomo to power in an independent Rhodesia.\footnote{Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 14, No. 10 (1977), p.4614B.} However, such claims by ZANU officials were not entirely correct because as Smith recalled, his meeting with Kaunda did not include Nkomo although he “was actually in the building, hoping he might be called in to participate—but it was not to be.”\footnote{Smith, Bitter Harvest, p.238.} What is clear from the initial Smith-Kaunda encounter was that the two leaders discussed the possibility of ending the “senseless war” and more crucially, gauged Nkomo’s popularity in Rhodesia and his relative chances of presiding over a future ‘internal settlement.’ As Smith assessed, Nkomo’s relative strength in terms of popularity was only 15 %, second to Muzorewa’s 60 % and above
Sithole and Chirau who shared 12.5% each. For Smith, Nkomo was losing support “because he was spending too much of his time away from his political grassroots.”

Undoubtedly, the secret Kaunda-Smith meeting created suspicion between Nkomo and Mugabe, awakening the deep-rooted mistrust caused by years of nationalist struggle for ultimate power in an independent Zimbabwe. Deeply distrustful of Kaunda’s intentions, Mugabe interpreted the secret talks as a confirmation of his long-standing fears about the Zambian government’s hostility towards ZANU and its followers. This was more so, since ZANU guerrillas languished in Zambian prisons until 1976. It was clear for Mugabe and Frontline Presidents like Nyerere and Machel, that Kaunda wanted to secure a direct handover of power by the Rhodesian government to a Patriotic Front dominated by Nkomo and encompassing all other nationalists. These attitudes were hardened further when Smith again secretly flew into Zambia for talks with Nkomo in August 1978.

Two months after signing the constitution legalising the internal settlement in June 1978, Smith sneaked into Zambia to negotiate with Nkomo. Smith recalled that:

We landed just after dark the following evening, Monday 14 August [1978] as they hoped to keep the visit secret. It was a long drive, about forty minutes, to their State House [lodge] on the other side of Lusaka. We were taken in to a big lounge where Nkomo came forward and greeted me, and introduced me to Brigadier [Joseph] Garba from Nigeria…. Kaunda then entered and was most affable, and we chatted for a while … Kaunda … then took leave of us. We then got down to serious business, with both Nkomo and Garba making constructive contributions with ideas that were balanced and in keeping with my own thoughts …. We talked until midnight and produced a plan which I thought was workable, bringing both Nkomo and Mugabe into our existing arrangement [internal settlement]. Nkomo thought that he and I should be joint co-chairmen, but I discouraged that idea, saying that I believed he would gain the necessary support on his own credentials.

---

797 Smith, Bitter Harvest, p.238.
799 Smith, The Great Betrayal, pp.262-263.
Thus, at the behest of the Anglo-Americans in collaboration with Kaunda, Smith secretly visited Zambia in August 1978. He met Nkomo and Brigadier Joseph Garba, a former Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs at a secret location—a remote presidential lodge in the Luangwa game reserve south east of Lusaka. Kaunda featured briefly at the meeting but Mugabe was not invited. As Smith noted, he and Nkomo, with Garba’s assistance produced a plan which sought to incorporate Nkomo and Mugabe into the transitional arrangement under the internal settlement signed five months earlier. But the question was whether “Mugabe and his wild boys would go along with such an arrangement.” Garba is said to have asked if Smith could return to Lusaka on Saturday 19 August for another meeting. If he was agreeable, Garba offered to fly to Maputo to consult with Machel and Mugabe and be back to Lusaka with Mugabe and confirm the agreement. But the anticipated meeting could not materialise because Mugabe “was obstinate.”

It is important to understand the context in which secret meetings took place. After Smith and internal black leaders, such as Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau secured an internal settlement in March 1978, they began appealing for international recognition in order to legitimise their coalition government and secure the removal of sanctions. But the internal settlement failed to gain international legitimacy partly because it excluded the Patriotic Front leaders, Nkomo and Mugabe who were in control of the armies locked in combat with Rhodesian armed forces. Thus, it became clear that any satisfactory settlement of the Rhodesian conflict would require the inclusion of the Patriotic Front. At the same time, the British government was promoting the Anglo-American proposals (see Chapter 3) to secure a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. While, the British

and the Americans recognised that the Patriotic Front needed to be part of the solution to finding lasting peace in Rhodesia which, if possible, might include Smith and his colleagues in the internal settlement, they preferred Nkomo to dominate. Thus, the secret contacts were calculated to achieve this objective and they found a reliable ally in Kaunda.

Without informing Mugabe’s wing of the Patriotic Front, Kaunda colluded with the British and the Americans and encouraged Nkomo to enter into secret contacts with Smith. Contrary to Andre Astrow’s suggestion that both leaders of the PF were difficult to convince to support the British and American initiative, available evidence suggests Nkomo was more amenable than Mugabe. As long as he was assured of assuming the leadership of Zimbabwe, Nkomo willingly entertained such secret negotiations. However, Nkomo’s secret negotiations with Smith naturally hardened Mugabe, Nyerere and Machel’s suspicion that Kaunda’s clandestine talks and the Anglo-American diplomacy towards the Rhodesian conflict was aimed at the installation of Nkomo as the first President of Zimbabwe. Kaunda and the Anglo-Americans preferred Nkomo because they believed he would offer the best chance of stability and continuity in Rhodesia, something which the Rhodesian whites could not contemplate under the socialist ideals expressed by Mugabe.

Kaunda’s secret diplomacy culminated in his sudden announcement to reopen Zambia’s border with Rhodesia on 6 October 1978, ostensibly to import a backlog of much needed fertilisers marooned at Dar-es-Salaam port in Tanzania. Although Kaunda’s decision was dictated by sheer economic necessity, it caused a serious rift among the Frontline Presidents especially because it coincided with his efforts in promoting secret

---

802 Astrow, Zimbabwe, p.127.
805 “Why Zambia Re-opened the Southern Railway Route” University of Zambia Library Special Collection Gov.Zam (02) 1978/27.
negotiations. At an emergency summit meeting of Front Line States in Dar-es-Salaam in October 1978, Nyerere’s frantic diplomacy failed to persuade Kaunda to change his mind. Machel refused to attend or send a representative to the meeting after he learnt that Kaunda had been conducting secret diplomacy, apparently, to strike a deal with Nkomo.\textsuperscript{806}

The Patriotic Front equally expressed concern at the decision to reopen the border. Nkomo issued a statement suggesting that the reopening of the border would create difficulties in the liberation struggle. He sympathised with Zambia’s decision stating that his organisation would only allow goods imported or exported by Zambia on the rail route and not goods exported by Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{807} On the other hand, Mugabe argued that “the decision to re-open the southern border would not only help to sustain the rebel economy but also raise the morale of white Rhodesians.”\textsuperscript{808} Nkomo’s mild, sympathetic reaction contrasted with Mugabe’s forthright response, perhaps reflecting the nature of their relationship with Kaunda.

Conclusion

The period of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was marked by a tense, difficult and sometimes distrustful relationship between Zimbabwean nationalists and the Zambian government and Kaunda in particular. This was partly because Kaunda adopted and implemented what the nationalist leaders considered to be an ambiguous policy towards the Rhodesian government. Kaunda preferred and pursued a peaceful political plan and only resorted to armed struggle when negotiations were blocked, an approach that formed the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto. For the nationalists, this policy could not be countenanced.

\textsuperscript{806} Africa Research Bulletin Vol.15 No.10 (1978), p.5036B.
\textsuperscript{807} Times of Zambia 8 October 1978 see also The Zimbabwe People’s Voice Vol. 1 No.68 14 October 1978. Nkomo claimed that Kaunda informed him prior to announcing the reopening of the border and that he appreciated the problem that Zambia was facing.
\textsuperscript{808} Times of Zambia 15 October 1978.
They preferred a strategy of an uninterrupted revolution to completely overthrow the white minority government. But because Kaunda insisted on negotiations and often intervened in the internal crises of the nationalist movements and consistently supported Joshua Nkomo, the nationalists, especially in ZANU, hardened their attitude towards him, accusing him of meddling in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs and seeking to impose a particular leadership. They examined the government policy and concluded that it was ambiguous and plausibly designed to propagate Zambia’s national interests rather than those of the liberation movements. Thus, for ZANU nationalists and others that joined the internal settlement, such as Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema, Zambia played a questionable, if not negative role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.
Chapter 6
The Cost of Zambia’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle

Introduction

At the opening of parliament in January 1980, Kaunda remarked that:

The Zambian people have made a great contribution on the historic victories of the people of Zimbabwe. The rebellion has been crushed by the resolute determination of the patriotic forces .... The task of the Zambian people has been to assist the freedom fighters remove a rebellious and fascist regime. That is gone. Our task was to help create conditions in which the people of Zimbabwe could hold elections under a true democratic constitution based on majority rule, under conditions which are genuine, free and fair. We have paid dearly in resources, in human life and property to help bring about the current situation in Zimbabwe. I believe the Zambian people have accomplished their mission. Now on the threshold of Zimbabwe’s independence, we declare that the rest of the job is for the people of Zimbabwe themselves. \(^{809}\)

Kaunda claimed that Zambia “made a great contribution” to the liberation war in Zimbabwe because it assisted freedom fighters “remove a rebellious and fascist regime” and consequently “paid dearly in resources, in human life and property.” Kaunda’s speech aptly summarised the situation: Zambia paid a heavy price for supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation war. As discussed in Chapter 3, Zambia played a vital role in the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe. It hosted Zimbabwean liberation movements, offered them rear bases, facilitated shipment of weapons and ammunition to the battlefront, assisted guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia, and provided sanctuary to thousands of Zimbabwean refugees.

However, Zambia’s efforts for the liberation of Zimbabwe were not without penalties. Rhodesian armed forces mounted retaliatory air strikes against suspected guerrilla bases, refugee camps and Zambia’s vital economic infrastructure such as road and railway bridges. Aimed at coercing Zambian authorities to withdraw support for the liberation struggle, the

Air raids were devastating: hundreds of ordinary Zambians, military personnel and Zimbabwean refugees were massacred. Despite the devastating attacks, the Zambian government remained resolute in its support for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Economically, Zambia paid the ultimate price in resources and lost opportunity for development. The costs arising from the damage inflicted by air raids on key economic infrastructure were incalculable.

Although Rhodesian direct military operations against Zambia commenced and became more frequent after 1976, coinciding with the intensification of the liberation war, the initial costs to the economy were incurred from 1965 onwards when Zambia was forced to confront UDI, whose intention was to halt progress towards majority rule but plunged the country into a “15-year civil war.”810 From the military perspective, Zambia decided to support armed struggle against the Rhodesian government. On the economic front, it backed UN sponsored sanctions against Rhodesia and, to that effect, embarked on a very costly exercise of establishing alternative transport routes and new sources of energy and electricity as a way of reducing its economic dependence on Rhodesia. Reinforced partly by the closure of Rhodesia’s border with Zambia in 1973, the diversification efforts were extremely expensive.

This chapter examines the costs arising from Zambia’s commitment to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. It argues that Zambia paid a heavy price—both in economic and human terms—for supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation war. The chapter is divided into two broad parts; the first explores the costs inflicted on Zambia’s economy as it responded in various ways to the Rhodesian crisis and the subsequent border closure in 1973. The second part

accounts for and analyses the significance of Rhodesian military operations against Zambia after the mid-1970s.

**Background to Zambia’s Economic Reliance on Rhodesia**

When Smith announced UDI, Zambia was confronted with a serious dilemma concerning the appropriate response to the Rhodesian crisis. The dilemma was that, on one hand, the Zambian government expressed commitment to supporting armed struggle in Zimbabwe; while on the other hand, it sought to protect its citizens and the economy from external harm.\(^{811}\) This dilemma was rooted in the country’s colonial legacy and its unenviable geopolitical situation. During the colonial period, especially the last ten years prior to Zambia’s independence, then Northern Rhodesia’s economy was developed as an appendage of Southern Rhodesia’s economic system. As noted in Chapter 3, it exported labour to agricultural and mining industries of Southern Rhodesia and provided a huge market for manufactured products.\(^{812}\) Northern Rhodesia also depended on its southern neighbour in almost all the key sectors of the economy, including transport and communication, energy and electricity. In short, it was during the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland that Northern Rhodesia’s economy became highly dependent on that of Southern Rhodesia. Although by the end of 1963 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved and Zambia secured independence from Britain, the UNIP government lacked effective control over the management and operation of the economy. Zambia had become so deeply integrated with Rhodesia’s economy that its economic survival depended on its southern neighbour. For Leonard Kapungu, the Zambezi River, the boundary between Zambia and Rhodesia became a battle line of two conflicting political ideologies; the

\(^{811}\) Mtshali, ‘Zambia’s Foreign Policy’, p.277.

Rhodesian Front (RF), Rhodesia’s governing party believed in white supremacy, while UNIP believed in Pan Africanism and the right of the majority to self-determination.\textsuperscript{813}

Zambia’s economic reliance on Rhodesia was clearly revealed when white settlers proclaimed UDI in November 1965, a development which polarised the political positions of the two countries. For example, as noted, in 1965 Zambia depended almost entirely on Rhodesia Railways to export copper and import consumer goods. It also exclusively relied on its southern neighbour for energy and electricity requirements. In view of this scenario, the attitude of Zambian leaders was unequivocal; that there should be no independence in Rhodesia before majority rule and that the act of rebellion should be brought to an end immediately.\textsuperscript{814} While the British government, having refused to use force to quell the rebellion, contemplated imposing economic sanctions on Rhodesia and as the UN Security Council was considering the same action, Zambia and the OAU commenced preparations to launch an armed struggle. As shown in Chapter 3, by June 1965, preparations to establish training camps and to facilitate the transit of ZAPU and ZANU militants proceeding for military training in Tanzania and beyond were already underway. UDI, Britain’s reluctance to quash it by military means, and the intransigence of Ian Smith, therefore, reinforced Zambia’s willingness to support an armed struggle as a legitimate strategy of political transformation in Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{815} As willing partners keenly interested in resolving the Rhodesian crisis within the shortest possible time, Zambian leaders did not only assist the nationalist movements to prepare for an armed struggle, but they also, on the diplomatic

\textsuperscript{813} Kapungu, 	extit{Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom}, p.66.  
\textsuperscript{814} \textit{Times of Zambia} 12 November 1965.  
\textsuperscript{815} A.M Kanduza, “Zambians Against UDI in Rhodesia” p.5.
front, supported international sanctions on Rhodesia despite expressing skepticism about their efficacy.816

**International Sanctions on Rhodesia**

Since UDI was considered an act of rebellion both by the British government and the international community more generally, the day Smith proclaimed it, Britain imposed “voluntary” economic and financial sanctions on Rhodesia and urged the international community to do the same. The sanctions included *inter-alia*: i) the British High Commissioner was withdrawn and Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London was expelled; ii) exports of arms, including spare parts, were stopped; iii) all British aid ceased; iv) Rhodesia was removed from the Sterling Area; v) the export of British capital to Rhodesia was prohibited; vi) Rhodesia’s access to the London capital market was halted, vii) Britain’s Export Credits Guarantee Department stopped further coverage for exports to Rhodesia; viii) Rhodesia was suspended from the Commonwealth Preference Area and its goods no longer received preferential treatment on entering Britain; ix) Britain banned purchases of Rhodesian sugar and tobacco—stopping a net total of 71 percent (by value) of Rhodesian exports to Britain and; x) Britain no longer recognised passports issued or renewed by the illegal regime.817

At the UN, the Security Council passed a resolution (S/216) condemning UDI and called upon all states not to recognise “this illegal racist minority regime” and to “refrain from giving it any assistance.” On 20 November, the Security Council passed another resolution (S/217) which noted the gravity of the situation caused by the Rhodesian crisis.

---


817 Strack, Sanctions, p.17.
The Council declared UDI “an act of rebellion” the continuance of which “constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” It also called upon all states to refrain from recognising the illegal regime, to avoid any action assisting and encouraging it and “in particular to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.”

The resolution also called upon Britain to quell the rebellion and the OAU to assist in the implementation of the resolution. The action against Rhodesia was based on a continuing recognition of British sovereignty and legal authority over the territory.

The following year, again at the initiative and request of Britain, a UN Security Council resolution (S/232) imposing “selective” mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia was adopted on 16 December 1966. The resolution determined, *inter-alia*, that the situation in Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security and decided that all UN member states should impose sanctions against specified Rhodesian exports and against the supply to Rhodesia of arms, military equipment, vehicles and aircraft, and oil products.

The failure of “voluntary” and “selective” mandatory economic sanctions to bring down the Rhodesian rebellion culminated in the introduction of another set of sanctions—the “comprehensive” mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia. On 29 May 1968, the Security Council adopted a resolution (S/253) making mandatory on all UN member states, the imposition of an embargo on all trade with Rhodesia (with certain minor exceptions such as medical and educational supplies), on all shipment in their vessels and aircraft of goods to and from Rhodesia.

---

819 Nyangoni, *African Nationalism in Zimbabwe*, p.84.
Rhodesia, and on the provision of funds for investments and other purposes.\textsuperscript{920} Clearly, the voluntary, selective and comprehensive mandatory sanctions failed to overthrow the Rhodesian government mainly because there was lack of “consensus in their application” and an absence of “instruments of coercion to implement the sanctions” within the UN.\textsuperscript{821} Similarly, for the Zambian government, the sanctions could not succeed because they were “applied selectively and enforced half-heartedly.”\textsuperscript{822}

**Zambia’s Attitude to “Voluntary” Sanctions**

The imposition of voluntary economic sanctions on Rhodesia by Britain, including an embargo on the supply of fuel enforced by the British Navy which intercepted fuel tankers destined for the Rhodesian pipeline at Beira,\textsuperscript{823} was premised on the conviction that “on the expert advice” available to Harold Wilson, the “cumulative effects” of the sanctions would bring the rebellion to an end “within a matter of weeks rather than months.”\textsuperscript{824} Although Wilson refused to use force in preference for economic sanctions, Zambian leaders were skeptical of the effectiveness of voluntary sanctions to bring down the Rhodesian government. This was due to a number of reasons. First, they maintained that voluntary sanctions would not work because of the South African and Portuguese factor. The two white minority ruled countries were less likely to enforce the sanctions than to promote their busting. Second, they insisted that success of voluntary sanctions could not be guaranteed

\textsuperscript{820}Nyangoni, *African Nationalism in Zimbabwe*, p.84.
\textsuperscript{821}Nyangoni, *African Nationalism in Zimbabwe*, p.85.
\textsuperscript{823}Sardanis, *Zambia*, p.28.
because they were not binding on any nation but were simply “voluntary” and their application depended on the good-will of individual countries. Thus, Zambian leaders regarded the application of voluntary sanctions as an ineffective policy which would undoubtedly damage the country’s economy. A Zambian delegate expressed this view at the Commonwealth conference in Lagos, Nigeria in January 1966. He stated that:

Zambia considers the establishment of a rebel regime across the borders as a permanent threat to our [economic] security and we will do everything possible to remove this threat from the start .... Zambia … is extremely doubtful whether economic sanctions will have the effect of bringing down the Smith regime within a time limit that will avoid serious damage to the Zambian economy including a severe if not complete curtailment of copper production and delivery.825

Zambia’s failure to persuade Britain to quell the rebellion through military intervention and to secure a specific British commitment to provide aid to cover the cost of sanctions placed it in an invidious position which R.L Sklar described as follows:

If Zambia endeavoured to support sanctions faithfully and to the best of its ability, it was bound to incur economic reprisals and pay dearly in shortages of supply without securing its political objectives [of overthrowing Smith] .... If Zambia did not support sanctions, it could hardly escape a measure of blame for their failure. Moreover, Zambia’s dereliction would make it much easier for Britain to reconcile with the Rhodesian regime.826

Despite expressing skepticism regarding the efficacy of sanctions, in November 1965 the Zambian government decided to join, though reluctantly, international sanctions against Rhodesia in order to fulfill its moral obligation towards the decision taken by the Security Council. Zambia declared economic war on Rhodesia, a decision which, given its dependence on Rhodesia, seriously undermined the country’s economic stability. In


retaliation to Zambia’s participation in the UN-sponsored trade embargo on Rhodesia, in December 1965 the Rhodesian government banned the shipment of oil and petroleum products to Zambia by preventing any movement of rail tanks. Rhodesian authorities took this action in an apparent move to build up the country’s oil reserves in the wake of sanctions. On 19 December 1965, they announced a hundred fold increase in taxes on coal exported to Zambia and demanded an advance payment of railway revenue in convertible currency. 827

The question of advance payment should be seen in the context of the machinery created to implement the UN sanctions against Rhodesia in November 1965. Prior to UDI, M. Bostock observed that Zambia maintained a trade and payments system that was practically free of restrictions. All imported goods originating from the Sterling Area (Rhodesia, South Africa and Britain) were free from restrictions, that is, they were not subjected to any form of licensing. But when UDI was proclaimed, Zambia adopted a full system of licensing for all imported goods from all countries. Exchange control regulations were introduced to restrict payments to Rhodesia, and payments to the jointly-owned services—the Central African Airways, Central African Road Services, Central African Power Corporation and Rhodesia Railways. 828 As part of its contribution towards the UN economic and financial sanction measures, the Zambian government blocked the transfer of surplus railway revenue from Zambia to Rhodesia. For several months, the payments had accumulated in the Lusaka account while the current account for the Railways in Salisbury

reached a point of virtual bankruptcy. Hence, the Rhodesian authorities demanded advance payment of Rhodesia Railway revenue from the Zambian government.\(^{829}\)

**Contingency Operations**

The crisis precipitated by the oil embargo, disruptions in coal supply and demand for pre-payment of freight charges for copper exports severely disrupted Zambia’s economy. It spurred contingency operations with enormous costs to the national economy. The resulting petroleum shortage in the county led to a severe reduction in essential services, and also retarded the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan.\(^ {830}\) It further gave rise to the introduction of a petrol and fuel rationing scheme throughout the country. The scheme was introduced to ensure that everyone got a fair allocation of fuel and for the general maintenance of the economy.\(^ {831}\) The fuel crisis was so critical that at the beginning, the fuel ration for an average private motorist was less than a gallon (about 4.5 litres) per week.\(^ {832}\)

The fuel shortage severely strained the economy and inflicted untold misery on the general citizenry. This prompted the government to initiate weekly radio and television addresses to the nation in an attempt to keep the general citizenry abreast with emergency measures government was putting in place in response to the crisis.\(^ {833}\) The radio and television addresses served not only to inform and update the nation, but they were also designed to instill a sense of confidence in the government and to, possibly, abate panic among the general populace. In a desperate attempt to salvage the economy from total


\(^{830}\) Kapulu interview cited.

\(^{831}\) *Times of Zambia* 20 December 1965.

\(^{832}\) Sardanis, *Africa*, p.175.

collapse, the Zambian government, in collaboration with and assistance of Britain, United States and Canada, launched an international rescue operation involving airlifting of fuel and petroleum products into the country. The operation started on 19 December 1965, a day after Smith terminated the flow of oil into Zambia when the first British Royal Air Force planes carrying petroleum landed in Lusaka. Within the same month, the Canadian government joined the exercise using four Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Hercules transport aircraft. The United States joined the rescue operation in January 1966 when they dispatched a Pan-American Airline 707 which landed in Elizabethville, Katanga Province, and unloaded 120 barrels holding 55 gallons of oil. The oil was transported into Zambia by road. Ten days later, another American Trans-World Airlines 707 joined the exercise. In an operation that lasted until 30 April 1966, the two American Boeing 707s flew fuel into Katanga, hauling a total of 68,921 barrels containing 3.6 million gallons of oil. The transport costs alone for the oil topped $1 per gallon.835

Apart from assistance provided by the international community in the airlifting of fuel and other imports into the country, the Roan Select Trust (RST) Group of companies, in co-operation with the Zambian government, established an airline in 1965, the Zambian Air Cargo (ZAC) as an emergency measure designed to deal with the crisis precipitated by the Rhodesian crisis. During an operation that lasted three years, ZAC carried 150,000 tonnes of freight—about half copper and half essential supplies—between Zambia’s Copperbelt and the port of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. Announcing its closure in 1968, the spokesman for the Zambian government noted that “the airline played a vital part in ensuring Zambia’s

economic survival at a difficult time when the country was virtually under siege and the government wishes to express its gratitude to all those who helped to make this emergency venture a success.\footnote{See speech by Sir Ronald L. Prain OBE Chairman of the RST Group of Companies to the informal meeting of the shareholders in New York, 21 April 1969.} Admittedly, the oil airlifts contributed immensely towards the maintenance of the Zambian economy during the critical period of fuel shortage. The exercise was a short-term measure intended to maintain the economy while alternative sources of energy supply and surface routes were being developed.

In this regard, in May 1965, the National Coal Supply Commission (NCSC) was established with the objective of developing domestic coal resources to replace coal imports from Wankie in Rhodesia to the maximum possible extent.\footnote{Republic of Zambia Economic Report 1966, pp. 19-20, see also Zambia Hansard no. 7m Daily Hansard Friday 12 August, 1966 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Third Session of the National Assembly (Resumed) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), pp.662-664.} Although it was known that coal deposits existed in Zambia at Nkandabwe, previous reports on its quality had been adverse. These reports and the availability of Wankie coal had led to the Zambian deposits being ignored. The investigations carried by Chartered Explorations Limited suggested that these old reports were unduly pessimistic and a bold decision was taken to undertake open cast mining operations at Nkandabwe, initially with the object of creating a stock of 300,000 tonnes of coal. Actual mining started in February 1966 with a total production capacity of 1,600,000 tonnes.\footnote{Republic of Zambia Economic Report 1966, p.20}

Although coal production commenced at Nkandabwe, the search for other better deposits of coal continued. In 1966, the National Coal Board (NCB) was created to further develop and establish an independent coal mining industry in Zambia. Following the dissolution of NCB, the coal industry was transferred to the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO) which established its subsidiary, Maamba Collieries Limited as an
agency responsible for the production of coal. The development of Maamba Colliery witnessed an increase in coal production such that, by 1971, coal imports from Rhodesia had been replaced by local supplies.\footnote{Republic of Zambia, \textit{Third National Development Plan 1979-1983}, pp.253-258.}

Another aspect of contingency operations involved primarily the development of alternative routes through Tanzania to Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara, through Malawi to Beira, and through the Democratic Republic of Congo to Lobito. The Great North Road (popularly known as the “Hell Run” due to frequent accidents that occurred over the gravel road) was upgraded in order to increase traffic capacity between Zambia and Tanzania. This was associated with the building up of port facilities in 1966 at Mbulungu on the south of Lake Tanganyika and the establishment of a transit depot at Isoka to which goods were transported from Tanzania by Tanzanian sub-contractors, and from which goods were transported by Zambian contractors to the line of rail. Equally, the Great East Road was upgraded in order to efficiently handle Zambia’s export and import traffic to the east through Malawi to the Mozambican ports.\footnote{Republic of Zambia, \textit{Economic Report 1966}, p.21.}

In May 1966, a transport corporation known as the Zambia-Tanzania Road Services Limited (ZTRS) was established jointly with the government of Tanzania and the Fiat Corporation of Italy (Zambia and Tanzania each held 35 percent equity and the balance was held by Italian interests) to transport copper to the port of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania and to bring in vital petroleum products on its homeward run.\footnote{Zambia Industrial Bulletin \textit{Vol. 1, No. 16 (1967)}, p.3.} Operations began in June 1966 on the 1,930.8 kilometre route from Dar-es-salaam to Lusaka and the Copperbelt, without depots or staging posts and with minimum administrative personnel. By December the fleet had increased to 239 Fiat truck-and-trailer units, each of 30-tonne capacity. Traffic included
7,154 tonnes of outward cargo, nearly all copper and 4,648 tonnes of inward cargo, mostly fuel. Initially, fuel was carried in drums or sealed rubber tanks, but both proved unsatisfactory and forced vehicles to operate at about half capacity. By the end of 1967, the transport organisation operated at its planned capacity of 450 units, including a 100 of the steel tanker type, which eliminated use of drums and rubber tanks. At its full capacity, the company carried 20,000 tonnes of cargo in either direction on a monthly basis.\textsuperscript{842} The foregoing contingency operations were initiated as temporary measures designed to deal with the emergency precipitated by the oil crisis and disruptions in coal supplies in the country. However, long-term development projects such as the Tanzania-Zambia Mafuta (TAZAMA) Pipeline, Indeni Oil Refinery, Kariba North Bank and Kafue Gorge hydroelectric power stations, and Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) were also established. They not only mitigated the country’s energy and transportation problems, but also laid a strong foundation for the country to become self-sufficient in these sectors.

Thus TAZAMA Pipelines (with the Zambian government holding 67 per cent of equity, while the Tanzanian government owned 33 per cent) was established in December 1966 as a result of intensive negotiations to construct a 1,720 kilometre pipeline for the transportation of petroleum products from Dar-es-Salaam to Ndola. The line, which is of 8 inch diameter buried throughout its length to a depth of several feet, was completed in September 1968 at a total cost of K36 million. It put a final end to the petrol supply problems which had bedeviled Zambia since the Rhodesian crisis.\textsuperscript{843} In 1973, the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), acting on behalf of the Zambian government, commissioned the first national petroleum refinery at Ndola called the Indeni Oil Refinery at

\textsuperscript{843}Zambia Industrial Bulletin, p.3
a total cost of US$ 25 million.\textsuperscript{844} It was established with a total refinery capacity of 650,000 tonnes of crude oil per annum. Together with the strategic TAZAMA Oil Pipeline which was completed earlier in 1968, the Indeni Oil Refinery contributed significantly towards eliminating the problem of rampant fuel shortages that engulfed the Zambian economy following the Rhodesian crisis. It assisted considerably in making Zambia become self-reliant in the production of petroleum products. Other diversification efforts involved the construction of Kafue Gorge and Kariba North Bank hydroelectric power stations in 1972 and 1976 by a Yugoslav firm and by the Italians, respectively.\textsuperscript{845} These projects not only made a significant contribution towards meeting Zambia’s energy needs, but also laid a strong base for the country to become self-sufficient in the energy sector.

Furthermore, TAZARA was established in June 1975 through a tripartite arrangement involving the governments of Zambia, Tanzania and China. Earlier attempts by the Zambian government to engage Britain and the USA to help build the rail line proved futile. The railway line stretches from Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia’s Central Province through the Northern Province to the Tanzanian town of Dar-es-Salaam covering a distance of 1,860 kilometres. The establishment of the railway line, which cost almost US$ 500 million, made a significant contribution towards mitigating Zambia’s transport problems.\textsuperscript{846} Clearly, the Zambian economy incurred huge financial losses due to the government response to the Rhodesian crisis. The crisis necessitated diversion of some financial resources from normal

development projects to contingency planning related projects and operations. The exact financial costs incurred due to contingency operations were not revealed.\footnote{Evidence from parliamentary debates suggests that issues related to government’s response to UDI were regarded as “matters of Government policy” which could not be subjected to detailed discussion for “reasons of national security.” See \textit{Zambia Hansard} no.7m Daily Hansard Friday, 12 August 1966, p.667.} The available statistics were based on estimates. They revealed an enormous expenditure. For instance, by August 1966, the Zambian government had spent ZMK10,400,000 on contingency operations.\footnote{\textit{Times of Zambia} August 25, 1966. See also \textit{Zambia Hansard} no. 7p Daily Hansard Thursday 18 August 1966 \textit{Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Third Session of the First National Assembly (resumed)} (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), pp.890-891. By January 1968, this amount was estimated to have reached ZMK47,640,000. See Elijah Mudenda, ‘Budget Address’ \textit{Zambia Hansard} No.13 25 January 1968 \textit{Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Fourth Session (resumed)} of the National Assembly, 23 January - 4 April (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968), p.43.} The Minister of Finance gave the following expenditure as indicated in Table 3:6.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Table 3:6}  
\textbf{Zambia’s Expenditure on UDI in 1966}
\end{center}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Items} & \textbf{Amount(K)} \\
\hline
Subsidies & 4,648,784 \\
\hline
Aircraft: BAC 1-11 & 1,880,034 \\
Hercules C-130 & 487,786 \\
BAC 1-11 Ferry Flights & 68,900 \\
\hline
Road Transport: 25 Fiat tenders for tobacco, 100 Fiat trucks, 161 Leyland trucks, 800 Rubber-seal tanks & 542,696 \\
Zambia-Tanzania Road Services & 233,500 \\
\hline
Fuel: Storage & 85,124 \\
Storage at Isoka & 46,000 \\
Fuel-oil drums & 96,386 \\
Petrol rationing costs & 17,258 \\
\hline
Coal: Development of Nkandabwe & 599,738 \\
National Coal Supply Commission & 3,244 \\
Stockpiles of 33,000 tonnes & 498,316 \\
\hline
Other Stockpiles: Steel- 6,000 tonnes & 596,316 \\
Extra Customs Facilities & 1,804 \\
Contingency Planning Organisation & 42,050 \\
Sundry, including Security Guards & 6,940 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total:} & \textbf{10,400,000} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Source: \textit{Times of Zambia}, 25 August 1966
The immediate post-UDI crisis confirmed Zambia’s vulnerability as a landlocked state and Rhodesia’s unreliability as a transit state for Zambia’s export and import trade. By virtue of the landlocked nature of the country and the hostility generated by the Rhodesian crisis, Zambian leaders adopted a vigorous approach in an effort to progressively extricate the country from economic reliance on Rhodesia and establish alternative trade routes through friendly countries. Evidence suggests that by 1968, the Zambian government had significantly reduced its trade with Rhodesia. For instance, Rhodesia’s share in Zambia’s imports dropped from 35 per cent in 1965 to 19 per cent in 1966. It fell further down from 11 per cent in 1967 to a bare 6 per cent in the first half of 1968. The foregoing statistics not only demonstrate the extent to which Zambia’s trade with Rhodesia declined, but they also reflected the government’s robust effort to divert its trade from the traditional southern route.

It is significant to note that establishing alternative trade routes was extremely expensive. It required huge financial resources which dislocated some development plans. Scarce resources were diverted from naturally priority areas to developing and improving alternative trade routes. As a poor and developing country, Zambia lacked basic human needs so much that priority should have been given to these sectors. However, due to the emergency precipitated by the Rhodesian crisis, the Zambian government accorded a high

849 J. H. Chileshe defined the expression ‘landlocked state’ as a country that is totally dependent on access to the sea through other states while a ‘transit state’ is any state with or without a sea or ocean coast but situated between a landlocked country and the sea or ocean and through which traffic of the landlocked state must pass to the outside world. See J. H. Chileshe, *Third World Countries and Development Options: Zambia* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1986), p.41.

degree of importance to the development of the alternative transport and communication networks. The First National Development Plan (FNDP) for instance, allocated K165,034,000 to transport and communications alone out of total government capital investment spending of K563,620,000, with Local Government and Housing coming out as a very poor second with only K84,666,000.\footnote{Republic of Zambia, First National Development Plan (FNDP) 1966-1970 (Lusaka: Office of National Development and Planning, 1966), p.288, see also Republic of Zambia Economic Report 1968 (Lusaka: Ministry of Finance, 1969), p.21.} This, undoubtedly, constituted a fairly high proportion of expenditure for a developing country where the immediate and basic needs for the majority still remained unmet.

The economic costs incurred as a result of the Rhodesian crisis were widespread. They affected every sector of the economy. In particular, the mining sector incurred huge production costs and drastic reduction in the levels of production. The disruptive effects to the industry were noticeable given the importance of the sector to the Zambian economy. For instance in 1965, copper, which constituted the principle foreign exchange earner of over 90 per cent, not only accounted for, on average, about 60 per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but also contributed, on average, 40 per cent of the total government revenue and accounted for about 17 per cent of the total number of people in paid employment.\footnote{MINDECO, Mindeco Mining Year Book, 1976, Lusaka, p.20, J. Mwanakatwe, ‘Budget Address, Republic of Zambia no.48i Daily Parliamentary Debates of the Fifth Session of the Third National Assembly (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1978), p.638.} In 1966, copper production costs rose by K19 million with the result that government lost revenue worth K13.4 million. Shortage of coal resulted in the reduction of copper production by 75 per cent. This meant a loss of 500 tonnes a day worth K400,000.\footnote{See Elijah Mudenda, ‘Budget Address’ Zambia Hansard No.13, p.43.} In the first half of 1966, the impact of the oil shortage gave rise to a drastic cut in copper production initially by 25 per cent and by the end of the year; production had
dropped by almost 34 per cent. Between 1965 and 1969, the production cost of copper had increased from K342 to K620 per tonne, an 81 per cent increase. The increase was largely attributed to the surcharge on the Zambian imports and exports, and also to higher port charges. From the foregoing, it can be noted that due to the Rhodesian crisis, the copper mining industry suffered huge financial losses as reflected in the increased cost of production accompanied by drastic reduction in the levels of production.

The rise in the cost of living was another disruptive effect on the Zambian economy brought about by the Rhodesian crisis. This was largely reflected in increased domestic consumer prices of essential commodities. Available evidence suggests that following the Rhodesian crisis, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all items showed a continued rise in the cost of living of all income groups, with the lower income groups being the most affected. Between 1966 and 1970, prices of consumer goods for high and low income groups rose at an average annual rate of 5.5 per cent and 6.5 per cent, respectively. Consumer prices for both income groups increased at an annual rate of around 6 to 6.5 per cent in 1972 and 1973. The rise in the general level of domestic prices was a reflection of the increasing costs of imports, accentuated by excess demand due to shortages of essential commodities. In order to compensate for the increase in prices so as to protect the poorer sections of the community from the effects of inflation, the Zambian government spent huge amounts of money on subsidies. For example, expenditure on subsidies increased sharply from K4 million in 1965 to K16 million in 1966 and to K35 million in 1968. The estimated

---

figure for subsidies stood at K70 million in 1975.\textsuperscript{856} Phyllis Johnson and David Martin estimated that, overall, the cost to Zambia as it was forced to respond to the Rhodesian rebellion was well in excess of US$ 1 billion by the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{857} The policy of disengagement adopted by the Zambian government following the Rhodesian crisis was given further impetus in 1973 when the Rhodesian government closed the country’s border with Zambia in January 1973. This development further disrupted the Zambian economy.

**1973 Border Closure**

In February 1973, the Rhodesian government closed the country’s border with Zambia, a move which meant the movement of people and goods between the two countries was to cease from that date.\textsuperscript{858} However, the decision to close the border must be seen in context. It coincided with the intensification of guerrilla war by ZANLA combatants between 1972 and 1973.\textsuperscript{859} The closure of the border was intended to apply pressure on the Zambian government to stop facilitating infiltration of armed guerrilla bands across its border into Rhodesia. Thus, Smith took action because Zambia was allowing its territory to be used as a “terrorists’” launching pad for military attacks on Rhodesia. In his view, the decision to close the border was “not a deliberate effort to impose a boycott against Zambia” but an effort to get Zambia’s leaders to “their senses.”\textsuperscript{860} However, Rhodesian authorities

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{857} Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, p.89.
\item \textsuperscript{858} However, the Zambian government still facilitated through special administrative arrangements, crossing of the border by individuals whose children were attending schools in Rhodesia. See UNIP7/23/44 Cabinet Circulars 1973-1974, ‘Secret’ Cabinet Office Circular no.15 of 1973 from A.M. Milner, Secretary General to the Government to all Permanent Secretaries, 9 March, 1973. Circular Caption: Border Closure: Permission to Cross into and from Rhodesia on Compassionate Grounds.
\item \textsuperscript{859} Astrow, Zimbabwe, p.62.
\item \textsuperscript{860} Africa Research Bulletin 10, 1 (1973), p.2735C
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
maintained that Zambia would still be allowed to export its copper through Rhodesia. The exclusion of copper exports was designed to allow the Rhodesian government to continue benefitting from payment of freight charges by the Zambian government. Although a month later, Ian Smith decided to reopen the border, perhaps after realising the futility of his initial action and ostensibly under pressure from the South African government, the Zambian government, however, refused to reopen its side of the border. They closed it on a permanent basis, suggesting the southern route would remain unreliable so long as a white minority government remained in power in Rhodesia. The decision was consistent with its support for UN sanctions on Rhodesia which, as noted, were imposed in 1965.  

The border closure affected the entire structure of the Zambian economy. The blockade entailed complete diversion of Zambia’s export and import traffic from the southern route to other routes. It is important to make this emphasis in this context because despite embarking on efforts to develop alternative routes in the immediate post-UDI period, at the time of the border closure, a significant portion of Zambia’s import and export trade still passed through the southern route. The alternative routes through Tanzania to the north and through Malawi to Mozambique in the east had not been sufficiently developed to efficiently handle increased capacity of Zambia’s export and import traffic. At the time of the border closure, Zambia’s import and export trade constituted 900,000 tonnes and

861 It remained closed until October 1978 when it was opened due to alleged congestion at Dar-es-Salaam port and the subsequent failure to efficiently handle Zambia’s vital imports including the much needed fertilizers, see “Why Zambia Re-opened the Southern Railway Route” University of Zambia Library Special Collection Gov. Zam (02) 1978/27


863 Chona interview cited.
400,000 tonnes, respectively, through the southern route.\footnote{UNIP7/2/26 Contingency Planning Committee Reports, 1973, See ‘Top Secret’ Report by Mr. M. C. Chona and Mr. L. M Lishomwa on International Assistance to Zambia, 26 March 1973. Chona interview cited.} A complete diversion of export and import traffic of such magnitude from the traditional southern route required increasing capacity on the alternative routes. This prompted the Zambian government to successfully negotiate with the Malawian government on the continued use of and increasing capacity through Malawi as a transit route for Zambia’s foreign trade while the TAZARA project was being developed.\footnote{UNIP/7/2/25 Record of the Meeting Between Hon A.M. Milner, M.P, Secretary-General to the Government and his delegation and Hon. A. K. Banda, M.P, Malawian Minister of Transport and Communication and Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Blantyre, Thursday 22 February 1973, see also UNIP7/2/25 Report of a Zambian Delegation to Malawi, issued by the Cabinet Office, February 1973.} Undeniably, the border closure presented a huge challenge to the Zambian government as it required huge financial resources to entirely divert export and import traffic. The UN Security Council team of experts estimated the cost of rerouting at K90 million, while the Zambian government placed the figure at K112 million.\footnote{UNIP7/2/26 Report on International Assistance to Zambia by Mr. M. C. Chona and Mr. L M. Lishomwa, 26 March 1973. See also UNIP7/1/15 State House Papers, 1972-1973, Dr. K.D Kaunda, ‘Zambia Shall Beat the Blockade: A Challenge to the Nation, March 1973.’} The costs were broken down as indicated in Table 4:6.
Table 4:6
Estimated Cost of the Border Closure in 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost (K)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,200 heavy vehicles (various)</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manpower costs</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing for additional manpower</td>
<td>1,484,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training costs</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop installations-Dar-es-Salaam route</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Malawi route</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- other</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage facilities</td>
<td>1,428,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling equipment</td>
<td>626,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia Railways</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 200 wagons</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 4 locomotives</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,138,020</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional costs of handling normal traffic</td>
<td>35,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements of telecommunications</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An airlift operation for seven months</td>
<td>28,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>112,738,020</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is evident from Table 4:6 that the blockade placed an extra financial cost on the Zambian government. As in the immediate post UDI period, the border closure equally affected the mining industry in terms of the increased cost of production and delayed investments in capital projects which translated to loss of colossal amounts of revenue. For instance, due to the blockade, the Zambian government estimated an increase of 5 per cent to the capital expenditure of K90 million for the mining industry in 1974. In addition, as a result of investment delays in major capital projects, it was estimated that in 1973/1974 a planned increase in copper production of about 65,000 tonnes would be deferred, representing a loss of about K55 million in foreign exchange earnings at a copper price of £500 per tonne.867

Furthermore, the blockade necessitated the reallocation of financial resources in the Second

---

National Development Plan from the previously planned projects to other emergency needs caused by the border closure.\(^{868}\)

Zambia’s participation in the UN sponsored sanctions against the Rhodesian government along with the disruption caused by the border closure drained huge financial resources from the Zambian economy. Between 1965 and 1976, it was estimated that Zambia lost a total of K478 million due to its participation in the UN mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. During this period, Zambia received only K64 million from the international community as a contribution towards defraying Zambia’s costs.\(^{869}\) The rerouting exercise alone during this period cost Zambia over K520 million. The continued closure of the border cost Zambia a total of K288 million between January 1973 and December 1976. The international assistance to Zambia in this connection was a paltry K40 million.\(^{870}\) By 1978, the cost to Zambia of its economic sanctions against Rhodesia was estimated to have reached a cumulative total of almost £750 million—equal to roughly a third of its annual Gross National Product (GNP).\(^{871}\)

Equally depressing to the economy was a growing rise in the cost of living due to escalating domestic prices of basic commodities. This phenomenon was a function of increased cost of imports for consumer goods arising from increased transport costs. For example, between 1971 and 1976, consumer prices for both low and high income groups registered significant increases, with an annual average increase of 9.6 percent for low

\(^{868}\) For instance in 1973, the budgetary allocation for SNDP projects and program were reduced by K20 to K25 million from K180 million previously envisaged in 1972. This was against the total five year outlay of K1,029 million projected budget for the entire period of the SNDP (1972-1976). See UNIP7/23/40 ‘Top Secret’ ‘The Effect of the Rhodesian Blockade on the SNDP Projects and Programs and on the Zambian Economy, see also UNIP7/2/25 DRAFT. Request for United Nations Assistance, Annexure VIII.

\(^{869}\) \textit{Times of Zambia} 7 December 1976.

\(^{870}\) \textit{Times of Zambia} 7 December 1976.

income groups and 9.4 per cent for high income groups. There was a further acceleration in the increase of prices of essential commodities in 1977 when consumer prices rose by 22.7 per cent for low income groups and by 18.5 per cent for the high income group over the previous year’s level.\footnote{UNIP7/2/34 See Republic of Zambia Economic Report 1977, Office of the Prime Minister, National Commission for Development Planning, Presented to the National Assembly, Lusaka, January 1978, p.3. See also Republic of Zambia Economic Report1978 (Lusaka: National Commission for Development Planning, 1979), p.24.} During 1978, domestic prices of basic goods increased further. The average index of consumer prices for the first nine months of 1978 reflected an increase of over 20 per cent for low income groups as compared with the price levels that prevailed in the corresponding periods of the preceding years. The factors responsible for pushing up the domestic level of consumer prices were largely attributed to the costs of re-routing of imports and exports, congestion at the port of Dar-es-salaam and, generally, transport problems that engulfed the country during this period.\footnote{Republic of Zambia Economic Report 1978, p.24. See also J. Mwanakatwe, ‘Budget Address’ Republic of Zambia no.48i Daily Parliamentary Debates January 27 1978 Official Verbatim Reports of the Debates of the Fifth Session of the Third National Assembly (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1978), p.642.}

However, the economic problems that bedeviled the Zambian economy following the border closure should also be seen in the wider context of waning global economic fortunes engendered by an oil crisis and sharp fluctuations of copper prices on the world market. The period after the border closure witnessed a drastic and prolonged fall in copper prices, the lowest since the Rhodesian crisis. This phenomenon considerably reduced the government revenue base from K339.2 million in 1974 to zero in 1977.\footnote{Mwanakatwe, ‘Budget Address’ Zambia Hansard No.48i, p.637. See further Ministerial Statement by J. Mwanakatwe, Minister of Finance, ‘Budget Deficit, Balance of Payments and the Mining Industry’ Republic of Zambia No.48kk Daily Parliamentary Debates Friday 17 March, 1978 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Fifth Session of the Third National Assembly,(Lusaka: Government Printer,19780, p.3298.} This created serious budgetary and balance of payments problems for the Zambian government. Thus, the economic problems precipitated by the border closure were also compounded by the global economic recession. However, as will be shown later in this chapter, Zambia’s economy remained
vulnerable mainly because of the sustained bombing campaign of Zambian bridges by the Rhodesian armed forces in the late 1970s.

**Disaster, Death and Destruction: Rhodesian Armed Attacks on Zambia**

As shown in Chapter 3, after the failure of constitutional negotiations between African nationalists and the Rhodesian government in August 1975 at Victoria Falls and the following year in October at Geneva, there was an escalation of the guerrilla war. The immediate background to the intensification of the liberation war was the creation of ZIPA in November 1975 by Frontline leaders Machel, Nyerere and Kaunda. Following Machel’s announcement of the closure of his country’s border with Rhodesia and the imposition of sanctions against it, ZIPA opened a “third-front” from Mozambique and stepped up guerrilla attacks against the Rhodesian forces. Meanwhile, as already noted, ZIPRA, the armed wing of ZAPU, also began to infiltrate armed bands of guerrilla fighters across the Zambezi on an increasing scale, and this was made possible by the upsurge in shipment of duty free weapons from the Soviet Union.875

The escalation of guerrilla war inside Rhodesia prompted the Rhodesian army to mount direct military operations against countries suspected of harbouring guerrilla fighters. Except for Tanzania—Zambia and Mozambique and, to a lesser extent Botswana and Angola—became victims of direct military aggression by Rhodesian Security Forces. The attacks caused a colossal amount of damage to infrastructure and deaths to hundreds of Zimbabwean refugees and ordinary citizens and the military personnel of host countries. This section investigates Rhodesian armed attacks against Zambia and examines their significance.

875 See Chapter 3.
Although prior to 1976, Rhodesian military air raids on ZAPU combatants were limited to and largely confined within Rhodesia where sporadic clashes often took place between security forces and the guerrillas, later Rhodesian military operations involved pre-emptive strikes against guerrilla bases and training camps in Zambia. This was because the Rhodesian army devised a new military doctrine known as “hot pursuit” which involved pursuing guerrillas across international borders and striking them in their safe havens. At the centre of these “hot pursuit” operations was the Selous Scouts—a crack special unit within the Rhodesian army, specialised in counter-insurgency. Just as the Israeli Defence Forces employed “hot pursuit” operations against Palestinian militants, the Rhodesian Army used it as a legitimate act of self defence. The objective was to destroy and disrupt ZAPU’s communication and command centre, thus degrading its ability to mount guerrilla incursions across the border from Zambia into Rhodesia.

**Air Strikes on ZAPU Guerrilla Camps**

Between 1977 and 1979, there was a marked increase in the scale of Rhodesian military operations against Zambia. In a Ministerial Statement to Parliament, Prime Minister Mainza Chona revealed that in 1977 alone, there were more than one hundred border incidents instigated by the Rhodesian government against Zambia as follows:

(a) Attacks .............................45  
(b) Violation by air .........................36  
   Violation by water ....................13  
(c) Kidnappings ..........................2  
(d) Landmines .............................8

The foregoing statistics not only reflected the intensification of guerrilla war, but also

---

876 For a thorough study of the evolution and operations of the Selous Scouts, see Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War*, pp.124-160.  
underlined increased Rhodesian military activities against Zambia. The Rhodesian Security Forces frequently violated Zambian sovereignty and territorial integrity and mounted several air and ground assaults against suspected ZAPU guerrilla bases, refugee camps and residential areas, killing many Zimbabwean refugees and combatants. The integration of Zimbabwean refugees among Zambians inevitably meant that ordinary Zambians inadvertently became victims of Rhodesian air strikes. However, occasionally, Zambian military personnel were also killed trying to repel Rhodesian attacks.

The first major attack on a ZAPU guerrilla base in Zambia by the Rhodesian Armed Forces took place on 21 August 1977 in Luangwa District. The raid left 5 people dead and several injured. The following month, Rhodesian Security Forces carried two similar raids in the same area of Luangwa District killing an undisclosed number of people and injuring several others.879 Again in March 1978, Rhodesian soldiers killed two Zambian civilians in Livingstone in an ambush.880

**Attack on Kavalamanja**

About ten days later, Kaunda revealed that twenty-two Zambians—ten soldiers and twelve civilians—died, while 44 were injured and two were unaccounted for when Rhodesian troops invaded Kavalamanja village in Luangwa District.881 Located at the confluence of the Zambezi and Luangwa rivers about eight kilometres from Luangwa town, Henrik Ellert, a former head of section of the Rhodesian intelligence, described Kavalamanja as an important forward base for ZIPRA fighters. Prior to the attack on Kavalamanja by Rhodesian Security Forces, ZIPRA forces opened a new front by crossing

---

880 *Times of Zambia* 2 March 1978
the Zambezi River near Kanyemba and moving into the Sipolilo [the colonial name used to be ‘Sipulilo’ clearly misspelt in the source. sic] and Magondi District of Mashonaland, launched attacks against Rhodesian Security Forces. As a response to guerrilla attacks in Mashonaland, Rhodesian Security Forces raided Kavalamanja using Hawker Hunters after weeks of reconnaissance work by Captain Chris Schelenberg of the Selous Scouts.\textsuperscript{882} According to Ellert, the Rhodesian Air Force surrounded the base at night and at dawn raided it. Fleeing guerrillas were shot as they fled from the bombed camp.\textsuperscript{883} However, the Zambian government official account suggests Rhodesian Security Forces attacked ordinary villagers at Kavalamanja using approximately 10 fighter aircraft and close to 7 helicopters of the size of Chinooks carrying almost 200 commandos and paratroopers. Without mentioning any guerrilla casualties, the Zambian account portrayed Zambian Security Forces as having repelled Rhodesian attacks: they shot down 8 enemy aircraft, some of which fell inside the country during a battle that raged for 72 hours.\textsuperscript{884} As will be shown later in the chapter, such conflicting interpretation of events, especially exaggerating or downplaying the actual numbers of victims of military conflicts served various purposes for the Rhodesian and Zambian governments, and nationalist movements alike.

Rhodesian raids on suspected guerrilla bases continued unabated. For instance in November 1978, Rhodesian planes bombed and strafed a ZAPU guerrilla base four kilometres west of Lusaka, killing six refugees and injuring a few others.\textsuperscript{885} On 24 February 1979, a government spokesman announced that Rhodesian jet bombers twice strafed a ZAPU refugee camp 40 kilometres south-west of Lusaka near Nampundwe Mine, killing an

\textsuperscript{882}Ellert, \textit{The Rhodesian Front War}, p.74.
\textsuperscript{883}Ellert, \textit{The Rhodesian Front War}, p.74.
\textsuperscript{885}\textit{Times of Zambia} 3 November 1978.
unknown number of refugees and wounding hundreds.\textsuperscript{886} Two days later, six Zambians were killed when Rhodesian jets bombed a farm house west of Lusaka.\textsuperscript{887} The following month, Rhodesian jets violated Zambian air space and bombed a village in Siavonga in which five women were killed and five others sustained serious injuries.\textsuperscript{888} Again on 11 April, Rhodesian war planes bombed three ZAPU refugee areas around Lusaka, killing one person, injuring six and destroying three houses.\textsuperscript{889} Two days later, Kaunda disclosed that 136 refugees were killed and 200 others seriously injured when Rhodesian jets dropped Napalm bombs on a camp in Solwezi.\textsuperscript{890}

In mid-April, Rhodesian commandos raided the heart of Lusaka, attacked and demolished the home of Patriotic Front co-leader, Joshua Nkomo, situated near State House, Kaunda’s official residence.\textsuperscript{891} The attack, described by Henrik Ellert as a “special mission” designed to “assassinate” or capture Nkomo by the Rhodesian Special Air Services (SAS) was a product of much ground intelligence work carried out on behalf of SAS by Michael Borlace, a member of the Selous Scouts who had been recruited for the job by the commander of that unit, colonel Ron Reid-Daly.\textsuperscript{892} The Rhodesian Security Forces failed to assassinate or capture Nkomo because, according to Hugh Macmillan, he had received intelligence about the impending attack and left the building before the raid and plausibly took refuge with Kaunda at State House or in the tunnels that had been built for Kaunda’s escape from it.\textsuperscript{893} Rhodesian raids against ZAPU targets continued. In June 1979, for

\textsuperscript{886}Times of Zambia 24 February 1979.
\textsuperscript{887}Times of Zambia 26 February 1979.
\textsuperscript{888}Times of Zambia 7 March 1979.
\textsuperscript{889}Times of Zambia 11 April 1979.
\textsuperscript{890}Times of Zambia 13 April 1979.
\textsuperscript{891}Times of Zambia 14 April 1979, see also Smith, The Great Betrayal, p.295.
\textsuperscript{892}Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, p.78.
\textsuperscript{893}Macmillan, The Lusaka Years, p.128. The escape tunnels at State House were built in the 1970s by Simon Zukas’ engineering firm. Joseph Nyaywa, a structural engineer working for Zukas’ company supervised the
instance, Rhodesian troops launched a combined air and ground attack against ZAPU’s intelligence headquarters in Lusaka’s Roma Township in which 20 people died and 30 others were injured.\textsuperscript{894} On 5 November 1979, it was reported that three Zambians were among at least 50 Patriotic Front combatants killed when Rhodesian warplanes bombed a ZAPU guerrilla camp in Chief Simwatachela area in Kalomo, southern Province.\textsuperscript{895}

‘Freedom Camp’ and Mkushi Raids

Although Rhodesian armed forces carried out many attacks on ZAPU guerrilla bases and refugee camps in Zambia, the most devastating ones took place in October 1978 at Chikumbi (also known as ‘Freedom Camp’ by ZAPU), approximately 20 kilometres from Lusaka city and a training camp for girls at Mkushi in Central Province. The \textit{Times of Zambia} reported that at Freedom Camp and Mkushi, Rhodesian troops massacred approximately 400 refugees and injured 629 others while 92 were declared missing.\textsuperscript{896} A ZAPU source suggests that Freedom Camp was occupied by almost 3000 refugees out of whom 226 men were killed and 629 were injured, while out of 1606 young women at Mkushi Camp, more than 100 were killed.\textsuperscript{897} The Rhodesian raids at Chikumbi began on 21 October after Rhodesian Security Forces threatened to destroy the entire Zambian Air Force if Zambian authorities refused to comply with Rhodesian orders to ground all aircraft at the Lusaka International Airport while they carried out attacks on ZAPU camps. Smith recalled that:

There was that occasion in 1978 when our air force put an aircraft over Lusaka [international] airport, giving instructions to the control tower to delay all arrival and departures, particularly those of the Zambian air

\textsuperscript{894} \textit{Times of Zambia} 27 June 1979, see also Smith, \textit{Bitter Harvest}, p.295.
\textsuperscript{895} \textit{Times of Zambia} 5 November 1979, see also \textit{Zambia Daily Mail} 5 November 1979.
\textsuperscript{896} \textit{Times of Zambia} 21 October 1978.
\textsuperscript{897} \textit{Zimbabwe Review} Vol. 7 October-December (1978), see “Massacre of Zimbabwe Refugees.”
force, while aircraft bombed a nearby ZIPRA camp. The instructions—reinforced by a flight of Hunters circling the area—were all faithfully carried out until the operation was completed.898

While the Hawker Hunters and helicopter gunships were blasting Chikumbi, Rhodesian Security Forces secured a small airstrip at Rufunsa, about 140 miles east of Lusaka. They used this as their forward communications base for strikes at Mkushi. Approximately 31 Zambian soldiers were reported to have been killed in these attacks.899 Like Zambian official sources, ZAPU accounts insist that Chikumbi and Mkushi were occupied by Zimbabwe refugees undergoing training in various skills in preparation for their future role in independent Zimbabwe.900 However, other explanations suggest that, apart from accommodating refugees, Chikumbi camp also housed ZAPU’s main communication centre and, thus, its destruction prevented warnings from going out to other camps. According to a correspondent for *Africa Research Bulletin*, Nkomo was stocking up his arsenal as reports suggested that two months prior to the attacks, large consignments of weapons and ammunition including SAM-3 anti-aircraft missiles and surface-to-surface rocket launchers were shipped in along the TAZARA Railway.901

There is a measure of truth in both the western journalists’ accounts (as reported in the *Africa Research Bulletin*) and ZAPU nationalist interpretations. It is true that Chikumbi and Mkushi were ZAPU refugee camps occupied by noncombatants; they trained Zimbabweans in various skills including agricultural activities and construction, and as Terence Ranger observed, were certainly supported by the United Nations High

900 *Zimbabwe Review* Vol. 7 October-December (1978), see “Massacre of Zimbabwe Refugees.”
901 See the *Africa Research Bulletin* Vol.15 No.10 November (1978), p.5043B.
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organisations.\textsuperscript{902} However, it is plausible to suggest that the so-called refugee camps were also used for clandestine activities including conducting some forms of military training of ZIPRA cadres, though on a limited scale.\textsuperscript{903} It was not uncommon for liberation movements to conduct such clandestine activities in the course of prosecuting the liberation war. Despite producing cattle, maize and vegetables, the ANC of South Africa, for instance, clandestinely used Chongela, a developed commercial farm located in Chisamba area 40 kilometres north of Lusaka, to store arms and communication equipment and to keep some of their cadres out of sight of the authorities.\textsuperscript{904} Although Freedom Camp and Mkushi were genuine refugee centres, the Rhodesian government saw such camps as potential sites for recruiting and training ZIPRA fighters and thus, as legitimate targets for attacks by security forces.

Rhodesian airstrikes against suspected guerrilla bases and refugee camps were not limited to Zambia. They were part of a general pattern of Rhodesia’s military offensive employed against Front Line States for abetting and assisting infiltration of guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia. For instance, from 1976 onwards, Mozambique suffered numerous attacks by Rhodesian Security Forces for training ZANLA fighters and actively facilitating their infiltration into Rhodesia. The most lethal attack occurred in August 1976 when Rhodesian Armed Forces blasted a refugee camp at Nyadzonia in Barue District, Manica Province, killing 670 refugees and injuring another 500.\textsuperscript{905} Again in November 1977, Rhodesian armed forces raided two ZANLA camps; the first one was located near Chimoio on the road between Umtali (now Mutare) in Rhodesia and the port of Beira and

\textsuperscript{903} Interview with Mark Chona, Makeni, Lusaka 27 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{904} Macmillan, \textit{The Lusaka Years}, p.126.
\textsuperscript{905} \textit{Zimbabwe Review} August (1976), p.5, see also Chung, \textit{Re-living the Second Chimurenga}, pp.141-142.
which was regarded as the main operational headquarters of ZANLA. The second attack was on Tembue, a guerrilla holding camp north of the Zambezi River. On 28 November, Rhodesian authorities announced that Rhodesian Security Forces had killed more than 1200 armed men and wounded hundreds more in the two attacks. Fay Chung—a member of ZANU who actively organised for the party during the liberation struggle while in exile in Zambia and Mozambique—provides a different account. She suggests that at Chimoio, Rhodesian Security Forces attacked a school, killing only 85 people, 55 of whom were children, while among the dead, the majority were women, and more than 500 were wounded.

Botswana and Angola also experienced similar attacks although they were less frequent and on a minor scale compared to attacks which Zambia and Mozambique endured. For instance, Wazha Morapedi has documented that the most lethal attack by Rhodesian Security Forces on Botswana occurred on 28 February 1978 when a helicopter-borne assault killed fifteen Botswana soldiers and injured eight close to the Kazungula border. Two civilians also died in the attack. In February 1979, the Rhodesian Armed Forces carried out a long-range bombing mission into central Angola and raided a ZIPRA training facility near Luso, killing 147 guerrillas and left 570 more injured.

There are several conclusions to be drawn from Rhodesian armed attacks against Zambia. The first relates to the problem of verifying the actual figures of casualties. While Rhodesian raids admittedly resulted in many Zambian and Zimbabwean deaths, the actual

---

906 For a detailed (and sometimes graphic) account of the devastating Rhodesian military operations against refugee camps and ZANU guerrilla bases in Mozambique, see Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, pp.117-199.
number of those killed will perhaps never be known. This is partly because of the problem of exaggeration or downplaying of real statistics of victims common in military conflicts. For various reasons, official accounts of casualties in military conflicts generally tend to be unreliable. It is, thus, difficult to authenticate the actual number of fatalities based on official government sources such as state-owned and government-controlled newspapers, liberation movements’ publications or even military sources themselves.

Thus, for instance, the Rhodesian government sometimes deliberately exaggerated the number of “terrorists” killed during “self-defence operations” to project to the wider world, especially their sympathisers, that they were fighting a “legitimate terrorist war” with significant results. They usually downplayed the numbers of casualties suffered by their army to avoid appearing ineffective. The nationalists also had their own reasons for claiming that Rhodesian Security Forces were killing only “non-combatants” or “refugees” and not armed groups who were legitimate targets. By making such claims, Zimbabwean nationalists sought to portray the Rhodesian government as irresponsible, merciless, and callous for targeting “defenceless men, women and children.”

Thus, because of the use of propaganda by parties to military conflicts, relying on official sources to provide accurate figures or account of events often proves problematic and elusive.

The other issue was related to Zambia’s response to armed attacks on its territory by Rhodesian Security Forces. A key feature of Rhodesian military raids in Zambia is that they were often not surprise attacks. The Zambian government often anticipated the attacks even before they were carried out, although they did not know the actual time and target. This is because the Rhodesian military, for various reasons, had the audacity of sometimes

---

911 Except that in the case of Nyadzonia and Chimoio, there were independent verification exercises and photographic evidence to show bodies of women and children. It clearly was not all propaganda. Such massacres of refugees were not uncommon.
notifying Zambian Security Forces prior to launching air strikes.\textsuperscript{912} In some cases, the Zambian government received intelligence from the British government about the imminence of Rhodesian raids. While they were forewarned about the attacks, Zambian Defence Forces sometimes and surprisingly avoided direct confrontation with Rhodesian Armed Forces. Several reasons have been advanced to explain why Zambian Security Forces usually did not retaliate but seemingly remained “neutral” in the face of blatant violation of the country’s territorial integrity by Rhodesian Armed Forces during their military operations against suspected ZAPU targets. One interpretation is that Zambian Security Forces were militarily too weak to confront Rhodesian forces, that they were no match to the Rhodesian army which possessed superior fire power.\textsuperscript{913} Another interpretation, advanced by former Zambian military commanders disagrees with the first explanation. It suggests that although Zambian Defence Forces were inferior to the Rhodesian forces, they had developed capabilities of defending Zambian air space and even mounting retaliatory air strikes against Rhodesian towns including Salisbury (now Harare) and Bulawayo. The basis of this argument is that during this period, the Zambia Air Force (ZAF) acquired sophisticated air defence systems including fighter jets such as MiG 21 Interceptors capable of intercepting Rhodesian Canberra jet fighters.\textsuperscript{914}

A retired former Zambia Army Commander, Lieutenant General Gershom Sibamba emphasised that Zambian forces were always prepared to “hit-back” at Rhodesian forces except they never received orders from Kaunda, the Commander-in-Chief of the Zambia National Defence Forces (ZNDF).\textsuperscript{915} Similarly, a retired former Defence Secretary in the

\textsuperscript{912}Sibamba, \textit{The Zambia Army and I}, p.162.
\textsuperscript{913}Zulu interview cited and Chona interview cited.
\textsuperscript{914}Kazembe interview cited, see also Sibamba, \textit{The Zambia Army and I}, p.162.
\textsuperscript{915}Sibamba, \textit{The Zambia Army and I}, p.162. On 16 June 1976, President Kaunda unified the three armed wings—Zambia Army (ZA), Zambian Air Force (ZAF) and Zambia National Service (ZNS) under one
Zambia Army and Chief of Military Intelligence, Brigadier General Timothy Kazembe, recalled that, despite acquiring capabilities of retaliating against Rhodesian raids, the Zambian Defence Forces could not do so because military commanders understood and had “captured the vision of the political leadership” who emphasised the need to avoid being drawn into direct military conflict with the Rhodesian Armed Forces. This was meant to avert the possibility of internationalising the conflict which would ultimately delay Zimbabwe’s independence.  

There is some measure of truth in both interpretations. Zambian authorities were reluctant to retaliate and commit Zambian Defence Forces into direct military conflict with the Rhodesian forces partly because they recognised Zambia’s military weakness against its powerful southern neighbour. Kaunda articulated this view when asked why Zambia did not retaliate after Rhodesian Commandos raided ZAPU refugee camp at Chikumbi in October 1978: “If I bomb Bulawayo and Salisbury that will escalate the war. I will be committing suicide for Zambia.” Kaunda’s admission that he would be “committing suicide for Zambia” if he ordered retaliatory airstrikes against Rhodesian cities reflected Zambia’s weakness in the face of Rhodesian raids. However, there is also value in the explanation that Kaunda’s reluctance to order retaliatory military strikes on Rhodesia was driven by fear of escalating the armed conflict. His fear of internationalising the war was real and must be understood in context. Zimbabwe’s liberation war intensified during this period against the backdrop of the escalating Cold-War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. After the Angolan crisis during which the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened in  

command and designated as the Zambia National Defence Forces (ZNDF) in order to strengthen the country’s defence capabilities.  

916 Kazembe interview cited.  
support of MPLA and defeated a pro-western alliance,\textsuperscript{918} the possibility of drawing the USSR in support of ZAPU (and it was already receiving heavy weapons on an increased scale) in a full scale armed conflict with the Rhodesian government with its western backers was real. Kaunda feared that the possible degeneration of guerrilla war into full scale conventional armed conflict between Zambia and Rhodesia increasingly carried the risk of dragging the superpowers into direct military conflict.

**Rhodesian Military Strikes on Zambian Bridges**

Towards the latter part of 1979, Rhodesian Security Forces stepped up military operations in Zambia. However, the latest attacks were different in character, scale and purpose from previous raids on specific ZAPU guerrilla bases and refugee camps. The new attacks mainly targeted road and railway bridges. The attacks on Zambia’s vital economic targets resulted in colossal damage to the infrastructure worth millions of kwacha and imposed extra costs on the economy. Between October and November 1979, Zambia suffered a wave of bombing raids. Rhodesian Security Forces destroyed 12 road and railway bridges in Zambia. On 13 October the *Times of Zambia* reported that Zambia’s vital link to the sea was blown up by Rhodesian commandos who planted explosives on the railway and road bridges across Chambeshi River in Northern Province.\textsuperscript{919} The destruction of the railway bridge rendered TAZARA inoperative as the railway line was the only alternative access route to the sea via Tanzania. Apart from the Rhodesia Railway, the Benguela Railway line connecting Zambia with the port of Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean via Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC) was cut off in 1975 during the independence struggle in Angola. Since TAZARA became a major trade route carrying about 40 per cent of Zambia’s trade,

\textsuperscript{918} See Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{919} *Times of Zambia* 13 October 1979.
its destruction was a significant blow to Zambia’s import and export trade. After the attack, Zambia was forced to depend on the southern route controlled by the Rhodesian government for vital copper exports and imports of mining equipment, raw materials, fertilisers and foodstuffs.  

The road and railway bridges over the Chambeshi River were not the only ones destroyed by Rhodesian Security Forces. On 19 November, Rhodesian commandos blew up two road bridges near Rufunsa—160 kilometres east of Lusaka at Nchoncho and Chimyangulo along the Great East Road and a railway and road bridge at Kaleya near Mazabuka in Southern Province. Quoting eye witness accounts, the *Zambia Daily Mail* reported that at Kaleya—situated approximately 96 kilometres south of Lusaka and 12 kilometres south of Mazabuka—15 white Rhodesian commandos emerged from two helicopters, stopped all motorists, mounted two roadblocks five kilometres away on either side of the bridge, planted explosives at the bridge and blew it up. Before they disappeared, the soldiers killed a woman and a young child and robbed one charcoal burner of K500 in cash. Other accounts suggest that travelers from the area saw a dozen bodies in military uniforms around a bullet riddled vehicle near the bridge. It was not clear whether the dead men were Rhodesian soldiers or Zambian troops. However, it is unlikely the 12 dead bodies belonged to Rhodesian commandos, for the Zambian government would have publicised their killing as it was always eager to announce the capture or deaths of enemy soldiers. It is likely the dead soldiers were Zambian because official accounts often either downplayed or

---

921 *Times of Zambia* 19 November 1979, see also *Zambia Daily Mail* 20 November 1979.
completely blacked out the media concerning casualties of Zambian military personnel killed in combat.

The Rhodesian bombing campaign of Zambian bridges continued. On November 20 President Kaunda described as savage the blowing up of the Mkushi Bridge on the Great North Road in Mkushi District, Northern Province by Rhodesian commandos. The following day, the Zambia Daily Mail reported that a Rhodesian commando was killed and another injured in an exchange of gunfire with Zambian soldiers guarding Chongwe Bridge on the Great East Road, 42 kilometres east of Lusaka. About 30 commandos arrived in six helicopters marked in Zambian Army colours, dropped a shower of hand grenades and blew up the bridge before they fled the scene. Thousands of villagers abandoned their homes, and more than 1000 boys fled the Chongwe Secondary School, less than two miles from the bridge, and hid in the nearby bushes. However, during his announcement of the general mobilisation of armed forces for a “total war” with Rhodesia at a press conference in Lusaka on 20 November 1979, Kaunda emphasised that Zambia lost 7 members of the security forces and killed 21 Rhodesian commandos during an attack on Chongwe Bridge:

I have mentioned the wanton attack on … the boys who were guarding the bridge, Chongwe Bridge, east of Lusaka. The casualties are as follows: we lost seven of our boys—the Zambia National Service and one police officer in charge. The enemy has admitted to loosing 10 whites, and yet we know for certain that our boys killed 21. One of them … we have got here. As they say, they mentioned only 10 in their broadcast. They lost 21 …. But when they tell you they lost 10, they are cheating. Our boys killed 21 of them, 21 of them. Really I pay tribute to these gallant boys on behalf of the nation. This then is the test of the nation and, as I say, I put the nation on full alert.

---

924 Times of Zambia 20 November 1979.
926 The Times (London) 20 November 1979.
As shown earlier in the chapter, conflicting statements as above concerning actual numbers of people killed, highlighted an aspect that features prominently in military conflicts; the problem of propaganda in disseminating information on actual numbers of victims of armed conflict.

The destruction of Zambian rail and road bridges undermined the country’s economic stability; trade with the outside world was severely disrupted, while the government had to spend colossal amounts of money to repair or rebuild the bridges. Table 5:6 suggests the costs of repair were estimated at more than K14.5 million (almost US$ 19 million at the exchange rate of 1979).

| Table 5:6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Cost of Restoration of the Bridges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Rail Bridges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two bridges are on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway linking Zambia to the port of Dar-es-Salaam:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) The Chambeshi rail bridge in northern Zambia was blown up on 12 October 1979. The cost of restoration is estimated at 3 442 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) The Lunsemfwa rail bridge in central Zambia was blown up on 19 November 1979. The cost of restoration is estimated at 324 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Road Bridges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) On the road to between Mpika and Kasama in the northern province, the bridge over Chambeshi River was blown up on November 19 1979. The cost of restoration is estimated at 2 992,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) The road over the Lunsemfwa River at Mkushi on the Great North Road to Tanzania was blown up on 19 November 1979. The cost of restoration is estimated at 1 025 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) The Kaleya road bridge on the Lusaka-Livingstone road in the southern province was blown up on 19 November 1979. The cost of restoration is estimated at 1 020 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Three bridges along the Kafue-Chirundu road in central Zambia were blown up on 16 November 1979. The cost of restoration is estimated at 1 666 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) The Chongwe road bridge on the Great East Road linking Zambia and Malawi was blown up on 19 November 1979. The cost of restoration is estimated at 493 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Two road bridges near Rufunsa, also on the Great East Road, were blown up on 17 November 1979. The cost of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© University of Pretoria
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost (1979)</th>
<th>Cost (1980)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restoration is estimated at</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>115,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cost of restoration of all 11 bridges has been estimated at</td>
<td>11,058,751</td>
<td>14,171,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government has added 15% for preliminaries and general items</td>
<td>1,658,063</td>
<td>2,125,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12,711,814</td>
<td>16,297,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>14,618,586</td>
<td>18,741,778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although Hugh Macmillan argued that Rhodesian attacks against guerrilla bases in general and particularly Zambia’s strategic installations were seen as exploiting Zambia’s weakness, there is evidence to suggest there were wider motives for the attacks. Firstly, the military raids were part of Rhodesia’s strategy designed to disrupt Zambia’s communication and trade links with the outside world, weaken its economy and subsequently make it more dependent on Rhodesia. The ultimate objective was to coerce Zambian leaders to abandon their support for Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Secondly, the military raids were aimed at precluding ZAPU from launching a large-scale ground offensive against Rhodesian Security Forces. During the second half of 1979, ZAPU nationalist leaders embarked on a new policy known as a “Turning-Point Strategy” aimed at transforming ZIPRA’s guerrilla war into a full scale conventional war. The new strategy entailed recruitment and training of ZIPRA combatants on a massive scale. Thus, by the end of the year, ZAPU had amassed thousands of fully trained ZIPRA fighters in Zambia ready to march into Rhodesia and acquired heavy weaponry from the Soviet Union including armoured personnel carriers, battle tanks, aircrafts—vital pieces of military hardware necessary for conducting conventional warfare.

The Rhodesian Security Forces extracted information on ZAPU’s imminent large-
scale ground offensive from what Ian Smith portrayed as captured “terrorists.”

The military operations were also part of retaliatory measures meted against ZAPU for shooting down a second Air Rhodesia Viscount civilian aircraft in February 1979. However, the significance of Rhodesian military operations during this period is that they coincided with constitutional talks at Lancaster House in London between the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian Government. By destroying vital economic installations, the Rhodesian Government was putting pressure on the Zambian Government to force it to also apply pressure on the Patriotic Front to give more concessions during negotiations.

Conclusion

The chapter has shown that Zambia’s support for Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was at a great cost to the country’s economic and social stability. By hosting Zimbabwean nationalists, providing bases, facilitating shipment of arms and ammunition, and guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia, and accommodating thousands of ordinary Zimbabwean refugees, Zambia became a target of the Rhodesian Security Forces which periodically raided suspected guerrilla bases and refugee camps and other economic targets such as road and rail bridges. The objective was to compel Zambia to withdraw its support for the liberation war. Thus, Zambia paid a heavy price for supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation war. Economically, Zambia incurred huge financial costs as it initially responded to UDI; it faithfully supported UN sanctions against Rhodesia and embarked on a very costly exercise of establishing alternative transport routes and new sources of energy and electricity. The country’s diversification efforts were reinforced when the Rhodesian government closed the border with Zambia as punishment for facilitating guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia.

---

financial costs were also incurred as a result of the damage inflicted by Rhodesia’s bombing campaign of Zambian bridges, which were a critical part of the country’s economic infrastructure. Zambia spent colossal amounts of money to repair or rebuild the bridges. However, the price Zambia paid in supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation war was not only limited to the economy but was also paid in human terms. Hundreds of ordinary Zambians and military personnel, and Zimbabwean refugees died in Rhodesian military attacks against ZAPU guerrilla bases and refugee centres.
Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion

This study has shown that between 1964 and the latter part of 1979, the Zambian government led by Kaunda played a major role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. It consistently backed ZAPU and ZANU, the two leading liberation movements which waged an armed struggle against the Rhodesian government. However, Zambia’s decision to back the armed struggle in Zimbabwe and more generally in southern Africa did not take place in the vacuum. This study has established that Zambia’s decision was influenced by a number of international, regional and local factors. At the international level, the influence of Pan Africanism was evident. Pan Africanism promoted African unity and advocated complete eradication of colonialism from the African continent. For Zambian leaders, the country’s independence was closely linked with the independence of the rest of Africa. They interpreted Zambia’s independence as incomplete as long as colonialism and white minority rule continued to thrive in some parts of Africa. Another related factor was derived from the principles enunciated in the OAU Charter. Among other principles, the OAU Charter called for an unqualified pledge from all member countries to work for the total emancipation of the African territories that were still dependent. Upon joining the OAU in 1964, the Zambian government pledged to uphold the Charter of the continental body. In addition, the Zambian government was also influenced by the 1960 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Decolonisation which endorsed the principle of the right of all people to self-determination and independence.

Zambia’s geopolitical position was another crucial factor which influenced the government to back the armed struggle in Zimbabwe and southern Africa in general. At
independence, Zambia was surrounded by many countries either ruled by colonialists or
dominated by white minority governments. Except for Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi and
Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), countries such as Angola, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), Namibia (then South West Africa) and South Africa, were
hostile to Zambia and posed a serious threat to Zambia’s security and stability. Thus, the
Zambian government supported armed liberation struggles in these countries in order to
eliminate threats to national security and secure the country’s frontier with friendly
neighbours.

Another factor which influenced Zambia’s decision to back the armed struggle in
Zimbabwe and the region as a whole was Rhodesia’s UDI. For Zambian leaders, UDI was a
geo-political disaster which could not be tolerated and had to be eliminated by every means,
including armed struggle. UDI threatened to roll back the winds of decolonisation in
southern Africa. As Ackson Kanduza observed, the Zambian government was not prepared
to co-exist with UDI in Rhodesia and tolerate a minority regime that was determined to
confine Africans to perpetual oppression. The Zambian government was also influenced by
economic factors. Zambia’s economy in general and particularly transport routes for export
and import trade passed Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the fact that hostile states controlled Zambia’s trade routes
meant that its economy was vulnerable to pressure from white minority governments.
Zambia supported liberation struggles with the view of overthrowing hostile states and
replacing them with friendly black-ruled governments which would potentially secure the
country’s economic interests by safeguarding trade routes. Supporting liberation struggles
was, therefore, an attempt to secure Zambia’s long-term economic independence.

Another factor identified in this study which contributed to Zambia’s decision to
back the armed struggle in southern Africa was the philosophy of humanism. Introduced by Kaunda in 1967, humanism, among other principles, rejected and condemned all forms of exploitation, discrimination and racism. For Kaunda, humanism was incompatible with and diametrically opposed to discriminatory and racist policies pursued by white minority governments in southern Africa. Consequently, the Zambian government found moral justification to support armed struggles in Zimbabwe and southern Africa in general.

This study also examined the nature of Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. It has been shown that this role operated at two levels, namely, local and international. At the domestic level, the Zambian government hosted ZAPU and ZANU and their representatives on its territory. It also provided food, medicine and clothing for the rank and file of the two nationalist movements. Like other liberation movements in the region, ZAPU and ZANU were also given office space at the Liberation Centre in Lusaka and other facilities essential for organising publicity and the general day-to-day operations of the nationalist movements. Another crucial role played by Zambia was to collaborate with Tanzania in helping ZAPU and ZANU militants launch the armed struggle in Zimbabwe. As the study has established, Zambia played an active role as a member of the Action Team of the Committee of Five countries mandated by the Liberation Committee to coordinate efforts aimed at preparing African nationalists for armed struggle in Zimbabwe. Zambia, together with Tanzania, played a major role in establishing military training camps in that country for ZAPU and ZANU combatants.

The Zambian government also provided transit facilities for ZAPU and ZANU men and women who went for military training in Tanzania and beyond in Eastern Bloc countries such as the USSR, China and North Korea. The Zambian government also facilitated the infiltration of trained cadres into Rhodesia across the frontier at selected crossing points. As
this study emphasised, Zambia’s provision of transit facilities for Zimbabwean nationalists was crucial in view of the fact that other countries in the region, such as Malawi and Botswana, especially in the early stages, were reluctant to allow ZAPU and ZANU access transit facilities. Furthermore, another vital contribution Zambia made towards Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was to facilitate shipment of arms and ammunition from outside and within the country to the battlefront. Zambia’s role in this regard was crucial because few countries that claimed to support the armed struggle in Zimbabwe were prepared to accept the burden of shipping weapons across their territory because of security risks. In addition, the provision of broadcasting facilities to the liberation movements was another significant role played by Zambia in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. The study has shown that the use of Zambia Broadcasting Services, not only helped ZAPU and ZANU to publicise their struggle to Zimbabweans at home, but also served as a crucial tool for galvanising solidarity and recruitment of cadres.

Zambia’s contribution towards the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was also in the form of financial aid given to the liberation movements. The Zambian government provided direct financial assistance and other material support to the liberation movements. In most cases, it gave financial relief to the liberation movements by waving import duty on almost all items they imported including motor vehicles, equipment and other materials necessary for prosecuting the liberation struggle. However, the Zambian government also channeled financial aid to the liberation movements through the Liberation Committee, an organisation mandated by the OAU to distribute aid to the nationalist movements. As shown in Chapter2, throughout the period under study, Zambia always fulfilled its financial obligations to the Special Fund of the Liberation Committee, a clear demonstration of its commitment to the struggle for black majority rule in Zimbabwe and southern Africa as a whole.
As part of its humanitarian role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, the Zambian government also allowed thousands of ordinary Zimbabwean refugees fleeing the conflict zones to settle in the country. As Fay Chung observed, thousands of refugees sympathetic to ZANU settled in Mumbwa, an area west of Lusaka where they engaged in viable agricultural activities, including the production of maize which fed ZANLA soldiers at the front. To date, there is still a large presence of Zimbabweans living in Mumbwa and some other parts of the country who have since adopted Zambian citizenship. Some of these have established viable businesses in the country. To investigate how Zimbabwean refugees and freedom fighters settled and established themselves in Zambia as successful businessmen and women could be an area of future potential research.

In addition, the Zambian government facilitated scholarships for Zimbabweans to study at the University of Zambia and abroad. By providing education to Zimbabwean refugees, the Zambian government partly helped to build a cadre of educated Zimbabweans some of whom later occupied administrative positions in the civil service after Zimbabwe became independent.

This study has shown that Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was also expressed at the diplomatic front. At various international fora, such as the organisation of African unity, United Nations, Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement, among others, Zambian diplomats played a leading role in mobilising leaders of other countries to support policies aimed at promoting black majority rule in Zimbabwe. In order to achieve this objective, they routinely urged the international community to grant Zimbabwe nationalists leaders a hearing and extend recognition to the liberation movements. The result was that

932 Chung, *Reliving the Chimurenga War*, p.77.
933 Kapulu interview cited.
they helped to legitimise Zimbabwe’s armed struggle in the eyes of the world community, thereby attracting international solidarity and assistance for the liberation movements. In addition, Zambian leaders played an active role in formulating and influencing the nature of some of the collective statements, declarations and resolutions on the problem of white minority rule in Zimbabwe and southern Africa as a whole. The 1969 Lusaka Manifesto and the 1971 Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles were, among others, cases of collective resolutions with significant Zambian input.

Furthermore, the study has noted that at the UN, in particular, and despite strong opposition from Western powers, Zambian representatives often took a leading role in sponsoring resolutions calling on the international community to take effective measures against the Rhodesian government for denying Africans the right to self-determination. They consistently backed international economic sanctions designed to isolate the Rhodesian government and persistently applied diplomatic pressure on Britain to assume responsibility over its colony and urge it to accept the principles of black majority rule and self-governance.

In view of the divisions which characterised the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe, Zambian leaders did not relent in attempts to unify the leadership of the liberation movements. For instance, Kaunda led efforts by frontline leaders in urging Nkomo and Mugabe to unify their liberation movements under the Patriotic Front. He played an instrumental role in securing the Patriotic Front’s recognition by the OAU and the wider international community. The striking feature of Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was that the leadership employed what Mark Chona referred to as “dual
revolutionary tactics—war and diplomacy—to pressure the Rhodesian government to concede black majority rule. The Zambian government supported armed struggle only to an extent that it became a necessary instrument of coercing the Rhodesian government to the negotiating table. When the Rhodesian government showed signs of negotiating, the Zambian government always exercised influence on the liberation movements to halt hostilities and give a chance to negotiations. However, when the Rhodesian government remained intransigent, the Zambian government promptly reinvigorated its support for intensified armed struggle to pressure it back to the negotiating table. This explains why each time negotiations failed—as was the case at Victoria Falls and Geneva—there was almost immediately a resumption of escalating guerrilla war. Despite variations in Zambian tactics, the goal remained constant, namely, securing majority rule in Zimbabwe.

Another crucial conclusion to be drawn in this study is that, in pursing negotiations for the Rhodesian conflict, especially during détente, Kaunda was accused of undermining the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe in order to promote Zambia’s economic interests. Admittedly, Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle strained its economic stability which, in the mid-1970s, was also partly exacerbated by waning global economic fortunes precipitated by an oil crisis and sharp fluctuations of copper prices on the world market. However, this study rejects the notion advanced by Fay Chung and other scholars of similar persuasion that the Zambian government and particularly Kaunda wanted to stop armed struggle in Zimbabwe at all cost in order to promote détente. This study maintains, as available evidence suggests, that Zambia’s policy was not entirely based on securing a negotiated political settlement of the Rhodesian conflict at any cost. Zambian leaders and Kaunda in particular, only resorted to negotiations when it was convenient and when

934 Chona interview cited.
circumstances offered the best prospects for a genuine settlement. He readily reinvigorated his support for an intensified armed struggle once negotiations collapsed. However, what is clear from the study is that in pursuing negotiations, Kaunda sought to uphold Nkomo’s leadership of Zimbabwe, a move that infuriated Mugabe, the co-leader of the Patriotic Front as well as Nyerere and Machel, the other two prominent frontline leaders. Kaunda’s preference for Nkomo was not surprising especially because the two established a long-standing personal relationship dating back to Zambia’s pre-independence days.

Kaunda’s involvement in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was a complex undertaking particularly because there were several nationalist leaders competing for dominance of the nationalist movement. Consequently, Zambia’s moves were constantly under scrutiny. The conclusion must be that Kaunda’s fraternisation with Smith and Vorster, though misguided, did not in any way diminish his contribution to the independence struggle in Zimbabwe for which he made many personal and national sacrifices. If Kaunda did not take such a firm, unequivocal and resolute stand, if he did not host liberation movements of Zimbabwe and their guerrilla forces, the liberation of Zimbabwe, and more generally southern Africa, would have arguably been more difficult to achieve.935

The study has also demonstrated that Zambia’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was pursued at a great cost to the country’s economy and human life. Zambia paid a heavy price for backing armed struggle in Zimbabwe. Another related factor which imposed serious penalties on the economy was the fact that, despite expressing serious doubts about their efficacy in bringing down the Rhodesian government, the Zambian government devotedly supported international economic sanctions against it. For certainly, and as pessimists were proved right, sanctions turned out to hurt more the Zambian economy and

less the Rhodesian economy largely because western governments and the multinational oil companies frequently busted the sanctions through South Africa and Portuguese colonial territories in Mozambique and Angola, the two ardent supporters of the Rhodesian government in the region. The study has shown that the cost in Zambia of supporting international sanctions against Rhodesia was much more than international financial assistance received to defray the costs.

Furthermore, Rhodesian bombing raids on major Zambian road and railway bridges, especially towards the close of 1979 increased the pressure on the Zambian economy. This is because the Zambian government was forced to spend unbudgeted colossal amounts of money to repair and in some cases rebuild the bridges. Although the Zambian government received some international assistance for repairing or rebuilding damaged infrastructures, the opportunity costs to the economy were often high. More generally therefore, Zambia’s economy suffered huge problems because of government’s support for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The cost of diverting trade routes, supporting sanctions, repairing and rebuilding bridges destroyed by Rhodesian bombs severely strained the Zambian economy. The increase in prices of consumer goods brought about by shortages of essential commodities, as well as the rise in inflation precipitated a general rise in the cost of living for many ordinary Zambians.

Apart from the pressure imposed on the economy, Rhodesian armed attacks on suspected guerrilla bases in Zambia wreaked massive disaster, death and destruction to human life. Throughout the period under review, thousands of Zimbabwean refugees, Zambian military personnel and ordinary citizens died in Rhodesian raids. Armed raids on guerrilla targets in Zambia and other Front Line States such as Mozambique, Botswana and Angola were meant to intimidate the leadership to withdraw support for the liberation
struggle in Zimbabwe. However, the study has shown that despite these attacks, the Zambian government remained resolute and it saw the final liberation of Zimbabwe from white minority rule. Thus, the Zambian government made a lot of sacrifices and paid a high price for securing the independence of Zimbabwe.
## Appendix I

### Contributions from Member States 1965/1966 Received up to 31 May 1968 (All Figures in Pounds Sterling, Shs. and Pence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Amount Paid</th>
<th>Amount Unpaid</th>
<th>Excess Payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>£40,000</td>
<td>35,015/9/5</td>
<td>4,984/10/7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,471/15/7</td>
<td>1,528/4/5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>28,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>8,043/9/6</td>
<td>7,956/10/6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>199/14/1</td>
<td>15,800/5/11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>14,102/4/-</td>
<td>1,897/16/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>7,255/18/2</td>
<td>8,744/1/10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>2,143/-/-</td>
<td>13,857/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>17,989/19/3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,989/19/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>23,970/-/-</td>
<td>4,030/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>18,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,000/-/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>4,764/-/8</td>
<td>11,235/19/4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Republic (UAR)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>25,000/-/-</td>
<td>75,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix II

**Contributions from Member States 1966/1967 Received up to 31 May 1968 (All Figures in Pounds Sterling, Shs. and Pence)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Amount Paid</th>
<th>Amount Unpaid</th>
<th>Excess Payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>£40,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1,307/4/-</td>
<td>14,692/16/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>29,414/7/7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13,414/7/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>28,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>19,728/1/8</td>
<td>271/18/4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>17,977/10/-</td>
<td>20,022/10/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,188/2/8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>188/2/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>17,623/19/5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,623/19/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>31,960/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,960/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>7,201/19/4</td>
<td>8,798/-/8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>13,782/16/11</td>
<td>2,217/3/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>7,295/2/9</td>
<td>8,707/17/3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>42,000/-/-</td>
<td>42,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>19,767/14/9</td>
<td>232/5/3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>Amount Paid</td>
<td>Amount Unpaid</td>
<td>Excess Payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>£40,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>28,000/-/-</td>
<td>11,760/-/-</td>
<td>16,240/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>20,922/18/10</td>
<td>15,077/1/2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>15,997/7/9</td>
<td>2/12/3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Total Budget</td>
<td>Funds Received</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>7,320/4/-</td>
<td>8,679/16/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,921/11/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>921/11/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>8,391/5/4</td>
<td>7,608/15/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>591/15/6</td>
<td>83,408/4/6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,240/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>240/-/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>13,983/-/-11/</td>
<td>2,016/19/1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>7,093/-/-9</td>
<td>8,906/19/3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>2,530/3/-</td>
<td>13,469/17/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,000/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Republic (UAR)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>18,575/-/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,575/-/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968 O.A.U Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Standing Committee on Finance Executive Secretary's Report
## Appendix IV

**Contributions from Member States - 1968/1969 Received up to 30 November 1968 (All Figures in Pounds Sterling, Shs. Cents)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Amount Paid</th>
<th>Amount Unpaid</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>£40,000</td>
<td>£86,306/6/1</td>
<td>40,000/--</td>
<td>For 1968/9 and arrears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>18,090</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td>For 1968/9 and arrears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>28,000/--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>30,570/3/2</td>
<td>5,429/16/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>20,506/11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1968/9 and arrears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>7,401/1/5</td>
<td>8,598/18/7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,794/12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1968/9 and arrears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>£13,282/1/7</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>14,692/16/-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>14/15/3</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR)</td>
<td>14,000/-/-/</td>
<td>1,528/4/5</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>14,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>585/12/5</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>24,500/-/-/</td>
<td>28,000/-/-/</td>
<td>28,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,240/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>14,000/-/-/</td>
<td>7,956/10/6</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17,587/10/-</td>
<td>271/18/4</td>
<td>20,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>12,248/4/-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>16,065/-/-/</td>
<td>19,935/-/-/</td>
<td>18,020/10/-</td>
<td>15,077/1/2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>14,000/-/-/</td>
<td>15,800/5/11</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,877/6/2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2/12/3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,020/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>7,959/11/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,375/1/7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22,335/11/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,018/15/-</td>
<td>40/-/-/</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,058/15/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy</td>
<td>6,695/14/7</td>
<td>16,000/-/-/</td>
<td>8,798/-/8</td>
<td>8,679/16/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>14,000/-/-/</td>
<td>1,897/16/-</td>
<td>1,295/12/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17,193/8/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968 O.A.U Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Standing Committee on Finance Executive Secretary’s Report

Appendix V

Arrears of Contributions from Member States for the Years 1964/65 to 1968/69 (All Figures in Pounds Sterling, Shs. Pence)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>14,000/-</td>
<td>8,744/10</td>
<td>8,707/17</td>
<td>7,608/15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39,060/14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>14,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62,000/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>49,000/-</td>
<td>56,000/-</td>
<td>56,000/-</td>
<td>56,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>217,000/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,095/12</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46,095/12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84,000/-</td>
<td>42,000/-</td>
<td>83,408/4</td>
<td>209,408/4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>9,714/-</td>
<td>13,857/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55,571/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>10,331/15</td>
<td>20,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19,47/13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49,769/9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,010/16</td>
<td>240/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,250/16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>14,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>2,016/19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48,016/19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>24,500/-</td>
<td>4,039/-</td>
<td>13,018/15</td>
<td>28,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69,548/15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>13,368/5</td>
<td>11,235/19</td>
<td>13,809/4</td>
<td>13,469/17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51,882/6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17,500/-</td>
<td>20,000/-</td>
<td>20,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57,500/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62,000/-</td>
<td>100,000/-</td>
<td>100,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>262,500/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic (UAR)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>14,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>16,000/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62,000/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968 O.A.U Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Standing Committee on Finance Executive Secretary’s Report
Bibliography

I. Primary Sources

(a) Archival Sources

(i) National Archives of Zambia (NAZ)


NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) 15th Regular Session Dakar, Senegal 15 July 1969, see Memorandum submitted by the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Z.A.P.U), Dakar, Senegal 15 July 1969.


NAZMFA1/1/261 Loc. 532 OAU Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa see “Africa Freedom Day” by G. Chipampata.


dated 24 November 1966 and addressed to all Resident Secretaries, District Secretaries, Commissioner of Police and copied to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Secretaries, Ministry of Home Affairs by A.S Masiye, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President.

NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, See confidential (CAB(65) 18th Meeting 20 April 1965, Extract from Cabinet Minutes signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Item 4: Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties (CAB(65) 110).

NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, see memorandum by the President presented to the 18th Cabinet Meeting, 28 April 1965, Extract from Cabinet Minutes signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Item 4: Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties (CAB(65) 110).

NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, see letter dated 22 October 1965 and addressed to the Chief Representatives for ZAPU, MPLA, SWAPO, FRELIMO, ANC (S.A) COREMO ZANU PAC UPA AAC and UM, UDENAMO by G.K Barr, on behalf of the Permanent Secretary, Office of the President and copied to the permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and the Commissioner of Police.

NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, Letter from D.C Mulaisho, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President dated 28 June 1966 addressed to the Chief Representatives for ZAPU, MPLA, SWAPO, FRELIMO, ANC (S.A) COREMO, ZANU PAC (S.A) and AAC and UM.


NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967 See letter dated 13 May 1967 addressed to Mr. V. J Mwaanga, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President by G.S Magombe, Executive Secretary, OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Political Parties/Rhodesia, 1966-1969, see confidential letter dated 23 March addressed to the
Chief Representative, ZANU Office, Lusaka by L. P. Chihota, Chief Representative, ZANU office, Dar-es-Salaam.


NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969, Minutes of the First Regular Meeting of the Permanent Representatives to the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam Thursday 20 March, 1969.


NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organisation of African Unity Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966, see letter dated 17 December 1965 and addressed to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU by the Executive Secretary of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa together with a cover letter dated 5 January 1966 addressed to the Ministers of Foreign/External Affairs of all O.A.U Member States by the General Secretariat of the OAU in Addis Ababa.

NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)-Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969 See confidential letter dated 24 November 1966 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and copied to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services.
NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969 See confidential letter captioned “Granting of Broadcasting Facilities” dated 3 December 1966 addressed to the Publicity Chief, ZANU, Lusaka by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and copied to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services, Lusaka.

NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969, OAU Coordinating Committee for the liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) 15th Regular Session Memorandum Submitted by the South West People’s Organisation (SWAPO) Dakar, Senegal, 15 July 1969.


NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969 see Cabinet Memo No. 26 CAB. 3/65 Signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, 14/09/65.


NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968 O.A.U Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Standing Committee on Finance Executive Secretary’s Report.

NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organisation of African Unity Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966, see “confidential” letter dated 28 September 1966 addressed to the Zambia High Commissioner to Tanzania by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969 see Organization of African Unity Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) Report of the Executive Secretary to the Fourteenth Session of the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-e-salaam, 8 February 1969.


NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968, Zimbabwe National Union Supplementary Information, 6 May 1965 signed by S.V Mtambanengwe, Secretary for Pan-African and International Affairs and N.G Mukono, Secretary for Public Affairs and Director of Central Bureau of Information.


NAZMFA1/6/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967, see letter dated 11 April 1967 captioned “Establishment of a Camp for Zimbabwe Freedom Fighters” and addressed to Mr. I.R Mwajasho, Principle Secretary, Second Vice President’s Office, Dar-es-Salaam by Dr. M.S Sami, Secretary, Committee of Five.

NAZMFA1/6/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967, see letter dated 1 April 1967 addressed to the Secretary, O.A.U Action Committee, Dar-es-Salaam by L.P Chihota, Chief Representative ZANU Office, Dar-es-Salaam.
NAZMFA1/1/262 Loc. 532 OAU Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1968, see letter dated 23 October 1968 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs by E.M Mwamba, Zambia’s Acting Ambassador to Egypt together with a Memo submitted to the Member States of the Liberation Committee of the OAU by ZANU on 2 October 1968.


NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 O.A.U Committee of Five, 1967 See letter dated 13 May 1967 addressed to Mr. Vernon J. Mwaanga, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President by G.S Magombe, Executive Secretary, OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.


NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 Organization of African Unity Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966, see letter dated 17 December 1965 and addressed to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU by the Executive Secretary of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa together with a cover letter dated 5 January 1966 addressed to the Ministers of Foreign/External Affairs of all O.A.U Member States by the General Secretariat of the OAU in Addis Ababa.

NAZMFA1/1/176 Loc. 519 Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), Political Parties and Organizations/Rhodesia, 1966-1968, see letter dated 6 April 1966 addressed to the Parliamentary Secretary, Commonwealth Affairs by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services., see also another letter dated 18 March 1966 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services by the Director, Zambia Broadcasting Services.


NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)-Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969 See confidential letter captioned “Granting of Broadcasting Facilities” dated 3 December 1966 addressed to the Publicity Chief, ZANU, Lusaka by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and copied
to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Postal Services, Lusaka.


NAZMFA1/1/141 Loc. 515 UN General Assembly Twenty First Session, 1966, see Address to the United Nations by His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, Tuesday 15 November 1966.

NAZMFA1/1/141 Loc. 515 UN General Assembly Twenty-First Session, 1966 Address by the Hon. S.M Kapwepwe, M.P Zambia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of Zambia’s Delegation to the Twenty-First Session of the General Assembly, 1966.


NAZMFA1/1/70 Loc. 503 O.A.U Summit: Accra Conference, 1965, see letter dated 13 November 1966 addressed to Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of Zambia by his Excellency M. Leopold-Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal, Dakar, Senegal.

NAZMFA 1/1/38 Loc. 498 International Reaction to Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 1965.

NAZMFA1/1/69 Loc. 518 ‘Speech by the Vice President of the Republic of Zambia at the Emergency Commonwealth Heads of State Conference on Rhodesia, Lagos, 11January 1966.’

NAZ CO17/1/5 Loc. 6920 General Papers Prior to 1 May 1966., ‘His Excellency’s Address at the National Rally, Lusaka Saturday 23 October 1965.

NAZMFA1/1/359 Loc. 550 ‘Relations with the United Kingdom’ 1971.


NAZMFA1/1/28 Loc. 496 O.A.U Liberation Committee, 1964-1968 Memorandum Submitted to the African Liberation Committee at Moshi, Tanzania, Southern Rhodesia New Political Proposal by the Zimbabwe African National Union, 24 February signed by Michael Andrew Mawema, National Organizing Secretary for

© University of Pretoria
ZANU.


NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee 1969, see letter dated 9 December 1969 captioned “the April 1969 Lusaka Manifesto” addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Zambia’s High Commission, Nairobi Kenya by A.N. Chimuka, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee, 1969, see letter dated 28 October 1969 addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs by R.M. Kapangala, Acting High Commissioner to Kenya, Nairobi.


NAZCO17/1/5 Loc. 6920 General Papers prior to 1 May 1966, see ‘Final Communiqué’ Meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Lagos 1966.

(ii) United National Independence Party (UNIP) Political Archives


UNIP7/23/16 Heads of State Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Lusaka September 1970 NAC/CONF, see Resolutions 2, 3, 4 and 6.


UNIP7/23/50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence to and from Zambian Embassies
Abroad, 1975, see Statement by Mr. B. L Mapani to the Third Committee of the 30th Regular Session on the Importance of the Universal Realisation of Human Rights, New York, 10 October, 1975 with a cover letter dated 10 November 1975 addressed to the Hon Minister of Foreign Affairs by D.W Kamana, Zambia’s Permanent Representative to the UN.


UNIP/19/3 Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K.D Kaunda on the occasion of the opening of Third Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 8 September, 1970.


UNIP7/23/5 Foreign Affairs Statements, 1966 see ‘Confidential’ Background Paper on Zambia’s Views on the Rhodesian Situation to be submitted to the Commonwealth Conference.


UNIP8/4/9 Political, Constitutional, and Foreign Affairs Reports, 1975, see “Declaration of Intention to Negotiate a Settlement, Victoria Falls Bridge 25 August 1975.”


UNIP8/4/9 Political, Constitutional and Foreign Affairs Reports, 1975, see “ANC Press Statement.”

UNIP 7/23/53 Reports, 1975-78 “Speech by His Honour A.G Zulu, M.C.C, Secretary General of the Party at a Banquet in Honour of the Indian Vice President, New Delhi, 2September, 1975.

UNIP7/2/26 Contingency Planning Committee Reports, 1973, see “top secret’ Report by Mr. M.C Chona and Mr. L. M Lishomwa on International Assistance to Zambia, 26 May 1973.


UNIP8/4/13 Political, Constitutional, Legal and Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, 1976-1977 see Memorandum “Independence of Zimbabwe”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,


UNIP7/23/5 Foreign Affairs Statements 1966 ‘Speech by the Vice President of the Republic of Zambia at the Emergency Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia, 11 January 1966 “Embargoed Against Delivery.”

UNIP 7/19/5 Address to the National Assembly by Hon. A. Milner M.P, Secretary General to the Government, “Why UNZA was closed?” 20 July 1971.


UNIP1/3/6 Speeches by His Excellency the President ‘The Challenge of the Future’ Address to the UNIP National Council at Mulungushi Hall, 5-7 June 1973, Lusaka.

UNIP7/19/4 Speech by the Vice-President Mainza Chona at the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Government on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the OAU, 26 May 1973.

UNIP16/14/3 Speeches 1973, see His Excellency’s Speech Delivered to UNIP Leaders of Lusaka Region, 4 May 1973.

UNIP7/2/27 Reports 1977, “Secret” Letter from the Minister of Finance, John Mwanakatwe to His Excellency the President and copied to Minister of Defence, Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Education and Culture, Minister of Trade and Industry and the Secretary General to the Government, 23 February 1977.

UNIP6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters, see document “All ZAPU Secrets Revealed to the Smith Regime.”


UNIP 6/4/2 Southern Rhodesia Political Parties/News Letters, “ZAPU Cadres Point of View.”
UNIP7/23/52 Correspondence from Foreign Embassies, 1975-1976 see Daily American 20 November 1975 “Whites, Blacks said to reach agreement on Rhodesia Conflict.”


UNIP1/3/3 See Budget Address by His Honour the Vice President, Mr. S. M Kapwepwe., delivered to the National Assembly, 30 January 1969.

UNIP/7/2/25 Record of the Meeting Between Hon A.M. Milner, M.P, Secretary-General to the Government and his delegation and Hon. A. K. Banda, M.P, Malawian Minister of Transport and Communication and Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Blantyre, Thursday 22 February 1973.

UNIP7/2/26 Report on International Assistance to Zambia by Mr. M. C. Chona and Mr. L. M. Lishomwa, 26 March 1973.


UNIP7/2/25 DRAFT. Request for United Nations Assistance, Annexure VIII.
(b) Government Documents


(c) Parliamentary Debates


*Zambia Hansard No.5c* Daily Hansard Thursday 9 December 1965, Official Verbatim
Report of the Debates of the Second Session of the First National Assembly


(d) Oral Interviews


Interview with Sikota Wina Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia 27 September 2013.

Interview with Mark Chona Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia 27 June 2013.

Interview with Bautis Frank Kapulu, Makeni, Lusaka Zambia 10 June 2013.

Interview with Alexander Grey Zulu Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia 4 June 2013.

Interview with Mama Chibesa Kankasa Kabulonga, Lusaka, Zambia 3 June 2013.

Interview with Mark Chona Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia, 16 March 2009.

Interview with Wilfred Peter Matoka, University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia, 5 July 2007.


(e) Press Releases


Speech by Sir Ronald L. Prain OBE Chairman of the RST Group of Companies to the informal meeting of shareholders in New York 21 April 1969.

II. Secondary Sources

(i) Books


Chisala, Beatwell S. The Downfall of President Kaunda Lusaka: Co-op Printing, 1994.


Houser, G. M. *No One Can Stop the Rain: Glimpses of Africa’s Liberation Struggle* New


Morris, M. *Armed Conflict in Southern Africa: A Survey of Regional Terrorism from their Beginning to the Present with a Comprehensive Examination of the Portuguese


Phiri, B. J. *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the Third Republic*,


387


(ii) Journal Articles and Chapters in Books


Gifford, L. “The Liberation Struggle in Mozambique and the Outside World” in Stokke and


(iii) Periodicals

Africa Confidential No.20, October 15, 1965.

Africa Confidential No.6, March 18, 1966.


Africa Confidential No. 11, June 3, 1966.

Africa Confidential No. 12, September 9, 1966.

Africa Confidential No. 18, September 9, 1966.
Africa Confidential No. 23, November 25, 1966.

Africa Confidential No. 1, January 6 1967.

Africa Confidential No.9, April 28, 1967.

Africa Confidential No. 11, May 26, 1967.

Africa Confidential No. 17, August 18, 1967.

Africa Confidential No. 12, June 14, 1968.

Africa Confidential Vol. 12, No. 2 (1971).

Africa Confidential Vol. 12, No. 18 1971.


Africa Confidential Vol 18, No. 10 1977.

Africa Confidential Vol. 18, No. 21 1977.


394

© University of Pretoria


395

© University of Pretoria


(iv) Newspapers

Times of Zambia 29 July 1965.

Times of Zambia 12 November 1965.

Times of Zambia 20 December 1965.

Times of Zambia 13 July 1966.


Times of Zambia 23October 1970

Times of Zambia 18 February 1970

Times of Zambia 24 April 1970.


Times of Zambia April 23 1971

Times of Zambia 7 December 1976.

Times of Zambia 22 January 1977.
Times of Zambia 5 February 1977.
Times of Zambia 2 March 1978.
Times of Zambia 14 March 1978.
Times of Zambia 3 November 1978.
Times of Zambia 8 October 1978
Times of Zambia 15 October 1978.
Times of Zambia 21 October 1978.
Times of Zambia 7 March 1979.
Times of Zambia 11 April 1979.
Times of Zambia 13 April 1979.
Times of Zambia 14 April 1979.
Times of Zambia 5 November 1979.
Zambia Daily Mail 9 November 1979

Zambia Daily Mail 13 November 1979


Daily Nation (Nairobi) 20 November 1979.


The Times (London) 20 November 1979.

(v) Unpublished Secondary Sources

(a) Conference/Seminar Papers


Malama, Anthony Katulwende. ‘The Role of Students at the University of Zambia in the Social and Political Development of Zambia’ Undergraduate History Research Project, Department of History, January 2004.


(b) Dissertations and Theses


(c) Student Publications

*Voice of UNZA* No.1 August 1966.

*Voice of UNZA* No.2 October 1966.

*Voice of UNZA* November 1968.


*The University Observer: For Unity and Truth* 1, 3, 1971.


(d) ZAPU/ZANU Publications


Zimbabwe News Vol. 8, No. 3 1974.


Zimbabwe Review August 1976.


Zimbabwe News Vol. 7 No.9 September 1973


Zimbabwe News Vol. 9, No. 4 May-June 1977.

Zimbabwe Review No.6 January 1977.


The Zimbabwe People’s Voice Vol. 1, No. 68 1978.


(e) University of Zambia Special Collection (Speeches and Statements)


University of Zambia Library’s Special Collection Gov. Zam (02) 1971 Dear Mr. Vorster … Details of Exchanges between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa’

University of Zambia Special Collection Gov. Zam (02) 1975 Speech by Dr. K. D Kaunda on the Situation in Southern Africa, Commonwealth Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 30 April 1975.

University of Zambia Special Collection Gov. Zam (02) 8 August 1979 Zambia Cabinet Office Contingency Planning Secretariat “Why Zambia Re-opened the Southern Railway Route.”

401

© University of Pretoria
(f) Internet Sources

http://www.liberationafrica.se/intervstories/interviews/ebrahim/?by-name=1 Tor Sellstrom interview with Gora Ebrahim (PAC-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Member of the National Assembly) 22 July 1995, Harare, Zimbabwe, accessed on 18/05/2015 15:53 p.m.


http://www.rhodesia.nl/commsupp.htm Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political groups in Rhodesia accessed on 27/08/2012 at 11:03 a.m

http://www.rhodesia.nl/commsupp.htm Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political Groups in Rhodesia accessed on 27/08/2012 at 11:03 a.m.

http://www.chronology: Rhodesia UDI: Road to Settlement accessed on 21/01/2014 at 10:30hrs.


http://www.swapoparty.org/the_role_of_the_oau_liberation_committee.html accessed on 18/05/2015 See article “The Role of the OAU liberation Committee in the Southern African Liberation Struggles” by Paul T. Shipale


Arnold Raphail, “There are CIA Agents at UNZA-Lecturer” Times of Zambia 18 February 1976 in Select Material on the 1976 Events, Part 2: University of Zambia Political Activism